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FAIR USE AS A MATTER OF LAW
NED SNowt
Courts have recently abandoned the centuries-old practice of con-
struing fair use as an issue offact for the jury. Fair use now stands as an
issue of law for the judge. This change is threatening traditional con-
tours of copyright law that protect fair-use speech. Courts, then, must
reform their current construction offair use by returning to its origins-
fair use as a factual matter for the jury. Yet even if courts do construe
fair use as a matter offact, the question remains whether courts should
ever decide fair use as a matter of law. To answer this question, I exam-
ine whether appellate courts should ever review fair use under a de novo
standard and whether trial courts should ever decide fair use on sum-
mary judgment. I conclude that both appellate and trial courts should
decide fair use as a matter of law under specific circumstances: appel-
late courts should review constitutional findings under a de novo stand-
ard only where a bench trial occurs or where a jury verdict favors the
copyright holder; trial courts should rule on summary judgment only in
favor of fair users. In short, ruling as a matter of law must serve the
speech-protective function offair use. Fair use as a matter of law must
favor fair users.
INTRODUCTION
A few decades ago, courts rarely determined the issue of fair use as
a matter of law.' Upholding two centuries of common-law precedent,
courts recognized that the issue of fair use "raise[s] essentially factual
issues and . . . are normally questions for the jury."2 Even the "slightest
doubt" as to whether a use was fair precluded trial courts from ruling
summarily on the issue. 3 Likewise, appellate courts always deferred to
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas. I appreciate the helpful comments on
a previous draft of this article from Professors Eugene Volokh, Stephen Sheppard, Edward Lee, and
Laura Gasaway. I further acknowledge helpful comments by the participants at the Fourth Annual
Junior Scholars in Intellectual Property Workshop, held at Michigan State University College of
Law. Finally, I am grateful for the excellent work of my research assistant, Michael Thompson.
I. E.g., DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982) (reversing
district court's grant of summary judgment on the grounds that fair use raises "essentially factual
issues and . . . are normally questions for the jury"); see also Ned Snow, Judges Playing Jury: Con-
stitutional Conflicts in Deciding Fair Use on Summary Judgment, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 483, 518-
28(2010).
2. DC Comics, 696 F.2d at 28; Sayre v. Moore, (1785) 1 East 361, 362 (K.B.) (Lord Mans-
field, C.J.) ("In all these [copyright cases where defendant had altered underlying work], the ques-
tion of fact to come before a jury is, whether the alteration be colourable or not? ... [T]he jury will
decide whether it be a servile imitation or not."); Snow, supra note 1, at 518-22 (tracing history of
common law courts placing issue of fair use with jury).
3. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468,472-73 (2d Cir. 1946).
I
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trial findings on fair use, employing a clear error standard of review.
Fair use represented an issue of fact for the jury, not an issue of law for
the judge.
Today everything has changed. Most trial courts treat fair use as a
pure issue of law, so even where reasonable minds might disagree, the
judge determines the issue on summary judgment.6 Rarely does the issue
ever see a jury.7 And in reviewing a trial court's ruling on fair use, appel-
late courts usually rule as a matter of law, applying a de novo standard.'
For all practical purposes, fair use now stands as an issue of law for
judges to decide.' The change could not have been more blatant. It was
unnecessary, unsubstantiated, and unconstitutional.' 0
In previous work, I argued that fair use should be construed as a fact
issue for the jury." Both the Constitution and sound policy, I argued,
mandate that fair use return to its factual origins.12 Unsurprisingly, my
argument was met with skepticism. 3 Commentators raised questions
about the seeming implications of denying judges the opportunity to de-
cide fair use as a matter of law: Doesn't my argument imply that I am
also proposing to do away with de novo review?' 4 Wouldn't this mean
4. See, e.g., MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981) ("Since the issue of fair
use is one of fact, the clearly erroneous standard of review is appropriate." (citations omitted));
Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publ'ns, Inc., 246 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 1957).
5. See Snow, supra note 1, at 518-28.
6. E.g., Castle Rock Ent'mt v. Carol Publ'g Grp., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260, 272 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (deciding fair use on summary judgment despite recognizing that the reasonableness of con-
trary inferences which made the court's "decision a difficult one"), affd, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir.
1998); Television Digest, Inc. v. U.S. Tel. Ass'n, 841 F. Supp. 5, 9 (D.D.C. 1993) (rejecting argu-
ment that fair use may not be decided on motion for summary judgment); see also Snow, supra note
1, at 532-35.
7. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 387 F.3d 403, 410-11 (5th Cir.
2004) (upholding jury verdict on issue of fair use).
8. See, e.g., Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriffs Dept., 447 F.3d 769, 777 (9th Cir. 2006)
("We also review de novo the district court's finding of fair use under the Copyright Act . . . .");
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2003) (declaring that a district court's finding
of fair use is reviewed under a de novo standard, and that this review entails balancing the four fair-
use factors); Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1999)
("[W]e review the district court's rejection of a fair-use defense de novo, although we will uphold its
subsidiary findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous."). However, in a relatively few instanc-
es, some appellate decisions have continued to apply a clear error standard where a jury has deter-
mined the issue. See, e.g., Compaq, 387 F.3d at 410-11; Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings,
Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 277-78 (6th Cir. 2009).
9. See L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int'l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 1998)
(interpreting caselaw as "rejecting [the] argument that fair use is appropriate for determination by
summary judgment only when no reasonable jury could have decided the question differently"
(citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Snow, supra note 1, at 532-35.
10. In another article, I explain the constitutional and policy reasons that demand judicial
construction of fair use as an issue of fact. See Snow, supra note 1, at 497-518, 544-55.
I. Id at 493-518.
12. Id. at 497-518, 544-55.
13. E.g., Ben Sheffier, Article Criticizes Deciding Fair Use on Summary Judgment; Gertner
Exhibited 'Class Favortism' Toward 'Large Corporations' in Fair Use Ruling, COPYRIGHTS &
CAMPAIGNS BLOG (Aug. 29, 2009, 9:55 AM),
http://copyrightsandcampaigns.blogspot.com/2009/08/article-criticizes-deciding-fair-use-on.html.
14. See id
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that appellate courts could no longer teach principles to clarify the ever-
muddled doctrine of fair use?" Wouldn't my proposal hurt fair users-
the party I'm trying to help-because it would deny them the ability to
prevail quickly on summary judgment, without incurring the cost of a
jury trial?l 6 These and other genuine questions seemed to plague the ar-
gument that fair use should be construed as it had been for two centu-
ries-as a factual matter for the jury.
In this Article, I take up these questions surrounding whether fair
use may ever be decided as a matter of law, even while construing it as a
matter of fact. I discuss the implications of classifying fair use in the
context of appellate review and motions for summary judgment, consid-
ering the effect on speech interests of fair users and copyright holders,
along with policy considerations regarding certainty and fairness. I ulti-
mately conclude that the factual classification of fair use for a jury does
not preclude a court from deciding the issue as a matter of law under de
novo review or on summary judgment, but only in specific circumstanc-
es. I propose that the standard of review should always favor fair users,
such that de novo should govern where copyright holders prevail at trial,
whereas clear error should govern where fair users prevail. I further pro-
pose that at trial, judges should rule on summary judgment only in favor
of fair users; they should rule for copyright holders on summary judg-
ment in the rarest of circumstances, if at all. I thus propose a double
standard of review and a one-sided application of summary judgment-
all favoring the defendant fair user.
Part I briefly provides a background of fair use and defines the is-
sues under consideration in the fair-use analysis-inferences that arise
from applying legal principles to historical facts. Part 11 sets forth the
history that both contravenes and resulted in the present mistaken state of
the law. Parts III and IV set forth my proposal to undo this mistake. Both
Parts rely on the fundamental premise that fair use should be a factual
matter, and this premise I examine in my previous article.' 7 Part III ad-
dresses the implications of that premise for appellate courts and Part IV
for trial courts.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND OF FAIR USE
As a limit on copyright, the doctrine of fair use protects those per-
sons who use another's expression without permission but in a fair man-
15. See email from Eugene Volokh, Gary T. Schwartz Professor of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law,
to Ned Snow, Assoc. Professor of Law, University of Ark. Sch. of Law (April 16, 2010, 18:39 CST)
(on file with author) (questioning whether it is wise to construe fair use as a factual jury issue given
that it would result in less predictability in the law).
16. I thank Professor Ed Lee, Director of the Program in Intellectual Property Law at Chica-
go-Kent College of Law, for this good question, which he brought to my attention at the Fourth
Annual Junior Scholars in Intellectual Property Workshop.
17. Snow, supra note 1, at 497-554.
32011]
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ner.' Deciding what is fair can be difficult and complex, often turning
on circumstances unique to each case.' 9 Fair use thus lacks a precise def-
inition or test that would fit all situations: it is instead intended to be flex-
ible, able to contemplate all factual circumstances that could possibly
20
justify a particular use of the expression.
Owing to the absence of a precise definition or test, the doctrine of
fair use follows general principles that guide the analysis of determining
fairness. 2' The Federal Copyright Act sets forth four factors that reflect
common law principles of fair use that have arisen over two hundred
years ofjudicial consideration.22 The four factors are non-exhaustive and
discretionary in application: any one factor may weigh more heavily than
another, and other factors not listed in the Act may be considered as
well.23 The first factor examines the purpose and character of the use,
which usually includes an examination into whether the use has trans-
formed the original work and whether the use serves a non-commercial
24purpose. The second factor examines the nature of the copyrighted
work:25 works of a more creative nature tend against a finding of fairness
26and works of a more factual nature tend toward a finding of fairness.
The third factor examines the amount and substantiality of the work
used.27 The fourth factor examines the effect that the use has on the value
of, or a potential market for, the copyrighted work.2 8
The legal principles underlying these four factors must be applied to
the factual circumstances of a case. Those factual circumstances courts
often label as historical facts, also called subsidiary or evidentiary facts.29
Applying the four factors to the historical facts produces inferences that
suggest whether a use is fair.30 All inferences must be weighed against
18. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
19. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 588 (1985) ("The
endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that can arise in particular cases
precludes the formulation of exact rules in the [fair-use] statute.").
20. See id.; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
21. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 576-78.
22. See 17 U.S.C. § 107. The Act does not specify who is to make this determination-judge
or jury.
23. Id.
24. Id. § 107(1); Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79.
25. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2).
26. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990).
27. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3).
28. Id. § 107(4).
29. See, e.g., Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir.
1999) (explaining that "subsidiary findings of fact" in fair-use analysis are to be reviewed for clear
error); Fitzgerald v. CBS Broad., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 2d 177, 183-84 (D. Mass. 2007) (drawing dis-
tinction between "historical facts" and interpretation of those facts in fair use analysis).
30. For instance, applying the first factor to the situation where a person copies excerpts from
an author's book for the purpose of critically reviewing the book yields a possible inference that the
copying has transformed the copied expression: the copier's critical analysis potentially casts the
copied expression in a new light, and thereby potentially transforms the copied expression. See 17
U.S.C. § 107 (listing criticism as example of fair use); Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592 (noting likely
fairness of critical review).
4 [Vol. 89:1
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each other, with the weight of any one inference depending on all other
inferences drawn.3 1 Together, these inferences must produce an affirma-
tive or negative answer to the question of fairness. The question of
whether a use is fair thus requires a person to apply legal principles to
factual circumstances, weigh the resultant inferences, and arrive at a sin-
gular determination.
II. HISTORY: FROM FACT TO LAW
The judicial change in classification of fair use from an issue of fact
to an issue of law is apparent only with a correct understanding of the
three-step process involved in the fair-use analysis. The first step is as-
certaining the evidentiary facts.3 2 Those evidentiary facts-also called
historical facts-comprise facts that speak to what actually happened.
They may be objectively determined directly from the evidence.34 For
instance, the following question raises an issue of evidentiary fact: What
use did the defendant make of the copyrighted expression ? Such ques-
tions indisputably lie within the domain of the jury as an issue of fact.
On this point, judges agree.
The second step in the fair-use analysis occurs when a person draws
inferences from the evidentiary facts. 38 When I refer to drawing infer-
ences, I mean the process of applying legal principles to evidentiary
facts, or in other words, making judgments that have legal significance.3 9
In the fair-use analysis, such inferences suggest the fairness or unfairness
of a use.4 0 For instance, the following questions require a person to draw
inferences from the underlying facts: Is the defendant's use of the copy-
righted expression transformative?; What is the nature of the copyright-
ed work?41 Both of these questions require the drawing of inferences
based on the evidentiary facts, as does each of the fair-use factors. This
31. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78, 590-91. In the example of copying excerpts from a book
for a critical review, see supra note 30, although that circumstance might yield an inference that the
use is transformative, that inference might not weigh much in the overall analysis if, for instance,
further inferences arose under the third and fourth factors that the copied portion constituted the
most substantial portion of the book and that consumers purchased the critical review as a substitute
for purchasing the original work. Cf Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 564-66 (1985) (rejecting argument that reporting newsworthy expression constituted fair use on
grounds that defendant used "heart" of copyrighted work).
32. See Snow, supra note 1, at 491-92.
33. See id.; see also Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc., 166 F.3d at 72; Fitzgerald, 491 F. Supp. 2d
at 183-84.
34. See Snow, supra note 1, at 492 (suggesting that fair use be judged based on the degree to
which it adds something new to the original work).
35. See id.
36. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.10[A]
(2011). (supporting the proposition that issues of historical fact are questions of fact for the jury).
37. See Snow, supra note 1, at 492-93.
38. See id. at 493-94 (discussing the resolution of inferences that arise during a fair-use
analysis).
39. See id at 494.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 493.
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process of inference drawing constitutes the second step of the fair-use
analysis.42
The third step occurs when a person weighs the inferences so as to
arrive at a negative or affirmative conclusion regarding whether the use
is fair.43 For instance, How much should the transformative nature of the
use weigh in the conclusion offairness? Each situation requires weighing
each inference on its own merits against all other inferences in the analy-
sis to reach a singular conclusion.44 Hence, the fairness (or unfairness) of
a particular use does not necessarily reflect the same weighing of infer-
ences as any other analysis.
Courts have treated the latter two steps in the analysis-the infer-
ences and their weighing-as raising the same sort of issues. Some
courts have treated both these steps as raising only issues of fact for the
jury, whereas other courts have treated both these steps as raising only
issues of law for the judge.4 5 The history of this disparate treatment of
the fair-use inferences and their weight I discuss in the sections below.46
For the sake of simplicity and brevity, in delineating this history I refer to
the inferences and their weighing as merely the issue of fair use. Techni-
cally, however, my reference to fair use goes to the process of drawing
inferences and the weighing of those inferences. I point this out only to
avoid potential confusion regarding the precise issues to which I am re-
ferring.
With this in mind, I turn to the history. Section A briefly discusses
the initial period where courts construed fair use as raising a factual is-
sue. Section B examines a pivotal point in the judicial change of constru-
ing fair use: two sentences from a Supreme Court opinion, Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises.4 7 In Section B, I conclude
that courts misinterpreted these sentences to arrive at the present charac-
terization of fair use as raising an issue of law.
A. Judicial Treatment over Two Hundred Years
Principles of fair use in copyright law trace back to English case
law that is over two-hundred years old.4 8 At that time, in copyright ac-
42. See id. at 491-94 (discussing the factual and legal nature of fair-use inferences).
43. See id. at 493-94 (explaining that fair-use inferences and the weight apportioned to each
determine whether a use is fair).
44. See id.
45. See id at 518-35 (comparing the judicial treatment of fair-use inferences as a questions of
fact or law by various courts).
46. See discussion infra Part II (tracing the history of fair-use inferences and their effect on
the fair-use analysis).
47. See 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
48. E.g., Cary v. Kearsley, (1802) 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 681 (K.B.) ("I shall address these
observations to the jury, leaving them to say, whether what so taken or supposed to be transmitted
from the plaintiffs book, was fairly done with a view of compiling a useful book, for the benefit of
the public, upon which there has been a totally new arrangement of such matter,-or taken coloura-
ble, merely with a view to steal the copy-right of the plaintiff?"). Many English cases involving
6 [Vol. 89:1
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tions arising in courts of law, judges would reserve for juries the question
of whether these principles applied. 49 That is, early English courts at
common law reserved the question of fairness for juries. In the United
States, early fair use cases arose only in equitable proceedings rather than
as actions at law.so As a result, judges could decide the issue of fair use
without thought as to whether it existed as an issue of law or fact."' Yet
even during those equitable proceedings,52 influential jurists such as Jus-
tice Joseph Story expressly recognized that, at common law, fair use
existed as a factual issue for the jury.53
Once the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures came into effect in
1938, fair use started arising in cases brought as actions at law.54 On the
heels of those first few cases, the Second Circuit clarified the factual
nature of the fair use issue.55 In Arnstein v. Porter,56 Judges Hand and
Frank held that cases involving issues about whether a defendant had
unlawfully appropriated a copyrighted work were especially inappropri-
ate to decide on summary judgment other than in the most extraordinary
circumstances, namely, those where there was not even "the slightest
doubt."57 Decided in 1946, Arnstein influenced judicial treatment of cop-
yright issues, including fair use, for decades to follow.58 Through the
1960s, fair use remained a factual question for which the jury was partic-
ularly well suited, and judges were particularly ill suited, to decide. 9 Fair
principles of fair use arose in courts of equity. WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN
COPYRIGHT LAw 3-26 (2d ed. 1995) (tracing the history of fair use). In equity, however, juries do
not decide issues of fact. I JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE: As
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 31, at 21 (12th ed. 1877); 2 id §§ 930-33, at 120-21.
So, those cases are not relevant in deciding whether English copyright cases treated the issue of
fairness as factual for a jury to determine.
49. Snow, supra note 1, at 518-22; see, e.g., Sayre v. Moore, (1785) 1 East 361, 362 (K.B.)
(Lord Mansfield, C.J.) ("In all these [copyright cases where defendant had altered underlying work],
the question of fact to come before a jury is, whether the alteration be colourable or not? ... [Tlhe
jury will decide whether it be a servile imitation or not.").
50. See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 34 F.2d 145, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) ("This is
a suit for the alleged infringement of a copyright, and the usual injunctive relief with an accounting
is prayed for." (emphasis added)), aff'd, 45 F.2d 199 (2d Cir. 1929); Snow, supra note 1, at 523-24
(explaining reasons that American copyright holders brought copyright suits in equity through mid
twentieth century).
51. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 2.6(2)
(1993).
52. See 2 STORY, supra note 48, §§ 930-33 at 120-21.
53. E.g., Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 623-24, (D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436) (Story, J.)
(deciding fair use in equitable proceeding, but characterizing the question of fair use as a "question
of fact to come to a jury").
54. See Snow, supra note 1, at 524.
55. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). Although the Arnstein court did
not specifically employ the words "fair use" to describe the issue of "permissible copying," the two
doctrines appear similar in substance, if not distinct in name only. See id. at 472-73. Furthermore,
the majority relied on the landmark fair use case of Folsom v. Marsh in its analysis. See id. at 472
n.18.
56. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
57. See id. at 468.
58. See Snow, supra note 1, at 526-28 (reciting the influence ofArnstein on fair-use caselaw).
59. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 677 (1st Cir. 1967) (relying
on Arnstein for the quoted proposition in a copyright suit); Armco Steel Corp. v. Realty Inv. Co.,
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use existed as a fact-intensive inquiry, where inferences in the analysis
raised issues of fact. Correspondingly, appellate courts applied a clear
error standard of review, deferring to trial court findings.o
During the 1970s and 1980s, some courts continued to adhere to the
Arnstein approach of refraining from deciding questions of fair use: trial
courts refrained from ruling as a matter of law on summary judgment,
and appellate courts continued to apply a clear error standard of review.6 1
Other courts, however, departed from the Arnstein approach: some trial
courts began deciding fair use as a matter of law on summary judgment
273 F.2d 483, 484 (8th Cir. 1960) (relying on Arnstein for the quoted proposition in a breach-of-
contract suit).
There were two exceptions recorded to this usual treatment during the 1960s. In Berlin v.
E. C. Publ'ns, Inc., the copyright holders of popular songs argued that the publishers of Mad Maga-
zine infringed their copyrights by publishing parodies of their songs. 219 F. Supp. 911, 913
(S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964). The court determined that the defendant's use
was fair as a matter of law, apparently because it believed that no reasonable jury could find other-
wise. Id. ("It is obvious that defendants' lyrics have little in common with plaintiffs' but meter and a
few words, except in two instances which will be discussed below. Defendants have created original,
ingenious lyrics on subjects completely dissimilar from those of plaintiffs' songs."). In Time Inc. v.
Bernard Geis Assocs., the copyright holder argued infringement based on the defendant's use of film
frames portraying President Kennedy's assassination. 293 F. Supp. 130, 144-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
The court determined that the defendant's use was fair as a matter of law. Id. In that instance, how-
ever, the court treated the issue as a pure matter of law, uninfluenced by the fact reasonable minds
might disagree. See id.
60. See MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[W]e may now review the
evidence to determine whether the district court's rejection of the fair-use defense was clearly erro-
neous. Since the issue of fair use is one of fact, the clearly erroneous standard of review is appropri-
ate." (citation omitted)); Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publ'ns, Inc., 246 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 1957)
("IT]he issue of fair use is a question of fact. We cannot say that the Master's finding in this respect
is clearly erroneous." (citation omitted)); see also Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Wag-Aero, Inc., 741 F.2d
925, 936 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., concurring) ("[C] lear error has been held to be the proper stand-
ard for reviewing determinations of most mixed questions of law and fact in intellectual-property
cases-such questions as similarity, copying, access, and fair use in copyright cases . . . ."(citations
omitted)). In at least one situation, an appellate court characterized the weighing of inferences as
raising a legal question, and so the court purported to apply a standard of review that was freer than
clear error. See Triangle Publ'ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1175 n.1 I
(5th Cir. 1980). The language of that appellate court implies that clear error is the appropriate stand-
ard of review in fair use cases:
We assume without deciding that a lower Court's finding that there was or was not fair
use is normally a finding of fact subject to the clearly erroneous rule of F.R.Civ.P. 52(a).
However, this Circuit has repeatedly made clear that the clearly erroneous rule does not
apply to findings made under an erroneous view of controlling legal principles. We be-
lieve that in viewing commercial motive as conclusive on the question of fair use, the
District Court incorrectly applied s 107. Accordingly, its finding of no fair use defense is
not subject to a clearly erroneous standard. Rather, we are more free to determine the
question of fair use. ... [And e]ven assuming the clearly erroneous standard is the appro-
priate one, we believe that the District Court's conclusion on the fair use question is in-
deed clearly erroneous.
Id. at 1175 & n. 11 (citations omitted).
61. See, e.g., DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982) ("The four
factors listed in Section 107 raise essentially factual issues and . . . are normally questions for the
jury."); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1071 (2d Cir. 1977) (reversing district court's grant of
summary judgment for defendants; stating that "whether or not there has been substantial use which
would deprive appellees of the fair use defense is a decision which must be made by the trier of fact
after all the evidence has been introduced"); Higgins v. Baker, 309 F. Supp. 635, 637 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) (relying on Professor Melville Nimmer's position that "the issue of 'fair use' presents ques-
tions of fact and thus should not be determined on a motion for summary judgment").
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where no reasonable juror could find otherwise. 62 Notably, several of
those courts admitted that summary judgment was usually inappropriate
for deciding fair use. Still other courts treated fair use as a pure issue of
law: in deciding fair use on summary judgment, some trial courts com-
pletely disregarded whether a reasonable jury could find otherwise;" on
appeal, some appellate courts applied a de novo standard.
By the 1990s, trial courts were routinely deciding fair use as a mat-
ter of law, and appellate courts were applying de novo review.66 No
longer did courts heed Arnstein's strong admonition that issues in copy-
right cases were particularly ill suited for judges to decide.67 And no
longer did courts rule as a matter of law only where they believed that no
reasonable jury could find otherwise.68 Fair use became a pure issue of
law for judges.6 9 It remains so today.o
62. See, e.g., Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., 431 F. Supp. 324,
326 (D. Iowa 1977) (finding on summary judgment that fair use could not apply, and noting that
evidence of fair use could lead to only one reasonable interpretation). Some courts were not always
clear on whether they were applying the no-reasonable-jury standard of summary judgment, or
alternatively, are treating the issue as a pure matter of law. See, e.g., Gardner v. Nizer, 391 F. Supp.
940,944 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
63. In Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., a district court granted a plaintiffs
motion for summary judgment where the defendant argued fair use. 663 F. Supp. 706, 709 (S.D.N.Y.
1987). Recognizing the law's preference for a jury to decide the issue, the Steinberg court explained
that because both parties had expressly waived their right to a jury and because none of the evidence
required assessing witness credibility, summary judgment was appropriate. Id. Under those circum-
stances, summary judgment would be indistinguishable from a bench trial. See also Quinto v. Legal
Times of Wash., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 554, 563 (D.D.C. 1981) (granting summary judgment for plain-
tiff and in so doing, noting that "[a]lthough courts are highly reluctant to grant motions for summary
judgment in copyright cases, this is an exceptional case in which summary judgment is appropriate"
(citation omitted)).
64. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 753-54, 757-58 (9th Cir. 1978)
(affirming summary judgment that denied fair use on grounds that substantiality of copying out-
weighed parodic nature of use, and reciting district court's view that issues for consideration on
summary judgment were "purely legal"); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 606 F.
Supp. 1526, 1531-32 (C.D. Cal. 1985), af'd, 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that summary
judgment of fair use is appropriate where parties do not dispute historical facts); Elsmere Music, Inc.
v. NBC, 482 F. Supp. 741, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (contemplating fair use on summary judgment;
stating that"[a]s no dispute exists as to the facts giving rise to this action, but only as to the legal
consequences, the Court believes this case to be appropriate for summary disposition").
65. See, e.g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The parties dispute only the
ultimate conclusions to be drawn from the admitted facts. Because these judgments are legal in
nature, we can make them without usurping the function of the jury." (citation omitted)).
66. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005,
156 U. PA. L. REv. 549, 554 (2008) (noting empirical trend demonstrating a "remarkable increase in
the prevalence of fair use summary judgment opinions that began in the mid-1990s and has contin-
ued to the present"); Snow, supra note 1, at 532-33.
67. See Snow, supra note 1, at 532-33.
68. See id.
69. See, e.g., Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1998) (ruling
for plaintiff on summary judgment, thereby reversing district court's grant of summary judgment for
defendant, and commenting that one of the factors in the fair-use analysis-the weighty factor of
market impact-posed "a very close question" but that "[o]n balance" that factor "tips" toward the
plaintiff on grounds that defendant failed to demonstrate "an absence" of a "potential" for market
harm); Television Digest, Inc. v. U.S. Tele. Ass'n, 841 F. Supp. 5, 9 (D.D.C. 1993) (expressly reject-
ing defendant's argument that a fair-use decision is improper on a motion for summary judgment);
see also Snow, supra note 1, at 531-33.
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B. The Misinterpretation ofHarper
Instrumental in the change of judicial treatment toward fair use
were two sentences in a 1985 Supreme Court decision, Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises.7 ' There the defendant had pub-
lished the copyright holder's memoirs of President Ford in a news maga-
zine.7 2 The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's bench trial judg-
ment that denied defendants' argument of fair use.73
Two sentences in the Harper Court's opinion have been misinter-
preted by appellate courts as suggesting a de novo standard of review.
The first sentence that led to confusion among courts was the following:
"Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact." 74 On the one hand, it is
understandable that the Harper Court labeled fair use as a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact: the inquiry necessitates applying legal principles to
factual circumstances. 5 On the other hand, courts had up to that point
usually labeled fair use as a question of fact. 6 By employing the label of
"mixed question," the Court had departed from the usual label that courts
had employed to describe fair use. The Court had created an ambiguity.
Unlike the prior label of "question of fact," 77 "mixed question" left open
the issue of whether the inferences that arise in applying the legal princi-
ples of fair use to the factual circumstances of a case should be treated as
70. See Snow, supra note 1, at 531. At least one court, however, has retained the factual
characteristic of fair use. In Harris v. San Jose Mercury News, the trial court explained:
Because the underlying facts are not in dispute, defendant contends that the Court should
weigh the fair use factors and determine whether the defense applies as a matter of law.
While the Court may analyze the factors and make a determination on this mixed ques-
tion of law and fact, the Court believes that inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts
are questions more appropriately resolved by a jury than a judge. Moreover, the Ninth
Circuit Model Jury Instructions includes an instruction for a fair use defense, which fur-
ther supports this conclusion.
No. C 04-05262 CRB, 2006 WL 995151, at *2 (N.D. Cal. April 10, 2006).
71. See 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985).
72. Id. at 541-42.
73. Id at 543, 569.
74. Id. at 560.
75. See Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977).
76. Prior to Harper, few courts had characterized fair use as presenting a mixed question of
fact and law. See Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1495 n.8 (1 1th Cir. 1984)); Meeropol,
417 F. Supp. at 1213, rev'd, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977). Notably, in 1984 Judge Posner stated in
dicta that fair use presents a mixed question of fact and law for which clear error is the proper stand-
ard of review. See Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Wag-Aero, Inc., 741 F.2d 925, 936 (7th Cir. 1984); see
also William Patry, Comment to Who is the Proper Decisionmaker on Questions of Fair Use-The
Judge or a Jury, EON (July 19, 2009, 9:41 PM), ("The characterization about fair use being a mixed
question of law and fact ... originated I believe with the I Ith [C]ircuit in one of its early Pacific &
Southern v. Duncan cases."), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/nesson/2009/07/20/summary-judgment-
morning-mail/.
77. See, e.g., Mathews Conveyor Co. v. PalmerBee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85 (6th Cir. 1943) ("As
fair use is to be determined by a consideration of all the evidence in the case, so, likewise, is the
question of infringement one of fact to be solved by a study of the evidence.").
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factual for the jury or legal for the judge, subject to clear error or de novo
78review.
In resolving this ambiguity, lower courts looked to the next sentence
of Harper:79 "Where the district court has found facts sufficient to evalu-
ate each of the statutory factors, an appellate court need not remand for
further factfinding . . . [but] may conclude as a matter of law that [the
challenged use] [does] not qualify as a fair use of the copyrighted
work.,,80
This sentence-which I refer to as the further-factfinding sen-
tence-became central in the judicial shift from classifying the infer-
ences in the fair-use analysis as raising questions of fact to questions of
law. As I discuss in the subsections below, the further-factfinding sen-
tence led courts to mistakenly interpret Harper as declaring that fair use
was a pure issue of law for judges to decide.
1. The Ninth Circuit's Mistaken Interpretation
One year after Harper, the Ninth Circuit in Fisher v. Dees8  misin-
terpreted the further-factfinding sentence to mean that the only elements
of the fair-use analysis that are treated as factual are the historical facts-
those which are evaluated under the legal principles of fair use. 82In
Fisher, the trial court had granted summary judgment for the fair user,
and on appeal, the copyright holder argued that the jury should have de-
cided the question of fair use, absent a finding that no reasonable jury
could have found otherwise. 83 The Ninth Circuit immediately rejected
this argument.8 4 It interpreted the further-factfinding sentence in Harper
78. 9C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2589, (3d ed. 1998) ("There is no uniform standard for reviewing mixed questions of law and
fact."). Often courts examine whether the inquiry is primarily factual or legal. See id.; see also, e.g.,
Uzdavines v. Weeks Marine, Inc., 418 F.3d 138, 143 (2d Cir. 2005) ( "[M]ixed questions of law and
fact [are reviewed] either de novo or under the clearly erroneous standard depending on whether the
question is predominantly legal or factual." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted));
Armstrong v. Comm'r, 15 F.3d 970, 973 (10th Cir. 1995) ("We review mixed questions under the
clearly erroneous or de novo standard, depending on whether the mixed question involves primarily
a factual inquiry or the consideration of legal principles."); Woods v. Boume Co., 60 F.3d 978, 991
(2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that in reviewing the mixed question of substantial similarity in the copy-
right context, the court reviews for clear error).
79. E.g., Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1998) (interpreting
the quoted two sentences of Harper as requiring de novo review); New Era Publ'ns Int'l., ApS v.
Carol Publ'g Grp., 904 F.2d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 1990) (relying on the quoted two sentences of Harper
to freely review issue of fair use).
80. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the internal quotations are omitted in the
above text, the Court quoted a portion of this sentence from Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d
1490, 1495 (11th Cir. 1984). For a discussion of how that decision employed the relevant language,
see infra note 99.
81. 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986).
82. Id. at 436.
83. Id. The defendant had composed a song entitled, "When Sonny Sniffs Glue," as a comedic
version of the copyright holder's song, "When Sunny Gets Blue." Id. at 434.
84. Id.
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to mean that the inferences in the analysis are legal in nature." Accord-
ing to the Ninth Circuit's interpretation, trial courts determine those in-
ferences as a matter of law86 and appellate courts review them de novo.87
That interpretation other courts soon adopted.8 8
The flawed nature of the Ninth Circuit's interpretation is evident
from the fact that the sentence refers to the process of drawing fair-use
inferences as a process of "further factfinding."89 The instruction that
courts "need not remand for further factfinding" means that appellate
courts could remand for further factfinding, but that they are not required
to do so.90 That is, the phrase "need not remand" implies that courts in
fact could remand, but that it is not necessary, and the phrase "for further
factfinding" demonstrates that if courts were to remand, the remand
would be "for further factfinding." That further factfinding on remand,
then, could not represent a finding of historical facts, i.e., facts "suffi-
cient to evaluate each of the statutory factors," for in the situation that the
Court posed, the trial court had already found the historical facts neces-
85. Id. at 436 ("The parties dispute only the ultimate conclusions to be drawn from the admit-
ted facts. Because, under Harper & Row, these judgments are legal in nature, we can make them
without usurping the function of the jury.").
86. Id. at 434; see also Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir.
2003) ("We recently noted as fair use is a mixed question of fact and law, so long as the record is
sufficient to evaluate each of the statutory factors, we may reweigh on appeal the inferences to be
drawn from that record." (internal quotation marks omitted)); L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television
Int'l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 1998) (interpreting caselaw as "rejecting [the] argument that
fair use is appropriate for determination by summary judgment only when no reasonable jury could
have decided the question differently"); Snow, supra note 1, at 531-33 (discussing cases where
courts treat fair use as pure question of law for judge). But see Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l. Ltd., 292
F.3d 512, 516 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) ("Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact, which
means that it may be resolved on summary judgment if a reasonable trier of fact could reach only
one conclusion-but not otherwise." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
87. See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 607 (2d Cir.
2006) (reviewing de novo fair-use finding); Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriffs Dept., 447 F.3d
769, 777 (9th Cir. 2006) ("We also review de novo the district court's finding of fair use under the
Copyright Act, a mixed question of law and fact."); Mattel, 353 F.3d at 799 ("We also review the
district court's finding of fair use under the Copyright Act, a mixed question of law and fact, by the
same de novo standard."); Castle Rock Entm't v. Carol Pub. Grp, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir.
1998) (reviewing de novo the four-factor analysis); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d
913, 918 (2d Cir. 1994) (relying on Harper for de novo review of fair use).
88. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 855 F. Supp. 905, 909
(E.D. Mich. 1994) (relying on Harper, 471 U.S. at 560, to deny fair use as a matter of law at sum-
mary judgment), affd, 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996); Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d 913, 918-32
(2d Cir.1994) (relying on Harper, 471 U.S. at 560, to engage in de novo review of fair-use analysis,
denying fair use); Fitzgerald v. CBS Broad., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 2d 177, 181, 183-84 (D. Mass. 2007)
(deciding issue of fair use on summary judgment for copyright holder on grounds that, according to
Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986), court may perform the fair-use analysis); see also
sources cited supra notes 86-87.
89. Despite the faulty reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Fisher, its holding is consistent with
the proposal of this Article. The Article proposes that trial courts should decide summary judgment
in favor of fair users, which the trial court did in Fisher, 794 F.2d at 434. See discussion infra Part
IV.A. The Article further proposes that an appellate court may affirm such a grant of summary
judgment under a clear error standard, yet in doing so, the appellate court may, if it so chooses,
articulate legal principles that guide the fair-use analysis as a matter of law. See discussion infra Part
Ill.C.2.b(l). The Ninth Circuit's ruling as a matter of law in Fisher, therefore, is consistent with the
proposal herein. Its reasoning for doing so, on the other hand, is not.
90. See Harper, 471 U.S. at 560.
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sary to perform the analysis.9' Further factfinding must correspond to
something other than the historical facts. And other than the historical
facts, the only determinations to be made in the analysis are the infer-
ences, so the further factfinding must correspond to the drawing of infer-
ences. Implicit in the further-factfinding sentence of Harper, then, is the
conclusion that the inferences in the analysis constitute a process of
factfinding.
In addition to the further-factfinding sentence of Harper, the con-
text of Harper also indicates that the Court did not intend for this sen-
tence to mean that fair-use inferences are legal in nature. Two centuries
of common law precedent had treated these inferences as questions of
fact for the jury.9 2 Just two years before Harper, the Second Circuit had
reversed a summary judgment decision on the grounds that fair use
"raise[s] essentially factual issues . . . [that] are normally questions for
the jury."9 3 Given the entrenched and active history of courts treating fair
use as a question of fact, it is unlikely that the Harper Court intended
through one sentence to affect the monumental change of treating fair
use as a question of law. The point was not even directly before the
Court. And the author of Harper, Justice O'Connor, is well known for
her adherence to common law precedent absent a showing of necessity.94
Hence, to interpret the further-factfinding sentence in Harper as suggest-
ing that the fair-use inferences should become legal in nature would be to
impute to the Court an intent to re-draw the line between fact and law,
which was patently absent.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit was simply wrong to interpret Harper as
holding that the inferences in the fair-use analysis represented pure issues
of law. Doing so affected an unintentional and historical change.
2. Possible Meanings of the Ambiguous Further-Factfinding
Sentence
The further-factfinding sentence in Harper, which the Ninth Circuit
erroneously interpreted, may connote one of two meanings. The first
meaning is that appellate courts may affirm a trial court's denial of fair
use without knowing the factual findings that the trial court relied on to
reach its judgment.95 According to usual appellate procedure, appellate
91. See id
92. See, e.g., Sayre v. Moore, (1785) 1 East 361, 362 (K.B.) (Lord Mansfield, C.J.) ("In all
these cases the question of fact to come before a jury is, whether the alteration be colourable or not?
. . . [Tihe jury will decide whether it be servile imitation or not."); Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615,
623-24 (D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436) (Story, J.); see also Snow, supra note 1, at 518-28 (outlining
two-hundred year history of courts treating fair use as factual issue for the jury).
93. DC Comics Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982).
94. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) ("[T]he very con-
cept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a
respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable." (citation omitted)).
95. See Snow, supra note 1, at 538-39.
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courts must vacate a trial judgment that fails to specify the factual find-
ings that support the trial court's judgment, remanding the case for the
trial court to articulate those findings.96 In Harper, the trial court had
failed to specify relevant factual findings in the fair-use analysis, so un-
der usual appellate procedure, it is arguable that the appellate court
should have remanded the case for the trial court to specify those find-
ings. 9 7 It is possible, then, that through the further-factfinding sentence,
the Harper Court was instructing appellate courts merely not to apply the
usual procedure. 9 8 The Court could have been instructing appellate courts
to affirm the trial judgment as a matter of law if the appellate court is
able to draw factual inferences supporting the judgment, despite the fact
that the trial court failed to specify those inferences as findings. 99 Stated
another way, if inferences exist that reasonably support the trial judg-
ment, an appellate court should affirm the judgment as a matter of law.
Under this interpretation, the Court's "as a matter of law" phrase would
apply only to the trial court's ultimate judgment. This interpretation fur-
ther suggests that appellate courts are to defer to the trial court's possible
findings of fact-a clear error standard of review.
The second possible meaning of the further-factfinding sentence is
that although the inferences in the fair-use analysis constitute findings of
fact, appellate courts may review those inferences de novo. As I explain
above, the Court's language implies that it was treating those inferences
as factual in nature when it referred to the process of drawing those in-
96. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 292 n.22 (1982) ("Where the trial court
fails to make findings, or to find on a material issue, and an appeal is taken, the appellate court will
normally vacate the judgment and remand the action for appropriate findings to be made." (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
97. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (S.D.N.Y.
1983). The extent of the trial court's fair-use analysis consisted of the following three sentences:
Assessing the "fair use" factors, I conclude here, too, that none of them provide The Na-
tion with the absolution it seeks. First, the article was published for profit. Second, the in-
fringed work was soon-to-be published. Third, The Nation took what was essentially the
heart of the book, and fourth, the effect of The Nation's extensive use of the Nixon par-
don material caused the Time agreement to be aborted and thus diminished the value of
the copyright.
Id. (footnotes omitted). These statements may or may not be an adequate analysis of the four factors
to support its ultimate judgment. This is a borderline case. By contrast, in Pacific & Southern Co. v.
Duncan-the case from which the Harper Court quoted the further fact-finding sentence-the trial
court had failed to engage in any analysis of the facts under the four factors. 744 F.2d 1490, 1495
(11th Cir. 1984).
98. See Snow, supra note 1, at 537-39.
99. This interpretation is consistent with the appellate decision from which the Harper Court
quoted the further fact-finding sentence. Pacific, 744 F.2d at 1495 ("Despite the district court's
erroneous interpretation of the law, we need not remand this case for further fact-finding. The dis-
trict court resolved all the issues of fact necessary for us to conclude as a matter of law that TV
News Clips' activities do not qualify as a fair use of the copyrighted work."). In Pacific, the district
court had failed to analyze any of the historical facts under the statutory factors. Id. The district court
had erroneously interpreted the Copyright Act as not requiring it to analyze the factual circumstances
under these factors. Id. In light of that erroneous interpretation, the district court failed to perform
"further fact-finding" that was necessary to support its judgment. See id. Nevertheless, the appellate
court appeared to believe that if it could draw inferences that supported the judgment, it could go
ahead and affirm as a matter of law. See id.
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ferences as a process of "further factfinding."'" At the same time, the
Court's language could further mean that appellate courts need not re-
mand for the trial court to perform that factfinding because the appellate
court may draw those inferences itself as a matter of law.'" In other
words, the trial court judgment and its factualfindings are to be reviewed
as a matter of law. Under this interpretation, the Court's "as a matter of
law" phrase would apply to the trial court's process of drawing the factu-
al inferences. This suggests a de novo standard of review.
At first glance, this second interpretation seems incorrect because it
suggests that courts may review factual findings de novo. Under Rule 52,
factual findings are to be reviewed for clear error. 10 2 Even on mixed
questions, the factual portion of the mixed question is reviewed for clear
error, 103 and the inferences in the fair-use analysis are factual in nature
for jury consideration."' 4 There is, however, an exception to the mandate
of Rule 52: independent review of a constitutional fact.105 Where a factu-
al finding determines the constitutional rights of a litigant, appellate
courts refer to that finding as a constitutional fact.10 6 Constitutional facts
raise factual questions that are subject to de novo review to ensure pro-
tection of the litigant's constitutional right. 10 7 I discuss this doctrine as
applied to fair use more fully below in Part III. For now, it suffices to
note that this second interpretation of the further-factfinding sentence is
consistent with the doctrine of independent review.
100. See Harper, 471 U.S. at 560.
101. See id.
102. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence,
must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . .").
103. See United States v. Wright, 582 F.3d 199, 205 (1st Cir. 2009) ("[T]he factual component
of this 'mixed question of law and fact' remains subject to clear error review." (citation omitted));
Anglo-Iberia Underwriting Mgmt. Co. v. Lodderhose, 235 Fed. Appx. 776, 780 n.5 (2d Cir. 2007)
("Of course, even if apparent authority were a mixed question of law and fact, we would still review
factual components for clear error."); see also cases cited supra note 8.
104. See Snow, supra note 1, at 556.
105. The Supreme Court articulated this doctrine of independent review as follows in Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc.:
The requirement of independent appellate review reiterated in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan is a rule of federal constitutional law. It emerged from the exigency of deciding
concrete cases; it is law in its purest form under our common-law heritage. It reflects a
deeply held conviction that judges-and particularly Members of this Court-must exer-
cise such review in order to preserve the precious liberties established and ordained by
the Constitution. The question whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is
of the convincing clarity required to strip the utterance of First Amendment protection is
not merely a question for the trier of fact. Judges, as expositors of the Constitution, must
independently decide whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to cross the consti-
tutional threshold that bars the entry of any judgment that is not supported by clear and
convincing proof of "actual malice."
466 U.S. 485, 510-11 (1984).
106. See, e.g., id. at 508 n.27.
107. See id. at 499 ("[I]n cases raising First Amendment issues we have repeatedly held that an
appellate court has an obligation to make an independent examination of the whole record in order to
make sure that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expres-
sion." (internal quotations omitted)).
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As between the two possible meanings of the further-factfinding
sentence, the Harper Court did not provide any clue as to which one is
correct. On the one hand, the Court's fair-use analysis in Harper appears
entirely unfettered, without any regard or deference to the trial court
opinion.'os This is consistent with the interpretation that appellate courts
should apply de novo review to the process of finding facts that support
an ultimate judgment. On the other hand, the trial court in Harper had
failed to make relevant findings in the fair-use analysis, such that the
Court had scant, if any, findings to defer to.' 09 This is consistent with the
interpretation that appellate courts should apply de novo review only to
the ultimate judgment, deferring to any factual findings that support that
judgment.
Thus, the meaning of the further-factfinding sentence is unclear.
What is clear, though, is that the sentence does not mean that the infer-
ences in the fair-use analysis should be construed as pure issues of law
for a trial judge to adjudicate. Under either of the two possible interpreta-
tions of the further-factfinding sentence, fair use would still be a question
of fact. Specifically, as a sentence suggesting that it is unnecessary to
remand for factual findings that go further than mere historical facts, the
sentence would imply that fair use raises inferences of fact. Alternative-
ly, as a sentence suggesting that de novo review is appropriate under the
doctrine of independent review, the sentence would imply that fair use
raises inferences of constitutional fact. Under either interpretation, it
would be incorrect to construe the sentence as meaning that the infer-
ences in the fair-use analysis must be legal. But as I discuss in Part L.A
above, courts did just that.
Hence, the present state of the law is that courts have adopted a mis-
taken meaning of the further-factfinding sentence, construing it to mean
that fair use constitutes an issue of law, contrary to the well established
history of courts treating it as an issue of fact. This historical departure
from precedent occurred without reasoned deliberation. It simply oc-
curred, seemingly unintentionally.
In another article, I argue for a return to fair use's original construc-
tion as a question of fact. 0 In short, I argue that the Seventh Amend-
ment mandates that fair use be construed as a fact issue for jury consid-
eration.'11 Yet even assuming that courts return to the original construc-
tion of fair use as a factual matter, the question remains as to whether
courts may ever decide fair use as a matter of law-without running
afoul of the Seventh Amendment. That question I address in the two
parts below.
108. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549-69 (1985).
109. See id
110. See Snow, supra note 1, at 486.
111. See id. at 544-54.
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III. APPELLATE COURT REVIEW
My proposal in another article that fair use be treated as a fact issue
for the jury leaves open the question of appellate review.112 1 now ad-
dress that question. I ultimately propose a double standard of review for
fair use questions. Specifically, for jury verdicts that favor a fair user, the
clear error standard should govern appellate review. For everything else,
de novo should govern. My reason for proposing this double standard
stems from the judicial obligation to protect speech interests that underlie
fair use. Supreme Court precedent dictates an independent review-or in
other words, de novo review-of facts that determine constitutional
rights.1 13 And as I explain below, fair use represents such a right.
A. Fair Use Under Bose
The proposal that a de novo standard, rather than a clear error
standard, should govern review of fair use cases turns on the constitu-
tional doctrine of independent review.1 14 Most instructive on this doctrine
is the case of Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States."' There,
a manufacturer of loud speakers, Bose, sued the defendant for libel when
the defendant published a critical review of the Bose speakers in its mag-
azine, Consumer Reports.16 After a bench trial, the district court made
factual findings that the defendants had made a disparaging, false state-
ment of fact and that the defendant made it without regard for its truth or
falsity." 7 The Supreme Court ultimately held that as a matter of law
Bose had failed to prove that the defendant had made the defamatory
statement without regard for its truth or falsity." 8 In reaching this hold-
ing, the Court conducted an independent review of the record, applying a
de novo standard rather than clear error. The doctrine of independent
review, the Court explained, imposes a constitutional obligation on ap-
pellate courts to review allegations of constitutional fact independent of
the trial court finding."' 9 The Court defined constitutional facts to mean
"special facts that have been deemed to have constitutional signifi-
112. Snow, supra note 1, at 510 n.150 ("This [alrticle ... addresses only the general question
of whether fair use represents a question of fact or law for the jury or judge, absent extraordinary
circumstances. In a forthcoming article, the Author will explore such circumstances where judges
may decide fair use as a matter of law.").
113. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510-11 (1984).
114. See Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment
Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431, 2433-35, 2468 (1998) (arguing for speech proce-
dural protection of proof burden to apply in fair-use context based on speech nature of copied ex-
pression); see also Ned Snow, Proving Fair Use: Burden of Proof as Burden of Speech, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 1795-804, 1807-10 (2010) (same); cf Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 209-10
(1998) (advocating ban on preliminary injunctions in copyright context).
115. 466 U.S. 485, 510-11 (1984).
116. Id. at487-88.
117. Id. at 490-91.
118. Id at 511.
119. Id. at 505, 510-11. See supra note 105.
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cance."12o Hence, a judge's obligation to uphold constitutional rights
demands that she perform an independent review of alleged facts to de-
termine whether a claimed constitutional right is upheld. 12 1
Courts have employed Bose's approach of independent review in
various speech contexts-obscenity, 122  fighting words, 123  public-
employee speech,124 and campaign finance to name a few.125 Fair use
should be no different. This conclusion presumes, of course, that fair use
merits protection under the Free Speech Clause. This premise raises its
own discussion outside the scope of this Article. I will not argue this
premise here, except to note that a few courts-including the Supreme
Court in dicta-and several scholars have recognized fair use as a consti-
tutional requirement in copyright. 12 6 Yet the premise is by no means well
established. I therefore only briefly explain the argument for constitu-
tional speech protection and direct readers to other more extensive au-
thorities that argue for this premise. 27 1In short, fair use eases the harsh
speech-suppressive nature of copyright; it communicates thought distinct
from the underlying work.12 8 The critical review of another's work, the
reporting of news, the scholarly demonstration of truth-each of these
activities may require copying expression and each may merit protection
from copyright as independent speech.129 Inferences in the fair-use analy-
sis ultimately determine the scope of a fair user's First Amendment right
of speech. On the premise that fair use constitutes a speech-protective
120. Bose, 466 U.S. at 505.
121. Id. at 510-11 ("The requirement of independent appellate review ... is a rule of federal
constitutional law.... It reflects a deeply held conviction that judges-and particularly Members of
this Court-must exercise such review in order to preserve the precious liberties established and
ordained by the Constitution.").
122. See id. at 506-08. (citing precedent to establish established practice of applying independ-
ent review in various speech contexts).
123. See id. at 505-06.
124. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384-86, 386 n.9 (1987).
125. See, e.g., Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 366 F.3d 900, 904 (10th Cir. 2004) (campaign
finance reform); see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557,
567-68 (1995) (expressive association).
126. The tension between the First Amendment and copyright has been well recognized in
judicial opinion and scholarship alike. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219, 221 (2003) (de-
scribing fair use as a "free speech safeguard[]" and a "First Amendment accommodation[]"); Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559-60 (1985); Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Sub-
stance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) ("The First Amendment adds nothing to
the fair use defense."); NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX 3-12 (2008); see
generally Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLuM. L. REV. 983 (1970);
Lemley & Volokh, supra note 114; Lawrence Lessig, Copyright's First Amendment, 48 UCLA L.
REV. 1057 (2001); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees
of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1181 (1970); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of
Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. I, 5-7 (2002); Eugene Volokh, Freedom
of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40
Hous. L. REV. 697 (2003).
127. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 126.
128. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111-12
(1990) (opining that the fair-use inquiry turns primarily on whether use transforms original expres-
sion).
129. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); see also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219-21.
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doctrine, then, fair use merits the constitutional safeguards of free
speech.13 0
Because the factual inferences in the fair-use analysis determine
whether the First Amendment protects a fair user's expression, those
inferences fit the definition of constitutional facts.'3' Independent review
should therefore apply in the fair-use context. Indeed, in their article,
Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment Review in Copyright
Cases, Professors Eugene Volokh and Brett McDonnell have argued that
the doctrine of independent review should be just as applicable in the
copyright context as it is in the libel context contemplated by Bose.' 32 As
they point out, copyright is much like libel law in that both define unpro-
tected speech; and like the factfinding process in libel, the factfinding
process in copyright "may misclassify . . . speech as unprotected." 3 3
Because Bose makes clear that its holding applies wherever judgments
might classify speech as unprotected,134 a fair-use decision must be sub-
' 35
ject to independent review.
B. Decisions Favoring Copyright Holders: De Novo Review
The conclusion that independent review should apply in the fair-use
context does not speak to whether all fair-use decisions should be subject
to such review. Despite Bose's clarity on explaining the necessity for
independent review, Bose leaves unanswered whether independent re-
view should occur even where the speaker prevails at trial.' 36 When the
speaker prevails, de novo review would not benefit the speaker's inter-
ests, so arguably it should not apply.' 3 7 On the other hand, de novo re-
view in that situation would allow appellate courts to better refine and
clarify the law, so arguably it should apply.' 3 8
These arguments are considered in the section below.139 At a mini-
mum, though, it can be said that Bose mandates de novo review where a
trial outcome favors the litigant seeking to suppress speech-i.e., the
130. I address the argument that First Amendment interests serve not only fair users, but also
copyright holders. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.a.ii.
131. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510-11 (1984).
132. See Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 114, at 2437-39.
133. See id. at 2437.
134. Bose, 466 U.S. at 505-09 (outlining various speech contexts where independent review
has been applied).
135. See Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 114, at 2437 (arguing that Bose should apply to
copyright cases).
136. See United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 950 (10th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he Bose opinion does
not make clear whether its more searching review-whose purpose was to avoid 'a forbidden intru-
sion' on First Amendment rights-applies symmetrically to district court findings that favor as well
as disfavor the First Amendment claimant." (citation omitted)).
137. See Multimedia Publ'g Co. of S.C. v. Greenville-Spartanburg Airport Dist., 991 F.2d 154,
160 (4th Cir. 1993) (explaining rationale for refraining from independently reviewing constitutional
facts where speaker prevails at trial level).
138. See Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 14, at 2442.
139. See discussion infra Part Ill.C.
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copyright holder. 140 This would be consistent with the Court's treatment
of fair use in Harper.14 1 Recall that the copyright holder in Harper pre-
vailed at a bench trial.14 2 On appeal, the Supreme Court performed its
own analysis of whether the use was fair, ultimately affirming the trial
court's verdict.143 The Court did not employ any language in deference to
the trial court's analysis, thereby suggesting that it performed an inde-
pendent review.
Although courts have not yet expressly recognized that fair use de-
mands independent review, for many courts this proposal would not
change present practices.145 Under the proposal, courts would continue to
apply de novo review, but they would do so because of a constitutional
obligation rather than because of the Ninth Circuit's erroneous construc-
tion of fair-use inferences as being purely legal in nature. Consider the
Eleventh Circuit's treatment of fair use in SunTrust Bank v. Houghton
Mifflin Co.14 6 The trial court had granted a preliminary injunction in fa-
vor of the copyright holder where the fair user had created a story, The
Wind Done Gone, that appropriated characters, plot, and scenes, from the
copyright holder's story, Gone with the Wind.14 7 In reviewing the trial
court decision, the appellate court's analysis of whether the use was fair
was anything but a review for clear error.14 8 The appellate court's lan-
guage suggested it was not deferring to any inferences of the trial court
in the least.14 9 And rather tellingly, the appellate court relied heavily on
the First Amendment as a basis for applying fair use.5 o SunTrust, then,
serves as a model for constitutional independent review of fair use. Thus,
where the copyright holder prevails at the trial level, courts should con-
tinue their present practice of applying de novo review, but they should
do so out of their constitutional obligation to ensure speech protection
rather than a mistaken belief that fair-use inferences are purely legal in
nature.
140. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 491-92 (1984) (institut-
ing independent review where defendant-speaker had lost at trial).
141. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560-61 (1985).
142. See id. at 543.
143. See id. at 561-69.
144. See id.
145. Professor Volokh points out that all circuits practice independent review of fair use, and to
the extent that this means a simple application of de novo review, that is correct. See Volokh &
McDonnell, supra note 114, at 2461; see also discussion supra Part Ill.B (observing that for many
courts the proposal to apply de novo review will not change their present practice). That said, no
appellate court has purported to conduct independent review of fair use decisions based on the con-
stitutional duty as outlined in Bose.
146. 268 F.3d 1257 (1 lth Cir. 2001).
147. Id. at 1259.
148. Seeid.at 1269-76.
149. See id. (analyzing fair use with minimal reference to district court analysis).
150. See id. at 1264 ("First Amendment privileges are also preserved through the doctrine of
fair use. Until codification of the fair-use doctrine in the 1976 Act, fair use was a judge-made right
developed to preserve the constitutionality of copyright legislation by protecting First Amendment
values." (footnotes omitted)).
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Some appellate courts, on the other hand, have employed clear error
review on the issue of fair use.151 Such instances usually arise while re-
viewing a jury verdict. And this is incorrect. These appellate courts must
instead adopt the de novo standard to review decisions where the copy-
right holder has prevailed at trial: even though a jury has made findings,
the appellate court must independently review whether a fair user's con-
stitutional right of speech demands a finding of fairness. Consider the
case of Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc.,152 where the
putative fair user had created a song that employed elements of the copy-
right holder's rap song.153 The Sixth Circuit deferred to jury findings in
favor of the copyright holder despite the court's recognition of compet-
ing inferences of fairness that cast significant doubt on those findings. 15 4
It is plausible to conclude that had the court applied de novo review, it
would have reached a different outcome, especially in view of the fact
that the court recognized that the use was "certainly transformative"--a
characteristic that the Supreme Court had suggested could be dispositive
under similar facts in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.155
Hence, where the trial outcome favors the copyright holder, even on
a jury verdict, de novo should govern the review. The independent re-
view would serve to protect the speech nature of fair use.
151. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 278 (6th Cir.
2009).
152. 585 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 2009).
153. See id. at 272-74.
154. Id. In Bridgeport, the defendant had created a song that employed three elements of the
plaintiffs song: (1) the phrase, "Bow wow wow, yippie yo, yippie yea"; (2) a repetition of the word,
"dog" using a low tone; and (3) rhythmic panting. Id. at 272. The jury found that this use was not
fair. Id. at 277-78. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the verdict, deferring to the jury's finding.
Id. Significantly, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the defendant's use was "certainly transforma-
tive (first factor), having a different theme, mood, and tone from [the plaintiffs song]." Id. This
admission is significant, for it is well established that the transformation factor should weigh heavily
in the fair-use analysis. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994); Leval,
supra note 128, at 1111-12. The Sixth Circuit further recognized that the amount used constituted a
"relatively small" portion of the plaintiffs song. Bridgeport, 585 F.3d at 278. And it acknowledged
the argument that the two songs targeted different markets. Id. Yet, despite these inferences that
suggest fairness, the Sixth Circuit upheld the jury verdict: it cited competing inferences suggesting
infringement and then concluded that the verdict reached by the jury "was not unreasonable." Id.
155. 510 U.S. 569, 574-94 (1994). Had the Bridgeport court fulfilled its constitutional obliga-
tion to perform an independent review, the court likely would have reached a different outcome
based on the similarity of its facts to those of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., where the Su-
preme Court recognized that a defendant's use of lyrics and rhythm from another song in the defend-
ant's rap song likely constituted a fair use. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 574-94 (recognizing likely
fairness of defendant's use of identifiable phrases from plaintiffs popular song in defendant's rap
song). This conclusion is supported by the fact that the Bridgeport court recognized the transforma-
tive nature of the use, which was an influential factor in Campbell. Compare Bridgeport, 585 F.3d at
277-78, with Campbell, 510 U.S. at 574-94.
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C. Decisions Favoring Fair Users: Mixed Review
1. Bench Trials: De Novo Review
No court has addressed whether independent review should apply
where a fair user has prevailed at trial for the simple reason that courts do
not rely on Bose in reviewing fair-use decisions. Bose itself is silent on
whether independent review applies where the speaker prevails at trial.156
In the wake of Bose's silence, courts have considered the issue in con-
texts other than copyright.'5 7 They are split on the issue. Some courts
have read Bose to apply symmetrically, meaning that independent review
applies wherever constitutional facts are disputed, regardless of which
litigant has prevailed at trial.'58 Their argument is that de novo review
better enables appellate courts to clarify the boundaries of the constitu-
tional right.15 9 By contrast, other courts have read Bose to apply asym-
metrically, meaning that independent review should apply only where the
speaker loses at trial.160 Their argument is that the authority for Bose to
disregard Rule 52(a)'s mandate for clear error review comes from the
judicial obligation to protect a constitutional right; and where the speaker
prevails at trial, a review that defers to the trial court's finding offers
more protection to the right than does a de novo review.' 6'
Independent review where the fair user has prevailed at the trial lev-
el makes sense if the trial occurred before a judge. The decision of fair
use rarely turns on witness credibility; rather, it turns on discretionary
judgment and opinion regarding whether an admitted use is fair.' 62 Fair-
ness is determined by the subjective views of the factfinder.163 This in-
sight suggests that the process of determining fairness on appellate re-
view would closely imitate that process at a bench trial: on appeal, judg-
es exercise discretionary judgment and opinion in the same way that the
judge did at trial. It would seem that the discretionary judgment and
opinion of three appellate judges would likely be more reliable and accu-
rate than that of a single trial judge. Three heads are better than one.
156. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1984); United
States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 950 (10th Cir. 2008) (recognizing silence of Bose on this issue).
157. See, e.g., Don's Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 485 U.S. 981, 981-82 (1988)
(White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting split among circuits on Bose-application issue
and desire to resolve issue).
158. See Friday, 525 F.3d at 950; Lindsay v. City of San Antonio, 821 F.2d 1103, 1107 (5th
Cir. 1987).
159. See Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 114, at 2441-43 (explaining reasons for their en-
dorsement of symmetric approach).
160. See Multimedia Publ'g Co. of S.C., Inc. v. Greenville-Spartanburg Airport Dist., 991 F.2d
154, 160 (4th Cir. 1993); Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 383 (9th Cir. 1988); Planned
Parenthood Ass'n/Chi. Area v. Chi. Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225, 1228-29 (7th Cir. 1985).
161. See Multimedia, 991 F.2d at 160.
162. See Snow, supra note 1, at 497-500; cf United States v. Quaintance, 608 F.3d 717, 721
n.3 (10th Cir. 2010) ("Even when the constitutional fact doctrine [of Bose] applies, credibility de-
terminations remain subject to clear error review.").
163. See Snow, supra note 1, at 497-501.
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Thus, a bench trial result merits independent review regardless of which
litigant prevails.1 64
This position is supported by Professor Volokh, who has argued that
courts should apply Bose symmetrically in the copyright context of de-
ciding the issue of substantial similarity.16 5 Presumably, Professor
Volokh holds this same belief in the context of fair use.i 66 And this posi-
tion is consistent with the present practice of courts.167 Indeed, the Su-
preme Court seems to have implicitly endorsed de novo review even
where a fair user has prevailed at trial, insofar as the trial was before a
judge. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,168 the
district court conducted a lengthy trial over whether defendants were
contributorily liable for producing video tape recorders, and the district
court ruled for the defendants on the grounds that the VCR users were
making a fair use of the copyrighted television broadcasts. 16 9 On appeal,
the Supreme Court engaged in its own fair-use analysis, which suggests
that the Court was performing an independent review.'70 Although the
Court deferred to the district court's findings of historical fact, the Court
appeared to draw the inferences in the fair-use analysis independent of
the district court's analysis, even though the defendant had prevailed at
trial. '7  The analysis of the district court-i.e., the process of drawing
inferences by applying the legal principles of fair use-seems to have
164. In addition to bench trials, preliminary injunctions and summary judgments would be
subject to an independent review under this proposal for the same reason that the decision maker in
those proceedings is a single judge. See discussion infra Part Ill.D (discussing scope of review in
summary judgment proceeding).
165. See Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 114, at 2442.
166. See id. at 2461-62 (citing fact that appellate courts examine fair use under independent
appellate review to support argument that independent appellate review should apply in substantial
similarity context, and relying on Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1434 (6th Cir.
1992), rev'd on other grounds, 510 U.S. 569 (1994), for this position, wherein the Sixth Circuit
reviewed de novo the district court's finding of fairness for the defendant); e-mail from Eugene
Volokh, Gary T. Schwartz Professor of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law, to Ned Snow, Assoc. Professor of
Law, Univ. of Arkansas Sch. of Law (Apr. 16, 2010, 18:39 CST) (on file with author) (advocating
independent review in context of fair use).
167. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 719-25 (9th Cir. 2007),
amended by 504 F.3d 1146 (reviewing de novo district court's grant of preliminary injunction for
copyright holder); Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 72-74
(2d Cir. 1999) (applying de novo review of four-factor analysis where defendant had lost at bench
trial).
168. 464 U.S. 417 (1984) , superseded by statute, Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998,
Pub. L. 105-304, 115 Stat. 2860, as recognized in Realnetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Ass'n,
Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 913 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
169. Id. at 420-21.
170. See id. at 448-55.
171. See id. at 449 ("[Tlhe District Court's findings plainly establish that time-shifting for
private home use must be characterized as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity."); id. at 450 (relying
on district court's finding of historical fact that market harm was speculative, and at best, minimal);
id. at 456 (relying on the "findings of the District Court" to arrive at conclusion that use was fair).
The Court did, however, employ other language suggesting that it deferred to the district court's
finding of fairness. See id. at 454-55 ("[W]e must conclude that this record amply supports the
District Court's conclusion that home time-shifting is fair use.").
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been subject to independent review. De novo review of bench trials
would thus be consistent with precedent.
2. Jury Verdicts: Clear Error Review
I propose that where a jury determines that a use is fair, appellate
courts should not employ de novo review. They should instead defer to
the factual inferences that the jury reached in the fair-use analysis, em-
ploying clear error as the standard of review. I therefore propose a dou-
ble standard: when a jury finds in favor of the copyright holder, the ap-
pellate court should review de novo, but when a jury finds in favor of the
fair user, the appellate court should follow Rule 52(a)'s requirement of
clear error review.172
My proposal for clear error review ofjury verdicts is consistent with
the practice and rhetoric of some courts. 73 For instance, in Compaq
Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc.,174 the Fifth Circuit applied a clear
172. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence,
must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . .").
I address the issue of whether fair use is properly characterized as an issue of fact, an issue
of law, or a mixed question of fact and law in Judges Playing Jury: Constitutional Conflicts in
Deciding Fair Use on Summary Judgment. Snow, supra note 1, at 492-518. Therein I conclude that
it should be characterized as a question of fact. For the sake of argument, however, assuming that it
was proper to characterize fair use as a mixed question of law and fact, this conclusion would not
preclude my proposal for a clear error standard of review. As Professors Wright and Miller note:
There is no uniform standard for reviewing mixed questions of law and fact. . . . It does
not appear to be the case that mixed questions of law and fact are entirely outside the
"clearly erroneous" rule. In a long line of cases courts have held that this rule limited ap-
pellate review of matters that certainly seem to contain both legal and factual elements.
Thus the Supreme Court has treated as a question of fact, governed by Rule 52(a), an is-
sue whether a payment to a taxpayer was a "gift," and lower federal courts have applied
that principle to many other determinations relating to the tax laws. Other courts have ap-
plied the "clearly erroneous" rule to a tremendous variety of matters including: whether a
party was guilty of laches; the existence and scope of an agency or fiduciary relationship;
questions involving contracts, including the existence of a contract or its validity or ap-
plicability, whether the parties had been under a mutual mistake, the nature or character
of an instrument, and even in some instances the interpretation of a written contract; the
eligibility of an alien for naturalization; the danger of consumer confusion with regard to
trademarks and tradenames; whether a transaction was fraudulent; the existence of sub-
ject matter or personal jurisdiction; and many other matters, as is exemplified by the cita-
tions in the note below. [Other matters "note[d] below" include: abandonment of trade-
mark; adequacy of records; apparent authority; attractive nuisance; buyer in ordinary
course; clear and present danger; common-law marriage; conservation and endanger-
ment; damages; discrimination; employee relationship; holder in due course; indigency;
intent; foreseeability; land use and tribal rights; mental competency; motivation; nature of
goods; privity; refusal to bargain collectively; Rule I1; satisfaction of burden of proof;
seaworthiness; secured creditor; status of corporation; voting rights; willful statutory vio-
lation.]
9C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 78, at 484, 486-98.
173. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 387 F.3d 403, 410-11 (5th Cir.
2004) (upholding jury verdict under clear error standard). In dicta, Judge Posner has pointed out that
he sees no reason that courts have instituted "plenary review" (de novo review) in copyright cases
dealing with fair use. United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 499 (7th Cir. 1999). Cf Anderson v.
City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 580 (1985) (applying clear error review in context of reviewing
mixed question of whether employer discriminated based on sex of employee-a question which
turns on divergent discretionary opinion).
174. 387 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2004).
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error standard to uphold a jury verdict that found a use to be fair.'
There, Compaq Computer Corp. had allegedly copied portions of the
176
copyright holder's book regarding correct hand positions for typing.
The appellate court reviewed the jury verdict that had found Compaq's
use to be fair.177 In that review, Judge Jones of the Fifth Circuit explained
that the standard of review required reversal only where "the [clourt be-
lieves that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict."1 78
Throughout her review, Judge Jones considered whether inferences in the
fair-use analysis, which would favor Compaq, were reasonable infer-
ences for a jury to draw.179 Concluding that jurors could have drawn rea-
sonable inferences in favor of Compaq, Judge Jones upheld the finding
of fairness.8
It is further noteworthy that Judge Posner has articulated a prefer-
ence for clear error review of fair use, albeit in dicta.'81 While consider-
ing whether to implement de novo review of a trial judge's ruling on the
mixed question of whether evidence was inadmissibly privileged, Judge
Posner noted that courts often refer to mixed questions-"such as fair
use in a copyright case"-as applying de novo (or plenary) review.182
Yet, he continued, such courts never explain why the issue merits de
novo review.'83 Judge Posner concluded that in the Seventh Circuit "the
clear-error standard is the proper standard for appellate review of deter-
minations of mixed questions of fact and law." 84 This statement sug-
gests, then, that Judge Posner believes that fair use should be reviewed
under a clear error standard.'8
A contrary position to this view is not immediately evident in case
law. In reviewing fair use opinions, I have not found any cases where an
appellate court overturned a jury's verdict of fairness under a de novo
175. Compaq, 387 F.3d at 410-11.
176. Id. at 406.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 409 (alteration in original) (citing Rubinstein v. Adm'rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund,
218 F.3d 392, 401 (5th Cir. 2000).
179. Id. at 410-11.
180. Id. at 411 ("The evidence presented at trial and the reasonable inferences therefrom, when
viewed through the lens of the statutory fair use factors, support the jury's fair use finding.").




185. See id. Judge Posner's characterization of the review standard for fair use is consistent
with his view of when courts should decide fair use on summary judgment-only where a reasona-
ble trier of fact could reach only one conclusion. See Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 516
(7th Cir. 2002) ("'Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact,' which means that it 'may be re-
solved on summary judgment if a reasonable trier of fact could reach only one conclusion-but not
otherwise."' (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985)).
That said, in the Frederick case where Judge Posner suggested that fair use should be reviewed for
clear error, he also referred to fair use as "a mixed question of nonconstitutional law and fact"-a
characterization that I entirely disagree with. Compare 182 F.3d at 499 (emphasis added), with
discussion supra Part 1II.B (arguing for de novo review of fair-use decisions favoring copyright
holders).
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standard. But this is unsurprising. The issue of the jury role begins long
before the jury reaches its verdict. It begins with summary judgment pro-
ceedings where litigants might argue that fair use constitutes an issue of
law for the judge. As I discuss in Part II, most trial courts treat fair use as
a matter appropriate for judicial decision at summary judgment.' 8 6
My proposal to apply a clear error standard to jury verdicts favoring
fair users would appear to gain support from Professor Volokh, insofar as
the jury verdict is a general one. In discussing independent review on the
issue of substantial similarity, he recognizes that independent review will
not work where the jury issues a general verdict of no infringement.187
There are so many subsidiary factual issues in a copyright claim (e.g.,
independent creation and substantial similarity) that the court of appeals
has no way to know the reason that a jury has decided against infringe-
ment. So even if the appellate court believes that a use should not be
fair, it must defer to the jury's general finding because other factual find-
ings, which are subject to clear error review, could have influenced the
decision.
Of course this reasoning would not apply where the jury has found a
use to be fair as a special verdict.189 The question thus arises as to wheth-
er special verdicts of fairness should be reviewed de novo or for clear
error. Professor Volokh argues for de novo review.' 90 On this point we
disagree. Presumably Professor Volokh relies on the same arguments that
he cites for independent review of bench trials: clarity of the law; fair-
ness to copyright holders; and serving the First Amendment purpose of
encouraging speech.191 For reasons explained below, however, I find
these arguments unpersuasive.1 9 2 The subsections below discuss reasons
that independent review should not apply symmetrically where a fair user
prevails at ajury trial.
186. E.g., Castle Rock Entm't v. Carol Publ'g Grp., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260, 272 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (deciding fair use on summary judgment despite recognizing that the reasonableness of con-
trary inferences which made her "decision a difficult one"), aff'd, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998);
Television Digest, Inc. v. U.S. Tel. Ass'n, 841 F. Supp. 5, 9 (D.D.C. 1993) (expressly rejecting
defendant's argument that a fair use decision is improper on a motion for summary judgment). But
see Harris v. San Jose Mercury News, No. C 04-05262 CRB, 2006 WL 995151, at *1 n.2 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 10, 2006) ("[T]he Court believes that inferences to be drawn [in the fair-use analysis] from
undisputed facts are questions more appropriately resolved by a jury than ajudge.").
187. See Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 114, at 2442-43.
188. See id.
189. The same would be true under a general verdict if the only issue at trial surrounded fair
use or if the other factual issues clearly could not have favored the defendant.
190. See Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 114, at 2442-43. Presumably, Professor Volokh
makes no qualification for fair use. See supra note 166.
191. See Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 114, at 2442.
192. See discussion infra Part Ill.C.2.a-b.
26 [Vol. 89:1
FAIR USE ASA MATTER OF LAW
a. Constitutional Considerations
i. Speech Rights of Fair Users
Under Bose, the justification for performing de novo review of a
factual finding is to ensure protection of speech. 93 In condemning a de-
fendant, a jury or judge could have overlooked the defendant's right of
speech, and so the appellate court is justified to review that finding with-
out deference. Yet when the defendant has prevailed at trial, a review
that is broader than clear error would not seem to benefit the defendant
speaker; plenary review would seem to create only a disadvantage for the
defendant. Replacing the usual clear error standard with de novo would
serve only to threaten the jury verdict that favored the defendant speaker.
The justification, then, for Bose's de novo exception to Rule 52(a) seems
lacking: imposing de novo over the statutory mandate of clearly errone-
ous does not seem to better protect speech where the speaker has already
prevailed at trial. It would seem, then, that clear error should govern in
the situation where a jury finds for the fair user.14
It might be argued, however, that independent review should govern
even where the putative fair user has prevailed for the simple reason that
judges better recognize speech than do juries.'95 If the role of judges is to
protect the constitutional right of speech, it would seem that judges
should be better able to identify speech. And even if appellate judges
reverse a jury finding favoring a defendant, the reversal will better define
speech for future fair users.
This argument is unpersuasive for two reasons.196 First, as a prelim-
inary matter, it is doubtful that judges can in fact better identify the
speech nature of fair use than can juries. Second, clear error review rep-
resents a procedural form of breathing space that the speech nature of fair
use requires. I discuss these reasons in greater detail below.
193. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 505, 510-11 (1984).
194. Although Bose never expressly states that independent review applies only if the speaker
loses at trial, its language suggests this application. See id. at 505, 509. The language describes
independent review as applying "[i]n cases in which there is a claim of denial of rights under the
Federal Constitution." Id. at 509 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Time, Inc. v.
Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 284 (1971)). It describes its past practices of independent review as ensuring
"that the speech in question actually falls within the unprotected category." Id. at 505 (emphasis
added). Also, it explains that independent review "imposes a special responsibility on judges when-
ever it is claimed that a particular communication is unprotected." ld. (emphasis added). Cf Hustler
Magazine v. Fallwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (accepting jury finding without any analysis that
defendant's publication did not constitute a fact in test for libel); 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF
DEFAMATION § 12:85 (2010) (interpreting Hustler as lending implicit support for view that inde-
pendent review applies only where speaker does not prevail at the trial level).
195. See Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 114, at 2440 (arguing that an appellate court can
determine whether two works are substantially similar just as well as a jury can).
196. See Snow, supra note 1, at 497-504. Analogously, a parent's role to ensure the health and
safety of children does not imply that the parent is better than a doctor at identifying a child's state
of health. To ensure protection of health, the parent facilitates an opportunity for the doctor to exam-
ine the sick child. Likewise, to ensure protection of speech, the judge facilitates an opportunity for
the jury to examine the disputed use.
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The first reason that judges should not review jury verdicts favoring
defendants is that judges are not necessarily any better at identifying fair
uses than are juries.197 Determining fairness rests on an understanding of
cultural norms and social values. As Professor Lloyd Weinreb observes
in his article, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, the ref-
erence to fairness suggests a normative element in the analysis, and that
element is desirable.19 8 That element, Professor Weinreb continues, gives
effect to the community's established practices and understandings.199 If
this is true, it would seem that the diversity of life experiences in a jury
would better reflect the established practices and understandings of the
community than would the single life experience of a judge.2 00 In identi-
fying the independent speech nature of repeated expression, the collec-
tive opinion of a disparate group of ordinary citizens would appear to be
worth more than the collective opinion of the homogeneous judicial
monastery.20 1
Admittedly, my intuition on this point may not be accurate. It could
be that, at least in some situations, judges are better at determining fair-
ness than are juries. Any empirical attempt to prove that the jury is a
better institution at identifying fairness would be unavailing, for such a
study would require an omniscient knowledge of whether the judge or
jury was in fact correct or incorrect. Even if a survey of copyright attor-
neys were to establish that defendants prefer juries to judges, this fact
would suggest merely that juries are perceived to be more likely to find a
use to be fair. It would not suggest that a jury would be more likely to
actually make an accurate finding. Because 'fairness' is an inherently
197. See id.
198. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1137, 1161 (1990) ("The reference to fairness in the doctrine of fair use imparts to the copyright
scheme a bounded normative element that is desirable in itself, It gives effect tot the community's
established practices and understandings and allows the location of copyright within the framework
of property generally.").
199. Id.
200. See id. The Court's comment in Sioux City & Pacific Railroad v. Stout is instructive on
this point:
Twelve men of the average of the community, comprising men of education and men of
little education, men of learning and men whose learning consists only in what they have
themselves seen and heard, the merchant, the mechanic, the farmer, the laborer; these sit
together, consult, apply their separate experience of the affairs of life to the facts proven,
and draw a unanimous conclusion. This average judgment thus given it is the great effort
of the law to obtain. It is assumed that twelve men know more of the common affairs of
life than does one man, that they can draw wiser and safer conclusions from admitted
facts thus occurring than can a single judge ....
... [W]hen the facts are disputed, or when they are not disputed, but different minds
might honestly draw different conclusions from them, the case must be left to the jury for
their determination.
84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 664 (1873).
201. Cf WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 78, at § 2585 ("This respect for the findings of fact by
the trial court should not be pressed too far. It is simply wrong to say ... that the 'findings will be
given the force and effect of a jury verdict."' (quoting Stoody Co. v. Royer, 347 F.2d 672, 680 (10th
Cir. 1967))).
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subjective concept, it is not possible to empirically demonstrate my intui-
tion-that juries are the better institution at judging fairness.
Yet my inability to produce evidence on this point should not be fa-
tal to my argument. My argument here is that proponents of de novo re-
view cannot establish that judges are better than juries. That is, I argue
that the proponents must bear the burden to demonstrate the superiority
of judges at determining fair use. And this makes sense: for two hundred
years fair use was a jury issue,2 02 and furthermore, the Constitution artic-
ulates a preference for the jury.203  Any deviation from the well-
established practice of jury determination must be justified. It is therefore
the proponents of de novo review who must justify that judges are better
than juries at identifying fair uses. And they have not.
Even assuming that judges are better able to identify fair-use
speech, they should still not employ de novo review of jury verdicts that
favor fair users. As I state above, a second reason supports clear error
review: breathing space necessary to protect fair-use speech.2 04 To ensure
the actual protection of speech that merits protection, the law must pro-
tect more than that which merits protection. 20 5 It must protect unprotect-
ed speech at the margins to give the protected speech breathing space
necessary for its exercise. Given the inherent uncertainty surrounding
most-if not all-uses that are in fact fair, most fair-use expression lies
at the margins of protected speech. 20 6 So to protect fair-use speech at the
margins, the law must protect speech that crosses the line; it must protect
202. E.g., Sayre v. Moore, (1785) 1 East 361, 362, (K.B.) (Lord Mansfield, C.J.) ("In all these
[copyright cases where defendant had altered underlying work] the question of fact to come before a
jury is, whether the alteration be colourable or not ... ? [Tlhe jury will decide whether it be a servile
imitation or not."); DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982) (reversing
district court's grant of summary judgment on the grounds that fair use raises "essentially factual
issues and . .. are normally questions for the jury"); see also Snow, supra note 1, at 518.
203. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VIl; see also Snow, supra note 1, at 504-05.
204. A third reason may be cited as well. De novo review of jury findings of fairness (or un-
fairness) could possibly abolish any burden of proof. If appellate courts could decide fair use without
any deference to a jury, so also could trial courts. See discussion infra Part IV.A. Trial courts have
the same obligation as appellate courts to uphold constitutional rights (without deference to a jury),
so trial courts could rule against fair users without deference to a jury in the same way that appellate
courts could rule against fair users without deference to a jury. Fair use, then, would effectively
become a constitutional issue solely for judges, much like the issue of whether an officer's conduct
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Issues that rest with the sole decision-making authori-
ty of judges are legal issues. And legal issues usually do not entail a burden of proof: judges most
often decide them without applying a presumption for either party. In the context of fair use, if the
burden of proof were to rest with the party seeking to suppress fair-use speech-the copyright hold-
er-this could prove a formidable challenge in close cases. Although courts have recently departed
from the historical judicial practice of placing that burden with copyright holders, First Amendment
principles dictate that the burden should rest with copyright holders. See Snow, supra note 114, at
1791-1807. Assuming that courts correctly place that burden with copyright holders, it would serve
to provide procedural breathing space to fair users. See id at 1807-14.
205. See generally Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 468-69
(2007) ("First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive.") (quoting NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
206. See Snow, supra note i14, at 1784, 1799-1804.
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207some instances of infringement. It must provide breathing space to the
protected fair uses. 208
This principle of breathing space suggests a clear error standard of
review.20 9 It seems indisputable that neither jury nor judge will in every
case correctly decide whether a use is fair. Even assuming, for the sake
of argument, that judges are better than juries at identifying fairness, no
one would believe that judges are perfect. 2 10 Indeed, it is well accepted
that sometimes judges get it wrong.211 The possibility exists, then, that
appellate judges might incorrectly label a fair use as infringing where a
jury has found otherwise. This possibility the law must protect against,
and the standard of review will offer that protection. Clear error would
favor a finding of fair use over infringement, so that even if judges be-
lieved a jury incorrectly found a use to be fair, they could not reverse the
finding without a compelling reason. On the other hand, clear error
would result in some instances of infringement being upheld as fair.
Clear error would serve to protect fair use at the cost of protecting some
infringement. It would provide breathing space.
This conclusion does not imply that an appellate court that must af-
firm a jury finding of fairness under the clear error standard could not
provide guidance to future speakers. Certainly judges could still set forth
legal principles to guide trial courts in formulating legal instructions to
future juries, all while upholding a jury verdict of fairness under clear
207. Cf id. at 1819-21 (discussing possibility that shifting burden of proof in fair use decisions
could result in greater instances of infringement).
208. See id.; see also Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 468-69.
209. Perhaps most illustrative of this principle is the Court's explanation in Waters v. Church-
ill:
[I]t is important to ensure not only that the substantive First Amendment standards are
sound, but also that they are applied through reliable procedures. This is why we have of-
ten held . . . a particular allocation of the burden of proof. . . to be constitutionally re-
quired in proceedings that may penalize protected speech.
511 U.S. 661, 669 (1994). Cf Snow, supra note 114, at 1781-82 (observing burden-of-proof proce-
dural protection to speakers in all speech contexts except fair use); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and
Breathing Space, 30 CoLuM. J.L. & ARTS 429, 438 (2007) (arguing that the Court should employ
procedural rules to create First Amendment breathing space in copyright).
210. The mistaken nature of judges at assessing fair use (or the lack thereof) is perhaps best
illustrated by the case histories of some of the most celebrated fair use decisions by the Supreme
Court. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), rev'g 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir.
1992), rev'g 754 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn. 1991); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation En-
ters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985), rev'g 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'g 557 F. Supp. 1067 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), rev'g 659 F.2d 963
(9th Cir. 1981), rev'g 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
211. Judge Pierre Leval observes:
Judges do not share a consensus on the meaning of fair use. Earlier decisions provide lit-
tle basis for predicting later ones. Reversals and divided courts are commonplace. The
opinions reflect widely differing notions of the meaning of fair use. Decisions are not
govemed by consistent principles, but seem rather to result from intuitive reactions to in-
dividual fact patterns.
Leval, supra note 128, at 1106-07.
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error.2 12 Judges could still opine in dicta that the use at issue is-in the
judge's view-infringing, teaching future speakers about the contours of
copyright.2 13 Clear error would not preclude appellate judges from articu-
lating principles that identify the presence or absence of fair use. In ef-
fect, judges could change the boundaries-just not the breathing space
around those boundaries.
Thus, the standard of review in fair use should exist to minimize the
possibility of erroneously denying protected speech-not to minimize the
possibility of erroneously deciding the issue either way. The goal of clar-
ifying the law to aid a fact-finder in correctly identifying speech should
not diminish the ultimate goal of protecting that speech. And to protect
speech, the standard of review should facilitate a finding of fair use
whenever either the jury or the judge favors that finding. Accordingly,
appellate courts should both defer to a jury's finding of fairness and ig-
nore a jury's finding of infringement. Stated another way, clear error
review should govern where a fair user has prevailed; de novo review
should govern where a copyright holder has prevailed.
Paradoxically, my argument up to this point relies on the same free
speech principle to reach seemingly contrary conclusions: I argue that
free speech requires both de novo and clear error review. It may seem,
then, that I employ the First Amendment opportunistically, only when it
serves my seemingly biased interest in furthering fair use. It should be
asked, then, whether I have ignored speech considerations in favor of
copyright holders. Yes, I have-up to this point. In the section below,
however, I consider speech interests that support copyright holders.214
ii. Speech Rights of Copyright Holders
This proposal to asymmetrically perform independent review to the
benefit of fair users over copyright holders seems to ignore the principle
that copyright serves First Amendment values as much as, if not more
than, fair use. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Eldred v. Ashcroft,215
"[C]opyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate
ideas," its very purpose being "to promote the creation and publication of
free expression."2 16 Denying copyright holders the benefit of independent
212. See discussion supra Part III.C.2.a.1 (explaining that error does not preclude a court from
declaring legal principles that should guide similar situations in the future).
213. See discussion infra Part Ill.C.2.b (explaining that judges can declare legal principle to
guide future decision even while affirming under a clear error standard).
214. 1 thank Professor Dotan Oliar for this consideration that he raised while commenting on a
previous draft of my article at the Fourth Annual Junior Scholars in Intellectual Property Workshop,
held at Michigan State University College of Law.
215. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
216. The Court rejected the argument that copyright is subject to a speech restrictive analysis
based on the following:
The Copyright Clause and First Amendment were adopted close in time. This proximity
indicates that, in the Framers' view, copyright's limited monopolies are compatible with
free speech principles. Indeed, copyright's purpose is to promote the creation and publi-
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review might increase the cost of protecting their protected speech, i.e.,
copyrighted expression. It is therefore arguable that independent review
should apply where fair users prevail to protect the speech of copyright
holders.
This argument seems to draw strength from First Amendment theo-
ry. If the purpose of freedom of speech is to give rise to a robust market-
place of ideas that ultimately produces human enlightenment, then the
role of the Free Speech Clause should be to engender ideas and their
217expression. Independent review of decisions favoring fair users would
seem to serve that end: it would offer greater protection to copyright
holders, which would facilitate an increase in the production of copy-
righted expression. Similarly, it is thought that copyright facilitates a
means for realizing individual autonomy218 and exercising freedom of
imagination.2 19 Thus, asymmetric application of independent review
seems inconsistent with these theoretical purposes underlying the Free
Speech Clause.
It is true that the proposal for asymmetric application of independ-
ent review might reduce production of copyrighted expression, which
would disserve the goals of First Amendment speech theories. But this
fact suggests only that a tension exists between over-enforcement of fair
use and the Free Speech Clause. It does not suggest that the tension be-
tween fair use and the Free Speech Clause is greater than, or even com-
parable to, the tension between copyright and the Free Speech Clause.220
And in fact, the copyright tension appears much greater than the fair-use
tension: copyright appears to pose a greater threat to free speech than
does fair use. Two reasons support this conclusion. First, the stakes are
much higher for fair users who contemplate an erroneous judgment than
they are for copyright holders. 2 2 1 Fair users face a penalty that both en-
cation of free expression. As Harper & Row observed: "[T]he Framers intended copy-
right itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the
use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and dissemi-
nate ideas."
Id. at 219 (alteration in original) (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 558 (1985)).
217. See generally Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas .... ); RODNEY A. SMOLLA,
SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT §2:20
(2011) (articulating marketplace theory).
218. See generally C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989).
219. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112
YALE L.J. 1, 37-48 (2002).
220. Nor does this fact suggest that any sort of abridgment has occurred. See U.S. CONST.
amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . ." (emphasis add-
ed)). Weakening the incentive of copyright holders to speak should not constitute an abridgment, for
otherwise, so would repealing the Copyright Act itself, as would repealing a law requiring the filing
of income-tax returns.
221. See Snow, supra note 114, at 1817 (concluding that disparity in outcomes that fair users
and copyright holders respectively face when each contemplates an erroneous judgment distin-
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joins their speech and inflicts financial punishment;222 Copyright holders
face a denial of rent due for the use of their property. 22 3 Second, the pro-
224
cedural landscape already favors copyright holders. A fair user must
demonstrate the legitimacy of his use: an admitted use is an infringing
use unless the fair user can persuade the fact-finder otherwise. 22 5 Where
uncertainty prevents that persuasion, copyright holders automatically
win.226 And uncertainty always accompanies the question of fairness.227
Procedurally, free speech in the form of copyrighted expression enjoys a
great advantage over free speech in the form of fair-use expression.
Accordingly, the fact that a tension may exist between fair use and
the Free Speech Clause does not suggest that courts should apply inde-
pendent review symmetrically. In practice, the tension that exists be-
tween copyright and the Free Speech Clause is much greater. This dis-
parity between tensions suggests that independent review should apply
asymmetrically so as to disfavor the copyright holder-the litigant whose
interest lies in greatest tension with the Free Speech Clause.
It should further be noted that a fallacy exists in the argument that
copyright as speech merits as much protection as fair use. The fallacy
becomes apparent when considering the meaning of protection. Protec-
tion of what? Copyright holders seek protection of their rights to exclude
others from using expression. Fair users seek protection of their rights to
express themselves by using another's expression. Stated differently,
copyright holders seek protection of property; fair users seek protection
of speech. This understanding implies that an argument that copyright
holders should be protected by strengthening their ability to enforce cop-
yright is a property argument. It is not a speech argument. The argument
is fallacious that purports that speech rights of copyright holders demand
the same protection as speech rights of fair users: copyright holders
claim protection of property rights, which are subservient to the speech
rights of fair users. Independent review applies asymmetrically to protect
the speech rights at issue-those, and only those, of the fair user.
guishes the chilling effects of those respective outcomes on the production of fair-use material and
copyrighted material).
222. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006).
223. See Snow, supra note 114, at 1817.
224. See id. at 1781.
225. See Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2003) ("The burden
of proof is on the copier because fair use is an affirmative defense . . . ." (citing Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994))); Snow, supra note 114, at 1787-91 (discussing effect
of placing burden of proof on fair user).
226. See Snow, supra note 114, at 1790-91.
227. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 588 (1985) ("[T]he
endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that can arise in particular cases
precludes the formulation of exact rules in the [fair use] statute." (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-176, at
66 (1976))); see also Leval, supra note 128, at 1106-07 (observing confusion among judges as to the
meaning of fair use); Snow, supra note 114, at 1790-91.
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A final argument for symmetric application based on the speech
rights of the copyright holder is that an erroneous finding of fair use
might force the copyright holder to speak when he prefers to remain si-
lent.22 8 This argument, however, is unavailing.2 29 It is questionable
whether copyright holders are speaking when others use their expression.
Likewise, it is questionable that using their already-published expression
forces them to speak given that they have already chosen to speak it.
Finally, constitutional jurisprudence calls into question a law that forces
speech only if a threat of punishment is present (e.g., imprisonment,
fines, taxes, or an injunction); copyright holders do not face such a threat
when someone uses their expression.230
b. Policy Consideration of Certainty
Aside from constitutional considerations, the policy reason of
providing greater certainty for litigants should be considered in contem-
plating the standard of review. It may seem that symmetric application
would facilitate greater certainty in fair use. After all, symmetric applica-
tion would allow an appellate court to rule as a matter of law regardless
of whether a fair user prevailed at trial, and more opportunities to rule as
a matter of law would seem to bring more clarity to the doctrine.21 By
contrast, if appellate courts may perform independent review only
asymmetrically, the cases in which they may rule as a matter of law seem
limited. Under clear error review, an affirmance would mean merely that
the jury drew reasonable inferences; the appellate court's holding would
not speak to whether the same conduct in the future would be considered
fair. The possibility of inconsistency would give rise to uncertainty.
This possibility appears unlikely because, as noted above, the
asymmetric proposal would not require courts to cease ruling as a matter
of law on appellate review when affirming under clear error (or, of
course, when reversing under clear error).232 In affirming a jury finding,
an appellate court may articulate legal principles to guide future fact-
finders. Indeed, if the court so chooses, the basis for its conclusion that
there is no clear error may be that the use is fair as a matter of law.233 The
standard of review speaks only to the floor for affirming a judgment; it
228. See Harper, 471 U.S. at 559-60 (recognizing that copyright serves "the right to refrain
from speaking at all" (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977))).
229. The Court's comment in Harper recognizing that copyright serves the First Amendment
value of refraining from speaking was made in the context of examining the right of first publica-
tion-not the right of subsequent uses. See id.
230. See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1291 (10th Cir. 2004).
231. Cf Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 114, at 2442 (citing certainty as a reason for apply-
ing independent review in the context of the substantial-similarity inquiry).
232. See discussion supra Part Ill.C.2.a.i (explaining that clear error does not preclude a court
from declaring legal principles that should guide similar situations in the future).
233. See, e.g., Triangle Publ'ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1175
n. 11 (5th Cir. 1980) (ruling as a matter of law that defendant's use was fair, and contemplating that
applicable standard could be clearly erroneous).
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does not speak to the ceiling.234 Courts could still rule as a matter of law
under a clear error standard.
The argument against the proposal for asymmetry is also questiona-
ble for the simple reason that uncertainty, to an extent, should be pre-
served in fair use. Uncertainty allows flexibility.2 35 To preserve flexibil-
ity, courts have always preached that a fundamental tenant of fair use is
that each use raises its own considerations of fairness.2 3 6 Each use poten-
tially raises circumstances that could represent an element of speech re-
quiring protection.2 37 Through case-by-case analyses, fair use necessarily
limits the precedential value of any inferences drawn in a particular anal-
ysis. 2 38 Inferences drawn in one case are not binding on a subsequent
case. 2 39 Procedures governing fair use, then, should not assay to eradicate
the doctrine of uncertainty.
234. See FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a)(6) (stating standard for reversal of factual finding in terms of
necessary circumstance, i.e., clearly erroneous findings). Of course the technical holding of an
affirmance under a clear error standard is that the evidence supports the jury's finding, and nothing
more than that. See generally WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 78 § 2585 at 405-06 (explaining the
meaning of the clearly erroneous standard and the mistake of inferring anything beyond that mean-
ing). But it seems improbable that future courts would ignore language that declares legal principles
in an affirming opinion. E.g., Sony Computer Entm't Am., Inc. v. Bleem, LLC, 214 F.3d 1022, 1027
(9th Cir. 2000) (relying on Triangle Publ'ns, 626 F.2d at 1175 n. 11, for propositions of law that the
Triangle court articulated in affirming fair use finding, despite fact that the Triangle court stated that
the governing legal standard might be clear error); Pro Arts, Inc. v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., No. 85-
3022, 1986 WL 16647 at *1 (6th Cir. March 25, 1986) (same). If the appellate court makes clear in
its opinion that the use must be viewed as fair as a matter of law, a future court contemplating simi-
lar facts would know that a finding of infringement would result in clear error. As a practical matter,
an appellate aflirmance under a clear error standard may still give license to future trial courts to
conclude that a use is fair as a matter of law.
235. See Ned Snow, The Forgotten Right of Fair Use, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming
2012), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1659855, at 5 ("Uncertainty, then, is unavoidable-
indeed, even intentional-in the doctrine of fair use, for uncertainty allows flexibility and a breadth
of application.").
236. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (noting that fair
use requires a case-by-case analysis); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No.
4901) (describing the process of determining whether an unauthorized copy constitutes fair use as
"the metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions are, or at least may be, very subtile and refined,
and sometimes, almost evanescent").
237. Cf Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219, 221 (2003) (describing fair use as a "free
speech safeguard[]" and a "First Amendment accommodation[]"); Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577.
238. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (explaining that fair use calls for case-by-case analysis);
see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (explaining that
each fair use case "must be decided on its own facts" (citation omitted)).
239. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.) ("[A]s
soon as literal appropriation ceases to be the test [for copyright infringement], the whole matter is
necessarily at large, so that, as what recently well said by a distinguished judge, the decisions cannot
help much in a new case." (citation omitted)). Compare Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919) (Holmes, J.) ("[T]he character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is
done. The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in
a theatre and causing a panic." (citing Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 205-06 (1904))), with
Simms v. Stanton, 75 F. 6, 10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1896) ("What would be a 'fair use' in one case might
not be in another."). Cf Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 n.9 (1973) (noting that even if juries
may reach different conclusions as to whether expression merits speech protection in the obscenity
context, constitutionals rights are not abridged because "one of the consequences we accept under
our jury system" is that "different juries may reach different results" (quoting Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 492 n.30 (1957)).
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The point at which flexibility should be sacrificed for certainty by
ruling as a matter of law is an issue for appellate courts to discern. Thus
far, for instance, appellate courts have chosen to establish as a matter of
law the process for determining fairness when a user records a television
show on a VCR for subsequent home use;240 however, they have chosen
to leave open the question of fairness when musicians employ portions of
another artist's song in a seemingly parodic style. 24 1 An asymmetric
standard of review would not preclude courts from continuing to discern
when it is appropriate to rule as a matter of law. Except in one situa-
tion-where judge and jury disagree. Specifically, where an appellate
court believes that a use should be infringing, but it views a jury's find-
ing of fairness as not clearly erroneous, the clear error standard would
prevent the court from ruling as a matter of law that the use is infring-
ing.242 And this is as it should be.243 Uses over which reasonable minds
disagree should lie in the grey. 24 It gives breathing space to those uses
that lie at the margins of fairness.245 Hence, those uses that a jury would
recognize as fair but an appellate court would rebuke as infringing
should be spared the condemnation of endless banishment as a matter of
law.
D. Decisions on Summary Judgment
Up to this point, I have addressed appellate review of bench trials
and jury trials. The question remains regarding the standard to apply in
reviewing the factual inferences of fair use at summary judgment. The
answer to this question is de novo-the same standard that applies in
reviewing any matter decided on summary judgment.24 6 For the same
reason that appellate courts should review bench trials de novo, appellate
courts should review summary judgments de novo: a single trial judge is
240. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447-55 (1984).
Likewise, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 709 (9th Cir. 2007), and Kelly v.
Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 817-22 (9th Cir. 2003), must be relevant for future cases that
contemplate the fairness of posting thumbnail images on a search engine.
241. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 589 ("In parody, as in news reporting, context is everything,
and the question of fairness asks what else the parodist did besides go to the heart of the original."
(citation omitted)).
242. The Seventh Circuit well defined the process of finding clear error as follows: "To be
clearly erroneous, a decision must strike us as more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must ...
strike us as wrong with the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish." Parts & Elec. Motors,
Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1988).
243. See Weinreb, supra note 198, at 1161 (criticizing the approach of providing a more defi-
nite and manageable doctrine of fair use).
244. See Snow, supra note 235, at 5.
245. Cf Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (1994) (explaining that fair use must guarantee "breathing
space within the confines of copyright").
246. E.g., Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2000) ("We review a grant of
summary judgment de novo applying the same standard as the district court." (citing Belfi v. Pren-
dergast, 191 F.3d 129, 135 (2d. Cir. 1999))). Because witness credibility is not at issue on summary
judgment, three judges on appeal are three times as qualified to offer their opinion of fairness as is
one judge on summary judgment. For the same reason, then, that de novo should govern a bench
trial, de novo should govern summary judgment. See discussion supra Part IlI.C. 1.
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in no better position to determine a use's fairness than are three appellate
judges.
Yet in reviewing summary judgment decisions de novo, appellate
courts must be careful not to rule as they otherwise might in other mat-
ters before them on summary judgment. Specifically, they should not
reverse the summary judgment and rule as a matter of law for the copy-
right holder-as they have at times done in the past.247 In Part IV below,
I explain that trial courts should employ summary judgment only in favor
of fair users.248 Assuming that trial courts follow my proposal in Part IV,
an appellate court's review of summary judgments will be limited to
those that favor fair users. In reviewing those decisions, if the appellate
court reverses the summary judgment for the fair user, it should not rule
as a matter of law that the use is infringing. For the reasons that trial
courts should refrain from ruling on summary judgment for copyright
holders, which I detail in Part IV below, appellate courts should also so
refrain. A reversal of summary judgment, then, should only deny the fair
user the opportunity to prevail as a matter of law before a judge; it should
not deny the fair user the right to prevail as a matter of fact before a jury.
IV. TRIAL COURT ADJUDICATION
As a general matter, the law recognizes some circumstances that al-
low judges to decide factual issues as a matter of law.2 4 9 For instance, a
judge may decide a factual issue on summary judgment where the judge
believes that a reasonable jury could reach only one finding.250 The ques-
tion that follows is whether fair use, as a factual issue normally for the
jury to decide, may be decided as a matter of law by a trial judge. I an-
swer this question in the affirmative by explaining the particular circum-
stances that should or should not allow for judges to decide fair use as a
matter of law. Specifically, I propose that judges should rule on summary
judgment whenever they believe that a use is fair. I further propose that
judges should refrain from ruling-except in the most blatant of circum-
stances-on summary judgment in favor of copyright holders. In short, I
247. See, e.g., Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1998) (ruling
for copyright holder on summary judgment, thereby reversing district court's grant of summary
judgment for defendant on fair use, and foreclosing opportunity for jury to find fair use); Marcus v.
Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1174-79 (9th Cir. 1983) (reversing district court's dismissal of the copy-
right holder's infringement claim, and in so doing, rejecting fair user's argument by entering sum-
mary judgment for copyright holder).
248. The Article contemplates summary judgment for copyright holders in only the most
obvious of circumstances, i.e., where fair use is not even arguable. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
249. See, e.g., Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1223 (11th Cir.
2008) ("[Nion-infringement may be determined as a matter of law on a motion for summary judg-
ment [on grounds that] no reasonable jury, properly instructed, could find that the two works are
substantially similar." (quoting Herzong v. Castle Rock Entm't, 193 F.3d 1241, 1247 (l lth Cir.
1999) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Containment Techs. Grp., Inc. v. Am. Soc'y
of Health Sys. Pharmacists, No. 1:07-cv-0997-DFH-TAB, 2009 WL 838549, at *8 (S.D. Ind. March
26, 2009) (applying Bose standard of constitutional speech protection on summary judgment).
250. See Oravec, 527 F.3d at 1223.
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argue for an extraordinary practice of summary judgment: an asymmetric
application that favors fair users.
A. Summary Judgment for Fair Users
It would seem that the constitutional obligation underlying the doc-
trine of independent review should apply as much to trial judges as it
does to appellate judges.2 5 1 If an appellate court is constitutionally obli-
gated to conduct an independent review of facts, it would seem that a
trial court must also, for trial courts are as obligated to protect constitu-
tional rights as appellate courts are.252 Therefore, a trial court's obligation
to protect a fair user's constitutional right of speech suggests that the trial
court may rule for a fair user as a matter of law. A trial court that be-
lieves that a factual finding of infringement would encroach on a consti-
tutional right of a fair user should be obligated to uphold that constitu-
tional right by overturning, or preventing, that finding. Accordingly, trial
courts should rule as a matter of law on the issue of fair use where doing
so would serve to protect the fair user's right of speech. Where a trial
court believes that a use is fair, a fair user's constitutional right to speak
requires the court to rule as a matter of law that the use is fair.
Because independent review calls for a de novo standard-where
appellate courts determine fairness without any deference to the reasona-
bleness of jury findings-it would seem that trial courts examining the
issue of fairness under the doctrine of independent review also would
perform that examination without any deference to the reasonableness of
jury findings. That is, the rationale for independent review suggests that
a trial court's conclusion that a use is fair should be realized even if the
court recognizes that reasonable jurors might disagree. If the court be-
lieves the use should be fair, even where it recognizes that reasonable
minds might differ, the court's obligation to protect the fair user's speech
should allow the court to rule as a matter of law that the use is fair.253
Under the constitutional obligation to protect fair-use speech, then,
the fairness of a use could be found at summary judgment as a pure issue
of law. But this constitutional justification supports only a summary
judgment ruling that favors fair users.2 54 As I discuss above in Part III,
the constitutional rationale for independent review suggests an asymmet-
ric application of de novo review; therefore, in the trial context, that ra-
tionale suggests that summary judgment based on a judge's constitution-
251. See Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 114, at 2443-44.
252. See, e.g., Quantum Elecs. Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 753, 767-
69 (D.R.I. 1995) (applying Bose standard of constitutional speech protection on summary judgment);
Containment Techs., 2009 WL 838549, at * 18 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (same).
253. See, e.g., Containment Techs., 2009 WL 838549, at *18 (granting summary judgment
under Bose on grounds that reasonable jury could find for speaker).
254. E.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 386 F. Supp. 2d 324, 327-33
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (granting defendant summary judgment based on fair use of copyright holder's rock
music posters in biographical book), affd, 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006).
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al obligation only applies to summary judgment decisions that favor fair
users.
This is not to say, though, that ruling for copyright holders on sum-
mary judgment-under the usual summary judgment standard-is inap-
propriate. That question I examine in the next section. The extent of the
argument in this section is that summary judgment based on the constitu-
tional obligation to protect speech, which would justify a judge in ruling
summarily even where she recognized that reasonable minds might disa-
gree, should only be employed in favor of fair users. This one-sided ap-
plication of the constitutional obligation appears justified for the same
reason that it is justified in the appellate context: independent judicial
review at both the trial and appellate levels protects a fair user's speech
right to the extent that it avoids an erroneous jury finding against the fair
user.25 5 By contrast, summary judgment favoring a copyright holder
would deny the fair user an opportunity for the jury to recognize the
speech nature of the use. In short, the speech right of the fair user gives
her two bites at the apple (the judge and the jury); the property right of
the copyright holder gives her one bite at the apple (the jury).
The Seventh Amendment strengthens this argument for asymmetric
application of summary judgment in favor of fair users.2 56 I have argued
elsewhere that the Seventh Amendment demands that the issue of fair
use be decided by a jury: either litigant has a Seventh Amendment argu-
ment that fair use should go to a jury.2 57 The only justification that would
excuse a court in ignoring this Seventh Amendment argument would be
that a more important constitutional right needs protection. 2 5 8 Disregard-
ing a copyright holder's demand for a jury may be constitutionally justi-
fled on the grounds that the more important constitutional right of speech
needs protection from a jury. That is, protecting the fair user's right of
speech would justify a trial court ignoring a copyright holder's constitu-
tional right to a jury. Only because the First Amendment requires inde-
pendent review may the trial court ignore the copyright holder's Seventh
Amendment right by deciding as a matter of law that the use is fair. Yet
255. See discussion, supra Part Ill.C.2.a.i.
256. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VII ("[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in
any Court of the United States.").
257. Snow, supra note 1, at 544-53.
258. 1 thank Professor Mark Lemley for this consideration that he raised while commenting on
a previous draft of my article at the Fourth Annual Junior Scholars in Intellectual Property Work-
shop, held at Michigan State University College of Law. Professor Lemley keenly noted a constitu-
tional tension in my argument that is based on both the First and Seventh Amendments; i.e., the
Seventh Amendment usually serves as a basis for directing an issue to the jury whereas the First
Amendment usually serves as the basis for removing an issue from the jury. Although this tension
exists, it is not fatal to my argument. On the one hand, as I explain in the passage above, the Seventh
Amendment constitutional interest of a copyright holder is less important than the First Amendment
interest of a fair user. On the other hand, the Seventh Amendment interest of the fair user is more
important than the First Amendment interest of a copyright holder. See Part Ill.C.2.a.ii (discussing
speech interests of copyright holder). In other words, I resolve the tension by prioritizing the consti-
tutional rights at issue under the distinct circumstances contemplated.
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ignoring the Seventh Amendment right is not so justified if the trial court
believes that a use is not fair. A denial of a defendant's Seventh Amend-
ment right where the judge believed the use to be infringing cannot be
justified on the grounds that the judge is protecting the fair user's right of
speech, for ruling against a fair user does not protect his speech. There-
fore, to decide against a fair user on summary judgment would be to de-
ny the constitutional right to a jury without any justifiable reason.25 9
Thus, the obligation of courts to protect constitutional rights, which
gives rise to the doctrine of independent review, implies that trial courts
may rule as a matter of law that a use is fair, independent of whether a
reasonable jury would disagree. It appears that a trial court may, under
specific circumstances, treat fair use as a pure issue of law appropriate
for summary judgment. Fair use decided on summary judgment-as a
pure issue of law-is appropriate where the court would rule for fair us-
ers, but it is not appropriate where the court would rule against fair users.
B. Prohibition of Summary Judgment for Copyright Holders
Although I argue that a trial court may not rule as a matter of law
for a copyright holder under the doctrine of independent review, this
argument does not imply that a trial court may not rule as a matter of law
for a copyright holder in any situation.260 Absent reason otherwise, the
usual standards for judgment as a matter of law and summary judgment
should apply;2 6 1 and both doctrines allow a trial court to rule for a litigant
as a matter of law where the court concludes that a reasonable jury would
reach only one finding.2 62 Arguably, then, it would seem that a trial court
may rule as a matter of law for copyright holders where, in the court's
view, no reasonable jury could find the use to be fair.
It is true that the no-reasonable-jury standard for ruling as a matter
of law is entrenched in American jurisprudence.2 63 But there is good rea-
son to depart from that standard in the context of deciding fair use cases.
When the Supreme Court explained the no-reasonable-jury standard on
summary judgment in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,264 the Court qualified
that standard as applying in the "run-of-the-mill civil case." 2 65 Fair use is
259. The denial of the defendant's jury right cannot be justified on the grounds that the court is
protecting the copyright holder's right of speech, for the copyright holder's right of speech is not
threatened in a copyright suit. See discussion supra Part Ill.C.2.a.ii.
260. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-53 (1986).
261. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a), 56.
262. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-53 (explaining that inquiry under the "genuine issue"
standard of summary judgment is the same for the "reasonable jury" standard of a directed verdict,
and that one "mirrors" the other); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 78, at § 2532, at 484-85 (recogniz-
ing judicial popularity of equating the reasonableness standard for ruling as a matter of law under
Rule 50 (a) with standard for summary judgment under Rule 56).
263. See generally WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 78, at § 2532.
264. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
265. The Anderson Court qualified its reasonable-jury standard for ruling on summary judg-
ment as follows:
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not a run-of-the-mill civil case. Fair use represents an especially difficult
subject matter to ascertain, and, as a result, it may be difficult for judges
to accurately assess whether a jury would find inferences of fairness to
be reasonable.2 66 Add to this the fact that the jury determination is inte-
gral to determining a speech right, and fair use stands apart from the run-
of-the-mill civil cases for which the no-reasonable-jury inquiry ap-
plies. 267
1. Uncertainty of Judicial Adequacy at Assessing Fairness
Even accepting the fact that fair use is not the run-of-the-mill civil
case, it is arguable that judges should still be able to apply the no-
reasonable-jury standard in favor of copyright holders. If fair use in truth
represents an issue that is especially difficult for judges to predict wheth-
er a reasonable jury could find a use to be fair, this would seem to sug-
gest merely that judges should not apply the no-reasonable-jury standard
when they are not sure whether a jury would find the use to be fair; it
does not seem to suggest that they should not apply the standard when
they are sure. Judges, it is arguable, are at least sufficiently competent to
assess when no reasonable jury would find a use to be fair.
This argument assumes that a judge's view of what a reasonable ju-
ry would find is accurate. But this assumption is questionable. The infer-
ences in the fair-use analysis often turn on social value judgments that
vary with extremity from one person to another.26 8 Simply put, subjectiv
ity may color not only a judge's perception of whether an inference is the
most reasonable, but also her perception of whether an inference is at all
reasonable. The likelihood of an inaccurate perception of the reasonable
jury varies according to the degree of subjectivity involved in the judg-
ment itself. And fair use often appears to raise subjective questions.2 69
For instance, in Clean Flicks of Colorado v. Soderbergh,27 0 the
judge believed that no reasonable jury could find that the defendant's
editing service of movies, which entailed removing indecent conduct
from movies without causing any harm to the market for the copyrighted
If the defendant in a run-of-the-mill civil case moves for summary judgment or for a di-
rected verdict based on the lack ofproofofa material fact, the judge must ask himself not
whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a
fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented.... The
judge's inquiry, therefore, unavoidably asks whether reasonable jurors could find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict ....
477 U.S. at 250-53 (emphasis added).
266. See discussion, supra Part HI.C.2.a.i.
267. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
268. See, e.g., Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108-12 (2d Cir. 1998) (revers-
ing district court's grant of summary judgment for defendant and precluding defendant from trying
issue of fair use to jury).
269. See Snow, supra note 1, at 497-501.
270. 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006).
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movies, would constitute a fair use. 271 Although the question of fairness
there was apparently highly subjective, the judge believed that no rea-
sonable jury could find otherwise.272 I believe that a reasonable jury
could have: the defendants were encouraging the sale of the copyrighted
works by editing them, and the defendant's editing was, in a sense, a
criticism of the underlying moral content. 27 3
Or consider Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood.274 The defendant,
Kirkwood, transmitted radio broadcasts over the phone to its customers
without the permission of the copyright holder of those broadcasts, Infin-
ity. At summary judgment, the district court held the use to be fair.276
The Second Circuit disagreed, holding the use to be infringing.2 77 Tell
ingly, the Second Circuit both analyzed fair use as an issue of fact and
denied the defendant the opportunity to try the issue to a jury. 278In ef-
fect, then, the Second Circuit held that its view of fairness was not only a
reasonable view that the trial judge did not recognize, but also one that a
reasonable jury could not disagree with.279 Putting aside the merits of the
question of fairness, the procedural implication of the court's denial of
the jury trial is that the trial judge's view was entirely unreasonable. So
whether we believe the appellate court (and accordingly doubt the trial)
or believe the trial court (and accordingly doubt the appellate court), we
can infer from the procedural holding that judges are not always accurate
at assessing the views of a reasonable jury. Kirkwood demonstrates judi-
cial incompetence at determining what a jury would consider to be an
unreasonable view.
In the face of uncertainty surrounding the competency of judges at
deciding fair use, it is advisable to preserve the opportunity for defend-
ants to have a jury decide the issue. So even when a judge believes that
no reasonable jury could find a defendant's use to be fair, the subjective-
ly and socially contested nature of the issue merits jury consideration.
Especially in the context of fair use does the necessity for jury considera-
tion become evident. Views of fairness often are held in the extremity.
Fairness turns on social value judgments that vary with extremity from
person to person, so opinions on whether a use is fair may vary as widely
as the disparity of life experiences between very different people. It ap-
271. Id. at 1241-44.
272. See Snow, supra note 1, at 501-03 (analyzing Clean Flicks).
273. Id. at 502-03.
274. 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998).
275. Id. at 106.
276. Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 965 F. Supp. 553, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
277. Infinity, 150 F.3d at 104.
278. Id. at 106, 111-12 (implicitly recognizing the factual nature of the fair-use question by
relying on the burden of proof as a basis to determine the issue).
279. See id.
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pears ill advisable, then, for a trial judge to rule as a matter of law on the
basis that no reasonable jury would find a use to be fair.280
2. A Narrow Exception to the Prohibition
This one-sided application of summary judgment in favor of fair us-
ers is not without qualification. An absolute prohibition of summary
judgment to copyright holders would result in defendants asserting fair
use, even where it was not arguable, simply as a litigation strategy to
prolong a final verdict. And where the facts indicate infringement to the
extent that a fair use claim is not even colorable, prolonging the obvious
verdict would not seem to serve any interests of a protected speaker.28 1 It
would seem, then, that those instances of infringement that are blatantly
obvious should not inhibit a copyright holder's ability to enforce his
property rights to the same extent as instances where fair use is at least
arguable. Copyright holders should incur a lower cost to enforce rights
against blatant infringers than against arguable fair users.2 82
Yet because subjective views of a judge color the framework
through which she views the fair-use inferences, the standard for deter-
mining blatant infringement must be high-something more than reason-
ableness. It should be requisite, then, that a judge deem a defendant's
fair-use argument to be frivolous-not merely unreasonable-before
granting a copyright holder's motion for summary judgment. Such a
280. Removing fair-use issues from summary judgment consideration would not be unfamiliar
to the law. See Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm't, 193 F.3d 1241, 1247 (11th Cir. 1999) ("Summary
judgment historically has been withheld in copyright cases because courts have been reluctant to
make subjective determinations .... ). Other areas of the law deny the application of Rule 50(a) and
Rule 56 owing to the subjectivity of a particular issue. For instance, issues relating to a defendant's
state of mind or the reasonableness of a defendant's conduct are often held to be inappropriate for
summary judgment. See Braxton-Secret v. A.H. Robins Co., 769 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir.1985)
("Questions involving a person's state of mind . . . are generally factual issues inappropriate for
resolution by summary judgment." (citation omitted)); Gauck v. Meleski, 346 F.2d 433, 437 (5th
Cir. 1965) ("Because of the peculiarly elusive nature of the term 'negligence' and the necessity that
the trier of facts pass upon the reasonableness of the conduct in all the circumstances in determining
whether it constitutes negligence, it is the rare personal injury case which can be disposed of by
summary judgment, even where the historical facts are concededly undisputed.").
Of course this position does not imply that a trial court should not rule as a matter of law
based on the doctrine of independent review-for fair users. See discussion supra Part 11I.A. That
the court is ill equipped to opine on the views of a reasonable jury does not imply that the court is ill
equipped to opine its own views on a constitutional fact. For ruling as a matter of law on the basis of
its obligation to protect a constitutional right enables a court to rule for a fair user independent of
whether the court believes that a reasonable jury could rule otherwise. Hence, precluding a court
from ruling as a matter of law under the no-reasonable jury standard should not preclude that court
from ruling as a matter of law under the independent-review standard. Courts, then, should refrain
from entertaining motions for summary judgment by copyright holders, whereas they should enter-
tain those motions by fair users.
281. Consider a defendant who has copied verbatim a plaintiffs creative work of fiction for the
sole purpose of selling unauthorized copies in competition with the author's work, where no differ-
ence exists between the copyrighted work and the unauthorized copies. In such a situation, it appears
that no inferences can in good faith be drawn to support a finding of fairness.
282. See Amstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468, 470 (2d Cir. 1946) (rejecting summary judg-
ment where there is "the slightest doubt as to the facts" but recognizing that "there are cases in
which a trial would be farcical." (citations omitted)).
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standard would mean that a defendant could defeat a copyright holder's
motion for summary judgment merely by making a fair use argument in
good faith. The good-faith standard would protect fair users from the
subjective views of judges.
C Precedent for One-Sided Summary Judgment
This proposal that summary judgment be available for only fair us-
ers merely restores the law to its proper state. Indeed, one-sided applica-
tion of summary judgment for fair users is not without precedent. When
the Second Circuit initially began treating fair use cases on summary
judgment, it employed language suggesting this: "Admittedly, the fair
use determination often requires a complex and subtle evaluation of nu-
merous mixed issues of fact and law. When the law requires a judgment
for defendant, however, the difficulty of the fair use question is not a
valid reason to shy away from summary judgment." 283
The reason that summary judgment was proper, according to the
court, was because the law required judgment for the fair user. This sug-
gests, then, that if the law seemed to require judgment for the copyright
holder, summary judgment would not be proper.
Relatedly, on the issue of substantial similarity in copyright suits,
courts will rule for defendants but are reluctant to rule for copyright
holders.284 Like fair use, the issue of whether two works are substantially
283. Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1258-59 (2d Cir. 1986) ("This court,
however, has never suggested the adoption of a per se rule granting a plaintiff in a copyright in-
fringement case immunity from the perils of Rule 56 when a defendant interposes the defense of fair
use.") (emphasis added). See also Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 F. Supp. 706, 709
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (deciding fair use for fair user on summary judgment on grounds that "this circuit
has 'recognized that a court may determine non-infringement as a matter of law on a motion for
summary judgment."' (quoting Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 905, 918 (2d Cir.
1980))).
284. The Second Circuit recently explained that a trial court may determine the factual ques-
tion of substantial similarity on a defendant's motion to dismiss:
[B]ecause the question of substantial similarity typically presents an extremely close
question of fact, questions of non-infringement have traditionally been reserved for the
trier of fact. . . . The question of substantial similarity is by no means exclusively re-
served for resolution by a jury, however, and we have repeatedly recognized that, in cer-
tain circumstances, it is entirely appropriate for a district court to resolve that question as
a matter of law, "either because the similarity between two works concerns only non-
copyrightable elements of the plaintiffs work, or because no reasonable jury, properly
instructed, could find that the two works are substantially similar."
Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations
omitted); see also, e.g., Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 624 (9th Cir. 2010)
("When the issue is whether two works are substantially similar, summary judgment is appropriate if
no reasonable juror could find substantial similarity of ideas and expression. Substantial similarity is
a fact-specific inquiry, but it may often be decided as a matter of law. Indeed, we have frequently
affirmed summary judgment in favor of copyright defendants on the issue of substantial similarity."
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Jones v. Blige, 558 F.3d 485, 490 (6th Cir.
2009) ("In copyright infringement cases, . . . 'a court may compare the two works and render a
judgmentfor the defendant on the ground that as a matter of law a trier of fact would not be permit-
ted to find substantial similarity."' (quoting Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 853 (6th Cir. 2003))
(emphasis added)); cf Segrets, Inc. v. Gillman Kintwear Co., 207 F.3d 56, 61-62 (1st Cir. 2000)
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similar raises questions over which reasonable minds often disagree
(even as to whether a contrary view is reasonable).28 5 Only where two
works are "virtually identical" do courts summarily rule for a copyright
holder on the issue of substantial similarity;28 6 by contrast, on the same
issue courts summarily rule for defendants under the no-reasonable-jury
standard.28 7
Other speech contexts outside of copyright that involve subjective
fact determinations employ summary judgment only for the defendant-
speaker.2 88 Consider defamation. As in the doctrine of fair use, in defa-
mation, a defendant's speech rights turn on a subjective factfinding pro-
cess: the fact-finder must determine a defamation defendant's intent.
In view of this subjective factfinding process, in defamation suits courts
have recognized the threat of summary judgment to speech.2 90 As a re-
sult, courts rarely, if ever, entertain motions for summary judgment
against a defamation defendant: the obviousness of the conclusion that
such issues are best left to a jury has resulted in a dearth of summary
judgment motions by plaintiffs. Nevertheless, given the speech at issue in
defamation actions, courts have recognized the importance of summary
judgments for defamation defendants. 29 ' Never willing to entertain sum-
(affirming grant of summary judgment for copyright holder on issue of substantial similarity given
that the defendant's work constituted "a virtually identical copy").
285. See Baby Buddies, Inc. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 611 F.3d 1308, 1316 (11th Cir. 2010) (af-
firming grant of summary judgment for defendant in copyright suit, but recognizing that on the issue
of substantial similarity "lists of similarities are inherently subjective and unreliable, particularly
where the lists contain random similarities, and many such similarities could be found in very dis-
similar works." (quoting Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1251 (1Ith Cir. 2007)).
286. See Segrets, 602 F.3d at 61-62.
287. See, e.g., Snow, supra note 1, at 502.
288. Compare Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403, 408 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[T]he [City] Coun-
cil's request that the movies be found obscene as a matter of law flies in the face of settled Supreme
Court case law which unquestionably establishes this as a factual determination."), with Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1964) (ruling for defendant as a matter of law, and rejecting argument
that "the determination whether a particular motion picture, book, or other work of expression is
obscene can be treated as a purely factual judgment on which a jury's verdict is all but conclusive"
on grounds that "the question whether a particular work is obscene necessarily implicates an issue of
constitutional law").
289. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
290. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979) (questioning whether deciding
defamation on summary judgment is appropriate, given that decision requires ruling on actual mal-
ice).
291. See, e.g., DeAngelis v. Hill, 847 A.2d 1261, 1267 (N.J. 2004) ("This Court has recognized
that 'summary judgment practice is particularly well-suited for the determination of libel [and defa-
mation] actions' because those actions tend to inhibit comment on matters of public concern." (alter-
ation in original) (quoting Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publ'g Co., 516 A.2d 220, 236 (1986))); see
also Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 673 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) ("[A] motion for
summary judgment in First Amendment cases is an approved procedure because unnecessarily
protracted litigation would have a chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights and
because speedy resolution of cases involving free speech is desirable."). The court in Oliver v. Vil-
lage Voice, Inc., declared in a defamation suit that "the granting of summary judgment may well be
the 'rule' rather than the 'exception."' 417 F. Supp. 235, 237 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (quoting Guitar v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1042, 1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)). Later, however, Justice
Rehnquist questioned this position, although he did not expressly overrule it. See Hutchinson, 443
U.S. at 120 n.9.
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mary judgment motions against defendants, courts are willing to rule on
summary judgmentfor defendants.
V. CONCLUSION
As an issue of fact, fair use may be decided as a matter of law, but
only where doing so serves its speech-protective function. On appeal,
courts should defer to a jury finding that favors the fair user. Everything
else courts should review de novo. This double standard of review is
necessary to protect speech interests of the fair user from the already
imbalanced landscape of the law that favors copyright holders. Adequate
speech protection should ensure that fair users have an opportunity for
both judge and jury to recognize the fairness of their use. For this reason,
trial courts should decide fair use on summary judgment only if their
ruling would find the use to be fair. The proposed double standard of
review and one-sided application of summary judgment are necessary to
uphold the speech protective function of fair use.
THE AFFECTIVE BLINDNESS OF EVIDENCE LAW
TENEILLE R. BROWNt
INTRODUCTION
Evidentiary rules and practices reveal a folk psychological view of
emotion, placing it at odds with reason. Specifically, many substantive
and procedural rules of evidence explicitly require jurors to turn off their
emotions in favor of rational, so-called "top-down," executive thinking.
In order to make the point that this dichotomy between emotion and rea-
son is simultaneously reflected in our evidence law and also empirically
wrong, I will address how emotion is treated in (a) the use of limiting
instructions, (b) the exclusion of prejudicial evidence, (c) credibility as-
sessments, (d) sentencing and damages instructions, (e) instructions re-
lated to the "heat of passion" theory of voluntary manslaughter, and (f)
the excited utterance hearsay exception. In each case I will demonstrate
that while the text of the rules may be benign, the way they are interpret-
ed reflects confusion over the role played by both subtle and intense
emotion. Specifically, the rules listed above evince one of five related
errors:
* Emotional and rational processes can neatly be divided, and by
attending to our emotions, we can-and should-use our cognitive facul-
ties to squash them.
* Emotional evidence and emotional processes always render deci-
sions that are less rational, more prejudicial, and therefore less accurate.
* Emotion testimony distracts us and makes it hard for us to pay at-
tention or remember events.
* Credibility assessments do not require empathy.
* Emotion should not and cannot be involved in moral judgment
and reasoning related to sentencing.
Perhaps more strikingly, encouraging jurors to use their reasoning
to quiet their emotions espouses a view of the juror as aspiring toward
psychopathy. Psychopathy is a clinical personality disorder. It is diag-
nosed through an individual's rating on a set of emotional and social
t Teneille R. Brown is an Associate Professor of Law at S.J. Quinney College of Law at the
University of Utah. She is also an adjunct professor of Internal Medicine, teaching for the Division
of Medical Ethics. Earlier versions of this work were presented to the Legal Decision-Making net-
work for the Macarther Law and Neuroscience Project. Special thanks to Owen Jones for encourag-
ing this paper, and to Hank Greely, Emily Murphy, and the students in Stanford Law School's Law
and Biosciences workshop in spring 2011 for their helpful feedback. Finally, this Article benefited
tremendously by a very thoughtful and careful review by Leslie Francis and Daniel Medwed.
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criteria. As data reveal that not all psychopaths are violent, it appears
that the hallmark traits include the ability to feel little remorse or empa-
thy, and possessing very shallow affect. Psychopaths may be uniquely
able to divorce their reasons from feelings of sadness, shame or guilt. So
they may defy the label of the false dichotomy. Even so, this is surely
not the ideal we aspire to for the modem American juror.
While emotions such as anger might prejudice our judgment, the
failure to differentiate between various emotional (affective) processes
and their impact on decisions reflects a view that is woefully out of step
with our current understanding of emotion and the brain. Emotions may
distract us in some situations and help us focus in others. This may have
to do with the emotion itself and its impact on our perception, attention,
memory or reasoning. Or it may have to do with the emotion's duration
or the social context in which we find ourselves.
Contrary to the skeptical view espoused by some of our greatest ev-
idence scholars, emotion is not universally corrupting, nor is it always at
odds with reason. Emotion is context-specific and non-linear, and it op-
erates at varying levels of consciousness and subtlety.' Further, the cog-
nitive sciences demonstrate that affect and reason are anatomically inter-
connected and functionally interdependent. In this Article, I hope to
demonstrate that, at the neuronal and the social level, the false dichotomy
between emotion and reason falls apart. It has persisted in part because
anatomically incorrect metaphors are deeply embedded in our cultural
history-that we think with our brain and feel with our heart.
This blindness to emotion has deep roots in our common law, and
traces back to the very beginning of jury trials. While civil juries existed
for property disputes and the like, throughout medieval times it was often
the clergy who determined whether an accused was guilty or innocent
through a subjective process known as "the ordeal." As one example, the
"cold water ordeal" involved the defendant being dumped in a large pool
1. See Ben Seymour & Ray Dolan, Emotion, Decision Making, and the Amygdala, 58
NEURON 662, 662 (2008) ("The resulting decision phenotype is typically emotional but arises from
underlying processes that are generally rational and whose effects might often only become apparent
in instances when they cause deviations from rationality.") (emphasis added); Adam L. Darlow &
Steven A. Sloman, Two Systems of Reasoning: Architecture and Relation to Emotion, I WIRES
COGNITIVE SC. 382, 383 (2010); Ap Dijksterhuis, Think Different: The Merits of Unconscious
Thought in Preference Development and Decision Making, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
586, 586 (2004) ("[W]hether what we may call 'unconscious thought' contributes to good decisions
is also not clear."); see generally Timothy D. Wilson et al., Introspecting About Reasons Can Re-
duce Post-Choice Satisfaction, 19 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. BULL. 331 (1993) (arguing that a
consumer's introspection about his or her choice will eventually cause dissatisfaction with that
choice). Psychological level embraces many processes (not just two) and at the neural level, these
processes are multiplied by a factor of 10 to the 16th. See Mark Lubell et al., Institutional Design
Capitalizing on the Intuitive Nature of Decision Making, in BETTER THAN CONSCIOUS?: DECISION
MAKING, THE HUMAN MIND, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONS 413, 417 (Christoph Engel &
Wolf Singer eds., 2008) ("[I]nstitutional-level approaches that embrace a binary distinction between
rational or conscious cognitive processes and the irrational or unconscious cognitive process will
necessarily miss the mark in terms of their value to accurate fact-finding.").
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with a rope tied around his hips. If he sank, he was saved as innocent,
"for the purity of the water had accepted him," but if he managed to
float, he was condemned as guilty. 2 The priest overseeing the ordeal was
thought to channel the judgment of God, or judicium Dei. In 1215 the
Fourth Lateran Council of the Christian Church prohibited clergy from
3
presiding over the ordeal, thus delegitimizing the once divine process.
When the process lost its ecclesiastical imprimatur, "it drew the ground
from under that method of trial."A
Courts needed a substitute for the clergy. The lay jury answered this
call, with common citizens in some cases rendering final judgments.5 To
make this radical shift, it was felt that rules must be put in place to tem-
per the power of uneducated lay jurors. This "reining in" of the jury was
habitually described in terms of quieting their ignorant emotional pas-
sions. Much of the subsequent development in evidence law continued in
this vein of accepting that it was jurors' emotions that needed silencing.
This Article hopes to shatter this deep-seated but folk psychological view
of emotion as pedestrian or corrupting.
While this Article is not meant to disrupt the preference for reason-
able arguments and outcomes over unreasonable and intuitive ones, it
argues that emotions are often necessary for reasoning. This may be par-
ticularly true in social interactions, where we attend to many stimuli and
digest bundles of non-verbal cues. Of course, in other situations, we give
emotion too much credit to improve our credibility, where emotions ac-
tually obscure our memory or our perception of others. Rather than draw-
ing bright policy lines as to when emotions ought to be relied upon, this
Article will take existing rules and practices and unpack the flimsy folk
2. George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 585 (1997). Another
type of ordeal involved burning the accused's hand with hot coals, and then binding the hand with
cloth. When the cloth was removed three days later, a priest would examine the burned skin and pray
to God before the accused to render his judgment. If the skin had begun to heal, the accused would
be acquitted, if it had worsened, the accused was guilty and punished. Thomas P. Gallanis, Reasona-
ble Doubt and the History of the Criminal Trial, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 941, 945 (2009) [hereinafter
Gallanis, Reasonable Doubt] (citing Thomas P. Gallanis, Ordeal in English Common Law, in THE
OXFORD INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL HISTORY (Stanley N. Katz, ed., 2009)).
3. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAW 37 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1898); JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM
OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS IN COMMON LAW, INCLUDING THE STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF
ALL JURISDICTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 3073 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1905).
4. Maximus Lesser, The Historical Development of the Jury System, 134, 150 (1894) ("in-
troduced originally as a matter of favor and indulgence, the jury thus gained ground with advancing
civilization, gradually superseding the more ancient and barbarous customs of battle, ordeal, and
wager of law, until at length it became, both in civil and criminal cases the ordinary mode of deter-
mining facts for judicial purposes.").
5. The reason for the decline of the judicial ordeal and the growth of its substitute, the jury
trial, has been the subject of two competing interpretations. One line of interpretation argues that the
judicial ordeal was about factual proof. Its decline came as people demanded that facts be found by
mortals, not by God. The second line claims that factual proof was never the issue, as the facts of
innocence or guilt were generally known prior to an ordeal. Instead, the latter camp posits that what
was at stake was the moral responsibility for judgment. Id. at 145; Gallanis, Reasonable Doubt,
supra note 2, at 945.
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psychological premises on which they rest.6 This Article argues for nu-
ance, and challenges the current lack of nuance in our evidence practices
related to emotion. I conclude by suggesting ecologically valid research
paradigms to determine how best to revise the rules to properly value
emotional processes.
I. STEPPING BACK: How EVIDENCE LAW MAY BENEFIT FROM THE
COGNITIVE SCIENCES
Scholars have been writing on the uneasy marriage between the
brain, behavior, and the law for at least a hundred years.' Enthusiasm for
the relationship has waxed and waned, with an intellectual explosion in
the last few years based on emerging data from cognitive neuroscience.
Despite developing later in time, the cognitive sciences do not replace
the importance of psychology. Instead, they build upon psychological
theories, offering an "expansion of the tools and concepts now available
to psychologists."9
Under the umbrella of "law and the brain," the doctrinal area that
seems most ripe for review is evidence law. Within evidence law, it
seems that neuroscience can help us articulate more precise definitions
for terms to ensure our normative commitments, once set, track the reali-
ty of our physiological constraints. Data from neuroscience can also
guide procedural rules, employing various decision-making models that
6. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF: As GIVEN BY LOGIC,
PSYCHOLOGY, AND GENERAL EXPERIENCE AND ILLUSTRATED IN JUDICIAL TRIALS 693, 792 (3d ed.
1937) (stating how crude the psychological presumptions under the rules are); see generally
WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE (1985).
7. In the first decade of the twentieth century, Hugo Miinsterberg, then a professor of psy-
chology at Harvard, brazenly announced that the new psychological sciences would supplant the
intuition and common sense of attorneys, judges and juries, especially as related to the "the mind of
the witness." See HUGO MONSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND: ESSAYS ON PSYCHOLOGY AND
CRIME 20 (1908). Some of Miinsterberg's theories have been tested in more sophisticated studies,
and have been borne out. Others, however, have not stood the test of time. One in particular was
Monsterberg's idea that simple word association tests could be used to detect whether a suspect is
lying, based on how much time it takes for the suspect to respond to neutral versus "crime-related"
words. Id. at 73-110. Even John Wigmore, who openly criticized Miinsterburg's book, hoped for an
"energetic alliance of psychology and law, in the noble cause of justice." See Daniel D. Blinka, Why
Modern Evidence Law Lacks Credibility, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 357, 373 (2010) (citing John H.
Wigmore, Professor Muensterberg [sic] and the Psychology of Testimony: Being a Report of the
Case of Cokestone v. Muensterberg, 3 U. ILL. L. REV. 399, 432 (1909)). Wigmore debunked
Mfinsterberg's theory about the ability of psychologists to consistently detect suspects who were
lying using simple word association tests. Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship
Reconsidered: Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REV. 949, 958 n.30 (2006) (citing
Wigmore, supra, at 427-31). Interestingly, more complicated versions of these guilty knowledge or
memory tests have been resuscitated by neuroscientists, and perhaps once again, though his data
were lacking at the time, Mfinsterberg's crude theories may be revitalized. See Eben Harrell,
Fighting Crime by Reading Minds, TIME (Aug. 7, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/health/article/
0,8599,2009131,00.html.
8. To be sure, according to the impressively well-researched work of Michael Saks and
Roger Park, this relationship has been "one of bursts of enthusiasm followed by periods of disen-
chantment." Park & Saks, supra note 7, at 957.
9. Greg J. Norman, John T. Cacioppo, and Gary G. Berntson, Social Neuroscience, I WIRES
COGNITIVE SC. 60, 64 (2010).
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might drive our institutional obligations, such as making sure that jurors
encode testimony and can recall it later. Thus in this Article we refer to
emotional evidence as both testimony of witnesses with emotional con-
tent as well as the related emotional processes of jurors when they hear
such evidence.
As the law of evidence is the law of managing inferences and elimi-
nating unwanted biases, the cognitive neuroscience of decision-making
has been, and will continue to be, very instructive in rethinking why the
rules of evidence exist in their present form, and whether they should
change.'o Seventy-five years ago, legal scholar Robert Maynard Hutchins
observed that evidence law harbored a confusing internal psychology
stemming from human experience and our folk intuitions." Hutchins
believed that if lawyers did not allow evidence law to be systematically
reworked by "objective psychologists," we lawyers would "abdicate our
position as specialists in human behavior" and instead "reaffirm the tra-
ditional conservatism of the profession, and permit the rules of evidence
to recede still further from reality."' 2 Wigmore, on the other hand, de-
spite being quite well read in contemporary psychology, felt that the res-
olution of legal principles should not be outsourced to interloping psy-
chologists.13 Rather than exposing the law's principles to a social science
chopping block, Wigmore thought that the proper gatekeepers for revis-
ing evidence rules "would be the lawyers themselves." 4 Even Hutchins
eventually came to rue his commitment to having psychologists answer
evidentiary questions. He offered an apologia later in his career:
We hoped to discover whether an evidence case was "sound" by
finding out whether the decision was in harmony with psychological
doctrine. What we actually discovered was that psychology had dealt
with very few of the points raised by the law of evidence; and that the
basic psychological problem of the law of evidence, what will affect
juries, and in what way, was one psychology had never touched at
all.' 5
Given the psychological methods of Hutchins's day, his skepticism
regarding psychology's ability to inform the law is understandable. But
10. In order to wash us of our subjective bias, some prefer a Bayesian approach, which is a
theory of evidence based on mathematical probabilities. However, as Allen & Leiter pointed out,
Bayesian analysis still requires subjective valuation for the model to be accurate in predicting out-
comes. Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87 VA.
L. REV. 1491, 1508-09 (2001).
11. See Blinka, supra note 7, at 373-74.
12. The work of Wigmore, Morgan, and Hutchins illuminates this relationship. Id at 374
(quoting HARRY ASHMORE, UNSEASONABLE TRUTHS: THE LIFE OF ROBERT MAYNARD HUTCHINS
47 (1989)). Wigmore disagreed with this proposition.
13. See WIGMORE, supra note 6, at 792.
14. Blinka, supra note 7, at 373; see also TWINING, supra note 6, at 136.
15. Robert Maynard Hutchins, The Autobiography of an Ex-Law Student, I U. CHI. L. REV.
511, 513 (1934). "Hutchins closed with 'the hope of some day striking some mutual sparks' between
law and psychology. That day would be far off." Blinka, supra note 7, at 375.
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the world has since changed.' 6 We now know quite a bit more about how
humans make complex social observations and decisions, and we can
observe the neural correlates of these mechanisms through various neu-
roimaging techniques. 7 Studies of individuals with localized brain le-
sions have also helped us understand how brain structures relate to
healthy and abnormal functioning. We can, therefore, take up where oth-
ers in the law and psychology movement left off, adding another layer of
explanatory power, and a framework for linking structures to functions.
Studying the function and mechanisms of the brain allows us to manipu-
late variables and tasks, control others, and thus say more about the
neuroscientific causes, connectedness, effects, and interventions than
could be said with psychological experimentation alone.' 8
Given the relationship of neuroscience to law, it might be time to
revisit normative epistemological questions in light of neuroscientific
developments.' 9 While I expressly adopt an empirical epistemology for
evidence law here, there are alternatives depending on the purposes be-
ing served in a courtroom.20 Surely discovering the truth is an important
function of the jury trial. But so is legitimately resolving disputes, pre-
serving the integrity of the legal profession and law enforcement, pro-
16. Although as early as the 1920s, some psychology and law researchers appreciated the
complementary and bivalent nature of emotion and reason: "[T]he mind is both receptive and active,
receptive in so far as it receives impressions, and is excited by them to emotion; active in so far as it
transforms its impressions and emotions by reasoning and volition." 2 PAUL VINOGRADOFF,
OUTLINES OF HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE 37 (1920).
17. To be fair, much of this research has not been conducted on mock jurors. But some of the
basic principles from social, cognitive, and affective science can definitely be extrapolated to a trial.
Even so, much more mock jury work needs to be conducted before the evidence rules are dramati-
cally changed. Park & Saks, supra note 7, at 957 ("For obvious reasons, psychology is the most
important of the interdisciplinary threads that can be woven into evidence law scholarship. Evidence
law is much concerned with the abilities of witnesses to perceive, to remember, and to report what
they have observed. It is also concerned with the abilities of jurors to comprehend, evaluate, and
draw inferences from the evidence presented to them, including their ability to assess the sincerity of
lay witnesses and to understand and not be overwhelmed by expert witnesses. All of these are psy-
chological issues.").
18. JOSEPH LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS UNDERPINNINGS OF
EMOTIONAL LIFE 12-13 (1996).
19. See Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and
Everything, 355 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y LONDON B: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775, 1775,
1778, 1784 (2004); Frederick Schauer, Can Bad Science Be Good Evidence? Neuroscience, Lie
Detection, and Beyond, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1191, 1197-99 (2010).
20. Empiricism should inform our evidence rules because courts are not philosophical thought
experiments. Courts exist in the real world, and in the real world, human beings have feelings, im-
perfect eyes and ears, wavering memory, and opinions. Even using a Bayesian analysis of evidence
law and procedure, we still need to generate facts and premises on which our probabilities of accura-
cy are based. Thankfully, there is no omnipotent observer that sees and memorizes everything we
humans do. Thus, at trial there can never be complete objectivity in the assessments of our behavior.
And yet, judges still need to resolve the disputes before them. Was there an agreement to burglarize
the victims' house? Did the physician know that he was committing fraud when he submitted the
Medicare claims? Did the gunman deliberately take aim and shoot, or was it an accident? These are
the kinds of factual legal disputes that result from conflicting versions of events. Of course, the
omniscient observer might be able to provide a third-person snapshot of externally-observable be-
havior. See Craig R. Callen, Cognitive Science and the Sufficiency of "Sufficiency of the Evidence"
Tests, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1113, 1118 (1991).
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moting justice, and encouraging civil obedience. Depending on the way
these oft-competing goals are prioritized, the rules of evidence may or
may not need to comport with empirical data related to cognitive neuro-
science. Indeed, in some cases it might be wise to reject empirical find-
ings in order to achieve larger normative goals.2 1
To the legal purists, let me console you by conceding that scientific
findings cannot and should not by themselves alter the steady drumbeat
of legal rules and traditions; raw data are incapable of answering social-
ly-driven normative questions.22 Specific to legal practice, the discon-
nect, or lack of cross- pollination between data and legal rules is intensi-
fied by the slow speed by which lawyers incorporate knowledge gained
from other fields.23 The normative question of whether science ought to
inform the law was the topic of heated debate between many of our
country's foundational evidence scholars. To be sure, some of our best
philosophers of biology and law still argue that "[e]mpirical questions
are the focus of scientific research, [while] conceptual questions address
how the relevant concepts are articulated" and whether "the degree to
which articulations regarding the brain make sense."24 While I agree that
philosophy should address how concepts are articulated and applied, it is
really the domain of neuroscientists and social psychologists to deter-
mine whether the empirical data are being interpreted in sensible ways.
21. Emotions can and should play differing roles, depending on the environment in which
they are elicited, in whom, and by what. For policy reasons, we may choose to actively discourage
emotional arguments on a ballot initiative, see Advisory Op. to Attorney Gen. re: Fla. Marriage Prot.
Amendment, 926 So. 2d 1229, 1238 (Fla. 2006), but allow them by the police to extract a confes-
sion, see State v. Ardoin, 58 So. 3d 1025, 1037-38 (La. Ct. App. 2011). And we might allow emo-
tion to be expressed overtly during a witness's testimony, but instruct the jurors not to rely on partic-
ular emotions, such as empathy, when they make decisions about how much damages to award in a
tort case.
22. Peter Tillers, What Is Wrong with Character Evidence?, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 781, 782
(1998) ("One prominent observer, John Langbein, takes the position that rules of evidence are par-
ticularly hardy weeds that manage to survive even when there is no good reason for their continued
existence."); see also John Leubsdorf, Presuppositions of Evidence Law, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1209,
1210 (2006) ("[The rules] are so feeble that 'to pull one misshapen stone out of the grotesque struc-
ture is more likely simply to upset its present balance between adverse interests than to establish a
rational edifice.' Not many fields of law can thus be described as too irrational to be improved."
(quoting Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469,486 (1948))).
23. ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 69 (1930) ("[I]nterest shifted on
the one hand to the physical and biological sciences, which were related directly to industry and
economic prosperity, and on the other hand to an empirical political and social science . . . . Such
movements always affect jurisprudence somewhat later than related social sciences because lawyers
respond cautiously to new tendencies through solicitude for the social interest in the general security
and fear of impairing the stability of the legal order.").
24. Michael S. Pardo & Dennis Patterson, Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neurosci-
ence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1211, 1225 (2010). To get a sense of the legs on this debate, see Hermann
Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism About Realism, 43 YALE L.J. 1240, 1248-49 (1933) (defending
rationalism in the face of growing legal realism scholarship, and discussing why realists are internal-
ly confused as they fail to see that legal and moral norms are different, as the law only cares about
behavior regardless of motive, while ethics and morality care about intention; stating that legal
science is empirical, the method of which is observation, the purpose of which is foretelling effect,
the model of which is natural science.). "[T]he realists confuse natural and cultural science ....
[They also] confuse explanation and justification . . . [and] law and ethics." Id. This appears to be
contradicted by such doctrines as mens rea and the torts of battery.
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Crucially, there still must be some translation by lawyers to decide
whether these neuroscience findings fit into the relevant legal molds. But
when drafters of the evidentiary rules explicitly and naively employ folk
psychological ideas to inform their rule-making, we must return to these
scientific assumptions to make certain our existing normative commit-
ments are being realized.
Here, identifying my small piece of the puzzle, I will merely expli-
cate whether our evidence principles, as currently justified and practiced,
track reality.2 5 Put differently, when we ask jurors to put their emotions
and feelings aside in order to make a purely rational decision, are we
asking them to do something that is often impossible? 26 This is a differ-
ent question all together from whether the rules ought to be supported by
empirical data. Once our policy commitments are determined, we must
make sure evidence rules rest on valid presumptions about how humans
actually process information.
As you may have guessed, the specific lens-or field of science-I
will draw upon to answer this question is cognitive, affective, and social
neuroscience, or "cognitive sciences" for short.27 Drawing on both new
and established work in cognitive science concerning the relationship
between emotion, or affect, and reason, I revive various challenges to
evidence law. I argue that we ought to rethink the value of emotion in the
formal decision-making process that is our modem jury trial, as reflected
in the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) and their state counterparts.
I am not the first one to recognize the valuable contribution of
scholarship on emotion to law. Other scholars before me have acknowl-
edged its value in our regulatory rulemaking, 28 legislative process,29 con-
25. In addition to ensuring that the rules themselves reflect how humans actually behave,
neuroscience can contribute in other important ways. Revealing the fuzziness of our behavioral
definitions is just one important function. Neuroscience might also provide structural improvements
to the way evidence is presented throughout a trial, enhancing juror comprehension and memory and
reducing unwanted bias. Neuroscience techniques can also be used to determine whether witnesses
are truly competent, and whether certain people, due to cognitive and affective deficits from autism
or psychopathy may be discouraged from serving on a jury.
26. One review posited that the interface between cognition and emotion encompasses the
"processing of emotionally salient information in contexts requiring cognitive evaluation to generate
an appropriate response." This is precisely what is expected of legal decision makers at trial. Rebec-
ca Elliott et al., Affective Cognition and Its Disruption in Mood Disorders, 36
NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY REVIEWS 153, 153 (2011).
27. 1 recognize that cognitive theorists are often positioned as separate from the subgroup of
affective or social neuroscientists. Here, I use the term "cognitive science" to include all of these
other disciplines and methods of investigating the human brain and its relation to the mind and
society.
28. Recent scholarship by Dan Kahan yields a more respected role of emotion in decision-
making and "rational" risk assessment, as he writes that emotion can serve as a tool for incorporating
cultural worldviews that may not be as capable of overcoming the collective action problem. Dan M.
Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 746 (2008) ("The
irrational weigher theory asserts that individuals lack the capacity to process information that max-
imizes their expected utility. Because of constraints on information, time, and computational power,
ordinary individuals must resort to heuristic substitutes for considered analysis . . . . Like the irra-
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stitutional interpretation,3 0 judicial decisions, ' jury instructions, 32 and
criminal sentencing.33 The specific issue I am addressing here is evidence
law's embodiment of the false dichotomy between emotion and reason.
In all fairness to the dedicated and capable drafters of our evidence rules
and the careful judges who interpret them, they were not alone in view-
ing emotion as antagonistic to reason. Deep within our Western culture is
a tradition of treating emotion as a monolithic fog, an "untrustworthy
force that cripples judgment." 34 While the dichotomy between emotion
tional weigher theory, the cultural evaluator theory treats emotions as entering into the cognition of
risk. But it offers a very different account of how-one firmly aligned with the position that sees
emotions as constituents of reason."); see also Dan M. Kahan, The Progressive Appropriation of
Disgust, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 63, 73 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) ("[W]hen we force decision
makers to be open about the normative commitments that underlie their disgust sensibilities, mem-
bers of the public are fully apprised of what those commitments are."); Rachel F. Moran, Fear
Unbound: A Reply to Professor Sunstein, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 8-9 (2002) (responding to how Cass
Sunstein characterizes the emotion of "fear" in the regulatory process); Molly J. Walker Wilson,
Adaptive Responses to Risk and the Irrationally Emotional Public, 54 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 1297, 1307
(2010).
29. See Andrew Jay McClurg, The Rhetoric of Gun Control, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 53, 66 (1992).
In the policy-making context, Don Welch has investigated the history of our love-hate relationship
with emotion, calling upon various theoretical arguments and practical examples. Welch cites An-
drew Jay McClurg's writing on the emotional rhetoric of the gun control debate, which argues:
Appeals to emotion are fallacious because emotions are irrelevant as a basis for deciding
an issue. While emotions have psychological relevance in that they have a persuasive im-
pact on the human mind, they have no logical relevance because they are incapable of es-
tablishing the truth of conclusions. Proving truth requires the mustering of convincing ev-
idence and not simply the exploitation of emotional sensitivities. Emotions may move us
to act, but reason should control the course of that action.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
30. Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as Constitutional Law, 62 VAND. L. REV.
851, 872 (2009) (."[A]nti-sympathy' instructions [are instructions] in which capital sentencing juries
are admonished to set aside all 'passion' and 'sentiment,' including emotions ranging from 'preju-
dice' to 'sympathy.' Such instructions are considered justifiable-perhaps even required-because
of the Court's evaluation that a capital sentencing jury's decision must be a 'reasoned moral re-
sponse' rather than 'an emotional one."' (footnotes omitted)).
31. Terry A. Maroney, The Persistent Cultural Script ofJudicial Dispassion, 99 CALIF. L.
REV. 629, 630-31 (2011) ("Thomas Hobbes declared in the mid-1600s that the ideal judge is divest-
ed 'of all fear[], anger, hatred, love, and compassion.' In 2009, more than three centuries later, then-
Judge Sonia Sotomayor testified at her Supreme Court confirmation hearing that judges 'apply law
to facts. We don't apply feelings to facts.' The idea that emotion might influence judging has been
characterized as 'radioactive."' (alteration in original)).
32. Susan A. Bandes, Introduction, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 1, 2 (Susan A. Bandes ed.,
1999) ("We take it for granted that jurors sometimes bring compassion and mercy, or anger and a
desire for vengeance, to their deliberations, but we may think of jurors' tendency toward such feel-
ings as illegitimate-steps on the path to jury nullification.").
33. Austin Sarat, Remorse, Responsibility, and Criminal Punishment: An Analysis ofPopular
Culture, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 32, at 168, 169-70 ("[R]emorse, unlike some other
emotions, does not challenge reason but seems instead to be a reasonable/rational response to trans-
gression. Indeed we worry more about the wrongdoer who feels nothing or who responds through a
careful cost/benefit calculus.").
34. The skepticism of emotional evidence and processes in the common law has very deep
roots. More recently, Christian beliefs equate emotions and passions with various sins, which good
Christians must resist in order to attain eternal salvation. See LEDOUX, supra note 18, at 24. Plato
famously argued that our emotions cloud reason and hinder thought. To him, "emotions were like
wild horses that have to be reined in by the intellect." Id; see also David J. Arkush, Situating Emo-
tion: A Critical Realist View of Emotion and Nonconscious Cognitive Processes for Law and Legal
Theory, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1275, 1279 (2008). When the process lost its ecclesiastical imprimatur, it
"drew the ground from under that mode of trial." LESSER, supra note 4, at 145.
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and reason is often wrong, it does make intuitive sense, as "[w]e all
mak[e] mistakes because of pride, anger, or other emotions."3
To be sure, bigots, anti-Semites, and anti-Muslims can manipulate
our fears to cloud our judgment and falsely accuse vulnerable people of
things for which they were not culpable. Today, we merely need to turn
on the television and view the public discourse surrounding health care
reform, climate change, or banking regulations to see that emotions can
be very powerful in obscuring our concern that the facts may be wrong.
Surely any good politician or trial attorney knows this. But it is not the
reliance on emotion itself that is immoral or destructive. Rather, it is the
use of emotion to confuse people into not appreciating that the speaker is
lying about crucial facts. Emotions themselves are not the enemy, and
they can be manipulated by all sides. To best take advantage of emotion-
al processes when we vote or sit on a jury, we need superior fact-
checking by critical journalists, and aggressive cross-examination by
well-matched attorneys. Even still, if we suspect emotion to cloud our
judgment, as it may with rage or anger, it is not universally antagonistic
to reason. As I will demonstrate, the cognitive sciences model of emotion
is far less monolithic than the folk psychological model that is embodied
in our evidence rules and practice. But for better or worse, and perhaps
due to history more so than data, we continue to lump the kaleidoscope
of emotions together, collapsing various shades and brightness into a hue
of complete darkness. This condensed hue is then more easily contrasted
with the bright light of reason.3 6 I am referring to this phenomenon as
"affective blindness."3 7 We are blind to the contribution that emotion
makes to rational thoughts and behavior. Just as with color blindness, we
fail to distinguish between various emotions and their important role in
decision-making.
Just as we appreciate that emotions such as rage can impair our rea-
soning, we also intuitively know how helpful they can be. Emotions are
the ultimate communication tool. No matter where you go in the world,
six facial expressions-happiness, sadness, fear, disgust, anger, or sur-
prise-can be instantly understood. This supports the idea, as Alan
Sanfey suggests, that certain brain structures, many of which are related
to emotion and value, have evolved across disparate cultures to assist
with communication.
35. Richard A. Posner, Emotion Versus Emotionalism in Law, in The PASSIONS OF LAW supra
note 32, at 309, 310; see also Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in
Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 569 (2004).
36. In fact, the dichotomy may be inadvertently furthered by this Article, as I will continue to
refer to emotions and cognition (or reasoning) by their traditional terms, rather than creating a new
language that reflects their complicated relationship.
37. Affective blindness in neuroscience refers to a specific trait when performing a specific
task (namely, being unable to be aware of the emotional valence of a masked image). I am using the
term differently here.
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Emotions can serve as decision-making aids and are vital for com-
munication. 38 Particularly with regard to social decisions, emotional per-
ception and sensitivity predicts faster and more appropriate social rea-
soning. 39 Deficits in emotional processing can lead to isolation and a lack
of trusting relationships. Emotional processes "foster mutual reciprocity .
. . make reputation important, and . . . encourage punishment of those
seeking to take advantage of others." 40 These are decidedly pro-social
attributes. Clearly, the picture of emotion is a diverse one, with many
different effects depending on the social and personal context. It can con-
fuse us, or make us do things we regret later, but it can also help us learn
whom to trust in our community, what painful mistakes should not be
repeated, and who might make a good partner.
What Is Emotion?
There are multiple definitions of emotion, and no philosophical or
scientific consensus.4 1 Emotion is a catch-all word that likely means
many different things depending on one's frame of reference. Is it a brief
feeling of lust or anger, a long-term mood of sadness, or a character trait
of melodrama? Indeed, the neurobiology behind emotions differs as
well-anger engages different brain circuits from empathy. Patients with
localized brain damage have taught us that one can still feel happy at
appropriate times even if he can never feel fittingly embarrassed or com-
passionate. This is because "different brain systems control[] different
feelings."42
Presently, many evidentiary theories deal with emotion as if it were
like a water faucet, either on or off, emitting only scalding hot water. The
volume of the water could be likened to how aroused we are. Arousal is
the term used to signal the intensity of an emotion, which can definitely
affect how we respond to it. Obviously water can also be varying degrees
38. Bhismadev Chakrabarti & Simon Baron-Cohen , In the Eyes of the Beholder: How Empa-
thy Influences Emotion Perception, in THE SCIENCE OF SOCIAL VISION 216, 216 (Reginald B. Ad-
ams, Jr., Nalini Ambady, Ken Nakayama & Shinsuke Shimojo eds., 2010).
39. See Deidre L. Reis et al., Emotional Intelligence Predicts Individual Differences in Social
Exchange Reasoning, 35 NEUROIMAGE 1385, 1385 (2007) (higher emotional intelligence predicted
faster social exchange reasoning and finding that emotional intelligence is mediated in part by brain
mechanisms supporting social reasoning). Reasoning about social interactions engages the brain
differently than reasoning about other non-social events. See Valerie E. Stone et al., Selective Im-
pairment of Reasoning About Social Exchange in a Patient with Bilateral Limbic System Damage,
17 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 11531, 11531 (2002).
40. Alan G. Sanfey, Social Decision-Making: Insights from Game Theory and Neuroscience,
318 SCI. 598, 600 (2007).
41. Reid Hastie, Emotions in Jurors' Decisions, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 991, 999 (2001) ("The
roles of emotions in decision-making processes have been neglected throughout the history of scien-
tific research on judgment and decision-making. Emotions have always been a puzzling phenome-
non to scientists. There is still no clear scientific consensus on definitions of basic terms, and emo-
tional reactions are one of the most mysterious aspects of everyday life."); Kevin N. Ochsner &
James J. Gross, The Cognitive Control ofEmotion, 9 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 242, 242 (2005).




of hot and cold. This captures the idea of valence, which is the term used
to describe whether an emotion is pleasant or unpleasant.43 While this
simple analogy allows us to characterize emotion more fully than the
rules of evidence do, it still is lacking. On this two-dimensional scale of
valence and arousal, how would we differentiate between stress, anger
fear, disgust, disappointment and shame? Or surprise, joy, love, pride or
sympathy?
In addition to valence and arousal, emotions can be characterized by
the actions and goals that they motivate. When we experience an emotion
such as fear, stress, or disgust, it can move us to withdraw from a situa-
tion, while happiness and surprise may motivate us to approach. This in
turn can affect how our brain perceives, responds to, and learns from
emotionally powerful events. Further, we might classify emotions based
upon whether they are socially-dependent, such as shame, or whether
they can be experienced outside of a socially interactive setting. We
might also classify emotions as being evolutionarily preserved, such as
the fight-or-flight fear we may feel in response to being chased, or the
modem empathy triggered at the sight of a suffering dog.
Despite this complex taxonomy, the law often uses the word "emo-
tion" without clarifying precisely what this captures. Even neuroscien-
tists have conflicting definitions when it comes down to how emotions
are generated and whether they are responsive to, or driving, our ac-
tions." With so many things being called emotion, "fear, guilt, shame,
melancholy, and so on ... it is dubious that they share anything but a
family resemblance."45
Even if we isolate one emotion, stress for example, we can see that
our emotional vocabulary is deplorably over-simplified. Complex emo-
43. Michael Platt et al., Neuronal Correlates of Decision Making, in BETTER THAN
CONSCIOUS? DECISION MAKING, THE HUMAN MIND, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONS, supra
note I at 125, 136. Functional imaging has demonstrated that unpleasant emotional stimuli is associ-
ated with increased BOLD intensities in the supplementary motor, anterior midcingulate, right
dIPFC, occipito-temporal, inferior parietal and cerebellar cortices, with highly arousing emotions
associated with increased BOLD intensities in the left thalamus, globus pallidus, caudate,
parahippocampal gyrus, amygdala, premorot cortex, and cerebellar vermis. Pleasant emotions, on the
other hand, resulted in relative increases in the BOLD response in the midbrain, ventral striatum, and
caudate nucleus, all connected to a reward circuit. See Tiziano Colibazzi et al., Neural Systems
Subserving Valence and Arousal During the Experience of Induced Emotions, 10 EMOTION 377, 377
(2010). See MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, RICHARD B. IVRY, & GEORGE R. MANGUN, COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE: THE BIOLOGY OF THE MIND, at 366-67 (2009).
44. Many argue that emotions help us learn the value of events, either by triggering physio-
logical responses, or being the responses themselves. Others view emotions as too complicated to be
purely visceral. See LEDOUX, supra note 18, at 23; EDMUND T. ROLLS, EMOTION EXPLAINED 11
(2005); Todd E. Pettys, The Emotional Juror, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1609, 1615 16 (2007) ("[Aln
emotion is accompanied by physiological changes, such as an increased heartbeat, a jittery feeling in
one's stomach, tightness in certain muscles, or changes in one's hormonal levels. It is these physio-
logical changes that often alert us to an emotion's arrival, signaling that we have rapidly appraised
something in our environment in a particular way.").
45. CRAIG DELANCEY, PASSIONATE ENGINES: WHAT EMOTIONS REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND
AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 3 (2002).
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tions, such as disgust or anxiety, play a different role on our decision-
making depending on how long they manifest. 46 Short-term exposure to
anxiety may assist in perception and memory, but after lengthy bouts,
anxiety can make these same processes break down. Disgust is also quite
complex. Despite its ostensible role in both helping us avoid harms and
moderate social mores, "the fact that subjects across a variety of experi-
ments report feelings of disgust when considering both feces and a hei-
nous crime does not necessarily indicate that the same mechanisms me-
diate these reactions."4 7 When we peel back a layer and look just at indi-
vidual emotions such as anxiety or disgust, we see that their biological
processes and behavioral effects vary.
Relegating emotion to a unitary fog-like state is made possible by
ignoring such nuances and treating emotions as monolithic. 48 But emo-
tion actually refers to a wide range of states that might be unrelated men-
tally, socially, and biologically. Despite this complexity, case law and
annotations to the rules of evidence often uses the word "emotion" with-
out justifying what it means in any given scenario and, more importantly,
why it is legally relevant. We need a new vocabulary to reflect the differ-
ent impacts and values of emotional processes on decision-making. But,
for now, we are stuck with what we have.
On account of this, I use the common understanding of these words
here. Affect and emotion are used interchangeably, even though in prin-
ciple, affect is much broader than emotion as it includes things like pref-
erences, desires, and moods.49 When I use the term reasoning or cogni-
tion, I am calling upon the traditional definition of these, meaning such
functions as attention, perception, memory, and analysis. This Article
does not need to espouse particularly rigid definitions of emotion and
reason. Rather, by contrasting the many possible cognitive science defi-
nitions with the fairly unitary construct of emotion in our legal system,
we can reveal a way for our interpretations to become more nuanced.
46. Anxiety has thus been described as an emotion operating on a "U" shaped curve, where in
controlled doses it can increase our vigilance, but over time it clouds our perspective.
47. Jana Schaich Borg, Debra Lieberman & Kent A. Kiehl, Infection, Incest, and Iniquity:
Investigating the Neural Correlates ofDisgust and Morality, 20 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1529,
1529, (2008). The authors went on to state:
[T]he data presented here show that although incest acts and pathogen acts are rated as
equally disgusting, incest acts are rated as more immoral and elicit dramatically more
hemodynamic activity than pathogen acts. These data, combined with data from other re-
cent multimodal disgust studies, suggest that disgust is likely best conceived of as a set of
heterogeneous responses overlaying a unified psychological and neurological response
Id. at 1543.
48. Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 269, 272 (1996) ("[Tlhe law has treated emotions in several different and conflict-
ing ways.").
49. Aaron Sloman, Ron Chrisley & Matthias Scheutz, The Architectural Basis of Affective
States and Processes, in WHO NEEDS EMOTIONS? THE BRAIN MEETS THE ROBOT 203, 208 (Jean-
Marc Fellous & Michael A. Arbib eds., 2005).
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Even so, by referring to the processes as separate in order to explain how
they are overlapping, I am in some ways furthering the false dichotomy
here. However, this appears to be a less confusing framework than com-
ing up with new names to trace old words and concepts.
Our present understanding of human decision-making, drawn from
the cognitive sciences, imparts a powerful critique of much of our basic
evidence law. This indeed could be the subject of an entire book. It is my
hope that through a patchwork of related articles, each pushing for new
consideration of evidence law in light of modem cognitive science rather
than invalid folk psychology, we can collectively engage rulemaking
bodies in the effort to improve our rules and practices.50 And if im-
provement is too ambitious, at the very least we can push rulemaking
bodies, such as the advisory committee to the FRE or the evidence sec-
tion of the Practicing Law Institute, to clarify the motives for adopting
particular rules. If nothing revolutionary is to happen yet, it would even
be fruitful to inspire researchers to develop models of social decision-
making and tasks that are more ecologically valid for mock jurors and
real judges. In the conclusion, I will suggest a few ways this could hap-
pen.
II. WHERE IN THE LAW Do WE SEE AFFECTIVE BLINDNESS?
Simplifying and denigrating emotion, and placing it at odds with
reason, is particularly apparent in legal rules related to trial. Here it is
said, "Emotion is unalterably opposed to Reason and thus to Justice it-
self."5' As Terry Maroney has chronicled in her spot-on work question-
ing judicial dispassion, "[I]nsistence on emotionless judging-that is, on
judicial dispassion-is a cultural script of unusual longevity and poten-
cy." 52 Maroney argues that the desire for judicial dispassion has stayed
on in our legal analysis despite being obviously incorrect because it
50. For a discussion on the bleak prospects for reform, see Park & Saks, supra note 7, at 954
("The mildly radical reform attempted in Edmund Morgan's Model Code of Evidence failed com-
pletely, and today's judges and lawyers seem generally satisfied with the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which were largely a codification of common-law rules extant in the mid-twentieth century. Finally,
the confusion that existed in Wigmore's time and before has been largely tamed by the Federal
Rules, so there is no enthusiasm for ground-breaking reclassifications." (footnotes omitted)).
51. Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment,
74 CORNELL L. REv. 655, 655 (1989) ("[Clourts have urged that the more a legal issue might pro-
voke popular rage, that hallmark of the lynch mob, the harder courts must work to insulate the legal
decision from emotive influence.").
52. Maroney, supra note 31, at 630-31 ("Thomas Hobbes declared in the mid-1600s that the
ideal judge is 'divested of all fear[], anger, hatred, love, and compassion.' in 2009, more than three
centuries later, then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor testified at her Supreme Court confirmation hearing that
judges 'apply law to facts. We don't apply feelings to facts.' The idea that emotion might influence
judging has been characterized as 'radioactive."' (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)).
60 [Vol. 89:1
2011] THE AFFECTIVE BLINDNESS OF EVIDENCE LAW
adopts an attractive, yet coherent view of emotion as "irrational, undisci-
plined, and idiosyncratic."53
Most modem evidentiary principles reflect the concern that jurors
will make illogical or biased inferences.54 Reining in the biased jury is
one of the chief historical and modem justifications for evidence law.
As far back as the eighteenth century, English courts began establishing
formal rules of evidence to limit the admissibility of information that
might trigger irrational inferences by the malleable jury. This continued
into the late twentieth century, when the FRE were adopted. Reid Has-
tie points out our conflicted view of the juror, as embodied in the FRE:
"There is an apparent contradiction between the conception of the ideal
juror as a logical reasoning machine and also as a source of community
attitudes, sentiments, and moral precepts."57 We see this as the rules de-
sire both an unfettered common voice of the people and a highly steered
and controlled decision-making process.
Before extrapolating this too far, however, it is important to observe
that we are not as committed to this false dichotomy as we might think.
In certain corners of our legal tapestry we actively encourage emotional
processes and evidence, such as when defendants present mitigation evi-
58dence or when attorneys present their opening arguments. In mitigation
hearings, this may be because we call upon emotional processes when we
think our status quo may not be fair, particularly for people deemed to be
marginalized or vulnerable. Perhaps emotions are encouraged to "rock
our cognitive boats" in furtherance of justice. But even in this situation,
53. Id at 632 (citing Gerald L. Clore, For Love or Money: Some Emotional Foundations of
Rationality, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1151, 1151 (2005) ("A long tradition, stretching from classical
philosophy to the present, views passion as the enemy of reason.")).
54. The three most commonly cited justifications for any evidence rules are (1) distrust of the
jury, (2) practical considerations of time and efficiency, and (3) the promotion of certain social
norms by controlling what juries may rely upon. See DAVID P. LEONARD & VICTOR J. GOLD,
EVIDENCE: A STRUCTURED APPROACH 2-3 (2d ed. 2008).
55. Joseph Sanders, Expert Admissibility Symposium: Reliability Standards-Too High, Too
Low, or Just Right?: The Merits of the Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the Admissibil-
ity of Expert Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REv. 881, 883-84 (2003); see generally Richard D.
Friedman, Minimizing the Jury Over-Valuation Concern, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 955 (2003).
56. Glen Weissenberger, Evidence Myopia: The Failure to See the Federal Rules of Evidence
as a Codification of the Common Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1539, 1570 (1999) ("By modeling
the text of the Federal Rules after the Model Code and the Uniform Rules, the Advisory Committee
embraced what can be placed in historical context as a codification of existing principles and not a
statutory displacement of preexisting evidentiary doctrines.").
57. Hastie, supra note 41, at 991-92 ("Robert Solomon noted this discrepancy when he com-
mented that 'the idea that justice requires emotional detachment, a kind of purity suited ultimately to
angels, ideal observers, and the original founders of society, has blinded us to the fact that justice
arises from and requires such feelings as resentment."' (quoting ROBERT D. SOLOMON, A PASSION
FOR JUSTICE 34 (1990))).
58. "[A]ppeals to the sympathy or passions of the jury are misconduct at the guilt phase of a
trial," but may be invoked for mitigation. People v. Pensinger, 805 P.2d 899, 918 (Cal. 1991).
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our implicit biases that seem rational might actually be deeply engrained
and reinforced by unobvious emotion.5 9
One final caveat about the treatment of emotion in litigation: re-
gardless of how emotion is formally treated in our rules, to be sure, emo-
tion is the currency of trial.60 Crafty attorneys use emotion to their ad-
vantage to engender empathy for their client, and anger or fear toward
the other side. Indeed, the value of story-telling and emotion was recog-
nized in Old Chief v. United States.6 1 In that case, the Supreme Court
instructed us that probative value is measured in part by its ability "to
influence jurors' hearts as well as their minds, even in ways that are not
strictly logical, and even if the evidence has no rational tendency to
prove any historical fact that is disputed at trial."62 In Old Chief despite
explaining in dicta that litigants may seek to do more than present factual
evidence but also to "tell a colorful story with descriptive richness," the
character evidence at issue was not admitted.63 This dictum would appear
to encourage something like emotional and personal testimony, which is
in contrast to the many rules and instructions that discourage it.64 And
yet, as soon as "colorful" turns into "emotional," courts have and may
continue to abandon this line of thinking. Colorful imagery and story-
telling are bound to awaken the emotions of any healthy juror, and yet
the former is acceptable when the latter is often explicitly not. Imagine
how frustrating it would be to sit on a jury where passionate testimony
and colorful evidence were presented throughout the trial, and then to be
told at the end that they were supposed to set aside any emotions that this
evidence may have generated?
There is thus a practical gulf. Why is there such a gap between the
rhetoric of stated instructions and the common understanding of the thea-
tre of jury trials? Why do we understand that trials run on emotions, but
59. Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation Predicts
Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 729, 730 (2000).
60. Though, by recent accounts, the appeals to emotion ought to be subtle. Raymond J. Bras-
sard, What Jurors Say About Lawyers, 47 Bos. B.J. 8, 9 (2003); Valerie P. Hans & Krista Sweigart,
Jurors' Views of Civil Lawyers: Implications for Courtroom Communication, 68 IND. L.J. 1297,
1318 (1993); Donald M. Peters, Basics of Oral Argument, 32 ARIZ. ATT'Y 18, 29 (1995).
61. 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997). Many, mostly Southern states, have declined to follow Old
Chief v. United States.
62. James Joseph Duane, "Screw Your Courage to the Sticking-Place": The Roles of Evi-
dence, Stipulations, and Jury Instructions in Criminal Verdicts, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 463, 467-68
(1998).
63. Leubsdorf, supra note 22, at 1226 ("Only such a story will 'sustain the willingness of
jurors to draw the inferences' of guilt or innocence and 'to implicate the law's moral underpinnings
and a juror's obligation to sit in judgment' as well as meeting 'jurors' expectations about what
proper proof should be."' (quoting Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 187-88)).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Barlin, 686 F.2d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that prosecutor's
comments appealing to the jury's passion and emotion were "designed to divert rather than focus the
jury upon the evidence and [did] not belong in summation"); Freeman v. Trombley, 744 F. Supp. 2d
697, 725 (E.D. Mich. 2010) ("Inflammatory remarks are improper because they 'invoke emotions
which may cloud the jury's determination of [the defendant's] guilt."' (alteration in original) (cita-
tions omitted)).
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certain emotions are to be kept in a locked box, only to be invited in oc-
casionally in the interest of social justice? I posit that we have an inco-
herent view of emotion because we are using a concept and word to sim-
ultaneously refer to many different things, without being more precise
about which aspects of "emotion" are doing the real theoretical work.
When we do this, we are forcing simple boundaries on something quite
complex. We intuitively understand that emotions are not only helpful in
some situations, but they can be impossible to dial down. And of course
some judges, being humans after all, get this as well.65 But the explicit
instructions, and the false dichotomy between reason and emotion on
which they rest, persist in evidence practice.
In order to make the point that this false dichotomy is simultaneous-
ly reflected in our evidence law and also empirically wrong, I will ad-
dress how emotion is treated in (a) the use of limiting instructions, (b) the
exclusion of prejudicial evidence, (c) credibility assessments, (d) sen-
tencing and damages instructions, (e) instructions related to the "heat of
passion" theory of voluntary manslaughter, and (f) the excited utterance
hearsay exception. I will demonstrate that while the text of the rules may
be benign, the way they are interpreted reflects confusion over the role
played by both subtle and intense emotion. 66 The affective blindness of
evidence law is woefully out of step with our current understanding of
the way affect and reason are anatomically and functionally intercon-
nected in the brain.67 Specifically, through reliance on cognitive science,
I will demonstrate that the following evidentiary principles are incorrect
in related ways:
* Emotional and rational processes can neatly be divided, and by
attending to our emotions, we can-and should-use our cognitive facul-
ties to squash them.
* Emotional evidence and emotional processes always render deci-
sions that are less rational, more prejudicial, and therefore less accurate.
* Emotion testimony distracts us and makes it hard for us to pay at-
tention or remember events.
65. See People v. Dykes, 209 P.3d 1, 50 (Cal. 2009) ("Although emotion 'must not reign over
reason,' it 'need not, indeed, cannot, be entirely excluded from the jury's moral assessment."' (quot-
ing People v. Leonard, 157 P.3d 973, 1009 (Cal. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
66. It is worth noting the obvious, which is that not all of our folk assumptions have been
incorrect. But many of them have been, including the ability of the oath to cure mendacity along
with the idea that someone who is dying would not "meet their maker with a lie on their lips." These
present examples of evidence practices that few believe to be true, illustrating the many fictions we
comfortably endorse in evidence practice.
67. Ralph Adolphs, Cognitive Neuroscience of Human Social Behaviour, 4 NATURE REVIEWS
NEUROSCIENCE 165, 166 (2003). Interestingly, when it comes to the "self," some researchers have
seen anatomical uncoupling between emotion and reason. See J.M. Moran et al., Neuroanatomical
Evidence for Distinct Cognitive and Affective Components of Self, 18 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
1586, 1586 (2006).
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* Credibility assessments do not require empathy.
* Emotion should not and cannot be involved in moral judgment
and reasoning related to sentencing.
III. AFFECTIVE BLINDNESS OF EVIDENTIARY PRACTICES
This next section will walk through each of the evidentiary practices
identified above, and explain why the folk psychology on which they rest
is invalidated by modem cognitive sciences. We will begin with the use
of limiting instructions, and the difficulty jurors face when attempting to
use evidence only for its non-emotional content. Then, I will discuss how
FRE 403 reflects the false dichotomy between emotion and reason. Next,
I will reveal how most damages and sentencing instructions both assume
emotion may be subjugated by reason, but also that good moral judg-
ments can arise in an emotional vacuum. Subsequently, I will discuss the
"heat of passion" jury instruction, describing how it also embodies a
view of all emotion as corrupting of both reason and, without extending
it to its logical conclusion, intent. I will then discuss a counter-example
of when we imbue emotion with too much power (albeit still the power
to corrupt our cognitive faculties). That is, when the excited utterance
hearsay rule is used to deem testimony more trustworthy when uttered
during stress or excitement. Finally, I will discuss the more general cate-
gory of jurors' credibility assessments, and why we might be blind to the
role of emotion this process.
A. The Use ofLimiting Instructions: Using Evidence for Rational, but
Not for Emotional, Purposes
We see the false dichotomy rear its head in the application of many
evidentiary rules. We will first address FRE 105, which appears to have
nothing to do with emotion on its face. The rule demurely says: "If the
court admits evidence that is admissible . . . for a purpose-but not ...
for another purpose-the court, on timely request must restrict the evi-
dence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly."68 This is a
very practical rule. Judges could not possibly order a new trial every time
evidence had the potential to be used for an improper purpose. Given the
way the probative/prejudicial balancing test favors admission, we can use
FRE 105 to restrict jurors' use of evidence to its non-prejudicial use.
This non-prejudicial use is often impeachment.
Reliance on FRE 105 and its state-law counterparts is ubiquitous.
The rule is commonly employed to cabin off emotional uses of evidence,
68. FED. R. EvID. 105. Most states have a similar rule to this.
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such as crime scene photographs or victim impact statements, and guard
against a mistrial. Consider the following representative examples:
* In a tax evasion case, the defendant argued that the prosecution
improperly appealed to the jury's emotions by reminding them that the
date of their deliberation was April 15th, the deadline for paying taxes.
The court stated:
[A]sk[ing] the jury ... to consider emotions rather than evidence-
"can be cured with proper instructions, and 'juries are presumed to
follow their instructions."' . . . [E]ven if the comment played to the
emotions of the jurors as taxpayers, the Court issued a curative in-
struction as to the comment as well as other instructions-including
after the Government's rebuttal-summation-which focused the ju-
rors generally to their task and responsibility. 70
* Where gruesome photos were introduced, jurors were given a
limiting instruction to rely on them "dispassionately."
* "[A]fter defendant's vulgar outburst, the judge gave an immediate
curative instruction, telling the jurors that sometimes emotions run high
and that their verdict must be based on the [non-emotional] evidence
alone."7 2
* Defendant was convicted of "risk of injury to a child." During his
rebuttal argument, the prosecutor displayed and briefly referred to a me-
dium sized McDonald's cup and a teddy bear. The child's father worked
at McDonalds, so this prop was employed to support the prosecution's
argument that the parents of the injured child were simple and hardwork-
ing. The teddy bear was to remind the jury that the victim was eight
years old (the victim held the teddy bear while testifying as well). De-
fendant moved for a mistrial. The court denied the defendant's motion,
stating that "irreparable damage had not been done" because the court
properly issued a curative instruction, stating that:
[P]rops[] were displayed to you. They are not evidence . . . and,
therefore, are not to be considered by you in any way in your consid-
eration of the facts or in your deliberations. You must base your ver-
69. Allen v. State, 923 P.2d 613, 619 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996) ("As evidenced by the ac-
ceptance of victim impact evidence at sentencing, it is not sympathy for the victim per se, but sym-
pathy that overcomes reason which is constitutionally unacceptable."), vacated, Allen v. Oklahoma,
520 U.S. 1195 (1997).
70. United States v. Holland, No. 3:09crl39 (JBA), 2010 WL 2976934, at *5 (D. Conn. July
22, 2010) (quoting Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1993)).
71. United States v. Treas-Wilson, 3 F.3d 1406, 1410 (10th Cir. 1993); see also People v.
Kimble, 289 A.D.2d 1062, 1063 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) ("[H]e was [not] deprived of a fair trial
based on the jury's viewing of the autopsy videotape.. . . [It] was inadvertent, and the videotape was
not presented by the People for the purpose of arousing the emotions of the jury." (citation omitted)).
72. State v. Rodriguez, No. 99-01-0102, 2010 WL 4226170, at *10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Oct. 27, 2010) (not deciding issue of curative instruction on the merits, as procedurally barred).
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dict on the evidence presented and the law as instructed, and not on
the basis of any emotions or sympathy. 73
There is well-documented doubt that jurors can follow curative lim-
iting instructions to remove prejudice.74 Judge Learned Hand called lim-
iting instructions a legal "placebo" as they require "a mental gymnastic
which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody's else."7 5 But these
are general problems with the ability to ignore evidence more broadly.
Here, I am interested in the more specific problem of cabining off emo-
tion-evoking evidence, or the jurors own emotional responses to them.
As an initial matter, we may not want to instruct jurors to dial down their
emotional processes, but what's more, in some cases we may not be able
to even if we tried.
There are instances when something other than emotion may be
moderating the jury's decision-making, even though the "bias" is pinned
on the emotional tenor of the evidence. Many of us are not aware of our
73. State v. Tricarico, 994 A.2d 323, 325, 328 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010); see also United States
v. Gomez, 617 F.3d 88, 96 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Delli Paoli, 229 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir.
1956); Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932); United States v. Johnson, 713 F.
Supp. 2d 595, 638 (E.D. La 2010); State v. Yates, 168 P.3d 359, 398 (Wash. 2007); Nancy Steblay
et al., The Impact on Juror Verdicts of Judicial Instruction to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A
Meta-Analysis, 30 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 469 (2006) ("The effect on juror verdicts of judicial
instructions to disregard inadmissible evidence was evaluated using meta-analysis. One hundred
seventy-five hypothesis tests from 48 studies with a combined 8,474 participants were examined.
Results revealed that inadmissible evidence (lE) has a reliable effect on verdicts consistent with the
content of the IE. Judicial instruction to ignore the inadmissible evidence does not effectively elimi-
nate IE impact. However, ifjudges provide a rationale for a ruling of inadmissibility, juror compli-
ance may be increased. Contested evidence ruled admissible accentuates that information, resulting
in a significant impact on verdicts."); J. Alexander Tanford, The Law and Psychology ofJury In-
structions, 69 NEB. L. REV. 71, 97 (1990).
74. Lisa Eichhorn, Social Science Findings and the Jury's Ability to Disregard Evidence
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 52 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 341, 345 (1989); Roselle L. Wis-
sler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Convic-
tion Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 37 (1985) ("Conviction rates did vary by
prior record, however, with the highest conviction rate occurring when the prior conviction was the
same as the present charge and the lowest conviction rate occurring in the no-prior-conviction condi-
tion. Defendants with a previous conviction for perjury or a dissimilar crime were convicted at an
intermediate rate. We concluded that the risk of prejudice to the defense under existing policy is
greater than the unrealized potential benefit to the prosecution."); see also RICHARD A. POSNER,
FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 384 (2001) ("Empirical evidence as well as common sense suggests
that courts greatly exaggerate the efficacy of limiting instructions."); Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie
Arndt, Understanding the Limits of the Limiting Instructions: Social Psychological Explanations for
the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6
PSYCH., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 677, 677 (2000); Deidre M. Smith, The Disordered and Discredited
Plaintiff Psychiatric Evidence in Civil Litigation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 749, 819 (2010) (discussing
how distinctions between appropriate and non-appropriate uses of evidence are likely to be "utterly
meaningless in the minds of jurors" and emotionally arousing testimony may be particularly "im-
mune to such limiting instructions"); Sarah Tanford & Michele Cox, The Effects of Impeachment
Evidence and Limiting Instructions on Individual and Group Decision Making, 12 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 477, 477 (1988). But see Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking
the Stand: The Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 1358-59 (2009) (citing a study by British researchers A.P. Scaly and
W.R. Cornish in which mock jurors were able to take account of an instruction to disregard similar
convictions as evidence of criminal propensity).
75. Nash, 54 F.2d at 1007.
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complex emotional processes. Thus, we sometimes have difficulty de-
scribing the what, why, and how of our emotions, even as we are physio-
logically experiencing them. This is likely exacerbated with more subtle
emotions such as shame, pride, or jealousy. Empirically speaking, there-
fore, limiting instructions related to emotion-evoking evidence are either
misguided or a waste of time.76 Because emotions are so salient, and yet
are sometimes subconscious, it might be more difficult to suppress emo-
tion-evoking evidence than other types of data.
The scant mock jury literature on emotional evidence and curative
instructions is unsatisfactory as it fails to appreciate these points. Some
of it further fails to acknowledge the relationship of probative value to
prejudicial effect. These studies assume that evidence is either prejudicial
or probative, when it can be degrees of both. Put another way, evidence
can help make a fact more likely true or false, while simultaneously prej-
udicing the jury against the defendant. Further, this research often fails to
recognize that the "affective" evidence may have different probative
value.77 Perhaps an example of this will help.
One study compared the effect of the emotional testimony of a cop
describing how the defendant had been accused of "hacking up a wom-
an" with the neutral control testimony that the defendant had been ac-
cused of "assault with a deadly weapon." The two statements have dif-
ferent probative value, and thus if they produce different results, it can-
not be said to be due to the emotional nature of the testimony. In one
case, the testimony may render the assault more heinous and, therefore,
more aggravating. The descriptive content of the emotional evidence
actually says something different about the facts of the crime. With the
latter stimulus, the mock juror may conjure up an image of someone get-
ting hit once on the head with the handle of a gun. Further, when subjects
heightened the verdict after hearing a victim impact statement, this was
equated with prejudice, even though it was not clear from the methodol-
ogy that something else may have been moderating the change. Sub-
jects may have intensified the verdict because they heard more aggravat-
ing information or the aggravating information was given more weight
because it was heard more recently.
The papers on the use of limiting instructions for emotionally-
evocative evidence unfortunately use emotions as shorthand for bias and
76. Of course, as mentioned, if the goal is merely to prevent waste and a mistrial, the instruc-
tions are doing their job swimmingly.
77. Jessica M. Salerno & Bette L. Bottoms, Emotional Evidence and Jurors' Judgments: The
Promise of Neuroscience for Informing Psychology and Law, 27 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 273, 283 (2009)
("Taken together, the literature on the effect of gruesome photographs and victim impact statements
demonstrates that, generally, mock jurors' judgments are more punitive when they consider highly
emotional evidence . . . ."). This is true except for when it is defense information that may be miti-
gating--only example given of child abuse and increased attributed and hypothesized increased
anger. Id at 285.
78. Id. at 279.
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inherent prejudice. One research team argued against an instruction "that
cautions against emotional arousal in the face of highly inflammatory
evidence" because it "raises the concern that jurors will perceive their
emotional responses to the evidence as a valid source of information." 9
Thus, while nobly attempt to improve the way jurors respond to instruc-
tions, they still presume that recognizing their emotions as a valid source
of data would be bad. In the same study, when the emotion-evoking evi-
dence was not found to always bias, researchers went to lengths to pre-
serve the theory of emotions as biasing, even when their own findings
suggest its nuanced role in decision-making:
[G]ruesome photographs increased victim compassion . . . but ...
gruesome photographs did not significantly increase defendant nega-
tivity or decrease defendant compassion compared to neutral evi-
dence. The likely reason is that the emotions aroused by gruesome
evidence were more readily associated with the victim and the crime
but were less clearly associated with a defendant whose culpability
was in doubt.s0
Of course, to be charitable to the researchers, some of these studies
were performed when we knew much less about affective neuroscience.
Another problem with much of the research on the use of limiting
instructions for emotional evidence is that the studies rely purely on self-
reports of the mock jurors' emotions.81 This is despite the fact that we do
not have conscious access to many effects of emotion on cognition or our
82 bi
physiological response. Better research into the subconscious role of
emotion requires measuring physiological correlates of emotion, such as
heart rate, skin temperature, sweating, and the like.
Much of the practical and scholarly writing on the use of limiting
instructions to suppress emotional processes reveals a dual process mod-
79. Rachel K. Cush & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, The Influence of Limiting Instructions on
Processing and Judgments of Emotionally Evocative Evidence, 13 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 110,
113 (2006) (citing Gerald L. Clore, Cognitive Phenomenology: Feelings and the Construction of
Judgment, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL JUDGMENTS 133 (Leonard L. Martin & Abraham
Tesser eds., 1992); R.B. Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences, 35 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 151 (1980)).
80. Cush & Goodman-Delahunty, supra note 79, at 117-119 (finding that mock jurors receiv-
ing limiting instructions pre-closing were actually more likely to view the evidence as less incrimi-
nating when they saw a gruesome photograph than if they viewed a neutral photograph, thus refuting
their premise that emotion is always biasing in one direction).
81. Id. at 118 (relying on self-monitoring of emotional bias, with 86% of respondents saying
that they "did not rely on emotion when making a culpability decision"); Salerno & Bottoms, supra
note 77, at 277-78 (acknowledging that emotion can have the greatest effect when we are unaware
of it, but then relies almost exclusively on self-reports of reliance on emotions).
82. Kari Edwards & Tamara S. Bryan, Judgmental Biases Produced by Instructions to Disre-
gard: The (Paradoxical) Case of Emotional Information, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
849, 850-51 (1997).
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el of the brain where emotion is wholly separate from cognitive process-
es:83
The concern that emotion is adversary to the reasoning process is
voiced in many contemporary social psychological models of emo-
tion and decision-making. . . . [S]trong negative emotion biases the
information-processing and decision-making processes by (a) initiat-
ing a biased information search and skewed interpretation of evi-
dence to be consistent with blaming a target, (b) influencing judg-
ments in a mood-congruent manner directly . . . and indirectly ...
and/or (c) leading to visceral intuitive judgments....
According to the dual process model, emotion depletes attention
and processing capacity and increases heuristic processing (i.e., deciding
with your gut). Some proponents of this model posit that anger specifi-
cally results in shallower processing due to the feeling of certainty that it
engenders. In order to remove this "mental contamination" of emotion,
some psychologists argue that we need to simultaneously do the follow-
ing: (a) be aware of the unwanted processing and the magnitude and di-
rection of the bias, (b) be motivated to correct it, and (c) possess the abil-
ity to exert mental control to adjust our responses.85 No surprise-
psychologists are pessimistic about our ability to do these things. This is
especially true when our emotional reactions are implicit and subcon-
scious. However, not all emotional processes are so subversive, and a
growing literature suggests that emotions are not always "fast" and "au-
tomatic" but rather can be the result of modulation, attentional control,
and reappraisal. This means that there may be opportunities for
thoughtful instructions reducing the effects of implicit, and unwanted,
juror biases.
The complexity of emotional processes may be why some research-
ers do not find differences in our ability to suppress emotional evidence
compared to non-emotional evidence, while others find the opposite. The
emotion being elicited, and the ostensible probative value of the two
statements, may not be similar enough to draw conclusions about their
effect on our decision-making. 7 But even if we assume for a moment
that an individual were cognizant of the biasing influence of emotion on
83. Salerno & Bottoms, supra note 77, at 283 ("In other words, does emotional evidence
influence jurors' judgments through an effortful, rational deliberative process, or does emotional
evidence cause emotion-driven reactions and processes that bypass effortful, deliberative, cognitive
processing?").
84. Id. at 284 (citations omitted).
85. See generally Thomas D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental
Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117 (1994).
86. K.S. Blair et al., Modulation of Emotion by Cognition and Cognition by Emotion, 35
NEUROIMAGE 430, 437-38 (2007).
87. Anita E. Kelly & Jeffrey H. Kahn, Effects of Suppression of Personal Intrusive Thoughts,
66 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 998, 999 (1994); see generally Lizabeth Roemer & Thomas
D. Borkovec, Effects of Suppressing Thoughts About Emotional Material, 103 J. ABNORMAL
PSYCHOL. 467 (1994).
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his or her reasoning processes, there may still be a lack of motivation to
correct for it.8" Edwards and Bryan posit that because of the unique prop-
erties of emotionally charged material, observing a limiting instruction
regarding it is particularly difficult and may lead to perverse outcomes-
more attention paid to emotionally charged material rather than less.89
Ironically, because of this, emotion could be "an even more powerful
influence on judgments when it is forbidden than when it is allowed."90
B. Federal Rule ofEvidence 403: Emotion= Undue Prejudice
The FRE simultaneously distrust jurors' ability to ignore prejudicial
information and then expect them to be quite capable of ignoring this
evidence when given an explicit instruction to do so.91 The last section
reviewing FRE 105 focused on the latter view. We will now investigate
the former through FRE 403.
FRE 403 states that relevant evidence may be excluded if the proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by its potential for prejudice.92
FRE 403 is sometimes referred to as the "general override," and it ap-
plies to all types of unduly prejudicial evidence. Rule 403 is a balancing
test: the evidence may be excluded only if such danger of unfair preju-
dice substantially outweighs its probative value. It is meant to remove
wasteful, emotional, biasing, or confusing evidence from the court's
plate, and to focus on central, material matters. As all effective evidence
is prejudicial to the party against whom it is offered, undue prejudice is
given a more specific meaning by courts.93
Once again, the actual text of the rule is agnostic to emotion. How-
ever, in practice, undue prejudice is said to occur when "the proffered
evidence has a tendency to influence the outcome by improper means or
if it appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, pro-
vokes its instinct to punish or otherwise causes a jury to base its decision
on something other than the established propositions in the case." 94 This
statement illustrates how "prejudice" has been defined by courts to refer
to evidence that appeals too much to the jurors' emotion rather than rea-
88. Cush & Goodman-Delahunty, supra note 79, at 112.
89. Edwards & Bryan, supra note 82, at 850.
90. For a discussion of how emotional information makes it harder to suppress our thoughts,
see id. at 856-858.
91. For example, "the state may introduce evidence of a defendant's prior convictions for the
purpose of sentencing enhancement, or statements elicited from a defendant in violation of Miranda
v. Arizona, for the purpose of impeachment, so long as the jury is instructed that such evidence may
not be considered for the purpose of determining guilt." Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 200 (1998)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S.
554 (1967)).
92. FED. R. EvID. 403.
93. State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1989) ("[Undue prejudice is] an undue tendency
to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly but not necessarily an emotional one, such as
bias, sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution or horror.").
94. State v. Franklin, 677 N.W.2d 276, 294 (Wis. 2004) (quoting State v. Davidson, 613
N.W.2d 606, 623 (Wis. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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son, and situates emotional responses as peripheral, somehow not at all
relevant to the case. Importantly, this sentiment is echoed in the Adviso-
ry Committee notes accompanying the proposed Rule 403, where the
committee defined prejudice as an "undue tendency to suggest decision
on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional
one."95 Many courts recite this mantra from the Advisory Committee
notes without explaining meaningfully how it applies to a particular case.
Because the rules of evidence are only reviewed for abuse of discre-
tion, and Rule 403 is itself a flexible rule, it comes as no surprise that
there is a great degree of variety in the way the rule is applied. This dis-
cretion has been advocated as it promotes rationalism and efficiency.96
Even so, one judge acknowledged how the rule is habitually misapplied,
even on its own discretionary terms:
Although the exigencies of a trial will always limit the time for a
careful analysis of evidentiary issues, both counsel and the court
should try to avoid shorthand references to Rule 403 or to "unfair
prejudice" in lieu of a brief but more complete explanation of the ba-
sis for exclusion pursuant to Rule 403.97
In some ways, this problem generates the nucleus of this paper. The
rule on its face may be appropriate and flexible. But in practice, it be-
comes shorthand to justify anything or nothing, with very thin legal rea-
soning. Thus, in practice, discretionary rules like 403 often work to ex-
clude so-called "emotional" evidence and processes across-the-board.
Without interpretive assistance, the mantra of emotion being equat-
ed with prejudice is cut and pasted everywhere, expansively covering an
95. Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee's note (1972).
96. Michael H. Graham, Relevance, Fed. R. Evid. 401, and the Exclusion of Relevant Evi-
dence, Fed. R. Evid. 403: "Many Prayers Are Heard, Few Are Answered", 45 CRIM. L. BULL. 1080,
1084 (2009) ("[Discretionary power of FRE 4031 is necessary to facilitate the ascertainment of truth
and to keep the conduct of the trial within bounds.").
97. State v. Thurlow, 712 A.2d 518, 522 (Me. 1998) (Lipez, J., concurring). To be sure, 403
analyses do tend to involve logical short-cuts and lack of engagement with the facts at hand. For an
egregious example of this consider the redundant passage from the California federal case, Green v.
Baca, 226 F.R.D. 624, 634 (C.D. Cal. 2005):
The court excludes evidence under Rule 403 if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, or if it would lead to jury confusion. FED. R.
EVID. 403. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it tends to suggest decision on an improper
basis, particularly an emotional one. See United States v. Allen, 341 F.3d 870, 886 (9th
Cir.2003) ("Unfair prejudice' . . . means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one."); Steger v. Gen-
eral Electric Co., 318 F.3d 1066, 1079 (1lth Cir.2003) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 403 advi-
sory committee's notes) ("Evidence is ... excludable if its probative value is substantial-
ly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury .... "Unfair prejudice" . . . means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one."); Stump v. Gates,
211 F.3d 527, 534 (10th Cir.2000) (same).
While the evidence of other acts offered by plaintiff may be prejudicial to defendant inso-
far as it tends to suggest that he has maintained an unconstitutional policy, it will not be
unfairly prejudicial.
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infinite number of definitions for either term. Of course not all courts
shirk their interpretive duties when it comes to FRE 403. Many try to
provide assistance in elucidating when and why emotional evidence is
unduly prejudicial, as when it is so inflammatory that it diverts "the ju-
ry's attention from the material issues in the trial."99 However, even this
gloss represents a type of prejudice that is not unique to emotional evi-
dence. Any evidence may be prejudicial if it distracts the jury from its
charge or confuses relevant issues with irrelevant ones.
Texas has a different standard that considers whether the evidence
"has the potential to impress the jury in some irrational but indelible
way."100 This is initially more attractive than the emphasis on emotion.
But in Texas, the switch to rationality is just another guise for the anti-
emotion bias in evidence law. For example, one court recalled:
Counsel argues the photographs of the tattoos were of such graphic
subject matter they would sway the jury in some irrational and emo-
tional fashion....
... The trial court must consider the "host of factors affecting
probativeness . .. and balance those factors against the tendency, if
any, that the photographs have to encourage resolution of material is-
sues on an inappropriate emotional basis." 10
Here, emotion is categorized as "inappropriate" and "irrational."
Another Texas court justified the admission of photographs, stating that
"there were valid reasons for each of the photographs to be admitted, and
98. Thin analysis of FRE 403 is not uncommon. See United States v. Gamble, 290 Fed. Appx.
592, 595 (4th Cir. 2008) ("We conclude that the videotape [of the defendant's capture] did not pose
a legitimate risk of arousing the emotions of the jurors to the point of creating a genuine danger that
the case would be decided based upon their emotional reaction to it. Although the jury exhibited an
interest in the footage, this interest, contrary to Gamble's argument, does not indicate that the video's
probative value was outweighed by any prejudicial effect."). There is no analysis of why the court
decided that interest did not equal prejudice, other than the ipse dixit statement by the judge. See also
Kesterson v. Jarrett, 704 S.E.2d 878, 885-86 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) ("The [DVD] recording depicted,
most significantly, the effort and cost associated with maintaining Kyla's day-to-day existence and
the emotional bond between mother and child. Because the record supports a finding that the proba-
tive value of the recording on the issues of liability and causation was slight and was substantially
outweighed by the risk of prejudicing the jury with the emotional nature of the scenes depicted, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding it."); People v. Raymond, 938 N.E.2d 131, 162-
64 (111. App. Ct. 2010); State v. Francis, 145 P.3d 48, 63-64 (Kan. 2006).
99. United States v. Koebele, No. CR 07-2015-MWB, 2008 WL 63293, at *3 (N.D. Iowa Jan.
3, 2008) ("It is not unrealistic to assume that some jurors will have such a negative view of anyone
who views pornography that evidence that the defendant possessed pornography might be 'so in-
flammatory on [its] face that it diverts the jury's attention from the material issues in the trial."'
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Adams, 401 F.3d 886, 900 (8th Cir. 2005)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
100. In this case, a motorist appeared drunk and had run through a red light. The state intro-
duced results of his breathalizer test that the cop obtained, which indicated he had been drinking.
This was found not to encourage an irrational decision. See State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 440-
41 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
101. Hart v. State, 173 S.W.3d 131, 148-49 (Tex. App. 2005) (quoting Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d
547, 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)); see also Parson v. State, 193 S.W.3d 116, 128 (Tex. App. 2006).
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none were offered simply to appeal to the jury's emotion to render an
irrational verdict." 102 Thus, as applied in Texas, we see that the touch-
stone for prejudice is irrationality, which is triggered by an appeal to the
jury's emotions."'
FRE 403's attempt to direct reasoned rather than irrational and emo-
tional decisions has been championed by social justice scholars as a tool
for keeping racially or religiously discriminatory evidence out of court.'04
This is a laudable goal. But the emotional nature of the evidence is prob-
ably less fatal for exclusion than its frequent irrelevance or lack of proba-
tive value. Put differently, discriminatory evidence with marginal proba-
tive value can often be excluded without referring to its emotional con-
tent. In fact, there is something powerful about excluding such evidence
on other grounds that are less forgiving to the bias (i.e., it is not emotion-
al, it is wrong). But the concern is not unfounded.
Emotion-evoking evidence may lead jurors to convict someone they
find to be morally repugnant for this reason alone and not because of the
facts of the instant case.'0o Alternatively, parties in civil matters could be
unfairly influenced by moral approbation when determining damages.
Consider the case where a woman was suing for sexual harassment under
Title VII, and the defendant's counsel attempted to introduce evidence
that she had an abortion that same year. The testimony was supposed to
suggest that her emotional pain and suffering was due to the abortion,
and not to the workplace sexual harassment. The court properly excluded
the evidence under FRE 403 as marginally relevant and likely inflamma-
tory, stating that the evidence "increased the likelihood that the jury
would view her as immoral and not worthy of trust and reach its verdict
on such basis."l 0 6 To be sure, there are cases when marginally probative
evidence ought to be excluded if it only appeals to some peripheral issue
that triggers a retributive or sympathetic impulse. But it is not the case
that appeals to emotion uniformly render decisions that are less fair or
less accurate. Rather, what matters is precisely why the evidence is being
offered, and whether it encourages a decision on something peripheral
and not in dispute, like the morality of the plaintiff's additive and unre-
lated suffering in a Title VII case.' 07 But there are many other examples
102. Kilgore v. State, No. 12-08-00450-CR, 2009 WL 2707175, at *4 (Tex. App. 2009) (citing
Erazo v. State, 144 S.W.3d 487, 494-95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)).
103. See Vasquez v. State, 67 S.W.3d 229, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see also Kilgore, 2009
WL 2707175, at *4; Erazo, 144 S.W.3d at 494-95 (error to admit photograph that was not related to
a disputed fact of consequence).
104. State v. Guthrie, 461 S.E.2d 163, 189 (W. Va. 1995).
105. United States v. Ham, 998 F.2d 1247, 1252 (4th Cir. 1993).
106. Nichols v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 154 F.3d 875, 885 (8th Cir. 1998).
107. See People v. Rivera, 661 N.E.2d 429, 436 (lll. App. Ct. 1996) ("The out of court identifi-
cation testimony .. .caused grave harm because it served as a substitute for courtroom identification.
The prosecutor's argument concerning a gang death warrant ... was highly prejudicial and inflam-
matory. These errors, when considered together, undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial.
These errors, then, are plain and warrant reversal." (citations omitted)).
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where courts shun emotional evidence, equating it with undue prejudice
even when it might be appropriately admitted.os
Cases dealing with gruesome crime scene photographs' 09 and victim
memorial videos reveal how differently FRE 403 can be applied depend-
ing on whether invoking sympathy is considered a good thing or a bad
thing."o They also reveal how courts fail "to scrutinize the emotional
appeal of this kind of evidence very carefully.""' In some cases, victim
impact videos are excluded because they were unduly prejudicial and
"created a danger of provoking undue sympathy and a verdict based on
passion as opposed to reason."I12 In others, the video is admitted because
it evokes sympathy; namely, that the "victims are individuals whose
deaths represent a unique loss to society and to their family and that the
victims are not simply 'faceless strangers."" 13 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has cautioned that individualizing the victim through memorial
108. For examples of fairly thin explanations of the emotional bias, see People v. Alexander,
235 P.3d 873, 925 (Cal. 2010) ("[D]efendant has not shown that the evidence's probative value was
substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice .. . [where] the lineup refusal evidence
was not especially emotional, the possible reasons why defendant chose not to participate were fully
developed, and the issue was not especially time consuming. . . ."). See also Gattis v. State, No. 03-
04-00268-CR, 2006 WL 1788207, at *5 (Tex. App. June 26, 2006) ("[T]here was nothing particular-
ly emotion-inducing about the evidence concerning the motorcycle wreck that would unfairly im-
press the jury.").
109. See generally David A. Bright & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Gruesome Evidence and
Emotion: Anger, Blame, and Jury Decision-Making, 30 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 183 (2006).
110. People v. Sampson, 67 A.D.3d 1031, 1032 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). Often emotional pic-
tures, such as those of a victim's body at a crime scene, can be excluded if their "sole purpose" is to
"arouse the emotions of the jury." Id. (quoting People v. Pobliner, 298 N.E.2d 637, 645 (N.Y.
1973)). For scholarship promoting the role of sympathy in legal decision-making, see Irving R.
Kaufman, The Anatomy of Decisionmaking, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 16 (1984) ("[O]ur intuition,
emotion and conscience are appropriate factors in the jurisprudential calculus."). For an inarticulate
version of the opposition, recall Michael Steele's comments about why he is opposed to empathetic
judges: "Crazy nonsense empathetic. I'll give you empathy. Empathize right on your behind. Crazi-
ness." Rachel Weiner, Michael Steele: "Empathize Right on Your Behind", HUFFINGTON POST (May
8, 2009, 3:46 PM), http://www.hufmingtonpost.com/2009/05/08/michael-steele-
empathize n 200324.html.
Ill. Christine M. Kennedy, Victim Impact Videos: The New-Wave of Evidence in Capital
Sentencing Hearings, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1069, 1078 (2008) ("[C]ourts have largely failed to
address the central question raised by victim impact evidence: when does it become so irrelevant
and/or emotion-provoking that the defendant becomes subject to unfair prejudice which substantially
outweighs probative value of the evidence, resulting in fundamental unfairness? The admittance of
material like the letters to the murdered mother and photographs of a dressed-up stillborn child sets a
high threshold for evidence courts may consider too inflammatory and prejudicial. The courts do not
seem to scrutinize the emotional appeal of this kind of evidence very carefully, nor do they appropri-
ately take into consideration the emotional effect of this evidence." (footnote omitted)).
112. United States v. Sampson, 335 F. Supp. 2d 166, 191 (D. Mass. 2004) ("The video, made
for a memorial service, was about twenty-seven minutes in length and featured over 200 still photo-
graphs of the victim, in roughly chronological order, from the time he was born until the time just
before his death. The pictures were set to evocative contemporary music, including that of the Beat-
les and James Taylor."). Perhaps this video should have been excluded, as it was too long to convey
its message; but the emotional content of the video could not be avoided. See also State v. Anthony,
776 So. 2d 376, 394 (La. 2000); State v. Allen, 994 P.2d 728, 751 (N.M. 1999).
113. State v. Gray, 887 S.W.2d 369, 389 (Mo. 1994) ("The evidence complained of included
testimony that the victims held liberal political views, were caring, community involved, excellent
students, advocates of social change, and 'without a hateful bone in her body.' In addition, during
the penalty phase the prosecution presented a video of the Kerry family Christmas.").
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videos is not meant to be a proxy for the loss to the community from her
death.1 14 Because sympathy is encouraged in some cases and discouraged
in others, these videos provide a Rorschach test for emotionally-laden
evidence under FRE 403. The irony may be that the rule aimed textually
at limiting bias is in fact encouraging the exact opposite in practice: bias
stemming from discretion and institutional norms.
The anti-emotions bias in FRE 403 is lamentable for at least three
reasons. First, it ignores the wide range of cases where emotion might be
said to render decisions more, rather than less, accurate. It is quite possi-
ble that empathy, rage, or sadness may be entirely appropriate emotions
to be conjured up at the guilt phase of trial, to better understand prima
facie mental states of the parties (mens rea, honesty, etc.). As was men-
tioned in the previous section on FRE 105, emotional testimony, and our
emotional reaction, may also help us focus, attend, and remember. Se-
cond, the focus on eliminating emotional bases for decisions does not
require, but does suggest, that emotion and cognition are two completely
separate processes. And third, it distracts from the fact that bad logic,
memory, or perception or marginally related facts, can also contribute to
prejudice.n 5
In their helpful treatise on the laws of evidence, Wright and Miller
suggest that the phrase "undue prejudice" ought not to focus on emotion.
Instead, we should ask whether the evidence fosters an "illegitimate
method of persuasion" that either appeals "to an inappropriate logic" not
based on the evidence or "to an undesirable emotion" such as hatred.
This gets us a bit closer, as only certain emotions that are thought of as
improper are excluded. At its core, this refashioning of FRE 403 asks us
to consider the effect our emotions have on our logical reasoning. Only
when our logical reasoning is impaired by emotion, or when we are re-
acting merely to improper emotions, should this type of evidence be ex-
cluded. This seems entirely reasonable and an improvement on the gloss
provided by the Advisory Committee. It does, however, beg the question
of when our emotions are improper, and when we are relying solely on
emotion rather than in tandem with other facts.
Given the flexibility judges have in balancing FRE 403, and the
standards for reviewing evidentiary decisions, potentially relevant infor-
mation may be excluded based on the fact that it also happens to stir up
emotion. But when is evidence ever limited to one potential purpose? We
are perfectly capable of constructing reasons post hoc to justify our emo-
114. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1991) ("The facts of Gathers are an excellent
illustration of this: The evidence showed that the victim was an out of work, mentally handicapped
individual, perhaps not, in the eyes of most, a significant contributor to society, but nonetheless a
murdered human being.").
115. Jody Lyne6 Madeira, Lashing Reason to the Mast: Understanding Judicial Constraints on
Emotion in Personal Injury Litigation, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 137, 149 (2006).
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tional impulses.' 16 Judges can use pretext, or not, depending on whether
they consider the evidence important enough for the jury to hear. This
rigid intolerance to emotional evidence under FRE 403 is particularly
disingenuous as so much emotional testimony and evidence is channeled
in jury trials-through the prosody of attorney's speech, from the wit-
nesses' eye contact, physical movements, and tone.l17
C. Sentencing and Damages Instructions-Imposing Legal and Moral
Judgment Without Sympathy or Empathy
1. The Anti-Golden-Rule Rule
The two illustrations above globally labeled emotions as problemat-
ic. Here, we deal with a rule that has a particular emotion in its cross-
hairs: empathy and its sister, sympathy." 8 "Golden Rule" instructions in
personal injury cases ask jurors to put themselves in the shoes of one of
the parties, usually the plaintiff, when calculating civil damages.11 9 Such
rules are generally thought to be impermissible because they encourage
jurors to decide cases based on what they would hypothetically want
rather than something more objective.12 0 Courts further consider them to
be inappropriate because they involve a "blatant appeal to the jury's nat-
ural sympathy for the victim."l21
Below are examples of Golden Rule arguments:
* "Mr. Herring has had something that God has given to him taken
away: a healthy, completely accident-free body. That is what he had.
Something we all want. Something we all cherish."1 2 2
116. See Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Ap-
proach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCH. REV. 814, 822-23 (2001).
117. Adolphs, supra note 67, at 168 ("Audition provides important social signals in addition to
language. The intonation of speech-prosody-can signal various emotions, and is recognized using
some of the same structures that we use for recognizing facial expressions. Music is an especially
intriguing stimulus, as it might serve a social function that is not found in other animals, and it has
been shown to elicit intense emotional responses that activate the orbitofrontal cortex, the insula and
the amygdala." (footnotes omitted)).
118. Empathy involves experiencing the emotions of others (because you have been in that
situation), while sympathy involves being able to appreciate or feel sorry for someone's feelings
(even though you have never been there). Tania Singer & Claus Hamm, The Social Neuroscience of
Empathy, in THE YEAR IN COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 2009, at 81, 82 (Michael B. Miller & Alan
Kingstone eds., 2009) ("Despite the word's linguistic roots in ancient Greek-from empatheia
(passion), which is composed of 'en' (in) and 'pathos' (feeling)-the scientific scrutiny of empathy
has a relatively short history that can be dated back to its use in philosophical aesthetics. From there
the English term originated as a direct translation of the German Einfaihlung ('feeling into' some-
thing), a term that was originally proposed as a tool for analyzing works of art and nature, but later
developed into a more general mechanism for recognizing each other as 'minded creatures."' (cita-
tion omitted)).
119. See Hall v. State, 16 S.W.3d 582, 585 (Mo. 2000).
120. 75A AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 547 (2011).
121. People v. Vance, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 98, 102 (Ct. App. 2010).
122. Klein v. Herring, 347 So. 2d 681, 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (leading to a new trial).
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* "The prosecutor improperly argued, 'How embarrassing, first, to
have to go through these acts, to have your father figure doing these
things to you. Imagine how just dirty [sic] it makes you feel.' [However,]
we conclude that the error did not affect Draw's substantial rights be-
cause the record indicates that the jury reached its verdicts based on a
review of the evidence presented at trial rather than on any empathy or
sympathy it may have had for the victims.',1
23
Ironically, Golden Rule arguments engender much vitriolic emo-
tion, with one judge declaring:
It is hard to conceive of anything that would more quickly destroy the
structure of rules and principles ... than for the juries to award dam-
ages in accordance with the standard of what they themselves would
want if they or a loved one had received the injuries suffered by a
plaintiff. In some cases, indeed, many a juror would feel that all the
money in the world could not compensate him for such an injury to
himself or his wife or children.1
24
If juries are not to be relying on their emotions such as empathy
when awarding damages, how are they deciding how much money to
award the plaintiff?
Typically, jurors are told very little about how to calculate damag-
es. 125 And what they are told is often just a very cursory definition of
what the damages are for (i.e., compensating for medical expenses, pain
and suffering, change of lifestyle, or punishing willful conduct) without
providing any metric by which they are supposed to calculate these val-
ues. The result is often a "common sense" decision about what seems
fair.
In all likelihood, jurors are doing precisely what they are told not to
do with the anti-Golden-Rule rules. For how else could they perform this
function if not evaluating what they think would be a fair amount based
on their personal sense of justice and what they would want if they were
the plaintiff? Some research shows that the best predictor of a jury's
damages award is their emotional reaction or feelings towards the par-
123. Draw v. State, No. 50560, 2010 WL 3270976, at *2 (Nev. July 22, 2010) (alteration in
original) (citations omitted).
124. Klein, 347 So. 2d at 682 (quoting Bullock v. Branch, 130 So. 2d 74, 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1961)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
125. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Matthew T. Bodie, The Effects of Jury Ignorance About
Damage Caps: The Case of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 90 IOWA L. REv. 1361, 1399-1400 (2005)
("As courts, practitioners, and academics have noted, jurors generally get precious little instruction
on how to calculate compensatory and punitive damages... . Even if an instruction counsels the jury
to avoid 'passion or prejudice,' such an instruction on its own does little to provide structure to the
jury's contemplation." (footnotes omitted)).
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ties.126 But to some, employing empathy in this way is tearing up our
legal system from its roots.
2. Sentencing Instructions-Punish Without Empathy or Sympathy
Another example of where empathy is discouraged is when jurors
hear evidence about imposing the death penalty in capital cases. It is
worth pausing here to note the irony: perhaps the most emotionally load-
ed action that the state can do-strip someone of their liberty and life-is
somehow supposed to be done coolly and without emotion. What a fic-
tion!
Jurors evaluate the weight of the aggravating factors to decide
whether someone eligible for the death penalty should actually receive it.
The death penalty was reinstated in 1976 through the Gregg v. Georgia
Supreme Court decision. 127 Since then it has become "talismanic" 2 8 for
courts to remind us that "[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments re-
quire a sentence of death to be based on reason, not caprice, emotion, or
other arbitrary factor."1 2 9 One scholar said, "[t]he greatest risk in the
moral-emotive approach is that sentencers will confuse moral outrage
with its amoral emotive cousin, the passion of vengeance."' 30 It is fair to
say that we do not want jurors to become hysterical or sentence based on
false stereotypes. But somewhere in the middle between moral outrage
and vengeance lies the proper ground. As further evidence of the com-
plexity of emotion and its impact on decision-making, research has
demonstrated that "contrary to most people's intuitions, happy moods
promote group stereotyping, whereas sad moods promote a focus on in-
dividuals."l 3 1 Thus, if our goal was to remove sentencing based on racial
126. For a helpful review of the research in this area, see Hastie, supra note 41, at 1005 ("Dan-
iel Kahneman, David A. Schkade, and Cass R. Sunstein conclude that outrage is the primary media-
tor of jurors' decisions concerning punitive damages. Brian H. Bornstein hypothesizes that the
impact of the severity of an injury on mock jurors' judgments of liability and compensatory awards
is mediated by jurors' feelings towards the parties involved in the cases. In Bornstein's studies,
injury severity had no effects beyond those predicted via the mock jurors' emotional reactions.
Similarly, Neal Feigenson, Jaihyun Park, and Peter Salovey interpreted the complex findings they
obtained in a study of personal injury judgments as the result of jurors' resolution of feelings of
sympathy and blame for the plaintiffs and feelings of anger or fear evoked by the defendants' ac-
tions.").
127. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
128. Maroney, supra note 30, at 872 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 514 (1990) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting)).
129. Allen v. State, 923 P.2d 613, 619 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 110 S.Ct.
1257, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1989)).
130. Pillsbury, supra note 51, at 690.
131. Gerald L. Clore & Jeffrey R. Huntsinger, How Emotions Inform Judgment and Regulate
Thought, 11 TRENDS COGNITIVE Sci. 393, 396 (2007) ("One relevant study involved a mock trial in
which a Latino student was accused of a stereotype-consistent offense. The results showed that
individuals in happy moods were more likely than those in sad moods to have their verdicts
influenced by the stereotype.. . . [T]he stereotyping seems to reflect a general cognitive style rather
than prejudice as such. Indeed, similar findings come from marketing and political science studies
showing that happy moods promote reliance on brand names as opposed to product attributes among
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stereotyping, attempting to remove saddening emotions, such as sympa-
thy, may not be the way to go.
As Terry Maroney correctly points out, the effort to rid the process
of emotion "was motivated in significant part by a desired move away
from the racial bias that pervaded the capital system, [but] the horse has
long left that barn; the Court now speaks in much more general terms
about the supposed perils of emotion."' 3 2 This is echoed in the statement
of Samuel Pillsbury that "[a]lthough the mob-at-the-jail scene illustrates
that anger can lead to injustice, it does not support the proposition that all
decisions influenced by anger are morally tainted."l33 We have seen this
flawed reasoning elsewhere, when the anti-emotion bias embedded in
FRE 105 and FRE 403 has been expanded to sloppily exclude many oth-
er types of emotional evidence and processes.
An example of this is when judges explicitly instruct jurors not to
rely on their empathic impulses, 13 4 or when they are told to come to a
unanimous verdict by rendering a decision "based on a reasonable, rather
than emotional, evaluation of the evidence."1 3 5 There are too many ex-
amples of this sentencing instruction to cite, but I will attempt to provide
its flavor. Jurors are told that they must not "be swayed by anger, sympa-
thy or prejudice or any type of passion or emotion. [Sentencing] requires
the exercise of sound judgment . . . . It is a matter of calm reflection, not
for the indulgence of emotion."l 3 6 This is the absolute form of anti-
sympathy present mostly in capital instructions, where theoretically no
emotion or sympathy is allowed.
A softer version of this instruction admonishes reliance on "mere
sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or
public feeling."m3 We can see an example of this sort of instruction after
the prosecutor urged the jury to "get mad" and rely on their emotions,
which was deemed impermissible. 138 While some courts refuse to allow
consumers, and a reliance on political party as opposed to candidate positions among voters." (foot-
notes omitted)).
132. Maroney, supra note 30, at 872 (footnotes omitted).
133. Pillsbury, supra note 51, at 656.
134. See, e.g., State v. Crawford, 133 S.E.2d 232, 240 (N.C. 1963) ("[T]hejury should arrive at
their verdict 'without sympathy or without prejudice towards any person."').
135. People v. Bowen, 134 A.D.2d 356, 356 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
136. Reynolds v. State, CR-07-0443, 2010 WL 3833960, at *79 (Ala. Crim. App. Oct. 1,
2010); see also United States v. Hammer, 25 F. Supp. 2d 518, 534 (D. Pa. 1998) ("You are to per-
form your duty as jurors without bias or prejudice as to either party. The law does not permit jurors
to be governed by fear, favor, emotion, prejudice, or public opinion.").
137. People v. Alvarez, 926 P.2d 365, 403 (Cal. 1996) (emphasis added).
138. See State v. Taylor, 944 S.W.2d 925, 938 (Mo. 1997). Defendant Taylor found guilty of
first-degree murder, first-degree robbery, first-degree assault, and three counts of armed criminal
action, and was sentenced to death on murder charge. "Taylor shot Newton once in the head, killing
him. Taylor then pointed the gun at the child. Taylor pulled the trigger, but the gun jammed and did
not discharge. Frustrated, Taylor locked the child in the back room and returned to the car." Id. at
930. "Urging the jury to 'get mad' and decide the case based on 'emotion' was impermissible.
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"mere sympathy or prejudice to influence [jurors] in reaching their ver-
dict,"i" it is impossible to know when a jury member is moved by
"mere" sympathy, as opposed to sympathy stemming from a serious
analysis of the facts. In all likelihood, the instructions we provide do very
little, as emotional reactions bubble up organically and are difficult to
consciously subdue. Of course in some cases, courts do not discourage
all emotion, but rather stress "that the emphasis throughout the proceed-
ing should be on reason rather than emotion."1 4 0 Even where emotion is
just subordinate, it still sits in a position where it is "rather than" reason.
Rather than ardently embracing empathy as the "cognitive" process that
empowers jurors to find facts, sentence, and determine credibility, courts
routinely grant appeals on cases where jurors were encouraged to be
sympathetic or empathetic.
3. Permitting Emotion: Mitigation
Emotion is affirmatively encouraged during many mitigation hear-
ings. Specifically, the Supreme Court has stated that in this setting the
Constitution requires jurors to rely on emotional arguments.141 An in-
struction that attempts to eliminate emotion from sentencing might mis-
lead jurors into believing that only factual physical evidence about the
crime is relevant and that mitigation based on character should be disre-
garded: "Mitigation does not return a jury to unbridled emotional discre-
tion, but it does require jurors to make a reasoned moral response to de-
fendant's personal background, character and crime." 42
As you might expect, this can lead to confusing instructions. Jurors
are told to simultaneously use emotion to show mercy, but remove emo-
tion for all other sentencing purposes (such as evaluating aggravating
factors). Proposed instructions have been deemed too confusing as one in
particular "discouraged reliance on emotional evidence to support a ver-
dict of death, while encouraging reliance on emotional evidence to show
mercy to the defendant." 4 3 Thus, jurors are asked to silence their emo-
tional processes during aggravation hearings, but later are told to rely on
Moreover, because the court overruled the objection to the criticized language, the appeal to emotion
had the stamp of approval of the trial court." id. at 938 (citations omitted).
139. State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 921 (Tenn. 1994).
140. People v. Innocent, 150 A.D.2d 608, 609 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
141. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989) (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164,
185 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
142. Leona D. Jochnowitz, Missed or Foregone Mitigation: Analyzing Claimed Error in Mis-
souri Capital Clemency Cases, 46 CRIM. L. BULL., 347, 352-53 (2010) ("[T]he Supreme Court held
that jurors' decisions must be rooted in the mitigating and aggravating evidence, and that they could
be instructed to avoid 'solely emotional responses.' By the same token, Justice O'Connor, in a
separate concurrence, required that capital sentencing reflect a 'reasoned, moral response to defend-
ant's background, character and crime, rather than mere sympathy or emotion.' A 'reasoned' re-
sponse meant that jurors had to consider the aggravating and mitigating evidence; and a 'moral'
response meant that juror must also make a moral inquiry into the personal and individual culpability
of the defendant." (footnotes omitted)).
143. People v. Hartsch, 232 P.3d 663, 697 (Cal. 2010).
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them for mitigation, despite the fact that the two are sometimes proxi-
mate in terms of presentation. Other courts perpetuate this confusing
instruction as a compromise, allowing emotion at mitigation but in hard-
ly any other proceedings. Still more remarkable, some courts decide to
define "mercy" as cognitive, so that it can properly be allowed.'" A
more nuanced instruction accounts for the potential problems of relying
on certain subjective emotion (such as homophobia) while encouraging
relevant emotional evidence and argument. It reads like this:
You must make this decision soberly and rationally, and you may not
impose the ultimate punishment of death as a result of an irrational,
purely subjective response to emotional evidence and argument. On
the other hand, evidence and argument on emotional, though relevant
subjects, may provide legitimate reasons to sway you to show mercy
towards the defendant.145
Better. But even this improved instruction perpetuates the myth that
we can consciously suppress our emotional reactions to increase sentenc-
es but allow them when we reduce sentences. The disparity here begs the
question: Is there a meaningful difference between the role of juror in
preliminary sentencing and ultimate sentencing through mitigation? We
are expecting jurors to perform mental gymnastics and are sending con-
fusing signals about the normative value of emotion in the sentencing
process.
D. Instructions Related to the "Heat ofPassion" Theory of Voluntary
Manslaughter
The heat of passion instruction embraces a robust position of our
emotions and reasons as competitors. The heat of passion defense reduc-
es first-degree murder to "voluntary manslaughter" if a criminal defend-
ant intentionally kills someone after adequate provocation. What counts
as adequate provocation is left for the jury to decide, but it should "vary
with the myriad shifting circumstances of men's temper and quarrels."1 46
The theory behind this instruction is that the defendant ought to be con-
sidered less morally blameworthy because they committed the act when
"incapable of that cool reflection."1 4 7 In other formulations, adequate
provocation was defined as what "might render ordinary men, of fair
144. 11 WASH. PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIM. 31.07 cmt. (3d ed. 2010) ("The wording
of this instruction, 'in fairness or in mercy,' was upheld in Gentry, citing the committee's Comment
to WPIC 31.03: 'The committee concluded that passion, prejudice and sympathy were "emotional"
considerations, while a finding of "mercy" would be based on "reason."' (quoting State v. Gentry,
888 P.2d 1105, 1151 (Wash. 1995))).
145. Hartsch, 232 P.3d at 696 (internal quotation mark omitted).
146. Commonwealth v. Pease, 69 A. 891, 892 (Pa. 1908).
147. Addington v. United States, 165 U.S. 184, 186 (1897).
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average disposition, liable to act rashly or without due deliberation or
reflection, and from passion rather than judgment." 4 8
Requiring "adequate provocation," the instruction contemplates this
as including emotional impulses that limit or eliminate our ability to act
rationally.149 While this emotion is frequently rage, it does not have to
be. Consider the California pattern instruction below:
Neither fear, revenge, nor the emotion induced by and accompany-
ing or following an intent to commit a felony, nor any or all of these
emotional states, in and of themselves, constitute the heat of passion
referred to in the law of manslaughter. Any or all of these emotions
may be involved in a heat of passion that causes judgment to give
way to impulse and rashness. Also, any one or more of them may ex-
ist in the mind of a person who acts deliberately and from choice,
whether the choice is reasonable or unreasonable.1 50
What is often required for the provocation is merely that it "engaged
an emotional, automatic, or involuntary process that limits or eliminates
the agent's ability to act 'rationally."""' As Blackstone describes it his-
torically, voluntary manslaughter "arises from the sudden heat of pas-
sions; murder from the wickedness of heart."l 52 Here we see the older
metaphors describing mental and emotional processes as visceral. Green-
leaf s nineteenth century treatise on the heat of passion evidence explains
two classic examples. The first is "where a husband caught a man in the
act of adultery with his wife, and instantly killed either or both of them,"
and the second:
[W]here a boy, being beaten by another boy, ran home to his father,
who, seeing him very bloody, and hearing his cries, instantly took a
rod or small stick, and running to the field three-quarters of a mile
distant, struck the aggressor on the head, of which he died, this was
ruled manslaughter only, because it was done upon provocation ...
and in sudden heat and passion.
In a telling summary of the heat of passion doctrine, Greenleaf edu-
cates us that the mortal blow should be given before the passion, aroused
by the provocation, had time to cool; "for it is only to human frailty that
the law allows this indulgence, and not to settled malignity of heart....
[If] there were time for passion to subside, and for reason to resume her
148. Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 220 (1862) (emphasis omitted).
149. See Commonwealth v. Harris, 171 A. 279, 281 (Pa. 1934) (stating that the mitigating
circumstances to be considered are those "which indicate provocation, impulsion of emotion, or
other satisfactory reasons for lessening the penalty").
150. CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIM. 8.44 (2011).
151. Paul W. Glimcher, The Neurobiology of Individual Decision Making, Dualism, and Legal
Accountability, in BETTER THAN CONSCIOUS?: DECISION MAKING, THE HUMAN MIND, AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at 343, 346.
152. 3 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 119 (16th ed. 1899).
153. Id § 122 (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted).
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empire before the mortal blow was struck, the homicide will be mur-
der."1 54
Below are more recent examples of this antiquated doctrine, which
highlight the confusion and false dichotomy between emotion and rea-
son:
* "Whether or not there was a reasonable opportunity for the pas-
sion to cool depends upon whether, under all the circumstances of the
particular case, there was such a lapse of time between the provocation
and the homicidal act that the mind of a reasonable person would have
cooled sufficiently, so that the homicide was directed by reason, rather
than by passion or emotion." 55
* "The defendant attempted to kill someone because of a sudden
quarrel or in the heat of passion if, [among other things] ... the attempt-
ed killing was a rash act done under the influence of intense [elmotion
that obscured the defendant's reasoning or judgment." 1
56
* "[D]efendant was overwhelmed with numerous affective states
specifically stemming from his sexual dysfunction and specifically the
volley of expletives that followed such dysfunction from Miss Clark ....
In this emotional state, defendant was incapable of premeditating and
deliberating or of coldly weighing the consequences of killing Clark....
In Dr. Franz's opinion as well, defendant killed Clark in a very emotion-
al, anxious state in which he did not have the skills available to premedi-
tate and deliberate."1 57
* "Heat of passion arises when 'at the time of the killing, the reason
of the accused was obscured or disturbed by passion to such an extent as
would cause the ordinarily reasonable person of average disposition to
act rashly and without deliberation and reflection, and from such passion
rather than from judgment.15 1
* "There is nothing in the instruction that would cause a jury to
consider only physical acts to the exclusion of emotions. . . . [T]he
court's instructions properly focused the jury on appellant's emotional
response to the provocation, as opposed to his physical response."l59
154. Id § 125 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
155. OKLA. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIM. 4-100 (2011).
156. People v. Rodriguez, No. G042583, 2010 WL 4261915, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 29,
2010) (third alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
157. People v. Rogers, 141 P.3d 135, 150-51 (Cal. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(affirming second and first degree murder charge).
158. People v. Barton, 906 P.2d 531, 540 (Cal. 1995) (quoting CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS-
CRIM. 8.42 (1995)); accord People v. Steele, 47 P.3d 225, 240 (Cal. 2002).
159. Rodriguez, 2010 WL 4261915, at *4.
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* "Heat of passion does not require anger, rage, or any specific
emotion. It can be any violent or intense emotion that causes a person to
act without due deliberation and reflection. ... 16
As you can see, emotion is placed sharply at odds with reason.
What many of the courts dodge, however, is the question of intent. In
order to be guilty of second-degree homicide, the defendant still must
have intended to kill, even if this intent was not part of a premeditated
plan. And if the effects of emotion are so debilitating, what does this do
for the state's ability to establish the requisite intent? Are the two pro-
cesses completely different? Forming intent requires some form of cog-
nition or reasoning, which is ostensibly shut down by passion or rage.
This is a third-rail issue that is not being properly discussed in criminal
law scholarship.
One way of limiting use of the heat of passion instruction is to place
a reasonableness requirement on it, as seen above. Let us pause to think
about this. Requiring that the provocation be objectively reasonable for
someone with "average disposition" is akin to requiring reasonable un-
reasonableness. This is surely a mechanism for furthering cultural power-
dynamics such as sexism and racism. 16 1 But it may not always be sinister
or hypocritical, as Daniel Kahan and Martha Nussbaum point out.
Kahan and Nussbaum have done terrific work with conceptual de-
velopment in this arena, arguing that the "disparate approaches to emo-
tion at work in the criminal law stem from a long-standing dispute in
Western culture about the nature and educability of the emotions."' 62
According to them, two accounts of emotion compete to explain our be-
havior.16 3 The "mechanistic conception" sees emotions as reflexive and
entrenched influences that do not require cognition.' The "evaluative
conception" conversely holds that emotions convey cognitive apprais-
als.16 5 These appraisals can be evaluated against individual and social
160. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 570 (2011); see also People v.
Moye, 213 P.3d 652, 660 (Cal. 2009) ("To satisfy the subjective element of this form of voluntary
manslaughter, the accused must be shown to have killed while under 'the actual influence ofa strong
passion' induced by such provocation.") (quoting People v. Wickersham, 650 P.2d 311, 321 (Cal.
1982)); State v. Bird, 734 N.W.2d 664, 673 (Minn. 2007) ("[W]hether a person of ordinary self-
control would be provoked under like circumstances requires an objective analysis." (citing State v.
Hannon, 703 N.W.2d 498, 510 (Minn. 2005))); State v. Buntrock, 560 N.W.2d 383, 386 (Minn.
1997).
161. Antonia Elise Miller, Note, Inherent (Gender) Unreasonableness of the Concept of Rea-
sonableness in the Context of Manslaughter Committed in the Heat of Passion, 17 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 249, 250 (2010) ("[F]lexible sentencing associated with voluntary manslaughter
emerged in the common law as an alternative to the rigidity of murder sentences in order to afford
leniency to males who have committed violent acts in response to provocation. Today, voluntary
manslaughter continues to accommodate men who kill their wives in the heat of passion, but not
women who kill their husbands for the same reason . . . ." (footnotes omitted)).
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morality, and can lead to moral education through emotional evalua-
tion.166 Thus, what is a "reasonable" emotion will change as the social
norms of what constitutes good character changes. To them, it is there-
fore not contradictory to hold people to different standards based on our
emotional reaction to their emotional behavior.
To that end, sometimes our social norms are informed by emotional
contagion, which may be morally wrong. We then must engage cogni-
tively with these reactions for social justice. This makes perfect sense,
but there is a third account of emotions that is largely missing from this
view. Namely, what is missing is a bi-directional top-down and bottom-
up mixture of evaluative and mechanistic, with both operating in tandem.
We also need to recognize the evaluative as sometimes automatic, and
not necessarily learned through updating social mores.'6 7 With regard to
the juror, we need to appreciate that the connection between emotion and
cognition is a two-way street. While emotions convey cognitive apprais-
als, cognitive appraisals also reflect evolutionarily engrained and sub-
conscious emotional information. In these cases our emotions may not
respond to cognitive appraisal through instruction. Certainly this also
suggests that the "heat of passion" must rest on retributive notions of
justice for the criminal defendant, as it is strained to think of an instruc-
tion having a deterrent effect through appraisal of emotion at the time of
the crime.
With regard to the defendant, we should be careful to excuse behav-
ior that has any strong emotional base. It might be that anger and rage
should be singled out as the only bases for the instruction, recognizing
that other emotions would not lead to a true "heat of passion" that stills
the reflective processes. This tracks our folk understanding of what it
means to "snap." It is not obvious, however, that we should punish these
people with shorter sentences. The truly enraged defendant may need
more specific deterrence, even if we might partially forgive their tres-
passes because of the situation. Thus, the instruction is anti-
consequentialist and may be based on folk thinking about impulsivity in
moments of adultery or child bullying.
IV. USING THE FALSE DICHOTOMY TO FAVOR EMOTIONAL
TESTIMONY-RULE 803(2)
The excited utterance hearsay exception was codified into the FRE
and exists in some form in every state's evidentiary rules. It is laid out in
FRE 803(2), and allows hearsay to be admitted when it contains "[a]
166. Id.
167. Blair et al., supra note 86, at 437 (finding that goal-directed processing disrupted the
BOLD response, an indirect measure of brain activity, to emotional pictures); Anett Gyurak et al.,
Do Tests of Executive Functioning Predict Ability to Down-Regulate Emotions Spontaneously and
When Instructed to Suppress?, 9 COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE, & BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 144, 149
(2009) (verbal fluency scores predicted successful regulation of emotion).
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statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declar-
ant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition."
Emotions of "stress" or "excitement" are thought to impair reasoning and
to make it impossible to lie. If the rules exhibit affective confusion at a
meta-level with emotions, we also see a micro-version here with the
monolithic view of a particular emotion-stress.
Stress can be absolute or relative. Absolute stress induces an evolu-
tionarily preserved "fight or flight" response, occurring regardless of a
person's history or character. Our individual survival depends on how we
respond to these life or death cues. Relative stress, on the other hand, is
incredibly variable and requires one to perceive the event as unpredicta-
ble, new, or out of our control. These relative stressors can be obvious or
subtle, and can depend on our personality and life experience. 168 The
previously discussed absolute stressors trigger physiological systems
(pulse, adrenaline, blood pressure) because they are threats to our lives.
For relative stress, we must interpret the situation in order to decide how
to respond, and there may not be the same physiological signs of
stress. 169
Whether stress will make it difficult for us to lie depends on what
type of stress we are experiencing, and when.170 Are we being followed
by a suspicious husband? If so, we might have no problem lying when
we are cornered by him. Have we just heard a blood-curdling cry? Have
we been repeatedly sexually abused? Are we starving? Each of these will
elicit different physiological stressors.'71 It is likely that only the absolute
stressors may impair our ability to lie, but the relative stressors may not.
Notwithstanding the many critiques of this hearsay exception, rather
than falling out of practice, this rule is only being invigorated in recent
years. 172 It is also quite broad, as it does not matter whether the statement
includes an opinion or a statement of observed facts. Excited utterance
168. See generally Ahmad R. Hariri et al., Serotonin Transporter Genetic Variation and the
Response of the Human Amygdala, 297 SC. 400 (2002); D.T. Hsu et al., jMRI BOLD Responses to
Negative Stimuli in the Prefrontal Cortex Are Dependent on Levels of Recent Negative Life Stress in
Major Depressive Disorder, 183 PSYCHIATRY RESEARCH 202 (2010); Randy J. Larsen & Timothy
Ketelaar, Personality and Susceptibility to Positive and Negative Emotional States, 61 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 132 (1991) (describing the different emotional responses of extro-
verts and introverts).
169. SJ. Lupien et al., The Effects of Stress and Stress Hormones on Human Cognition: Impli-
cations for the Field ofBrain and Cognition, 65 BRAIN & COGNITION 209, 210-11 (2007).
170. Christian J. Merz, Oliver T. Wolf & Jurgen Hennig, Stress Impairs Retrieval of Socially
Relevant Information, 124 BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 288, 291 (2010) ("[T]he cognitive response to
stress might be reduced only at times of high endogenous sex steroid concentrations (e.g., during the
luteal phase of the menstrual cycle)." (citation omitted)).
171. Lupien et al., supra note 169, at 215 (stating that glucocorticoids can have differential
effects-creating both hyper and hypovigilance in response to auditory and visual stimuli).
172. See William C. Thompson & Maithilee K. Pathak, How Do Jurors React to Hearsay
Testimony?: Empirical Study of Hearsay Rules: Bridging the Gap Between Psychology and Law, 5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 456, 457 (1999) ("This article is designed to help bridge the gap between
psychology and law with respect to hearsay.").
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testimony may also be admitted if the declarant later denies having made
the statement. Courts even admit such out-of-court statements when
much time has passed between the startling event and the purportedly
excited utterance. According to Ed Imwinkelried, "[TJhere is an incipient
trend to admit so-called 're-excited' utterances-statements the declarant
makes upon viewing a movie, television program, or newspaper article-
that reminds the declarant of a much earlier startling event."' 7 ' While
Wigmore himself was of the view that the time component was less criti-
cal than the fact that the declarant was still experiencing some stress, 17 4
some courts still require a close proximity in time between the startling
event and the statement.175
In his somewhat freckled folk view of psychology, Wigmore wrote
that:
[U]nder certain circumstances of physical shock, a stress of nervous
excitement may be produced which stills the reflective faculties and
removes their control . . . . Since this utterance is made under the
immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, and during the
brief period when considerations of self-interest could not have been
brought fully to bear by reasoned reflection, the utterance may be
taken as particularly trustworthy ... .176
This was supported by the leading psychologist of the era, William
James. James wrote, "An impression may be so exciting emotionally as
almost to leave a scar upon the cerebral tissues .... It is widely be-
lieved that emotion affects episodic memory (memory for autobiograph-
ical events). And it does, but in complex and non-linear ways.178
Courts have interpreted the excited utterance rule to require three
things: first, an exciting event; second, that the declarant was under stress
from the event when making the utterance; and third, that the utterance
concerns the exciting event.17 9 Many feel that the rule has been expanded
173. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Need to Resurrect the Present Sense Impression Hearsay
Exception: A Relapse in Hearsay Policy, 52 How. L.J. 319, 325; see also Jone Tran, Note, Crying
Wolf or an Excited Utterance? Allowing Reexcited Statements to Qualify Under the Excited Utter-
ance Exception, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 527, 533 (2004) ("There are an assortment of chronic psycho-
logical syndromes that do not fit cleanly within the excited utterance exception and consequently
should toll the 'excited state' requirement or allow for the statement to fall under the exception
because it constitutes 'reexcitement[,]' . . . unremitting physical pain, or where the declarant is a
victim of a psychologically debilitating crime such as rape or brutal physical battery.").
174. Angela Conti & Brian Gitnik, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2): Problems with the Excit-
ed Utterance Exception to the Rule on Hearsay, 14 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 227, 246
(1999).
175. See Harrison v. Baker, 71 So. 2d 284 (Ala. 1954); People v. Gutierrez, 200 P.3d 847 (Cal.
2009); Littlejohn v. State, 219 A.2d 155 (Del. 1966).
176. 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1747 (1976).
177. 1 WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 670 (1890) (emphasis omitted).
178. See infra notes 349-354.
179. United States v. Reggio, 40 M.J. 694, 699 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1994); United States v.
Phelps, 168 F.3d 1048, 1054 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Moore, 791 F.2d 566, 570 (7th Cir.
1986).
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too much, and judges should be stricter about the amount of time that has
passed between the original event and the statement.180
Originally, the emphasis of the rule was on keeping out intentional
lies-the idea being that people do not have time to lie when experienc-
ing stress. However, this misses the typical hearsay problem: memory.
The person testifying as to the declarant's speech is more often than not
giving false testimony accidentally as a result of mistaken recollections.
Ironically, "the emotions that seemingly ensure sincerity distort the accu-
racy of the observer's perception and memory."181 Put differently, emo-
tions can enable us to be very confident in our recollections, but these
flashbulb and vivid memories are often wrong.182 The processes of emo-
tion and memory are so complex and subtle, that in some experiments,
emotion impairs memory and in other situations, it aids it.183 Subjects
initially have better memories of events when simultaneously experienc-
ing a little bit of a particular emotion, but when that same emotion, say
anxiety or stress, is more long-lasting, this yields the opposite results.
Instead of acknowledging the nuanced roles of memory and emo-
tion, the excited utterance rule likewise adopts the false dichotomy be-
tween reason and emotion. Here, deception is considered a process that
requires cognitive faculties, faculties that are paralyzed by emotion. Thus
emotional declarations are more trustworthy as you do not have cognitive
capacity to deceive. To make this point, consider the following examples
from case law regarding this hearsay exception:
* "Testimony 'that [a] declarant appeared nervous and upset, com-
bined with a reasonable basis for emotional upset, will usually suffice for
admission of declarant's hearsay statement under the excited utterance
exception. ",184
* "[S]tress of nervous excitement may be produced in a spectator
which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control . . . . Since
this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination
of the senses, rather than reason and reflection, and during the brief peri-
180. This would look more like the original "res gestae" exception. Conti & Gitnik, supra note
174, at 237-38.
181. lmwinkelried, supra note 173, at 322.
182. Tali Sharot et al., How Personal Experience Modulates the Neural Circuitry of Memories
of September 11, 104 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 389, 391 (2007) ("In other words, participants who
were closer to the WTC on 9/11 showed decreased activation in the posterior parahippocampal
cortex and increased activation in the amygdala during retrieval of 9/11 memories relative to sum-
mer memories."). See generally, John Neil Bohannon Ill, Flashbulb Memories for the Space Shuttle
Disaster: A Tale of Two Theories, 29 COGNITION 179 (1988).
183. Karin Roelofs et al., The Effects of Social Stress and Cortisol Responses on the Precon-
scious Selective Attention to Social Threat, 75 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 1, 5 (2007) ("These find-
ings indicate that the effects of the social stress context and the cortisol stress-responsiveness were
specific for context relevant (social threat) cues and not for unspecific emotional cues.").
184. Daniel v. State, 677 S.E.2d 120, 125 (Ga. 2009) (quoting Walthour v. State, 497 S.E.2d
799, 802 n.7 (Ga. 1998)).
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od when consideration of self-interest could not have been fully brought
to bear, the utterance may be taken as expressing the real belief of the
speaker as to the facts just observed by him."' 85
* "[T]he critical factor in determining whether a statement is an ex-
cited utterance is whether the emotions, excitement, fear, or pain of the
event still dominated the declarant at the time of the statement."18 6
* "[T]he hearsay was admissible .... He was anxious and admitted
that he was scared; therefore the statement was an excited utterance.""
Thus, the excited utterance rule, like many other evidentiary rules,
also espouses a corrupting view of emotion. Specifically, the emotions of
stress and anxiety turn off our cognitive capacities and make it impossi-
ble for us to lie. In this case, emotion works to render the testimony more
trustworthy rather than less, albeit by ignoring the role of memory and
the different types of stress.
A. The Ultimate Role of the Jury: Credibility Determinations
As David Blinka put it, "One expecting to find a comprehensive,
cogent approach to credibility assessments in the FRE will be greatly
disappointed."" 8 While there is no FRE rule that speaks directly to this,
in practice it is clear through other rules related to impeachment that the
judge in bench trials and the jury in jury trials are meant to serve this
function. Jurors assess credibility based on subtle physical cues-
stutters, stares, and fidgets-and on not so subtle cues, like conflicting
stories. 89 Jurors also choose whom to believe based on reported behavior
from witness testimony.190
Emotion, intuition, and common sense perspectives are encouraged
when jurors make credibility assessments.' 9' Only in this function do we
openly accommodate juror frailty, illogical and inaccurate statements,192
185. People v. Dobbey, 957 N.E.2d 142, 153 (lll.App. Ct. 2011) (quoting People v. Damen,
193 N.E.2d 25, 29 (111. 1963) (internal quotation marks omitted).
186. Langford v. State, No. 03-08-00456-CR, 2010 WL 323081, at *2 (Tex. App. Jan. 27,
2010) (citing Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 596 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
187. Cox v. State, 849 So. 2d 1257, 1269 (Miss. 2003).
188. Blinka, supra note 7, at 365.
189. See Peter David Blanch et al., The Measure of the Judge: An Empirically-Based Frame-
work for Exploring Trial Judges'Behavior, 75 IOWA L. REv. 653, 667-668 (1990) (citing Bert Pryor
& Raymond W. Buchanan, The Effects of a Defendant's Demeanor on Juror Perceptions of Credi-
bility and Guilt, 34 J. COMMC'N 92 (1984)).
190. See Adolphs, supra note 67, at 171 (discussing the "Theory of Mind", which holds that
people attribute mental states to others people when presented with information relating to those
other people).
191. Steven 1. Friedland, On Common Sense and the Evaluation of Witness Credibility, 40
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 165, 166 (1990).
192. See People v. Riel, 998 P.2d 969, 1015 (Cal. 2000) ("Not all comments by all jurors at all
times will be logical, or even rational, or, strictly speaking, correct.").
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and heated emotional processes.193 In fact, we build this faith in the
common juror into the standards of appellate review, preferring the trial
court's assessment as an appellate court "cannot weigh on appeal ... the
intonation and demeanor of the witnesses preceding the testimony in
issue ... nor can we determine the emotional reaction of the jury to other
pieces of evidence . . . ."'94 Reviewing courts often find that the lower
court cross-examiner should be given "wide latitude" to vouch for credi-
bility with emotionally-evocative testimony because "cross-examination
is the means by which to test the truth of the witness's testimony and the
witness's credibility."l 95 Thus, when it comes to credibility determina-
tions, reviewing courts will sometimes go to great lengths to protect the
jury's dominion, including forgiving emotional arguments. But this is an
area where the acceptance of emotion is not universal and in fact may
reflect conflicting sentiments about the jury's historical role and value.
Building on our strong preference for juries to assess credibility, we
also sometimes discourage expert witnesses to testify regarding the like-
lihood of an individual being honest.1 9 6 So why is it the case that we ad-
mittedly allow and encourage jurors to engage in emotional decision-
making when weighing the facts about credibility assessments, but in
very few other places? There is still much to be learned by psychologists
in terms of the unreliability of jurors' credibility assessments. So why
does the law give so much deference to the credibility assessments of
jurors? Blinka points out that in the many "collisions" between psychol-
ogy and law on the topic of credibility, the "law triumphed" because of
"the age and staying power of popular views of credibility."1 9 7 But this
still begs the question-Why?
The answer may lie in the fact that if juries do not perform credibil-
ity assessment, it is not clear whether there is a future for them. We as-
sume that jurors can perform this role well. 198 Whether this belief is well-
founded is a different question, but much judicial ink is spilt on our cul-
193. See People v. Keenan, 758 P.2d 1081, 1121 (Cal. 1988) ("Heated debate is expected of
jurors . . .. ").
194. State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (alterations in original)
(quoting Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 379 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Sean T. Carnathan, Re-Assessing the Trial Court's Opportunity to Assess
Credibility, 13 ME. BAR J. 316, 316 (1998).
195. McCoy v. State, No. CRI0-472, 2010 WL 3922687 (Ark. Oct. 7, 2010).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Wertis, 505 F.2d 683, 685 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding that the trial
court's refusal to permit an expert witness to opine on the credibility of another witness was proper).
197. Blinka, supra note 7, at 370.
198. See Julie A. Seaman, Black Boxes, 58 EMORY L.J. 427, 458 n.129 (2008) (citing United
States v. Stromberg, 179 F. Supp. 278, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) ("The most important function served
by a jury is in bringing its accumulated experience to bear upon witnesses testifying before it, in
order to distinguish truth from falsity. Such a process is of enormous complexity, and involves an
almost infinite number of variable factors. It is the basic premise of the jury system that twelve men
and women can harmonize those variables and decide, with the aid of examination and cross-
examination, the truthfulness of a witness."))).
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tural and constitutional commitment to having the jury serve as lie detec-
tor.199
In two fairly recent cases involving the potential use of technologi-
cal lie-detection, the courts in dicta acknowledged that even if a lie de-
tection device were to become highly accurate and reliable, the results
may still not be admissible if they take the lie detection role away from
the jury.2 00 Collectively, as a legal society, we are highly committed to
the jury's ability and role as credibility detector, even if this process may
also be prone to bias. To be sure, the common law so frequently extols
the role of the jury that it is hard to imagine an American institution that
is a better symbol of our commitment to democratic ideals. 20 1 Given this,
one might also be surprised to learn that the fact-finding jury is a rela-
tively recent phenomenon. Despite having the appearance of being an
age-old common law practice, the judge served as the exclusive finder-
of-fact until after the American Revolution.202 When our Bill of Rights
was drafted, the Seventh Amendment allowed for jury trials in civil cases
that existed at common law in 1787.203 The Sixth Amendment allows for
"speedy and public" jury trials in all serious criminal prosecutions where
204time could be served in jail.
More recently, some hold "it is essential that the jury have the ex-
clusive prerogative of passing upon the credibility of the evidence and of
determining the facts" 205 in order to safeguard the existence of the jury
199. See generally Fisher, supra note 2. See also Anne Bowen Poulin, Credibility: A Fair
Subject for Expert Testimony?, 59 FLA. L. REv. 991, 1001 (2007) (discussing the "common-law
maxim" that the assessment of a witness's credibility is firmly within the jury's province).
200. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312-314 (1998); Wilson v. Corestaff Servs.
L.P. 900 N.Y.S.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
201. See Seaman, supra note 198, at 488 n. 129 ("The right of trial by jury is of ancient origin,
characterized by Blackstone as 'the glory of the English law' and 'the most transcendent privilege
which any subject can enjoy."' (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 485 (1935))).
202. See Edward J. lmwinkelried, Trial Judges-Gatekeepers or Usurpers? Can the Trial
Judge Critically Assess the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Without Invading the Jury's Province
to Evaluate the Credibility and Weight ofthe Testimony?, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 9 (2000) ("[Alfter
the American Revolution . . . [i]t became a virtual 'article of faith' that the trial judge's authority
encompassed the determination of all factual questions conditioning the admissibility of proffered
evidence. This was not only the early common-law conception of the judge's authority; this concep-
tion was likewise codified in Rule 8 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 11 of the Model Code
of Evidence, and state statutes such as California Code of Civil Procedure § 2102 adopted in 1872."
(footnotes omitted)).
203. This is due to the Amendment's phrasing, "In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . U.S.
CONST. amend. Vil.
204. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
205. Flynn v. W. P. Harlin Constr. Co., 509 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah 1973); see also Thompson v.
Janes, 227 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) ("Our judicial system, in which the right to trial
by jury is held inviolable, denies the right of a trial judge, in the presence and hearing of the jury, to
comment upon the credibility of a witness or the weight to be given his testimony."). A Kansas court
held on the same lines that the "trial court errs when it instructs the jury that as a matter of law, an
element of the offense charged has been established by the evidence. Such instructions invade the
province of the jury as the factfinder and violate the defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights
to have the jury determine guilt or innocence." State v. Potts, 118 P.3d 692, 698 (Kan. Ct. App.
2005), rev'don other grounds, 135 P.3d 1054 (Kan. 2006).
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trial. If the jury ceases to serve as lie detector, then its power and value is
seriously diminished-for what else would it do? If juries need to be
protected, then the core functions of the jury, namely credibility assess-
ments, may need to be strengthened and shielded from outside intrusion.
We are sentimental about the value of human jurors, because of the con-
stitutional and emotional desire to keep this institution preserved.2 06 But
in other areas of trial, we are afraid of this contract we have made-
inventing rules like FRE 403 to alleviate the storm that the emotional
juror can brew.207
The outer bounds of accepting emotion in credibility assessments
have been tested in cases regarding possible juror dismissal. In People v.
Varela,208 the appellate court was asked to evaluate whether a juror
should have been dismissed based on her emotional state. 2 09 The court
searched the record and found no facts "assert[ing] that her emotional
state rendered her unable to deliberate." 2 10 They found the case "sharply
distinguishable" from People v. Collins,2 1 1 where a juror requested re-
moval because she was unable to follow the jury instructions, was upset,
and "stated several times that she could not decide the case on the evi-
dence and the law since she was involved emotionally more than intel-
lectually." 2 12 The bar for dismissal appears to be quite high, even though
it is discretionary. And here, too, the justification for the dismissal was
affective blindness or the perceived conflict between emotion and cogni-
tion.
206. See Dimick, 293 U.S. at 486 ("Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such
importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtail-
ment of the right to jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care."); see also United States v.
Adams, 271 F.3d 1236, 1246 (10th Cir. 2001) (describing the jury's role to make credibility assess-
ments as "vital and exclusive"); Ric Simmons, Conquering the Province of the Jury: Expert Testi-
mony and the Professionalization of Fact-Finding, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1013, 1064 (2006) (discussing
society's psychological and emotional desire to keep credibility determinations in the hands of
juries); Suja A. Thomas, Judicial Modesty and the Jury, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 767, 792-793 (2005)
(arguing that constitutional principles, such as federalism and the separation of powers, call for
restraint ofjudicial actors in favor of preserving the function of the jury).
207. Jody Lyne6 Madeira, Lashing Reason to the Mast: Understanding Judicial Constraints on
Emotion in Personal Injury Litigation, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 139 (2006) ("[J]urors are ex-
posed to evidence thought likely to lure them into treacherous, irrational waters, necessitating that
legal practice make every effort to lash their judgment to the evidentiary mast. Thus, a number of
constraining principles and rule systems have evolved to escort jurors safely through perilous seas of
sentiment, lest reason be wrecked.").
208. No. H022985, 2003 WL 1950390 (Cal. Ct. App. April 25, 2003).
209. Id. at *8-9.
210. Id. at *1O-1l.
211. 552 P.2d 742 (Cal. 1976).
212. Varela, 2003 WL 1950390, at *10 (quoting People v. Collins, 552 P.2d 742, 748 (Cal.
1976)). In Collins:
The juror said she arrived at her state of mind prior to the commencement of delibera-
tions and that her professed inability to follow the court's instructions was not the result
of anything that had occurred since deliberations began. The extensive hearing in which
the juror steadfastly maintained that she could not follow the court's instructions, that she
had been upset throughout the trial and that she wanted to be excused . . . established
good cause for her discharge.
Collins, 552 P.2d at 748.
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What should judges do when attorneys attempt to alter credibility
assessments by appealing to jurors' emotions? The testimony of those in
power could obviously influence lay-jurors, replacing their individual
responses with those of the "legal experts." States have responded differ-
ently to the question of how far counsel can go to appeal to the jurors'
213emotions. Attorneys are often permitted to display some aspects of
emotion during their closing arguments, but they are "not permitted to
appeal to the emotions and prejudices of the jurors."2 14
As an attorney, it would be difficult to know in advance when you
have crossed that line.215 In one case, the prosecutor invited the jurors to
use their emotions when she stated, "[Y]ou can use your experience,
your emotions to evaluate the evidence and the testimony, and decide the
credibility of the witnesses and the evidence that's presented before you.
So, don't do it in a vacuum because that's why you were all chosen."216
This statement was considered improper because it invited jurors to use
217their emotions to guide them. In Connecticut, there are many cases
where prosecutorial statements were deemed improper because they in-
vite juror emotions.218 However, if a witness's credibility is attacked,
rehabilitation may be allowed with more forgiveness to its emotional
content. 219
In some ways the state diversity related to propriety of "emotional"
closing arguments reflects the practical reality that rules cannot control
jury deliberations. Rule 105, Rule 403, the "anti-Golden-Rule," and sen-
tencing instructions each provide a tool for entertaining the fiction that
we can control jurors' ultimate reliance on emotions throughout the
presentation of evidence. We may know these rules rarely work, but they
give the emperor respectable clothing. Yet at the near endpoint of credi-
bility assessments and closing arguments, we are more open in acknowl-
edging the fictions for what they are. The disconnect between the instruc-
213. "If exercise of trial court's discretion to grant or not to grant probation is based upon
reason rather than emotion, it will not be disturbed ..... State v. Cornwall, 518 P.2d 863, 867 (Ida-
ho 1974).
214. J. ALEXANDER TANFORD, THE TRIAL PROCESS: LAW, TACTICS AND ETHICS 385-86 (3d
ed. 2002); see also Neil R. Feigenson, Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A Psychological Analysis, 65
TENN. L. REv. 1, 17 (1997) ("By tolerating emotional utterances and emotional displays by lawyers
to the extent that they relate to the evidence, the law forbids not emotion per se, but only emotions
unrelated to the facts of the case-a seeming acknowledgment that emotional judgment, while
generally undesirable, is inevitable." (footnotes omitted)).
215. Daniel Medwed, Closing the Door on Misconduct: Rethinking the Ethical Standards that
Guide Summations in Criminal Trials, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 915, 946 (2011) (discussing how
advisory bodies like the American Bar Association Task Force to Revise the Prosecution and De-
fense Standards must provide examples in advance of what counts as inappropriate prosecutorial
appeals to emotion in order for attorneys to know ex ante when lines are about to be crossed).
216. State v. Sells, 844 A.2d 235, 244 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kemah, 957 A.2d 852 (Conn. 2008).
217. Id However, the statement was isolated and not egregious, so it did not result in a mistri-
al. Id.
218. State v. Salamon, 949 A.2d 1092, 1130 (Conn. 2008).
219. See State v. Thomas, 955 A.2d 1222, 1232 33 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
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tions and the jury deliberation process is obvious, as the jurors are about
to leave the courtroom to deliberate. They will be relying on a myriad of
facts, emotions, and memories of the trial, and will be working out whom
to believe largely by themselves. This may be why reviewing courts are
more forgiving toward emotional processes at the final stages of trial-to
preserve the legitimacy and finality of trials when we can no longer pre-
tend that the jurors credibility assessments are under our judicial control.
B. Credibility Assessments Require Theory ofMind, Theory ofMind Re-
quires Empathy
Another, less cynical, reason we might be more forgiving of emo-
tion in credibility assessments is because we are ignorant to the emotion-
al processes required to perform this function. Without explicitly describ-
ing it this way, assessing credibility requires theory of mind (ToM). And
theory of mind, as we will see, requires some form of empathy. ToM, or
mentalizing, is the ability to consider the mental states of others, and
recognize that not only are they different from yours, but in fact they
might be in conflict with the individual's overt speech or behavior (i.e.,
she might be lying). While we may not be familiar with the theory, we
are all familiar with the practice. You know that others cannot get inside
your head and know everything you know and feel everything you feel.
This allows us to hide our true thoughts: to deceive. For if others knew
our thoughts, or we merely thought they did, this would make it much
less likely that we would lie.
ToM has been chiefly studied in the context of false beliefs and in-
tent. According to some it may only be present in higher-order primates,
and likely works through something known as mirror neurons.220 ToM
probably emerges around the age of four, and aspects of it appear to be
impaired in people with severe autism or psychopathy.22 1
220. Norman, Cacioppo & Berntson, supra note 9, at 64 ("Mirror neurons are a network of
cells within the premotor cortex which respond to the sight of particular actions and their associated
motor patterns, whether the individual performed or merely witnessed the actions of others. . . .
[This] may have evolved specifically to facilitate action understanding. . .. [And], within higher
primates, this system may have been elaborated to support social imitation learning through real-
time activation of the motor properties within the mirror neuron system. . . . [T]he putative mirror
neuron system has progressed beyond the mere physical aspects of an action, to the ability to predict
underlying intentions, thoughts, and feelings that motivated the particular action through reciprocal
connections with other limbic and prefrontal structures." (footnotes omitted)). See generally J. A. C.
J. Bastiaansen, M. Thioux & C. Keysers, Evidence for Mirror Systems in Emotions, 364 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SoC'y B 2391, 2391 (2009) ("[O]bserving the actions and tactile sensations
of others activates premotor, posterior parietal and somatosensory regions in the brain of the observ-
er which are also active when performing similar movements and feeling similar sensations. ... [The
article examines] recent experimental evidence suggest[ing] that motor simulation may be a trigger
for the simulation of associated feeling states.").
221. Adolphs, supra note 67, at 171, 174. For research complicating previous findings based
on a more nuanced view of adult theory of mind, see R.A. Richell et al., Theory of Mind and Psy-
chopathy: Can Psychopathic Individuals Read the 'Language of the Eyes'? 41 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA
523, 523-26 (2003).
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Theory of mind is crucial for making all kinds of credibility deter-
minations. Specifically, determining "culpability and liability frequently
require[s] inferences about the motives, goals, intentions, and emotions
of the actors involved." 22 2 These mental determinations are critical to the
legal system and involve complex brain processes that require empathy,
deduction, and common sense.223 When jurors decide whether a criminal
defendant had the requisite mens rea, whether the prosecutor's key wit-
ness is telling the truth, if the white-collar criminal feels remorse, or
whether the custodial parent loves their child, they are engaging ToM.
Empathizing, which is the ability and drive to know someone's
emotions and thoughts, is a key ingredient to ToM.224 Empathizing is
likely a non-unitary construct with several component parts: cognitive
empathy (usually dubbed mentalizing, as described above), emotional
contagion225 (mimicking the facial expressions and emotions of those
around us, and thus converging on a social experience), affective empa-
thy (feeling your pain), and sympathy (understanding your pain).22 6 Em-
pathizing goes further than merely calculating others' feelings (as psy-
chopaths can do this), but rather involves the triggering of an appropriate
emotional response in the observer.
Empathizing is a complex process, contingent on perception, inter-
pretation, and affective responses to other actors. There are considerable
individual and sex differences in empathy, with women performing this
function better than men.2 27 Empathizing may be implicit; that is, "people
seem to represent the emotional states of others quite automatically with-
out having to engage in deliberative thinking."228 Empathizing may also
be sensitive to cognitive appraisal, as we will see below.
Many prominent neuroscientists argue that there is a functional in-
terdependence between cognitive and affective ToM, pointing to a cru-
cial role of the right DLPFC (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) within neural
networks mediating cognitive ToM.2 29 Even so, and interestingly, some
222. Lubell et al., supra note 1, at 418.
223. See Todd F. Heatherton, Neuroscience of Self and Self-Regulation, 62 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 363, 370-71 (2011) ("[L]iving harmoniously in social groups requires that we be able to
interpret the emotional and mental states of others. ... ToM enables individuals to empathize and
cooperate with others . . . ." (citations omitted)).
224. The word "drive" is used, even though empathy can be the result of learned experience
and skill.
225. See generally Elaine Hatfield, John T. Cacioppo, Richard L. Rapson, Emotional Conta-
gion, 2 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCi. 96 (1993).
226. Id.
227. Christine Mohr, Angela C. Rowe and Olaf Blanke, The Influence of Sex and Empathy on
Putting Oneself in the Shoes of Others, 101 BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY 277, 278 (2010);
Bhismadev Chakrabarti & Simon Baron-Cohen, Empathizing: Neurocognitive Developmental
Mechanisms and Individual Differences, 156 PROGRESS BRAIN RES. 403, 403-405 (2006).
228. Lubell et al., supra note 1, at 418 ("These automatic empathic responses can be modulated
by perceived fairness, similarity, or affective link to the other.").
229. See Elke Kalbe et al., Dissociating Cognitive from Affective Theory of Mind: A TMS
Study, 46 CORTEX 769, 770 (2010) (citing PJ Eslinger, Neurological and Neuropsychological Bases
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researchers have used transcranial magnetic stimulation to find support
for a distinction between affective and cognitive theory of mind. Put an-
other way, there appear to be functional differences between the brain
areas involved in surmising another's emotions and surmising another's
thoughts.2 30 This does not, however, mean that the two processes are
completely distinct in the healthy, unaltered brain. But it does suggest
that in some narrow circumstances, the dichotomy between emotion and
reason may have a neurological base.
To demonstrate that empathy is a component of ToM, Tania Sing-
er's lab generated a thought experiment, where the cognitive and emo-
tional perception of pain interact. When we see a subject experience
231pain, we automatically mirror this pain response in our own brains.
However, when we are told that the subject is a masochist and thus the
pain is pleasurable to her, this response can be attenuated through cogni-
tive regulation.2 32 This suggests that the two can be related but can also
be disassociated. They likely rely on different developmental pathways,
with mentalizing developing much later in life than empathizing. Even
so, the "two developmental pathways also interact" 233 psychologically
and neurologically. Empathy and cognition are intertwined.
Because credibility assessments require ToM, and ToM requires
empathy, transitively, credibility assessments require empathy. Through
the function of ToM, empathizing is revealed as crucial to the trial pro-
cess. Empathizing assists us in making credibility determinations, by
mirroring the witness's testimony, checking it against our own set of
knowledge, beliefs, and feelings, to see if we think it is trustworthy and
sincere. Critically, empathic processes then generate a feeling inside of
us: justice, sadness, frustration, pity, mercy, or anger. This is therefore
where we shift from a discussion of empathy per se, and move into the
ways in which moral reasoning requires theory of mind and empathy.
ofEmpathy, 39 EUR. NEUROLOGY 193 (1998)). Imaging studies consistently show that ToM prefer-
entially activates the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and the temporo-parital junction (where the
temporal lobe meets the parietal lobe). Heatherton, supra note 223, at 371.
230. Kalbe et al., supra note 229, at 777.
231. Christian Keysers, Jon H. Kaas & Valeria Gazzola, Somatosensation in Social Perception,
11 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 417, 425 (2010) ("Taken together, these data indicate that we
can share the pain of others in two ways. If all we know is that the observed person is in pain, we
share the affective aspects of their distress through vicarious activity in the anterior insula and rCC.
If, however, we focus on the somatic causes of that pain, we additionally share its somatic conse-
quences by vicariously recruiting [visceral pain areas of the brain].").
232. Kevin McCabe & Tania Singer, Brain Signatures of Social Decision-Making, in BETTER
THAN CONSCIOUS? DECISION MAKING, THE HUMAN MIND, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONS
supra note 1, at 103, 119.
233. Tania Singer, The Neuronal Basis and Ontogeny of Empathy and Mind Reading: Review
ofLiterature and Implications for Future Research, 30 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVIEWS
855, 861 (2006).
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C. Theory of Mind, Empathy, and Moral Reasoning
From a very early age, empathy facilitates ToM. It does so by help-
ing us understand where others are coming from, how they feel, and what
they know.234 This in turn allows us to make judgments about what is a
fair way to treat people. Without functioning empathy processes, we
would be unable to infer what is going on inside the heads of others. This
means we also would not be able to engage in informed moral reasoning
based on our assessments of the individual's intent and credibility. Many
studies show that as the intent of a moral violator increases, so does the
moral blameworthiness and severity of punishment levied by subjects.
Research shows that this ToM ability develops over time and is not
innate. When given information about intentional harms versus inten-
tional acts that result in unintentional harms, young children justify their
moral judgments based more on the outcome than the actor's intention.
For example, someone who intends to give a traveler correct directions
but accidentally gets him lost is judged to be "naughtier" than a person
who maliciously wants to give incorrect directions but accidentally di-
rects the traveler to the correct spot.235 The preference for judging based
on intent rather than outcome develops as we age. This reflects not only
the development of ToM, but also our ability to integrate information
about mental states and moral consequences in order to judge behavior as
morally wrong.
Patients who have trouble mentalizing due to frontotemporal de-
mentia also have trouble with moral reasoning, emotion, empathy, and
executive function. They can operate according to social rules, but they
are incapable of rating the seriousness of moral and conventional trans-
gressions appropriately.2 36 This suggests anatomical diversity in the pro-
cess, and an interdependence between empathy, executive function, and
moral judgment.
Deficits of ToM can play out differently, depending on what else is
working in the brain. Because a tumor or functional deficit in a brain area
affecting either classical cognition (memory, face perception) or emotion
(empathy) is likely to affect ToM, many researchers posit that ToM relies
critically on both "emotional" and "cognitive" systems.237
234. Lubell et al., supra note 1, at 418; also Adolphs, supra note 67, at 171, 174.
235. Liane Young, Fiery Cushman, Marc Hauser & Rebecca Saxe, The Neural Basis of the
Interaction Between Theory of Mind and Moral Judgment, 104 PROC. NAT. ACAD. So. 8235, 8235
(2007) (discussing JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (1932)).
236. Sinclair Lough et al., Social Reasoning, Emotion and Empathy in Fronlotemporal Demen-
tia, 44 NEUROPSYCIHOLOGIA 950, 950 (2006); Christopher M. Kipps & John R. Hodges, Theory of
Mind in Frontotemporal Dementia, I Soc. NEUROSCIENCE 235, 236-237 (2006).
237. Rajendra D. Badgaiyan, Theory of Mind and Schizophrenia, 18 CONSCIOUSNESS &
COGNITION 320, 321 (2009).
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Given how valuable empathizing is to evaluating social scenarios, it
remains a process that is often explicitly discouraged in jurors. Its value
is explicitly rejected in FRE 105, FRE 403, the "anti-Golden-Rule rule,"
and sentencing instructions. This is likely because we have no idea how
often empathizing is reflexive, automatic, and valuable to credibility
assessments and moral reasoning. 238 We have little understanding of how
crucial empathizing is to many aspects of trial.
The complicated processes involved in ToM are only now being
parsed out. Even so, we do know quite a bit about how it works, and how
this process can lead to unfair results. First, in what Kevin McCabe has
labeled the "egocentric" bias, we may judge others as having mental
states similar to ours, based on perceived physical or personality similari-
ties. Thus, the fellow Sikh who looks like me may not have mental states
that are like mine, although I might naturally think so. Jurors could also
engage in a "misattribution" bias, where one incorrectly relies on stereo-
types, ignoring the possible similarities between oneself and others. The-
se two processes appear to be functionally segregated in the brain, with
mentalizing about people we find similar to us engaging one part of the
mPFC (medial prefrontal cortex) and a more dorsal part being active
when we mentalize about people we view as dissimilar. What these data
suggest is that the process of knowing someone's thoughts depends on
different brain regions, may be a result of skill, and likely also overlaps
with our ability to relate to others. Of course, none of this suggests that it
is impossible to soften our empathic urges through deliberate means, but
it might be harder than we think.
Softening our empathic urges can be done through "reappraisal" and
self-regulation, where individuals modulate feedback to relearn associa-
tions and mitigate implicit biases.239 We humans are capable of changing
our perspectives based on updated information, often through taking the
perspective of a victimized other. For example, if an expected guest
misses your dinner party and does not call to let you know she is not
coming, you might feel irritated at her for having a selfish mental state.
After all, she was supposed to bring the dessert! However, once you
238. Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, supra note 235 at 8268 ("The results of the current
study suggest that moral judgments depend on the cognitive processes mediated by the RTPJ ([right
tempoparietal junction], previously associated with belief attribution, and, to a lesser extent, the PC
[precuneus], LTPJ [left tempoparietal junction], and MPFC [medial prefrontal cortex], which
compose a network of brain regions implicated in theory of mind.").
239. See Adolphs, supra note 67, at 167 fig.] ("Reappraisal and self-regulation are particular
modes of feedback modulation whereby evaluation and emotional response to social stimuli can be
volitionally influenced."); see also Sophie Lebrecht et al., Perceptual Other-Race Training Reduces
Implicit Racial Bias, 4 PLoS ONE 1, 3-5 (2009); Blair et al., supra note 86, at 438 (discussing emo-
tional regulation through reappraisal); Gyurak et al., supra note 167, at 151 (showing that verbal
fluency scores predicted successful regulation of emotion). The "harder" reappraisal task is associat-
ed with activation of regions of the prefrontal cortex (PFC). See Robert M. Sapolsky, The Frontal
Cortex and the Criminal Justice System, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'Y B: BIOLOGICAL
Sci. 1787, 1791 (2004).
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learn that she was in a terrible car accident, the irritation will quickly
transform into sympathy. 240 Another example involves viewing a woman
crying in front of a church. You may feel sad until you are told that her
daughter just got married, at which point your sadness may turn to joy. In
fact, in the lab, researchers can get subjects to be more empathic and
more willing to assist third parties merely by asking them to "try hard to
take another person's perspective." 24 1 The empathy that can result from
perspective-taking may in turn motivate one to examine why he may
have taken the other person's side initially, which can lead to delibera-
tion about important moral principles.
While cross-examination and explicit jury instructions can ferret out
and then mitigate some inappropriate emotions, it remains to be asked
whether they should. Even if the answer to this question is yes, it is nayve
to think that instructions can do the job, particularly if the emotional pro-
cess is unconscious, automatic, deeply engrained, or difficult to extin-
guish. Our naivet6 regarding the power of cross-examination and instruc-
tions to mitigate bias is perhaps enabled by a bit of hubris. Because we
humans can examine some of the contents of our mind, our memories,
and opinions, we sometimes "create the illusion that we control more
about ourselves . . . than we actually do, and that we know what our
preferences are and why we have them." 24 2 This fuels the fiction that we
can put our prejudice aside when told to do so, even while our implicit
attitudes are automatically and unconsciously affecting our behavior.
Even so, more work should be done in realistic mock jury settings to
determine how much impermissible bias (however related or unrelated to
emotion) might be mitigated through explicit instructions.
To conclude this section, I will briefly summarize the rules and
practices that embody the false dichotomy between emotion and reason,
and that are, in some way or other, blind to the role of affect. First, the
ubiquitous practice of instructing jurors to disregard emotional testimo-
ny, or only use it for its unemotional purpose, is a practical fiction. It
assumes that our cognitive faculties can consciously access and then
squash emotional processes, and that we can segregate the emotional
from the unemotional rather handily. Second, it fails to appreciate that
240. See David A. Pizarro & Paul Bloom, The Intelligence of Moral Intuitions: Comment on
Haidt (2001), 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 193, 194 (2003) (explaining how taking the perspective of the
victimized other after new information has come to light can change one's perspective on and ap-
praisal of a given situation); see also Peter Sokol-Hessner et al., Thinking Like a Trader Selectively
Reduces Individuals' Loss Aversion, 106 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCL 5035, 5035 (2009) ("[T]he inten-
tional cognitive regulation strategy, which emphasized 'perspective-taking,' uniquely reduced both
behavioral loss aversion and arousal to losses relative to gains, largely by influencing arousal to
losses.").
241. Pizarro & Bloom, supra note 240, at 194 (citing C. D. Batson et al., Five Studies Testing
Two New Egoistic Alternatives to the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis, 55 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 52 (1988)).
242. Damian Stanley, Elizabeth Phelps & Mahzarin Banaji, The Neural Basis of Implicit Atti-
tudes, 17 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SC. 164, 164 (2008).
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when instructing people either to disregard emotional evidence or to not
engage emotional processes themselves, the individual likely cannot
comply, and in fact, the instruction might backfire. Next, I analyzed the
under-theorized practice of equating emotional evidence with bias under
FRE 403. This rule is often used to exclude evidence that is thought to
arouse too much emotion. Typically, in practice, it is accompanied by a
very crude examination of what the emotion is, and why exactly it gener-
ates bias. Third, I reviewed the anti-Golden-Rule rule, where judges dis-
courage jurors from being sympathetic in their assessment of damages. I
argue that this is impossible for jurors to do. Otherwise, how else would
they determine damages? The false dichotomy between reason and emo-
tion runs throughout the sentencing instructions, with sharply different
instructions in aggravation and mitigation hearings. In the former, but not
the latter, sympathy is equated with bias and subjectivity, despite its crit-
ical role in social decision-making. Following this, I turned to the heat of
passion instructions, where it is theorized that emotions can impair rea-
soning to such a degree that an intentional murder can be reduced to vol-
untary manslaughter. Then, I reviewed the psychological understanding
of the excited-utterance hearsay exception, where the false dichotomy
rears its head again to admit emotional hearsay testimony made under
stress, as the emotion shuts down the particular reasoning of prevarica-
tion. Finally, I concluded with some thoughts about the role of emotion
in something that runs across all of these practices: credibility determina-
tions. I argue that credibility assessments require theory of mind, which
in turn requires some form of empathy. Thus rather than seeking to re-
move empathy from juror decision-making, we might learn to recognize
its value in credibility assessments.
V. EMPIRICAL DATA FROM COGNITIVE SCIENCES OBLITERATES THE
FOLK ASSUMPTIONS UNDERNEATH MANY OF OUR EVIDENTIARY
PRACTICES
The notion that we can make choices with either our heart (emotion)
or head (reason) was first proposed in early philosophical writings,
and this distinction persists to this day in common language, legal
reasoning, as well as scientific investigations. A primary contention
of this dual selves approach is that emotion and reason compete with
one another when arriving at a decision.
... [T]here is clearly some intuitive appeal in viewing decision-
making this way. However, there are also numerous problems which
lead us to suggest that the model is simply too simplistic, as well as
unrealistic, to capture the role of emotion in decision-making. 243
The following section will address how the cognitive sciences can
inform this confusion over the proper role of emotion in evidence prac-
243. Platt et al., supra note 43, at 136.
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tice. Through peer-reviewed neuroscience and behavioral data, I will
demonstrate why the dichotomy between emotion and reason is empiri-
cally incorrect. Rather than always competing, the two processes are
often, though not always, structurally interconnected and functionally
interdependent in the brain. 244
A. What Are Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, and How Can They
Inform Evidence Laws?
This is where we turn to the fields of cognitive, affective, and social
neuroscience to see how the data contribute to this discussion. But first, I
will define each field. Cognitive neuroscience is the study of our process
of knowing, or cognition-stemming from awareness, perception, and
reasoning-married with neuroscience, which is the study of the brain
and its nervous system.2 45 This forty-year-old field has simultaneously
provided exciting support and trenchant critiques for the traditional psy-
chology and biology of how humans think. Overall, this has drastically
improved our theoretical framework and provided some ideas as to the
mechanisms underlying how humans learn, make complex observations
and decisions, and how we form memories. The complementary field of
affective neuroscience is the study of the neural mechanisms of emotion.
Depending on whom you ask, affective neuroscience is either a subpart
of cognitive science or a separate but related field.
Affective neuroscience combines the study of emotion, mood, and
personality to understand how these drive, and are driven by, higher or-
der cognitive functions. In the last few decades, many researchers have
dedicated their careers to uncovering the complexity of humans' emo-
tional processes and localizing these mental functions in the brain. To
disambiguate emotional processes from cognitive ones, at least in the
ways the terms have been used in the past, I will label tasks as "cogni-
tive" when they involve perceiving, attending, evaluating, reasoning, and
deciding, even though my thesis is that this term can also encompass
emotion. Taken together, researchers in these twin fields have obliterated
the folk psychological assumptions identified in the previous section.
244. Richard J. Davidson, Seven Sins in the Study of Emotion: Correctives from Affective
Neuroscience, 52 BRAIN & COGNITION 129, 129 (2003) ("This brief commentary highlights seven
sins in the study of emotion that are explicitly treated in contemporary affective neuroscience. These
sins are (1) affect and cognition are subserved by separate and independent neural circuits; (2) affect
is subcortical; (3) emotions are in the head; (4) emotions can be studied from a purely psychological
perspective; (5) emotions are similar in structure across age and species; (6) specific emotions are
instantiated in discrete locations in the brain; and (7) emotions are conscious feeling states. Each of
these is briefly discussed and evidence from affective neuroscience that bears on these sins is not-
ed.").
245. GAZZANIGA, IVRY & MANGUN, supra note 43, at xiii.
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B. Emotional and Rational Processes Can Neatly Be Divided, and by
Attending to Our Emotions, We Can-and Should-Use Our Cogni-
tive Faculties to Squash Them
First, cognitive science obliterates the notion that emotion and rea-
son writ large can be neatly divided. Based on how deeply embedded the
false dichotomy is in our popular culture, it should be no surprise that it
persevered in the brain sciences as well. 2 46 This is exhibited both in how
graduate programs are organized, and in how brain regions have been
studied. In the past, psychologists focused on the mechanisms of "ration-
al deliberation and the development of cognitive abilities" before recog-
nizing the role of emotions and intuitive impulses. 2 47 The preference in
psychology for top-down, executive rationalism might be because it is
easier to inspect and verify the verbal reasoning of subjects than it is to
inspect emotions and intuitions through self-report or proxies such as
pupil dilation, sweating, blood pressure, hormone levels, metabolites, or
heart rate.248
For many years cognitive science has thus preferred rational pro-
cesses, treating minds like computers. The field was "more interested in
how people . .. solve logical problems or play chess than in why we are
sometimes happy and sometimes sad." 2 4 9 As Alan Sanfey has noted,
"[c]lassical models of decision-making have largely ignored the influ-
ence of emotions on how decisions are made, but recent research has
begun to demonstrate the powerful effect these factors play." 25 0 Even
now that many of the cutting edge brain scientists are looking at social
and affective cognition, researchers still try to answer which would win
in a competition: emotion or reason.2 5 1 Put differently, many are still
asking which pathway is the dog and which is the tail.252 This debate
246. See LEDoux, supra note 18, at 11. To be sure, even neural substrates themselves that
were once thought to be dichotomous have recently been reported to not be. See, e.g., Amit Etkin,
Tobias Egner & Raffael Kalisch, Emotional Processing in Anterior Cingulate and Medial Prefron-
tal Cortex, 15 TRENDS COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES 85, 85 (2011) ("[C]ontrary to the traditional
dichotomy, both subdivisions make key contributions to emotional processing. Specifically, dorsal-
caudal regions of the ACC and mPFC are involved in appraisal and expression of negative emotion,
whereas ventral-rostral portions of the ACC and mPFC have a regulatory role with respect to limbic
regions involved in generating emotional responses.").
247. Pizarro & Bloom, supra note 240, at 193; see also Antoine Bechara, The Role of Emotion
in Decision-Making: Evidence from Neurological Patients with Orbitofrontal Damage, 55 BRAIN &
COGNITION 30, 36 (2004) ("[W]e argue that impulsiveness, which usually means the lack of re-
sponse inhibition, is fundamentally different from decision-making, both cognitively and anatomi-
cally."); Darlow & Sloman, supra note 1, at 385 ("While affect may be an essential property or
heuristic of intuitive decision-making, there is little evidence of it at this point.").
248. Haidt, supra note 116, at 825.
249. LEDoux, supra note 18, at 20.
250. Sanfey, supra note 40, at 600.
251. See Luiz Pessoa, On the Relationship Between Emotion and Cognition, 9 NATURE REV.
NEUROSCIENCE, 148, 148 (2008).
252. See, e.g., Pizarro & Bloom, supra note 240, at 194.
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over whether cognition controls emotion or emotion triggers cognition
continues to thrive in the literature of moral judgment.25 3
The valuable role of emotion in moral judgment is reflected in Jona-
than Haidt's work. In his "social intuitionist" model, Haidt argues that
moral judgments are typically the products of effortless and automatic
intuitions, rather than on articulable, conscious reasons, which he argues
are post-hoc constructions. 2 54 To Haidt, some moral judgments do not
rely on reasoning. This is very interesting; because if he is right, then we
are fooling ourselves by thinking we can and should dampen emotion
during the heavily moralistic trial. Haidt analyzes social psychology data
to demonstrate that while there may be a weak link between moral rea-
soning and moral action, there is a strong link between moral emotions
and actions.25 5 A variant on this can be seen in "moral dumbfounding"
where we have strong gut responses to some behavior such as post-
fertility adult incest, but cannot articulate reasons why. Other scholars
have disagreed with this view, finding evidence that moral judgments
necessitate coterminous cognitive processing.
One study posited that according to the social intuition model where
emotions guide our impulses, "jurors who are affected by emotion ...
might fail to convince their fellow jurors, while jurors whose opinions
,,256
are based on rational evidence deliberation might be more persuasive.
However, this misunderstands the social intuitionist model, as we can
often construct rational bases for these emotions ex post that can be ra-
ther convincing (i.e., you do not know why you find same-sex marriage
to be so viscerally wrong, but you justify its prohibition by focusing on
other specious-to-some-rational-to-others harms to society). It is also the
case that emotional arguments, depending on the context, may be quite
convincing. The role of emotion is far too complicated and contextual to
253. See Jana Schaich Borg et al., Consequences, Action, and Intention as Factors in Moral
Judgments: An fMRI Investigation, 18 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 803, 803--04 (2006) ("Hume
(1888) and many utilitarian philosophers based morality on emotion or sentiment via what the for-
mer called 'sympathy' and what contemporary psychologists call 'empathy.' In their view, core
moral judgments arise from an immediate aversive reaction to perceived or imagined harms to
victims of actions that are judged as immoral only after and because of this emotional reaction. In
contrast, Kant (1959) insisted that his basic nonutilitarian moral principle (the categorical impera-
tive) could be justified by pure reason alone, and particular judgments could then be reached by
reasoning from his basic principle, all without any help from emotion. Although somewhat trans-
formed, this fundamental debate still rages among philosophers today... . Studies using functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) surprisingly suggest that neither Kant nor Hume had the whole
truth, and that some moral judgments involve more emotion whereas others involve more reason-
ing.").
254. Haidt, supra note 116, at 822 ("However, if people have no access to the processes behind
their automatic initial evaluations then how do they go about providing justifications? They do so by
consulting their a priori moral theories.").
255. See id at 823-24.
256. Salemo & Bottoms, supra note 77, at 291.
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predict its impact in any given case. This is only magnified in social set-
257tings.25
So if we struggle to tease out emotion from cognition in behavior,
what does a functional scan of the brain tell us? A fascinating experi-
mental philosophy study used brain imaging to investigate whether dif-
ferent brain structures are recruited when subjects engaged in conven-
tional moral judgments.258 Specifically, the researchers discovered that
brain areas traditionally connected to emotion were preferentially re-
cruited when subjects were asked to judge intentional, as opposed to un-
intentional, harms to people. This has obvious implications for jury trials,
as determining whether a defendant had the requisite mens rea may au-
tomatically engage circuitry thought to be involved in emotional pro-
cessing. Of course, we do not need to cow-tow to biology, but the data
do provide strong accounts of emotion moderating important jury func-
tions.
In all likelihood, the answer to this debate over whether emotion
wags cognition's tail, or vice-versa, depends on the specific emotion and
context. But at the neuroanatomical level, it is difficult to even label
structures as either cognitive or emotional. In the next section, I will dis-
cuss how the structures traditionally thought of as "emotional" or "cogni-
tive" are in fact interconnected. I will then discuss how they are func-
tionally interdependent, and how this serves to shatter our folk psycho-
logical presumptions in the evidence practices I have outlined.
C Anatomical Interconnectedness Between Emotion and Reason
There are multiple connected brain structures that work together to
help us think and feel. Early neuroscientists thought that brain functions
were somewhat localized; we mostly performed our "cognitive" process-
es with our prefrontal cortex, and our emotional ones with our primal,
subcortical parts. This has been a sticky concept, tracking teleological
and evolutionary tropes. While there is some structural localization, the
structures do not work alone. Areas involved in emotional processing are
incredibly interconnected with those involved in classical cognitive
tasks.259
A structure that illustrates this beautifully is the amygdala.26 0 The
amygdala is almond-shaped. It is also bilateral, meaning that there are
257. See Adolphs, supra note 67, at 167 fig.1 ("[T]he flow of social information defies any
simple scheme for at least two reasons: it is multidirectional and it is recursive. . .. Processing routes
differ in terms of their automaticity, cognitive penetrability, detail of the representations they involve
and processing speed.").
258. Borg et al., supra note 253, at 803.
259. See ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN
BRAIN 175 (1994). Individuals with bilateral damage to these regions exhibit poor judgment and
decision-making in the social realm.
260. See graph below.
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two clusters on either side of the
brain. The amygdala is preferentially
activated when we hear blood-
curdling screams, anticipate painful
shocks, or see images of snakes. But
it is also involved in other positive
and negative emotional stimuli, such
as the detection of eye gaze, or the
perception of unfamiliar, happy, or
261sad faces2. It appears that the amyg-
dala may be more selectively engaged
262when moderating affective arousal, compared to other brain structures.
The rendering of the human brain below, illustrates other important brain
structures that are involved in emotional processing. Notably, each of the
brain structures discussed herein are neither cognitive nor emotional, but
rather both. Part of the reason for this is the neuronal connectedness of
these brain structures.
In an analysis by Young and colleagues, the amygdala was shown
to be connected to all but eight cortical areas.263 These structural links are
displayed in the graphic to the above left, with the amygdala appearing in
the center (labeled "Amyg," and all other labels indicating cortical areas,
with the exception of the subcortical Hippocampus). 64 As you can see,
the projections involve multiple clusters, suggesting that not only is the
amygdala extensively connected, but it may serve as a central connector
hub that links multiple provincial hubs. You might therefore think of the
amygdala as Atlanta's airport, with its projections looking somewhat like
the flight routes for Delta airlines. Because of its dense connectivity to
cortical areas (and subcortical areas) the amygdala is considered a strong
candidate for integrating information classically dubbed as emotional or
cognitive.
The amygdala's coordinating role between what we perceive, how
we evaluate decisions, and how we act is complicated. The amygdala
receives sensory information from the auditory, visual, olafactory, and
somatosensory cortices, as well as from polysensory brain areas.265 Be-
cause of this, the amygdala can influence the "neural systems underlying
261. See Mary L. Phillips et al., Neurobiology of Emotion Perception I: The Neural Basis of
Normal Emotion Perception, 54 SOC'Y BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 504, 505 (2003).
262. Gary G. Berntson et al., The Insula and Evaluative Processes, 22 PSYCHOL. SCI. 80, 80
(2011) (finding that, compared to the patients in the control-lesion group, individuals with insula
lesions exhibited progressively reduced arousal ratings for progressively more pleasant or unpleasant
pictures; results from this study also suggest that the amygdala is more responsive to, and may play a
more selective role in, affective arousal, particularly with regard to negative emotional stimuli).
263. Pessoa, supra note 251, at 151 (discussing M. P. Young et al., Analysis ofConnectivity:
Neural Systems in the Cerebral Cortex, 5 REV. NEUROSCIENCE 227 (1994)).
264. Both images taken from id. at 149, 152.
265. C. Daniel Salzman & Stefano Fusi, Emotion, Cognition, & Mental State Representation in
Amygdala andPrefrontal Cortex, 33 ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE 173, 177 (2010).
105
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
cognitive and social behaviors, in response to emotional cues."266 The
amygdala is also involved in highly cognitive functions such as attention
and associative learning.267
The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is part of the prefrontal cortex gen-
erally, and gets its name from its location immediately above and behind
the eye orbits, or sockets.268 It was originally viewed as critical for ex-
ecutive functions such as impulse control, but more and more research
identifies it as also integral in emotional processing. Researchers have
discovered that the OFC is implicated in assessing expected versus actual
reward value,269 which might explain why individual differences are per-
vasive as individuals place different values on decision-making out-
comes. Studies suggest that lesions in the OFC result in inabilities to
update our representations of value, such as when the triggering stimuli
switches from being aversive to pleasing.270 Based on such data, many
266. Elizabeth A. Phelps, Emotion and Cognition: Insights from Studies of the Human Amyg-
dala, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 27, 29 (2006); see also Adolphs, supra note 67, at 168 ("The amygda-
la is one structure that is anatomically positioned to participate in such post-perceptual processing, as
it receives highly processed visual information from the anterior temporal cortices, and stores codes
for subsequent processing of such perceptual information in other brain regions. In this way, it can
influence memory, attention, decision making and other cognitive functions on the basis of the social
significance of the stimuli that are being processed.").
267. Pessoa, supra note 251, at 149.
268. Morten L. Kringelbach, The Human Orbitofrontal Cortex: Linking Reward to Hedonic
Experience, 6 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 691, 693 (2005). Quite a bit of individual variability
has been found in this structure, meaning that activation patterns between individuals are often pretty
different in response to the same cues.
269. See, e.g., Edmund T. Rolls et al., Expected Value, Reward Outcome, and Temporal Dif-
ference Error Representations in a Probabilistic Decision Task, 18 CEREBRAL CORTEX 652, 656
(2007) (demonstrating that activations in the orbitofrontal cortex had a positive correlation with both
expected value and reward magnitude).
270. Salzman & Fusi, supra note 265, at 181. However, this was not confirmed in a recent
study of monkeys. Id. (citing Andy Kazama & Jocelyne Bachevalier, Selective Aspiration or Neuro-
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theorize that this is precisely the purpose of emotions-to help us attach
value to events and decisions. Thus, with its role in helping us evaluate
expected and actual rewards, it is no surprise that the OFC is so intimate-
ly involved in emotional and cognitive processes and has many connec-
tions to other similar structures.
The OFC is more and more active when subjects view increasingly
angry, but not sad, faces. This suggests that the OFC helps us explicitly
label emotional faces as angry. 271 The subjective feeling of enjoying a
good meal or appreciating a gambling victory also appears to be moder-
ated by the OFC. Interestingly, the OFC seems to be more involved in
the processing of cues that subjects are explicitly told to pay attention to,
such as angry voices, while the amygdala appears to respond more to
background stimuli to which we do not specifically attend. The two are
likely acting together to update the value of a reinforcing stimuli in con-
ditioned (Pavlovian) learning.272 One study found that damage to the
OFC impaired the ability to detect a social faux-pas by a confederate,
suggesting that this brain region may assist our understanding of other
people's motives by engaging the emotions and feelings that accompany
mimicked social interaction.27 3
In support of this idea, researchers discovered that "appreciation of
humor, social-norm transgression resulting in embarrassment, viewing of
erotic stimuli and elicitation of other moral emotions, all activate the
medial prefrontal cortex."274 The ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC) is either part of the OFC, or adjacent to it, depending on whose
terminology you use. Like the previous brain structures, it is also critical
to both emotion and reason. The vmPFC sits at the midline of the brain.
It plays a key role in tying mental objects to bodily feedback to make
emotional connections for use in decision-making.
One theory submits that as the likely value of punishment or reward
has been evaluated, our bodies respond by providing a "somatic marker".
This leads to a feeling, which in turn becomes a relevant criterion in our
decision-making calculus. Put another way, the process of decision-
making depends in part on neural substrates that regulate emotion, feel-
ing, and our body's resting functions. Antonio Damasio and Antoine
Bechara have labeled this the "somatic marker theory." According to
toxic Lesions of Orbital Frontal Areas 11 and 13 Spared Monkeys' Performance on the Object
Discrimination Reversal Task, 29 J. NEUROSCIENCE 2794 (2009)).
271. See Megan L. Willis et al., Orbitofrontal Cortex Lesions Result in Abnormal Social Judg-
ments to Emotional Faces, 48 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 2182, 2183 (2010).
272. Salzman & Fusi, supra note 265, at 181.
273. Valerie E. Stone et al., Frontal Lobe Contributions to Theory of Mind, 10 J. COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE 640, 646 (1998).
274. Adolphs, supra note 67, at 172.
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their account, the vmPFC also has a hand in modulating emotions and
our reactions to them. 27 5
In 2004, a team studied the somatic marker theory using the Iowa
Gambling Task in patients with complete autonomic failure.2 76 These
patients have damaged peripheral autonomic nervous systems, meaning
that their bodies cannot provide feedback to the brain from the peripheral
nerves (everything outside of the brain and spinal cord-such as the
nerves in the stomach, feet, etc.). Contrary to the somatic marker theory,
apparently this population did not experience impairments in emotional
performance, face expression identification, ToM, or social cognition
tasks.277 While our body may provide feedback to inform our decisions,
the somatic marker thesis does not explain how emotion guides decision-
making in this population. 27 8 Perhaps some other body structures com-
pensated for the lost peripheral communication to the brain, the meas-
urement of emotion was different, or, most likely, the autonomic nervous
system is more complicated than we thought. Of course, this is just one
study questioning the somatic-market hypothesis in one population.
The anterior insula (Al) is another brain structure simultaneously
involved in both emotion and cognition. It is located in the deep folds
between the temporal lobe and the frontal lobe in what is known as the
lateral sulcus (also called the Sylvian fissure). The sulcus runs from your
temples toward the back of your head at about a 45 degree angle. It is a
highly recognizable feature of the human brain and develops by roughly
the fourteenth week in utero. Activation in the insular cortex is strongly
associated with certain feelings of disgust toward others.279 It is also cor-
related with our internal assessments of how much pain we are experi-
275. Bechara, supra note 247, at 30; see also Antoine Bechara, Hanna Damasio & Antonio R.
Damasio, Role of the Amygdala in Decision-Making, 985 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 356, 356-57
(2003).
276. The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is a common neuropsychological task that assesses sub-
jects' decision-making under ambiguity. It is meant to replicate real-world decision-making, as the
subjects select playing cards in order to win or lose money. The task allows researchers to study
subjects' risk aversion versus risk taking. The IGT was first conceived to study the real-world defi-
cits exhibited by patients with lesions in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC). Daniela Di
Giorgio Schneider et al., Iowa Gambling Task: Administration Effects in Older Adults, I DEMENTIA
& NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 66, 67 (2007).
277. H.C. Heims et al., Social and Motivational Functioning Is Not Critically Dependent on
Feedback ofAutonomic Responses: Neuropsychological Evidence from Patients with Pure Autonom-
ic Failure, 42 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 1979, 1979 (2004).
278. See Platt et al., supra note 43, at 137 ("[S]imply changing the order or outcomes of the
possible options has been shown to lead to the opposite result; that is, a stronger physiological re-
sponse for the preferred option." (citation omitted)).
279. M.L. Phillips, Understanding the Neurobiology of Emotion Perception: Implications for
Psychiatry, 182 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 190, 190 (2003). Interestingly, the insula is a neural correlate
both for experiencing disgust directly, and for perceiving it in others. Bruno Wicker et al., Both of
Us Disgusted in My Insula: The Common Neural Basis of Seeing and Feeling Disgust, 40 NEURON
655, 655 (2003).
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encing,280 and when you think about others' pain or see images of activi-
ties that would hurt someone. 28 1 The insula is positioned to interact ex-
tensively with the brain networks underlying both affect and cognition,
and may play an important role in mixing affective and cognitive pro-
cesses.
Specifically, recent research suggests that the Al plays an important
role in social emotions, particularly the representation of current emo-
tional states and the prediction of future emotional states for ourselves
and others.2 82 Along these lines, damage to the insula has been associated
with impaired recognition of emotion from facial expressions.283 At a
more sophisticated social level, Alan Sanfey's research links the Al with
our sense of justice. He notes the Al's role in "a basic sense of fairness
and unfairness," which is "essential to many aspects of societal and per-
sonal decision-making and underlies notions as diverse as ethics, social
policy, legal practice, and personal morality."28 4 The Al may do this as it
is an "integral hub" in mediating interactions between brain networks
associated with externally oriented attention and internally-oriented
thinking. The insula thus helps us register that an event is emotionally
salient, marking particular events for additional processing later on.285
The anterior cingulate (ACC) is the final structure I will discuss. It
is located in the front of the cingulate cortex in the center of the brain. It
looks a little bit like a collar, framing the recognizable divide between
the right and left hemispheres. The ACC receives projections from the
OFC, amygdala and Al, implicating it broadly in emotional and cognitive
processing. In contrast to the extensive data on the structures above, the
data are a bit more scattered related to the ACC and processing the emo-
tions of disgust, sadness, and anger. Some studies indicate that ACC ac-
tivity levels may predict a subject's response to treatment in anxiety dis-
orders,2 86 and also suggest that the ACC assists with "error monitoring"
where we detect conflict between concurrently active, rival representa-
tions. The ACC may engage another area of the prefrontal cortex, name-
280. Irene Tracey & Patrick W. Mantyh, The Cerebral Signature for Pain Perception and Its
Modulation, 55 NEURON 377, 379 (2007) (citing A. Vania Apkarian et al., Human Brain Mecha-
nisms of Pain Perception and Regulation in Health and Disease, 9 EUR. J. PAIN 463 (2005)).
281. Kevin N. Ochsner et al., Your Pain or Mine? Common and Distinct Neural Systems Sup-
porting the Perception of Pain in Self and Other, 3 Soc. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE
144, 148 (2008).
282. Claus Lamm & Tania Singer, The Role ofAnterior Insular Cortex in Social Emotions, 214
BRAIN STRUCTURE & FUNCTION 579, 579 (2010).
283. Adolphs, supra note 67, at 173 fig.6.
284. Alan G. Sanfey et al., The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Making in the Ultimatum
Game, 300 SCI. 1755, 1757-58 (2003).
285. Vinod Menon & Lucina Q. Uddin, Saliency, Switching, Attention and Control: A Network
Model ofInsula Function, 214 BRAIN STRUCTURE FUNCTION 655, 656 (2010).
286. See, e.g., Jack Nitschke et al., Anticipatory Activation in the Amygdala and Anterior
Cingulate in Generalized Anxiety Disorder and Prediction of Treatment Response, 166 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 302, 309 (2009).
109
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ly the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) to resolve such conflict. 28 7
Some posit the ACC acts as a social alarm signal that reacts to breaches
in social norms.288 This structure may therefore assist us in our active
updating-that is, developing new behaviors needed for new environ-
ments.289
The brain structures discussed above do not work independently,
and do not represent all emotional processing in the brain. Instead, they
work together with other brain networks to help us respond appropriately
to old and new stimuli. They also rely on sensory networks, memory, and
language. For example, if we are presented with a visual representation,
such as watching someone, getting mugged, the above emotional net-
works will rely critically on input from sensory areas such as the visual
cortex.29 0 If the person is someone we know, then our memory networks
will be more active. If we are physically touched ourselves, or if we
smell something distinctive, very different sensory processes will in-
creasingly come out of our default resting state.29 1 We might also engage
in more "cognitive" processes related to feeling conflicted about whether
we ought to go help, call the police, or run.
Because most social decisions rely on each of these brain structures,
many of the regions sketched out above are implicated in both emotion
and cognition. The structural connectivity between these "emotional"
structures and the "cognitive" prefrontal cortex and OFC obliterates the
idea that the two functions are easily and neatly separated. At the neuro-
biological level, it becomes inaccurate and metaphorical to refer to one
mental state as "emotional" and the other as "cognitive." For example, is
the OFC a cognitive or an emotional structure? What about the vmPFC?
The answer is that they are neither one nor the other, but a combination
of the two. The very categories of emotion and reason fall apart when we
287. See Cameron S. Carter & Vincent van Veen, Anterior Cingulate Cortex and Conflict
Detection: An Update of Theory and Data, 7 COGNITIVE AFFECTIVE & BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 367,
367 (2007).
288. James K. Rilling & Alan G. Sanfey, The Neuroscience of Social Decision-Making, 62
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 23,40 (2011).
289. See Farshad A. Mansouri et al., Conflict-Induced Behavioural Adjustment: A Clue to the
Executive Functions of the Prefrontal Cortex, 10 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 141, 141
(2009).
290. The cortex plays a larger role in the processing of emotional visual stimuli than is typical-
ly acknowledged, and the amygdala's involvement may have more to do with processing salience,
significance, ambiguity, and unpredictability than in processing emotion per se. Luiz Pessoa &
Ralph Adolphs, Emotion Processing and the Amygdala: From a 'Low Road' to 'Many Roads' of
Evaluating Biological Significance, II NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 773, 780 (2010).
291. See Adolphs, supra note 67, at 168 box 2 ("Whereas touch is an important social commu-
nication channel in other mammals, in modem humans it is relatively restricted to those with whom
we have the most intimate relationships. A recently described distinct neural pathway of slow-
conducting, C-afferent fibres that convey information about pleasant, light touch to the insula could
underlie processing of social somatosensory signals, such as a caress. The sense of smell provides
powerful social signals in other mammals but, again, it seems to be less important in humans. Labor-
atory studies have found influences of odorants on human physiology, but the effects of odours on
social behaviour are less clear." (footnote omitted)).
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speak at this level of neurological detail. And if the distinctions are fuzzy
at this level of analysis, imagine how confused they are when we extrap-
olate out to the social decision-making of jurors! While social decision-
making does engage different brain processes than mere self-reflection, it
is impossible for our bodies to bypass our basic neural machinery at this
fundamental level.2 92 Although this taken in isolation perhaps only sug-
gests we refine what we mean by emotion in particular contexts, rather
than conflating it with reason.
This also does not mean is that there could never be a dichotomous
relationship between what we have traditionally called "emotion" and
what we call "reason." Given that some of the data focus on reductionist
processes, it is possible that once my thoughts, emotions, and the social
context are all mixed together, the ultimate "output" in terms of a simple
decision or moral judgment may track folk views of emotion and reason.
Some may find in this last statement the thread that unravels my entire
thesis. But this commits a logical fallacy. The problem with the false
dichotomy between emotion and reason is that it is not consistent with
many of our neurological and behavioral data. It assumes the two always
embody completely distinct categories, which they do not. But it would
be equally invalid to say that emotion and reason always overlap on cer-
tain features. In the Venn diagram of emotion and reason, my argument
is merely that in many social spaces, the two overlap considerably. Thus,
the false dichotomy that began in Western culture thousands of years
ago, and continues up until this day, may be remarkably empirically im-
precise.
Even so, it is not completely incoherent for society to superimpose
dichotomies on the output of these structures, as society can choose to
reclassify our brain output however it so chooses. (Say, for example, we
continue to separate out "mental harms" from "physical ones" in terms of
reimbursement or health insurance coverage mechanisms.) But if we
choose this false dichotomy, when we defend it we need to recognize
that this dichotomy is a social construct, and not a biological one. The
problem with deferring to the social construct of the false dichotomy by
superimposing it on behavior that is not dichotomous at the neural or
behavioral level is that it yields legal rules that are impossible for judges
and jurors to follow in many contexts. This practice engages the fiction
that the empire of cognition can rule over emotion if we try really hard.
292. See Norman, Cacioppo & Berntson, supra note 9, at 60 ("[C]onceptual breakthroughs of
the late 20th century began to suggest that biological and social levels of analysis are not antithet-
ical."); see also Platt et al., supra note 43, at 136-137 ("Another primary difficulty with the dual
selves model is that it suggests a unitary role for emotion in decision making. . . . [T]here are several
means by which different components of emotions can influence decisions, and no single characteri-
zation will suffice. . . . [T]he relation between emotion and reason in decision making is not simply
competitive."); Id. at 138 (noting that research up until now has been "imprecise in defining the
specific aspects of emotion that are important" and that emotions can create "opposite patterns,
depending on the specific emotional state").
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In the extreme cases, we can appreciate that something different is going
on when someone storms into our offices screaming, sweating, and bare-
ly able to breathe. We could classify this behavior as "emotional." And
yet, in less extreme cases, subtle emotional processes are guiding every
rational decision that we make. As it has been made quite clear, emotion
represents many things besides "rage" or "fear," and encompasses broad-
er social categories of empathy, pride, or shame.
Observing the anatomical interconnectedness and functional inter-
dependence of emotion and reason has been aided by neuroimaging such
as fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging), EEG (electroenceph-
alography), and DTI (diffusion tensor imaging).2 93 Recent imaging data
obliterates old notions of modularity in the brain, or the exclusive dedica-
tion of certain neural substrates for either cognitive or affective func-
tions. As our knowledge of cognitive and affective neuroscience grows,
we have learned that the neural and behavioral networks of emotion and
cognition "interact from early perception to decision-making and reason-
ing," 29 4 and are "inextricably linked."295 As one legal scholar noted, the
process by which individuals interpret things-ascribe meaning and val-
ue to events-"actually melds emotions and reason to the point where,
within the interpretive schema, the two cannot be separated but, rather,
emerge as meaning upon which action is taken."29 6
From the very beginning of our unconscious visual, olfactory, or
audio perception, our emotions are working alongside our cognitive pro-
cesses. And we can now observe this relationship through visual repre-
sentations using EEG, fMRI and DTI. 297 While some of the component
parts to emotion and reason might be different, and their circuitry distin-
guishable in some tasks, there is considerably more overlap than previ-
ously imagined.29 8 In the next section, I will sketch out a few of the many
behavioral tasks that require emotion and cognition to be working along-
side each other.
293. For a brief summary of this technology, see Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a
Scanner Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant's Past Mental
States, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1119, 1136-39 (2010).
294. Phelps, supra note 266, at 28.
295. Salzman & Fusi, supra note 265, at 175.
296. Peter Brandon Bayer, Not Interaction But Melding-The "Russian Dressing" Theory of
Emotions: An Explanation of the Phenomenology of Emotions and Rationality with Suggested Relat-
ed Maxims for Judges and Other Legal Decision Makers, 52 MERCER L. REV. 1033, 1034 (2001).
297. Thomas Ethofer et al., Differential Influences of Emotion, Task, and Novelty on Brain
Regions Underlying the Processing of Speech Melody, 21 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1255, 1255
(2009); Joseph LeDoux, Emotion: Clues from the Brain, 46 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 209, 210-211
(1995); Patrik Vuilleumier & Gilles Pourtois, Distributed and Interactive Brain Mechanisms During
Emotion Face Perception: Evidence from Functional Neuroimaging, 45 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 174,
174 (2007).
298. See Borg et al., supra note 253, at 803-04 ("[Elmotion and reasoning remain distinct
components in an overall process of decision making.").
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D. Functional Interconnectedness: The Role ofEmotion in Cognition
If I asked you to come up with as many words as you could in ten
seconds to describe "cognition," you would probably generate a list with
words like perception, attention, evaluation, reflection, regulation, con-
templation, knowledge, recollection, execution, etc. And these are tradi-
tionally the tasks that psychologists have referred to as "executive func-
tions," or "cognition." What I will show in this section is that while these
may be classically cognitive functions, they could not operate well, par-
ticularly in social situations, without the input of our emotions.
Elizabeth Phelps, a strong proponent of rejecting the false dichoto-
my or "dual process" model, has written that "[i]nvestigations into the
neural systems underlying human behavior demonstrate that the mecha-
nisms of emotion and cognition are intertwined from early perception to
reasoning." 29 9 A 2008 review suggested that much of this integration
may be moderated by the amygdala. As we saw from the previous sec-
tion, it is anatomically positioned to do so, as the amygdala receives
highly processed visual data from the temporal cortex, and saves tracers
of this for later processing in other brain areas. Studies show that the
amygdala "influence[s] memory, attention, decision making and other
cognitive functions on the basis of the social [and emotional] signifi-
cance of the stimuli that are being processed." 3
Now shifting to the other side of the dichotomy, I will briefly dis-
cuss how oft-labeled "cognitive" structures are actually quite involved in
our emotional processes. The parietal cortex and prefrontal cortex are
two regions thought to be primarily involved in cognition and reason.
However, we now know they also play a powerful role in affective pro-
cessing. Three sub-territories of the cortex-the anterior cingulated cor-
tex (ACC), the lateral prefrontal cortex (IPFC), and ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex (vmPFC)-factor prominently into some of the most re-
spected proposals for emotional circuitry. Despite being previously la-
beled "cognitive" regions, they are now considered to be extensively
involved in affective function, and there is growing evidence for "func-
tional integration of cognition and emotion in these regions." 301 Even our
ability to inhibit impulses, which is considered classically "cognitive"
and implicates the ACC, dlPFC, and inferior frontal cortex, may be mod-
ulated by emotional stimuli and processes.302
299. Phelps, supra note 266, at 27.
300. Adolphs, supra note 67, at 168.
301. Pessoa, supra note 251, at 151; see also ANTONIO DAMASIO, THE FEELING OF WHAT
HAPPENS: BODY AND EMOTION IN THE MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS 40-41 (1999).
302. See Jeremy R. Gray et al., Integration of Emotion and Cognition in the Lateral Prefrontal
Cortex, 99 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCi 4115, 4118-19 (2002); William M. Perlstein et al., Dissociation
in Human Prefrontal Cortex of Affective Influences on Working Memory-Related Activity, 99 PROC.
NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. 1736, 1739-40 (2002).
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I will not be addressing each of the "cognitive" capacities listed
above. Instead, I will focus on perception and attention, with a brief
summary of the role of emotion on memory. Because attention and per-
ception are the derivative stages of stimulus processing, anything that
affects these will also affect later cognitive functions, although in itera-
tive ways that may complicate the ultimate outcome.303 Because we per-
ceive and attend almost without noticing it, the role of emotions in these
functions may not be seen; indeed, we are blind to it. First, I will discuss
the cognitive neuroscience of perception, and how emotion often inter-
acts with it to aid in our decisions.
1. The Neuroscience of Perception Obliterates the Assumption that
Emotion Always Disturbs Cognition
Rather than biasing our decision-making, emotions often play a crit-
ical role in our perception. And, as you can imagine, perception is crucial
to many aspects of trial, as the credibility of all parties (witnesses, judg-
es, jurors) depends in turn on how well each is perceived.304 Witnesses
share their stories about what was said between partners to a contract,
what graphs were shown during a board meeting, and whether they were
able to observe the make or model of the car zooming past them on the
freeway. Jurors then perceive the testimony based upon all of this: the
subtle shifts in posture, the failed eye-contact, the furrowed eyebrows
between the accused and his attorney. They then listen to conflicting
testimony to fold together their narrative "story" of what occurred.305
Without perception, there could be no oral or written testimony. Critical-
ly, there could also be no jury. This field of cognitive neuroscience there-
fore has widespread implications for both witness testimony as well as
jury deliberations and judicial reasoning. Here, I am focusing specifically
on the role of perception in juror decision-making. The empirical data,
which we will now turn to, illustrates that in some cases emotion can
actually assist jurors in perceiving events. I will begin with research on
visual perception.
To test the effect of emotion on visual perception, one team studied
contrast sensitivity. Contrast sensitivity is the ability to perceive differ-
303. See Elizabeth A. Phelps, Sam Ling & Marisa Carrasco, Emotion Facilitates Perception
and Potentiates the Perceptual Benefits ofAttention, 17 PSYCHOL. SCL 292, 292 (2006).
304. Witnesses recall what they perceived with their eyes and ears, and they relay these percep-
tions in court. Ironically, witnesses did not use to be able to draw inferences or conclusions, and
were just supposed to be the jury's eyes and ears. This was because it was felt that perception did not
require any inferential process. See THAYER, supra note 3, at 524.
305. Mariska Esther Kret & Beatrice de Gelder, Social Context Influences Recognition of
Bodily Expressions, 203 EXPERIMENTAL BRAIN RES. 169, 169 (2010). ("[Data] show that observers
judging a facial expression (fear or anger) are strongly influenced by emotional body language; an
enhancement of the occipital Pl component as early as 115 ms after stimulus presentation onset
points to the existence of a rapid neural mechanism sensitive to the agreement between simultane-
ously presented facial and bodily emotional expressions. . . . Knowledge of the social situation, body
postures, voices, scenes, linguistic labels, or other emotional faces all influence emotion perception."
(citations omitted)).
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ences between an object and its background, such as detecting a bluebird
against a slightly darker blue sky. When there is very little contrast be-
tween the two objects, it can be difficult to determine the orientation of
the object in the scene. Researchers relied on this to ask fourteen under-
graduates to look at a display and determine whether the black box
against a gray background was upright, shifted to the left, or shifted to
the right. The research team found that the presentation of a fearful face
prior to the stimuli presentation and test led to more accurate assessments
of the orientation of the square. Put differently, the mere presence of a
fearful face before the task improved the sensitivity of their eyes! 3 06 In a
follow-up experiment, the researchers found that presenting fearful faces
in the periphery of our visual field, immediately before the orientation
task, increased contrast sensitivity even more. It was thought that flash-
ing the face peripherally was so unexpected, that it drew the subjects'
attention to the fearful face, improving the subject's visual perception for
a few moments. 30 7 Importantly, while this data suggests that emotion
improves our cognitive functioning during perception, it cannot be said
that this conclusively holds for all contexts or emotions. But it is at least
one example of where the emotion of fear may aid in perception.
Researchers have also used the technique of backward masking and
308
binocular rivalry to tease out emotion's effect on perception. Briefly,
backward masking involves presenting a target emotional face for a split
second (less than 30 ms), followed by a masking stimuli of a neutral face
for a longer period of time. If the time between the target and the mask-
ing stimuli is short enough, the subject is consciously unaware of the first
stimulus and can only report seeing the second neutral face. In a binocu-
lar rivalry task, different images are introduced within visual domains
specific to one or the other eye. As the eyes cannot focus on both, mo-
nocular channels in the primary visual cortex alternatively inhibit one
another, so that only one image dominates and is perceived. The subor-
dinate image does not reach awareness, even though it was registered
subconsciously.
Something unintuitive was discovered using neuroimaging and the-
se tasks. Namely, certain subcortical regions of the brain, such as the
amygdala, basal ganglia, pulvinar and superior colliculus, are actually
more active in response to emotional stimuli that are not consciously
perceived. As one might expect for both tasks, the regions of the cortex,
such as the frontal lobe, cingulate, and occipitotemporal lobe, were more
active during the processing of consciously perceived stimuli. This
means that there are certain regions of our brain, especially those that
appear to be heavily involved in emotional processing, that are more
306. Phelps, Ling & Carrasco, supra note 303, at 298.
307. Id. at 295.
308. Marco Tamietto & Beatrice de Gelder, Neural Bases of the Non-Conscious Perception of
Emotional Signals, 11 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 697, 699 box 2 (2010).
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involved in processing an emotional stimulus when we are not aware of
them.
We can be unaware of what we subconsciously perceive when the
stimulus is not strong enough or not presented for long enough time to
trigger a response in the cortex. However, weaker stimuli are often capa-
ble of activating the sub-cortical visual regions, such as the superior
colliculus, that ostensibly have a lower threshold for activation.3 09 Being
unaware of a stimulus due to lack of attention, on the other hand, results
not from a weak stimulus, but from when we are otherwise engaged and
lacking the mental bandwidth to process it. This thereby reduces cortical
responsiveness to the unattended event.31 0 Even so, recent data indicate
similar, though weaker, effects of non-conscious perception of happi-
ness, sadness, or disgust cues on these areas of the brain.
This likely occurs through the amygdala, which receives infor-
mation about the emotional salience of stimuli quickly and often prior to
awareness. 312 Relative increases in activation occur in the amygdala even
when the fearful faces are masked and subjects seem to be unaware that
they were very briefly flashed before them. Thus we see from this data
that in certain situations, emotion can help us perceive stimuli. This may
be especially true when the emotion is fear. Linking up with the previous
section, this suggests that in certain cases, when the jury experiences
some emotions, they might be more likely to perceive important features
of the trial, which may lead to better recall of facts.
As emotion can affect perception, it is also the case that cognition
affects perception, and our emotional response to this perception. 3 14 One
team presented subjects with isovaleric acid, which smelled a bit like
cheddar cheese. Subjects were placed in a scanner and given words to
describe the odor, with some reading "cheddar cheese" and others read-
ing "body odor."315 The word label altered brain activation in the second-
ary olfactory region of the orbitofrontal cortex. The label was also corre-
lated with subjects' ratings of pleasantness, with the body odor label be-
ing more likely labeled as unpleasant. There was greater olfactory cortex
activation when the scent was framed as cheese rather than body odor.3 16
309. Id. at 699.
310. Id. at 700.
311. Id
312. Paul J. Whalen et al., Masked Presentations of Emotional Facial Expressions Modulate
Amygdala Activity Without Explicit Knowledge, 18J. NEUROSCIENCE 411,415 (1998).
313. J. S. Morris et al., A Neuromodulatory Role for the Human Amygdala in Processing
Emotional Facial Expressions, 121 BRAIN 47, 49, 53 (1998).
314. Blair et al., supra note 86, at 437 (finding that goal-directed processing disrupted the
BOLD response, an indirect measure of brain activity, to emotional pictures).
315. Rolls, supra note 44, at 123-25.
316. Ivan E. de Araujo et al., Cognitive Modulation of Olfactory Processing, 46 NEURON 671,
674 (2005).
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Thus, the emotional response was moderated by cognitive framing. 17
This is just one example of many, and it has direct application to jury
instructions. While it suggests that we can moderate our emotional re-
sponse by framing and reappraisal, jurors are often not specifically being
asked to reappraise information, so much as ignore part of their apprais-
al. This often does not work without their being given a justification or
anchor for doing so.
2. The Neuroscience of Attention Obliterates the Assumption that
Emotion Always Disturbs Cognition
We now move to another prototypical cognitive function that is in-
timately related to perception: attention. Attention is considered one of
the most paradigmatic of cognitive functions, allowing us to filter out
many sensory sounds, visuals, and smells to focus only on the most criti-
cal inputs.3 ' Attention to a face or scene increases neuronal firing rates
in the visual and sensory cortex, and is believed to improve our behav-
ioral response by making us quicker and more agile to respond." 9 This
particular intersection of cognition and emotion helps us answer a com-
mon question: Given what I am hearing and seeing, and how I feel,
where should I direct my focus?
The importance of emotional salience and its impact on auditory at-
tention has been well established. A ubiquitous example of this is the
classic "cocktail party" effect, where an emotionally significant state-
ment, such as one's name or hometown, is heard from across the room
even when we are not dedicating our deliberate attention to the speak-
er.3 20 Subsequent research has confirmed that when our attention is di-
vided and stimuli are competing, emotional networks can facilitate
awareness for emotionally-salient stimuli.32 1 Some posit that the amygda-
la makes this possible; it is likely that various brain structures are in-
volved.
We know from imaging studies that both the amygdala and the or-
bitofrontal cortex (OFC) receive highly processed input from secondary
317. See Benedetto De Martino et al., Frames, Biases, and Rational Decision-Making in the
Human Brain, 313 SC. 684, 684 (2006); see also M. Deppe, Evidence for a Neural Correlate of a
Framing Effect: Bias-Specic Activity in the Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex During Credibility
Judgments, 67 BRAIN RES. BULL. 413, 419-20 (2005).
318. Jacqueline Gottlieb et al., Parietal Control ofAttentional Guidance: The Significance of
Sensory, Motivational and Motor Factors, 91 NEUROBIOLOGY LEARNING & MEMORY 121, 121
(2009) ("Because the brain is 'bombarded' with more sensory information than it can process in
depth, the argument goes, attention is needed to prioritize and limit the amount of information that
reaches higher processing stages at any one time.").
319. See Robert Desimone & John Duncan, Neural Mechanisms of Selective Visual Attention,
18 ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE 193, 194 (1995); Sabine Kastner & Leslie G. Ungerleider, Mecha-
nisms of Visual Attention in the Human Cortex, 23 ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE 315, 322-23 (2000).
320. E. Colin Cherry, Some Experiments on the Recognition of Speech, with One and with Two
Ears, 25 J. ACOUSTICAL Soc. AM. 975, 976 (1953).
321. Phelps, supra note 266, at 37.
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visual areas, making them ideally situated to adjust perceptual processing
based on our evaluation of the stimulus. 32 2 Thus, the emotional cue can
trigger amygdala-mediated attention and laser-like focus, helping us
sense whether we need to go chase a child down the theatre steps or keep
watching the ballet.323 A growing number of studies hint at a bivalent
role of attention, with positive emotional states expanding our scope of
attention and negative emotional states restricting it. 324 Once again, the
relationship between emotion and cognition is not black and white, but is
incredibly nuanced depending on the context.
It is generally thought that this quick response to fear by the amyg-
dala is critical in helping us modulate our attention toward dangerous
events. 325 As Robert Sapolsky has pointed out, we humans have the luxu-
ry of being relatively predator-free. This means that unlike our more
primitive ancestors, modern man is typically not in the position of run-
ning from an animal that seeks to eat him. Even so, the emotion of fear,
and the evolutionary-engrained behaviors associated with it, continue to
save us from even the most banal dangers. These defensive behaviors can
come in handy when we are responding to the rare drunk driver who
swerves into our lane or to a home-security alarm that goes off at 2:00
a.m.32 6 In each of these cases, our personal safety appears to be threat-
ened. And when our safety is threatened, responses in the brain prepare
us to react. Even though it seems to happen automatically, recent data
suggest that neural processing of stimuli with certain types of emotional
content often requires some degree of thought to attend to valence.3 27
This does not suggest that the amygdala only responds to attended to
stimuli or that we are unable to respond to threats outside of the focus of
our attention.
322. See David G. Amaral et al., Anatomical Organization of the Primate Amygdaloid Com-
plex, in THE AMYGDALA: NEUROBIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF EMOTION, MEMORY, AND MENTAL
DYSFUNCTION 1, 1 (John P. Aggleton ed., 1992); Jennifer L. Freese & David G. Amaral, The Or-
ganization of Projections from the Amygdala to Visual Cortical Areas TE and VI in the Macaque
Monkey, 486 J. COMP. NEUROLOGY 295, 315 (2005).
323. Luiz Pessoa, Emotion and Cognition and the Amygdala: From "What Is It?" to "What's
To Be Done? ", 48 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 3416, 3416-18, 3426 (2011).
324. Ronald S. Friedman & Jens Forster, Implicit Affective Cues and Attentional Tuning: An
Integrative Review, 136 PSYCHOL. BULL. 875, 875 (2010); see also Brendan P. Bradley et al.,
Attentional Biases for Negative Information in Induced & Naturally Occurring Dysphoria, 35
BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 911, 912 (1997); John D. Eastwood et al., Differential Attentional Guid-
ance by Unattended Faces Expressing Positive and Negative Emotion, 63 PERCEPTION &
PSYCHOPHYSiCS 1004, 1006-07 (2001).
325. Adam K. Anderson et al., Neural Correlates ofthe Automatic Processing of Threat Facial
Signals, 23 J. NEUROSCIENCE 5627, 5627 (2003); Patrik Vuilleumier et al., Effects ofAttention and
Emotion on Face-Processing in the Human Brain: An Event-Related JMRI Study, 30 NEURON 829,
837 (2001).
326. Sarina M. Rodrigues, Joseph E. LeDoux & Robert M. Sapolsky, The Influence of Stress
Hormones on Fear Circuitry, 32 ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE 289, 291 (2009).
327. Luiz Pessoa et al., Attentional Control of the Processing ofNeutral and Emotional Stimu-
li, 15 COGNITIVE BRAIN RES. 31, 40 (2002) (finding through the use of brain imaging that all "brain
regions responding differentially to emotional faces, including the amygdala, did so only when
sufficient attentional resources were available").
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Another set of tests revealed the impact of emotion on attention.
Here, researchers relied on something called the "attentional blink." In
this paradigm, stimuli are presented in rapid succession (about every 100
milliseconds or so). This is so quick that it is difficult for subjects to
identify any one stimulus. However, if subjects are told that they can
ignore most pictures and selectively attend to a few targets (such as those
that appear in pink) subjects are able to selectively perceive those targets
and later identify them. This ability is negatively affected the longer the
time between the two different targets. If a second pink target is present-
ed a few items after the first, in what is called the "early lag period,"
subjects will often miss it.32 8 Noticing and encoding the first target stimu-
lus results in a temporary refractory period, during which time it is diffi-
cult to notice and encode a second target.329 Using this paradigm, re-
searchers can examine what our brain perceives pre-awareness, when our
attention "blinks." Comparing emotional and neutral words as stimuli,
one team found that when the second word is emotionally arousing, the
blink is attenuated.33 o Put another way, emotionally arousing words en-
hanced subjects' ability to spot the second target during the refractory
period. This finding did not extend to patients with left amygdala dam-
age, as they still had a hard time seeing the second target, even if it was
an emotionally arousing word.
Together, these studies suggest that when demands are placed on
our attention, emotional arousing stimuli are more likely to reach percep-
tual awareness, and are more likely to be later identified. It also suggests
that the amygdala plays a necessary role in this facilitation of attention
with emotion.33 1 There are many other studies revealing that emotion
assists us in attending to stimuli.3 32 Applying these findings to courtroom
applications, it may be the case that we should not discourage emotional
testimony at trial, purely because it is arousing. Arousal may help jurors
328. Phelps, supra note 266, at 37.
329. Marvin M. Chun & Mary C. Potter, A Two-Stage Model for Multiple Target Detection in
Rapid Serial Visual Presentation, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 109, 109 (1995); Jane E. Ray-
mond et al., Temporary Suppression of Visual Processing in an RSVP Task: An Attentional Blink?,
18 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 849, 858 (1992).
330. Adam K. Anderson, Affective Influences on the A ttentional Dynamics Supporting Aware-
ness, 134 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 258, 264 (2005).
331. Adam K. Anderson & Elizabeth A. Phelps, Lesions of the Human Amygdala Impair
Enhanced Perception ofEmotionally Salient Events, 411 NATURE 305, 305 (2001).
332. This is particularly true for threatening stimuli. Gilles Pourtois & Patrik Vuilleumier,
Dynamics of Emotional Effects on Spatial Attention in the Human Visual Cortex, 156 PROGRESS
BRAIN RES. 67, 67 (2006) ("These data confirm that threat may act as a powerful exogenous cue and
trigger reflexive shifts in spatial attention toward its location, through a rapid temporal sequence of
neural events in parietal and temporo-occipital areas, with dissociable neural substrates for engage-
ment benefits in attention affecting activity in extrastriate occipital areas and increased disengage-
ment costs affecting intraparietal cortex. These brain-imaging results reveal how emotional signals
related to threat can play an important role in modulating spatial attention to afford flexible percep-
tion and action.").
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filter through all of the social stimuli in the theater of trial, to help them
maintain their attention.333
While emotion can affect perception and attention, the inverse is al-
so true. Cognitive perception and attention control can also shape our
affect. Imaging work has investigated two types of control of emotion:
attentional control and cognitive change. A hypothetical continuum ex-
ists between the two methods.334
In its purest form, attentional control is the deliberate and selective
inattention to emotional stimuli. An analogy would be burying your head
in your jacket during the particularly gory parts of a horror film, or look-
ing away from a dead deer on the road. Moving along the spectrum we
then have the ability to engage in a distracting secondary task, which will
compete for attention with the emotional stimuli. Here we can think of
humming or reciting Yeats poems in your head while a dentist drills your
teeth. Next, one might attend to the stimulus and engage with it, closely
evaluating the attributes that are "emotional," against those that are "non-
emotional." Research in this area has yielded "strikingly discrepant" re-
sults, with some suggesting cognitive judgment reduces emotional-
amygdala response, and others suggesting the opposite. This likely de-
pends on the cognitive burden of the stimulus and task and the operating
335definitions of the critical terms3. Cognitive change begins to be em-
ployed when we anticipate emotion and prepare for processing it. This
may occur when we know we are about to get married, and we are think-
ing of ways not to cry during the ceremony. We might also attempt re-
versal learning, where we aim to retrain our brain not to associate the
sound of a particular alarm with getting up at 5:00 a.m. or to reverse an
emotional association to extinguish our learned response. To some ex-
tent, emotions can be modulated by any of these methods.336 But we may
333. Training can improve attentional focus by reducing the behavioral costs of distraction. See
Todd A. Kelley & Steven Yantis, Neural Correlates of Learning to Attend, 4 FRONTIERS HUM.
NEUROSCIENCE 1, 9 (2010).
334. Figure depicting continuum attributed to Kevin N. Ochsner & James J. Gross, The Cogni-
tive Control ofEmotion, 9 TRENDS COGNITIVE Sct. 242, 243 (2005).
335. Id. at 244.
336. "Top-down" appraisal and reappraisal involves deliberately reinterpreting neutral images
in emotional ways to change our associations. This can be contrasted with the 'bottom-up' approach
where we respond to intrinsically emotional perceptual properties of the stimulus. One team looked
at this comparison, and observed amygdala activation in both. However, only in the top-down task
was the ACC (anterior cingulate cortex), the LPFC (lateral prefrontal cortex), and the MPFC (medial
prefrontal cortex) activated, which might represent the cognitively generated aversive appraisal. See
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not be able to employ these strategies effectively when the emotion is
subconscious. We therefore must continue to research individuals
through physiological cues rather than just conscious self reports. Emo-
tional stimuli that do not even pierce our conscious awareness can still
elicit physiological responses that suggest autonomic arousal, including
inducing us to make spontaneous and emotionally reflexive facial ex-
pressions.337
3. The Neuroscience of Memory Obliterates the Assumption that
Emotion Always Disturbs or Enhances Memory
Without delving too deeply into the enormous literature of memory
and emotion, I will sketch out some of the ways in which emotion im-
pacts memory formation and recall. Mounting data suggest that that emo-
tion generally assists memory by facilitating the specific steps of atten-
tion and encoding.338 Many studies confirm that emotional events can be
better encoded and remembered. 33 9 Further, through the role of emotion
in tagging events as pleasant or aversive, emotions play a vital in how we
learn. 340 Memories are enhanced for location and activity when we expe-
rience natural disasters, like earthquakes, or unnatural disasters, like car
accidents. 34 1 But for some details of so-called "flashbulb" memories, we
can be quite confident, and yet wrong, in our recall.
Kevin N. Ochsner & James J. Gross, Thinking Makes It So: A Social Cognitive Neuroscience Ap-
proach to Emotion Regulation, in HANDBOOK OF SELF-REGULATION: RESEARCH, THEORY, AND
APPLICATIONS 240, 242-42 fig. 12.4 (Roy F. Baumeister & Kathleen D. Vohs eds., 2004). Studies of
cognitive change have had more consistent results than those for attentional control. Specifically,
data demonstrate that emotional appraisal systems can be modulated by the PFC (prefrontal cortex),
the OFC (orbitofrontal cortex) and cingulate control systems. These systems may be activated by
expectations or beliefs about interpretations of stimuli or by learning new associations between
stimuli and feelings. Interestingly, there is no data to suggest that we can regulate our emotions just
by being told to do so, without being given an explicit reason or way of replacing the emotional
reaction with something less emotional. Cf Kateri McRae et al., Bottom-Up and Top-Down Emotion
Generation: Implications for Emotion Regulation, SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE, 2
(Feb. 4, 2011), http://scan.oxfordjoumals.org/content/early/2011/02/04/scan.nsq 103.abstract (noting
that, in experimental settings, methods such as cognitive reappraisal, involving "the re-consideration
or re-framing of an event in less emotional terms," have been more reliable and effective in emo-
tional regulation studies than merely instructing participants to suppress their emotions).
337. Tamietto & de Gelder, supra note 308, at 698.
338. Kevin S. LaBar & Roberto Cabeza, Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotional Memory, 7
NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 54, 55 (2006); see also Ueli Rutishauser et al., Activity of Human
Hippocampal and Amygdala Neurons During Retrieval of Declarative Memories, 105 PROC. NAT'L
ACAD. SCi. 329, 329 (2008).
339. See, e.g., LaBar & Cabeza, supra note 338, at 54 ("Emotional events often attain a privi-
leged status in memory.").
340. Id. at 55 ("Emotional situations initiate complex interactions between adrenergic and
glucocorticoid systems that are coordinated by the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis at central and
peripheral sites of action. . . . Within the basolateral amygdala and hippocampus, noradrenaline
enhances glutamatergic synaptic plasticity, which is thought to underlie learning and memory func-
tions.").
341. Benno Roozendaal et al., Stress, Memory and the Amygdala, 10 NATURE REVIEWS
NEUROSCIENCE 423, 423 (2009). Roozendaal goes on to note that "[s]uch memory enhancement is
not limited to experiences that are unpleasant or aversive: pleasurable events also tend to be well
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The effect of emotion on memory depends on what the emotion is
and when it is experienced in the memory process. Encoding is the initial
stage of episodic memory, and it involves the processing of incoming
data that will be stored in the brain. It has two separate steps: acquisition
and consolidation. Acquisition refers to the registration and analysis of
an input in sensory buffers such as the auditory or visual cortex. Consol-
idation occurs when the memory creates a strong representation and ease
of recall over time. 3 4 2 Emotion can affect encoding through its modula-
tion of both processes, 343 and it likely plays out differently depending on
which point in the process it is involved.3 " The enhancing effects of
stress on consolidation may be balanced out by its impairing effects on
retrieval.345
A 2005 study found that patients with amygdala damage showed
deficits in recall for details of emotional scenes that were central to an
event, while keeping intact their memory for "unemotional" details that
were considered peripheral.34 6 This has been described as their remem-
bering the trees, but not the forest. It suggests an important role for the
amygdala in contextualizing memory.3 4 7 However, many studies to date
have not differentiated between the amygdala's influence on encoding
and on the consolidation process.
4. Social Decision-Making Studies Obliterate the Assumption that
Rational Actors Never Rely on Emotion
In this next part, the Article will apply findings from the cognitive
sciences to social models of decision-making. While processing differ-
ences often lead to behavioral differences, it is behavioral differences
remembered... . [S]tress hormones and stress-activated neurotransmitters enhance the consolidation
of memory for emotionally arousing experiences through actions involving the amygdala." Id.
342. GAZZANIGA, IVRY & MANGUN, supra note 43, at 248.
343. See J. A. Easterbrook, The Effect of Emotion on Cue Utilization and Organization of
Behavior, 66 PSYCHOL. REV. 183, 183 (1959).
344. The timing of stress is critical for recall. If stressful stimuli occur before learning, there is
impairment. If stressful event occurs after learning, there is enhanced recall. This effect was greater
in magnitude for emotional rather than neutral stimuli. Tom Smeets, Acute Stress Impairs Memory
Retrieval Independent of Time of Day, 36 PSYCHONEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 495, 495, 499-500
(2011). In another study, retrieval of social information (biographical sketches including phone
numbers, names, part of life stories, birth dates, home towns) was impaired when stress occurred
after learning/encoding. Stress paradigm was the Trier Social Stress Test (being asked to give a
public speech on a topic of researchers' choosing). Researchers measured the level of stress induced
through cortisol levels and mood evaluations. There was no effect of sex for those having elevated
cortisol. Merz, Wolf & Hennig, supra note 170, at 291. Emotionality of the material can further
potentiate these effects. See Roozendaal et al., supra note 341, at 426.
345. Mathia Luethi, Beat Meier & Carmen Sandi., Stress Effects on Working Memory, Explicit
Memory, and Implicit Memory for Neutral and Emotional Stimuli in Healthy Men, 2 FRONTIERS
BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 1, 6 (2009).
346. Ralph Adolphs, Daniel Tranel & Tony W. Buchanan, Amygdala Damage Impairs Emo-
tional Memory for Gist but Not Details of Complex Stimuli, 8 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 512, 512, 515
(2005).
347. For an example of this impairment resulting from acute social stress, see Charles A.
Morgan, Ill et al., Stress-Induced Deficits in Working Memory and Visuo-Constructive Abilities in
Special Operations Soldiers, 60 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 722, 726 (2006).
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that are relevant to the law. We now then turn to social decision-making
models that integrate emotion, cognition, and behavior.
For some time, classical economics and legal models predicted that
human beings would make decisions in hyper-rational ways. 348 Even
non-economists thought that it was basic human nature to behave in a
way that maximized personal returns. Early psychology and neurosci-
ence researchers focused on the information-processing view of making
"optimal" decisions, a view that generally ignored emotion.349 To these
researchers, the prototypical question was, "Given a particular situation,
how should one go about selecting the best among competing alterna-
tives?" 350 But as cognitive and affective neuroscience developed, re-
searchers began to understand how an individual's "best choice" may be
classically "irrational." I place irrational in quotes, because it rests on a
particular definition of rationality that does not accommodate social and
affective goals. Many of our complex emotions, such as shame, empathy,
jealousy, and pride, depend on cognitive and social context.' Research-
ers have hypothesized that they developed later in our evolutionary histo-
ry than more primitive emotions like fear or sadness.352 These social
emotions serve to regulate group behaviors rather than promote individu-
al interests.
Despite our intuition, people frequently make decisions that do not
seem to yield net economic benefits to them. Humans are both more co-
operative and less selfish than social game theories would predict, choos-
ing sometimes to mutually benefit strangers in ways that once would
have been deemed irrational. And yet, this cooperation can be seen in
various research paradigms, with subjects of different ages and back-
grounds and despite the fact that the subjects may only play one anony-
mous game against each other. Of course, one must ask whether a finan-
cial investment or laboratory task can ever truly model other social losses
or gains (such as injury to our reputation). And to be sure, research on
348. See Thomas Raeburn White, Oaths in Judicial Proceedings and Their Effect upon the
Competency of Witnesses, 51 AM. L. REG. 373, 373 (1903) ("Self-interest is perhaps the fundamental
fact in human nature. Every man naturally seeks to promote the welfare of himself and his family
before that of his neighbor.... [H]ewill, if necessary, tell a lie for that purpose.").
349. Phelps, supra note 266 at 27; see also Pizarro & Bloom, supra note 240, at 193 ("We
agree that psychology has suffered from an overreliance on reasoning at the expense of affective
processes." (citation omitted)).
350. Joseph G. Johnson & Jerome R. Busemeyer, Decision Making Under Risk and Uncertain-
ty, I WIRES COGNITIVE Sci. 736, 736 (2010) (emphasis added).
351. Adolphs, supra note 67, at 166; see also Yuko Akitsuki & Jean Decety, Social Context
and Perceived Agency Affects Empathy for Pain: An Event-Related fMRI Investigation, 47
NEUROIMAGE 722, 722 (2009) ("Our study demonstrates that the social context in which pain occurs
modulate the brain responses to others' pain. This modulation may reflect successful adaptation to
potential danger present in a social interaction.").
352. Adolphs, supra note 67, at 165-66.
353. Sanfey, supra note 40, at 599; see also Dominic J. Barraclough, Michelle L. Conroy &
Daeyeol Lee, Prefrontal Cortex and Decision Making in a Mixed-Strategy Game, 7 NATURE
NEUROSCIENCE 404, 404 (2004).
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mock jurors in deliberative settings must continue, so that we can learn
more about the way real-world jurors actually decide. But for now, we
have learned that human beings are not always rational in the classical
sense when they are working in groups. In fact, we are often "irrational"
in predictable ways that make sense once we acknowledge our social and
affective impulses. We will now turn to two theories that highlight this
phenomenon.
a. Prospect Theory
Prospect theory describes the behavior of individuals when making
various decisions about money and value. In laboratory settings, individ-
uals find the marginal utility of a constant change to be greater for losses
than for gains. 3 54 Put another way, if you lose money, this will be more
aversive to you than the same amount of monetary gain is pleasant. This
is known as loss aversion, and it is a feature of prospect theory. Teams
have demonstrated, many times over, that individuals will give more
money to keep an item than they initially paid to bring it home. This is
not predicted by pure rational decision-making, as it would seem that you
would not attach sentimental value to something so quickly, making
someone pay quite a bit above last week's sale price to take the object
from you.
Financial games such as this introduced many revolutionary things
to cognitive psychology. These tasks conveyed a less rational and more
emotion-centered view of social decision-making. 35 5 We also learned
something about the component parts to a complex social decision. Spe-
cifically, through prospect theory games, we now appreciate that there is
a pre-decisional editing stage, where the decision is framed, outcomes
ordered, and clearly inferior options are eliminated. Second, we have
learned that outcomes are compared to salient benchmarks and are not
weighed absolutely in the abstract. Instead, the value placed on outcomes
is influenced by our subjective emotions. Third, prospect theory has con-
firmed that outcomes could be evaluated differentially based on whether
they were posed as losses or gains. Finally, we have learned that sub-
optimal choices can be the result of loss aversion, where marginal utility
of a constant change is greater for losses than for gains. 3 56
Taken together, these findings paint a picture of decision-making
that is not centered on optimizing individual financial rewards. 357 This
may be due to sentimental value we place on the things we own, once we
own them. Taking into account our subjective evaluations, mediated
354. De Martino et al., supra note 317, at 684-86.
355. Johnson & Busemeyer, supra note 350, at 739.
356. Id.
357. The question has shifted from "What is rational?" to "Because humans often make
suboptimal' decisions, how can we describe and predict the choices that one will make in a particu-
lar situation?" Id. at 736.
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through emotional cues and memories, we can make better predictions as
to how people actually make social decisions. Up until recently, models
such as those adopted by the drafters of our evidentiary practices were
blind to the value of emotion in this decision-making.
b. Ultimatum Games
A task called the Ultimatum Game has uncovered other ways in
which humans make a different type of seemingly irrational decision.
The game essentially involves two subjects, the proposer and the re-
sponder. The proposer is given some amount of money by whoever is
controlling the experiment. Let's say she is given $10 dollars in ten one
dollar bills. Both subjects are told that the proposer gets to split the mon-
ey between the two of them in any way the proposer chooses. The pro-
poser then reveals to the responder how much money she wants to give.
If the responder accepts the proposal, they each get to keep the amount of
money suggested. But if the responder rejects the offer, neither person
gets anything. Under a purely rational view of human behavior, you
would expect that the proposer usually recommends giving the responder
the least amount possible, or $1. This seems rational because the re-
sponder should be happy to have a dollar more than he had before, and
the proposer, being in charge, could keep the maximum amount.
Shockingly, and not in keeping with cognitive rationalism, this is in
fact not what usually occurs. In many replicated studies, the proposer
does not keep $9 and, instead, typically divides the money equally be-
tween the two. And when she does not, and the allocation is thought of as
being too unequal (say, giving $1 to the responder) the responder will
reject the $1 outright, preferring to take no money at all.358 This effect is
observed regardless of whether the two subjects are anonymous
strangers, only play in one exchange, or whether they are repeat play-
ers-so long as the proposer is not given real-time feedback about
whether the responder has rejected her offers.359 Classical economists
mulled over why this might be the case; after all, why wouldn't someone
choose $1 over nothing? Ironically, the reason comes to us from emotion
and affective neuroscience.
Emotions such as frustration, disgust, or anger motivate the re-
sponder to punish the unfair offers, even when this punishment is only
revealed to the proposer at the end of the experiment. Receiving an un-
fair offer is associated with negatively-valenced emotions as well as acti-
vation of the Al and dlPFC.360 As you recall from earlier sections of the
358. See, e.g., Gary E. Bolton & Rami Zwick, Anonymity Versus Punishment in Ultimatum
Bargaining, 10 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 95, 102 (1995).
359. See Shmuel Zamir, Rationality and Emotions in Ultimatum Bargaining, 61 ANNALES
D'ECONOMIE ET DE STATISTIQUE 1, 9, 19, 23 (2001).
360. Sanfey, supra note 40, at 600; Sanfey et al., supra note 284, at 1758 ("Therefore, not only
do our results provide direct empirical support for economic models that acknowledge the influence
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Article, the Al is implicated in feelings of disgust, which might help us
learn from, and then avoid, aversive experiences. The dlPFC may be
361involved with cognitive reappraisal and regulation of strong emotions.
Conversely, fair offers are associated with activation in brain areas
linked to reward leaning, including the ventral striatum.3 62 The striatum
receives positive dopamine boosts following successful actions, perhaps
instructing the network to respond in the same way when reactivated in
the future.363
Subjects are more likely to accept unfair offers when the dlPFC ac-
tivation is substantially greater than the insular activation. This has sug-
gested to some that difficult social decisions may rely on iterative com-
petitions between so-called cognitive processes and emotional ones, with
rejection resulting when the emotional process is not sufficiently checked
by the cognitive control. 3 64 This sort of data reinforces the false dichoto-
my and suggests that, in some cases, there might be competition between
structures. However, this competition likely does not fall on such clear
lines-with emotion at one end and reason at the other. Rather than the
dlPFC "checking" the insula activity, it is entirely possible that in those
cases where the offer was rejected, the person was just not feeling as
disgusted by similar unfair behavior.
Interestingly, unfair offers are also rejected when it is not the actual
responder who gets to keep the money, but instead some anonymous
third party beneficiary.6 One study tried to figure out whether the emo-
of emotional factors on decision-making behavior, but they also provide the first step toward the
development of quantitative measures that may be useful in constraining the social utility function in
economic models." (footnotes omitted)). Further, in related cooperative games involving trust:
Providing general personality profiles of partners before they play a [trust game] led to
reduced caudate activity when responding to partners described in either positive or nega-
tive terms, although responses to morally neutral players remained unchanged. This sug-
gests that prior beliefs can reduce the amount of trial-by-trial learning, which demon-
strates both top-down and bottom-up influences on the neural basis of social cooperation.
Sanfey, supra note 40, at 600 (footnotes omitted).
361. See James K. Rilling, Brooks King-Casas & Alan G. Sanfey, The Neurobiology ofSocial
Decision-Making, 18 CURRENT OPINION NEUROBIOLOGY 159, 162 (2008).The top-down cognitive
override of bottom-up emotional responses has been found when subjects make utilitarian moral
decisions or delay gratification. See id.
362. Id at 161. This effect appears to hold even when the researchers control for the monetary
payoff. Id.
363. See Wolfram Schultz, Neural Coding of Basic Reward Terms ofAnimal Learning Theory,
Game Theory, Microeconomics and Behavioural Ecology, 14 CURRENT OPINION NEUROBIOLOGY
139, 141 (2004). The striatum is thought to be implicated in craving, reward anticipation and predic-
tion, and romantic love. Phillips et al., supra note 261, at 507.
364. See Sanfey et al., supra note 284, at 1757; cf M. R. Delgado, R. H. Frank & E. A. Phil-
lips, Perception of Moral Character Modulate the Neural Systems of Reward During the Trust
Game, 8 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1611, 1616 (2005). See generally Martin A. Nowak & Karl Sig-
mund, Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by Image Scoring, 393 NATURE 573 (1998); Claus
Wedekind & Manfred Milinski, Cooperation Through Image Scoring in Humans, 288 SC. 850
(2000).
365. Claudia Civai et al., Are Irrational Reactions to Unfairness Truly Emotionally-Driven?
Dissociated Behavioural and Emotional Responses in the Ultimatum Game Task, 114 COGNITION
89, 94 (2010).
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tional response is the same in the third-party or self-reward paradigms,
and found that while unfair offers were likewise rejected when the mon-
ey went to a stranger, there was less of an external response, as measured
by skin temperature and heart rate.366 A different team discovered that
the punishment signal (i.e., rejecting unfair offers) was attenuated when
the responder was given Citalopram, a seratonin reuptake inhibitor.
When seratonin was enhanced in the subjects, subjects were much less
likely to reject unfair offers from the proposer. Similarly, when sub-
jects were given oxytocin during the games, they were more likely to
trust others, perhaps by attenuating the fear or anxiety related to rejec-
tion. 368 Thus, in the Ultimatum Game, we also see how important emo-
tions such as disgust, anger, or fear are essential for social decision-
making.
There are many other examples where humans make decisions that
appear irrational at first blush, but in fact might make sense if we factor
in emotions such as anger, sadness, or empathy. Seemingly irrational
decisions make more sense because of the social nature of the decision,
and whether trust and cooperation are important. 369 Together, emotions
and social norms powerfully regulate our responses to others, in ways
appropriate for social cooperation. We must therefore begin to develop
legal decision-making rules that understand the important role of emo-
tion in social decisions such as credibility assessments and ultimately in
moral judgments such as sentencing. To be sure, a leading researcher in
this area, Alan Sanfey, put it this way in 2003: "Models of decision-
making cannot afford to ignore emotion as a vital and dynamic compo-
nent of our decisions and choices in the real world. 370
CONCLUSION: ELIMINATING THE FALSE DICHOTOMY AND REMOVING
OUR AFFECTIVE BLINDNESS
[Our] [r]eliance on a traditional two-system model, in which a
"cold," rational, far-sighted cognitive system battles against a "hot,"
366. Id. at 89 ("The 'irrational' rejections of unfair offers ... have traditionally been associated
with negative emotions, such as frustration, elicited by unfairness. We recorded skin conductance
responses as a measure of emotional activation while participants performed a modified version of
the UG, in which they were asked to play both for themselves and on behalf of a third-party. Our
findings show that even unfair offers are rejected when participants' payoff is not affected (third-
party condition); however, they show an increase in the emotional activation specifically when they
are rejecting offers directed towards themselves (myself condition). These results suggest that theo-
ries emphasizing negative emotions as the critical factor of 'irrational' rejections should be re-
discussed. Psychological mechanisms other than emotions might be better candidates for explaining
this behaviour." (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted)).
367. Molly J. Crockett et al., Seratonin Selectively Influences Moral Judgment and Behavior
Through Effects on Harm Aversion, 107 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCL 17433, 17433 (2010).
368. Michael Kosfeld et al., Oxytocin Increases Trust in Humans, 435 NATURE 673, 673
(2005).
369. For example, reciprocal cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma game is associated with
caudate nucleus activation and cooperative reciprocity in subsequent rounds. Rilling, King-Casas &
Sanfey, supra note 361, at 160.
370. Sanfey et al., supra note 284, at 1758.
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irrational, short-sighted emotional system is beginning to prove inad-
equate in light of contemporary psychological and neurobiological
data that favor multiples decision-systems. 371
When the law speaks of emotion, it often has intense, visibly arous-
ing states in mind. But subtle emotions guide almost everything we do-
from perceiving, attending, and remembering, to deciding to send some-
one to prison for life. The foregoing examples from cognitive science
have hopefully convinced you of the weak theoretical bases for some of
our evidence practices that fail to recognize the wide diversity in emo-
tional processes. Specifically, the idea that we can and should use infor-
mation only for its non-emotional content, that emotion equals bias, that
we can selectively recruit or bracket off our empathic impulses, that the
"heat of passion" suspends all reflection, and that we cannot lie when
stressed, are just a few of the ways that evidence law fails to reflect reali-
ty. As I have demonstrated through a painstaking survey of our complex
brains and legal rules, emotion and reason are often not at odds. Indeed,
functional interactions between the amygdala and prefrontal cortex me-
diate emotional influences on cognitive processes and vice versa. Even
individual neurons encode for both cognitive and emotional variables! 3 72
So why does any of this matter? The failure to appreciate the inevi-
table and often helpful role emotions can play in courtroom decision-
making results in rules and practices that are woefully out of step with
cognitive science data on emotion and reason.373 The monolithic view of
emotions as corrupting of reason results in affective blindness. We there-
fore ask jurors to perform mental gymnastics and emotional regulation
that may not be possible, and also might not be desirable, given that
emotions assist with perception, attention, memory, empathy, and social
decision-making.
Even the world of artificial intelligence appreciates that the false di-
chotomy does not make sense, as fully "rational" robots without emotion
would never fool anyone and would not quite fit in. Emotion certainly is
part of what makes us socially cooperative beings, and it may be the very
process by which we learn, by helping us attach labels for our life's
events, so we can classify the activity as enjoyable or not for future deci-
sion-making. It therefore should be better understood in its various mani-
festations before being formally rejected from the courtroom. Our work-
ing constructs of emotion in evidence practice need to be redefined and
made more precise. In fifty years, when we reflect on the clumsy way we
were referring to "emotion," we will realize that what we actually meant
was one thousand different things.
371. Seymour & Dolan, supra note 1, at 662 (citations omitted).
372. Salzman & Fusi, supra note 265, at 173.
373. See Lubell et al., supra note 1, at 417.
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For now, this Article calls for two things. First, I argue that eviden-
tiary practices emphasizing the biasing effect of emotion be revised to
reflect the mounting proof that (1) emotion is not always biasing and (2)
emotion and reason are structurally interconnected and functionally in-
terdependent. Second, I argue that social psychologists continue to con-
duct mock jury research on emotional processing. The hope is that a
growing body of research will discover alternatives to the current models
of the FRE that are crudely antagonistic to emotion.
Researchers have struggled to define the "emotional brain" in part
due to the complexity of function, but also due to conceptual difficulties
in reliably testing different emotions in social contexts. Given the com-
plexity of emotional states, it can be difficult to translate feelings such as
joy, sadness, disgust, empathy, disappointment, love, shame, guilt, or
fear, into suitable laboratory tasks. This is compounded by our reliance
on subjects' self-reports of experienced emotion. 3 74 And even if we by-
pass self-reports and look to changes in amygdala activity as proxies for
emotional arousal, we still need corroborating behavioral or physiologi-
cal measures (such as startle response, stress hormones, blood pressure
increase, heart-rate, temperature) to support the inference that emotional
responses have occurred.37 5 Further, in the real world, reduced amygdala
activation might mean we are reasoning through our emotions, challeng-
ing them, and yet still are guided by their implicit encoding. This is just
one more way that the study of emotions is incredibly context-specific.
Thus, we need more studies looking at context-specific variables and a
panoply of physiological and behavioral markers that a precise emotion
was experienced. Specifically, future studies should be geared at testing
the following:
* The role of emotional evidence and processing on attention, per-
ception, memory, and credibility assessments in mock jury settings. Spe-
cifically, this research needs to expand out from focusing on fearful
stimuli and should compare effects of other emotional processes such as
joy, surprise, anger, and shame;
* The degree to which mock jurors can consciously down-regulate
emotions such as empathy, and whether these judgments are externally
considered socially more fair, efficient, or stable;
* Whether instructions telling jurors to rely on emotional evidence
when hearing mitigation evidence, but not when hearing aggravating
evidence or determining civil damages awards, are understood and fol-
lowed;
374. Pessoa, supra note 251, at 149.
375. This is because the amygdala is preferentially activated in response to many things. See
Ochsner & Gross, supra note 41, at 244.
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* Whether the jury understands the difference between the require-
ment of specific intent and adequate provocation in the "heat of passion"
instructions, and whether emotions other than rage can be said to gener-
ate "adequate provocation" that makes "cool reflection" impossible;
* Whether jurors respond differently to limiting instructions related
to emotional testimony when controlling for the social power of the
speaker (i.e., judge, prosecution, defense, lay witness);
* The role of memory, as opposed to prevarication, on hearsay ex-
ceptions and the trustworthiness of the out-of-court statement; and
* Whether mock jury credibility assessments can be performed well
in individuals who suffer from deficits in empathy.
The breadth of our charge is overwhelming. But that does not mean
we should revert to the state of affairs in 1933, when Hutchins lamented
that there was no psychological data relevant to jury decision-making.
While modem cognitive science has not dealt with every point raised by
the laws of evidence, it has at least made actionable inroads. And with
studies using larger sample sizes, controlled protocol, physiological as-
sessments of emotion (such as heart rate, sweating, etc), we can begin to
understand averages that might approach normal emotional processing in
groups.376 However, much more care needs to be taken to model the real-
world social aspects of deliberation and trial as best as possible, without
allowing the perfect methodology to be the enemy of the good (or bet-
ter). The data from cognitive science have and will continue to help us
articulate more precise definitions for legal terms, and will help us make
sure our normative trial commitments, once set, track the reality of our
physiological constraints. Even after all of the best and ecologically valid
data is gathered, rulemakers may still decide to thumb their noses at cog-
nitive science. If this happens, we must revisit our normative commit-
ments to epistemological rationalism, judicial efficiency, repose, and
governmental legitimacy. A legal system purportedly aimed at any of
these (perhaps with the exception of judicial efficiency, taken alone) will
never be achieved if we continue to ignore the way human beings make
complex social decisions. As it is, we assume that jurors can divorce
their emotions from their reasons, behaving in many ways like a cal-
loused psychopath. Robert Maynard Hutchins remained hopeful that one
376. But even if we begin to see reliable activation patterns, or neural correlates, for certain
emotions, we must be mindful of the curse of the reverse inference. The reverse inference is a logical
fallacy that occurs when we infer that specific mental processes are engaged based on seeing pat-
terns of brain activation that are correlated with that mental process. The reason this is flawed is that
our brain structures do not have a 1:1 relationship with function. As just mentioned, neural networks
and structures perform many functions. Seeing activation in one area may mean multiple things.
Although there is not as much power in the reverse inference, it is not without some merit in terms of
drawing correlations. Further, newly developed methods from the field of machine learning may
strengthen them. See generally Russell A. Polldrack, The Role of fMRI in Cognitive Neuroscience:
Where Do We Stand?, 18 CURRENT OPINION NEUROBIOLOGY 223 (2008).
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day we could strike some "mutual sparks" between evidence law, the
brain, and behavior. 3 77 My hope is that this Article will fan the fire with
more relevant data from the cognitive sciences, particularly social and
affective neuroscience.
377. See Daniel Blinka, supra note 7, at 417 (2010) (quoting Hutchins supra note 15, at 513).
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THE MCREYNOLDS MYSTERY SOLVEDt
LOUISE WEINBERGtt
Justice McReynolds' authorship of the celebrated case of Meyer v.
Nebraska seems puzzling in view of McReynolds' known
predilections. Developments in the law and revelations offact cast a
long shadow back upon Meyer, and McReynolds' positions in other
cases support the conclusion that we have a plausible solution to the
mystery of McReynolds' authorship of Meyer.
INTRODUCTION
Ordinary mortals may not have heard of the case of Meyer v.
Nebraska,' but in American law schools, Meyer, a 1923 case in the
Supreme Court, is mentioned reverently as a great fount of constitutional
rights. It is the first modem civil rights case.2 True, Meyer has been
deplored as the source of a regrettable jurisprudence of open-ended,
unanchored rights under the oxymoronic rubric of "substantive due
process." 3 The Supreme Court itself seems to approach substantive due
process with reluctance.4 A lecturer might mention Meyer with a certain
tCopyright 0 2012 by Louise Weinberg. I would like to acknowledge with gratitude and
appreciation the particular excellence of the Editor in Chief of this law review, Matthew Arentsen.
ftHolder of the Bates Chair and Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law.
1. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
2. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process
Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 109 (2007) (tracing to Meyer v. Nebraska modem civil rights
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); David E. Bernstein, Lochner v.
New York: A Centennial Retrospective, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 1469, 1509 (2005) (finding that "[tihe
expansion of Lochnerian due process jurisprudence to civil liberties began with Meyer v. Nebraska .
. . ."); Paul Finkelman, German Victims and American Oppressors: The Cultural Background and
Legacy of Meyer v. Nebraska, in LAW AND THE GREAT PLAINS: ESSAYS ON THE LEGAL HISTORY OF
THE HEARTLAND 33, 33 (John R. Wunder ed., 1996) (viewing Meyer "as the most significant civil
liberties victory of the WWI period" and "the immediate prelude to the incorporation of the Bill of
Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment.").
3. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
18 (1980); James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of
Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMM. 315 (1999).
4. See, e.g., Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (Stevens, J.) (stating
that "the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because
guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered [sic] area are scarce and open-
ended.").
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sophisticated irony, pointing out that Meyer was rooted in Lochner v.
New York,' a case as reviled as Meyer is admired.
None of these common responses to Meyer touch the riddle of the
case's authorship: How on earth could the notoriously illiberal Justice
James Clark McReynolds have written that liberal icon, Meyer v.
Nebraska? At some level of consciousness the question must still perplex
other toilers in the vineyard of constitutional law as it did me. It is no
answer to say that Meyer was an exuberance of McReynolds'
"Lochnerism."6 Lochner was not a fount of rights, and Meyer was. Nor
can Meyer be explained as some inadvertence on McReynolds' part. Two
years after Meyer, McReynolds wrote the opinion for the Court in Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, an important reassertion of Meyer. Nor can we
conclude, in our satisfaction with Meyer, that we have somehow
exaggerated the Scrooge in McReynolds.8 It is not possible to exaggerate
the Scrooge in McReynolds. 9
No writer in constitutional law, as far as I can discover, has solved
this riddle. Although many must have experienced this cognitive
dissonance, few have troubled even to articulate it.10 This paper records
one writer's working-out of a solution to the McReynolds mystery. With
a deeper grasp of what was at stake in the case, we can see that Meyer
has a dark side, one that links it to Lochner, but one that cannot be
understood simply by fretting over Meyer's roots in Lochner.
Part I of this paper recalls Meyer in its 1923 context, as well as its
successor, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, and the celebratory light in which
both cases came to be perceived. Part II focuses on the difficulty, for
authorship of Meyer, that the character of Justice McReynolds presents.
Part III grapples with the specific issue confronting the Court in Meyer:
the persistent problem of the language of instruction in schools. Part IV
then turns to Wisconsin v. Yoder," decided a half century later - a
5. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a state statute providing a maximum ten-hour day for bakers as violating the "liberty of
contract" of both worker and employer).
6. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Constitutional Convention of 1937: The Original Meaning of
the New Jurisprudential Deal, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 492-96 (2001).
7. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). See also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 199 (1927)
(McReynolds, J.) (striking down, under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, a local Hawaii
statute barring Japanese parents from enrolling their children in Japanese language schools).
8. See, e.g., Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four Horsemen, 83 VA. L. REV. 559, 560
(1997) (pointing out apparently anomalous liberal positions taken by Supreme Court Justices such as
McReynolds, now more usually remembered as consistently seeking to balk New Deal legislation).
9. The point is developed infra Parts 11 and VI.
10. See, e.g., David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1921-1930, 1986 DUKE
L. J. 65, 143 (opaquely attributing McReynolds' "liberal" decision in Meyer to judicial activism);
Louise Weinberg, Fear and Federalism, 23 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 1295, 1334 (1997) (characterizing
McReynolds as the "improbable author" of Meyer).
11. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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significantly similar case. Part V finds in Yoder and its aftermath a key to
the McReynolds mystery. Part VI then proposes and details a solution to
the mystery. The proffered solution builds on the facts in both cases, the
language and other features they share, the character of Justice
McReynolds, and the judicial positions taken by McReynolds.
Notwithstanding this paper's disturbing reinterpretation of Meyer, it
concludes with an appreciation of Meyer's legacy.
I. THE ROMANCE OF MEYER V. NEBRASKA
Meyer v. Nebraska has become even more illustrious today than it
was in the decades immediately following it. But the Justices who
decided Meyer would be astonished by the case's grand future as a
bedrock of constitutional thinking in our time. Among other things,
Meyer lies at the foundation of our modem constitutional rights of sexual
privacy,12 including the limited right to abortion first recognized in Roe
v. Wade.13 Meyer itself, however, was only about a teacher teaching
Bible stories in a private parochial school.
Meyer arose in a Nebraska courthouse, where Robert N. Meyer was
found guilty of the charge that "on May 25, 1920, while an instructor in
Zion Parochial School he unlawfully taught the subject of reading in the
German language to Raymond Parpart, a child of 10 years, who had not
attained and successfully passed the eighth grade, . . . a collection of
biblical stories being used therefore [sic]., 14
Meyer's little pupils were reading Luther's Bible in Luther's own
German - surely a fine thing. But a Nebraska statute enacted shortly
before Meyer's prosecution outlawed this. The statute prohibited the
teaching of a foreign language even in English, deferring any such study
to high school: "Languages, other than the English language, may be
taught as languages only after a pupil shall have attained and
successfully passed the eighth grade as evidenced by a certificate of
graduation issued by the county superintendent of the county in which
the child resides."15 Moreover, the statute specifically provided that "[n]o
person, individually or as a teacher, shall, in any private, denominational,
parochial or public school, teach any subject to any person in any
language [other] than the English language."' 6
12. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563 (2003) (citing Meyer as the origin of
modem rights of sexual intimacy); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (citing Meyer as the
origin of modem substantive due process rights of parental autonomy).
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396-97.
15. Act of Apr. 9, 1919, ch. 249, § 2, 1919 Neb. Laws 1019.
16. Id. § 1.
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Another section of the statute went so far as to attribute these
proscriptions to a state of emergency in Nebraska: "Whereas, an
emergency exists, this act shall be in force from and after its passage and
approval."' 7 Perhaps with this state of "emergency" in mind, Justice
McReynolds, writing for the Court, attributed the statute to
"[ulnfortunate experiences during the late war and aversion toward every
character of truculent adversaries."' 8 Indeed, in World War I, Americans
had so reviled anything German that they had even troubled to rename
sauerkraut "liberty cabbage" for the duration of the war.19 And now,
unsettled conditions in Germany following the war had produced a fresh
wave of German immigration, evidently stoking further xenophobia in
Nebraska.20
Justice McReynolds pointed out that the teacher surely had a right
to teach. "[T]he [Nebraska] Legislature," he observed, "has attempted
materially to interfere with the calling of modem language teachers." 21
Then, forgetting that in a prosecution of the teacher the rights of neither
the parents nor the children, strictly speaking, were at issue, McReynolds
added that the legislature had also interfered "with the opportunities of
pupils to acquire knowledge, and with the power of parents to control the
education of their own."22 None of this could be due process.23
Note this unemphatic ringing in of "the power of parents to
control." This is the faint improbable dawn of an articulated
constitutional realm of parental autonomy.24 In time, lawyers would
17. Id. § 4.
18. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402. McReynolds here may have been referring not only to Germany,
but to the German-Americans who, before the War, sought to influence American policy in ways
favorable to Germany. See Reinhold Niebuhr, The Failure of German-Americanism, 118 THE
ATLANTIC MONTHLY 13, 13 (1916).
19. See, e.g., JAMES GEARY, I IS AN OTHER: THE SECRET LIFE OF METAPHOR AND How IT
SHAPES THE WAY WE SEE THE WORLD 120 (2011); TED WIDMER, ARK OF THE LIBERTIES: AMERICA
AND THE WORLD 180 (2008).
20. German immigration to the United States resumed after World War I in reaction to
uncontrolled inflation and growing street violence. For federal anti-immigration law at the time of
Meyer, see infra note 51 and accompanying text.
21. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401 (holding, in language reminiscent of Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 61 (1905), that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment secures a "liberty of
contract"). Interference with the right of the teacher to contract was an essential piece of reasoning
for the Meyer Court. Constitutional theories more relevant today to Meyer's facts were unavailable
in 1923. See infra notes 33, 34 and accompanying text.
22. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401.
23. Id. at 399 ("The problem for our determination is whether the statute as construed and
applied unreasonably infringes the liberty guaranteed to the plaintiff in error by the Fourteenth
Amendment: 'No state ... shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law."').
24. This parental right also appears in Meyer in an accompanying laundry list: "While this
Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received
much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
[Vol. 89:1136
2011] THE MCREYNOLDS MYSTERY SOL VED 137
come to see Meyer as grounding a regime of personal and family liberty,
including the privacy of sexual intimacy, even in matters with which the
Court at first had attempted to deal under some aspect of the Bill of
Rights.2 5 In time, Meyer's substantive due process would come to allow
women some freedom to decide whether or not to abort an early
pregnancy.26 Meyer's most recent efflorescence is a constitutional right
to homosexual intimacy. 27 Something that only a half-century ago
compassionate doctors and liberal lawyers could argue was not a crime
to be punished but only an illness to be cured, is now understood to be
not an illness, but rather a part of a person's very being, the private
expression of which, between consenting adults, is a fundamental
constitutional right.28
More broadly, Meyer grounds the modem theory under which the
Constitution today, in its two provisions for due process29 substantively
protects fundamental human rights not specifically enumerated in the
Constitution.30 This, notwithstanding that "due process" strikes the ear as
having something to do with procedure.
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men." Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (emphasis added). This sort of list is first
prominently encountered in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (Washington, Circuit Justice, C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1823) (listing rights protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, U.S. CONsT. art. IV).
25. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down as inconsistent with the
penumbras and emanations of the First and Fourth Amendments a state law prohibiting the use of
contraceptives, in a case involving a married couple); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1971)
(under the Equal Protection Clause, extending Griswold to unmarried couples); see also Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (under the First Amendment, striking down law criminalizing the
possession of pornography, in a case in which the offense took place in the privacy of the home).
26. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down a state prohibition ofabortion in the first
trimester of pregnancy; stating that the state could regulate in the interest of the health of the mother
in the second trimester, and the health of the fetus in the third); but see Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (approving, as not imposing "undue burdens" on the
right recognized in Roe, a statutory waiting period, a requirement of parental consent; and
requirements that the provider convey certain information to the patient seeking an abortion, and
report to authorities).
27. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down, under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, a statute criminalizing sodomy), overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986).
28. In a joint opinion by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, the Court declared sexual
intimacy and procreation to be "matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, . . . central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." Casey, 505
U.S. at 851. Justice Scalia later dubbed this the "sweet-mystery-of-life" theory of constitutional
interpretation. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
29. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
30. For the discovery of a fully elaborated theory of substantive due process as early as 1843,
protecting unenumerated rights acknowledged by the Ninth Amendment, see Louise Weinberg, An
Almost Archaeological Dig: Finding a Surprisingly Rich Early Theory of Substantive Due Process,
27 CONST. COMMENT. 163 (2010).
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Today a Supreme Court reluctant to endorse the concept of
"substantive due process" might decide Meyer as a free speech case,"1 or
a religious freedom case.32 But in 1923 the First Amendment's protection
of speech was not quite established in its relation to state government, 33
and the First Amendment obligation to protect religious freedoms was
not imposed on the states until many years later.34 Instead, Justice
McReynolds based Meyer on the right to transact. Citing Lochner v. New
York,'35  McReynolds found applicable a "liberty of contract"36
substantively protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment provides,
among other things, that, "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." For decades the
Court had been working up an old idea that certain fundamental liberties,
like the freedom to transact - the "liberty of contract" - though not
explicit in the Bill of Rights, were nevertheless protected by the Due
Process Clause. 37
31. This was Justice Douglas's view, writing for the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 482 (1965). See also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (Marshall, J.) (striking
down, under the First Amendment, a statute criminalizing the private possession of pornography;
remarking that "also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from
unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy.").
32. The similar case of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), discussed infra Parts IV, V,
was handled in this fashion.
33. See Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 387 (1927) (holding the First Amendment right to
freedom of speech applicable against a state).
34. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (holding the First Amendment Free Exercise
Clause applicable against a state); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (same, with regard to
the First Amendment's Establishment Clause).
35. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45.
36. Id. at 56.
37. See, notably, Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 593 (1897) (holding that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to transact with an out-of-state
insurance company), and cases there cited; a Westlaw search finds sixty-six other Supreme Court
cases predating Meyer and mentioning "liberty of contract" or "liberty to contract," and twenty-two
predating Lochner. Twenty-nine of the sixty-six precede a citation to the Fourteenth Amendment or
the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court has come to adopt Justice Harlan's view, concurring in
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), that enumerated and unenumerated constitutional rights both
inhere in the fundamental due process right of liberty:
"[L]iberty" is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property;
the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which,
broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and
purposeless restraints.
id. at 543, and that sexual privacy cases are properly due process cases:
In my view, the proper constitutional inquiry in this case is whether this [anti-
contraception] statute infringes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because the enactment violates basic values "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" . . .
. While the relevant inquiry may be aided by resort to one or more of the provisions of the
Bill of Rights, it is not dependent on them or any of their radiations. The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in my opinion, on its own bottom.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
THE MCREYNOLDS MYSTERY SOL VED
In Meyer, Justice McReynolds buttressed his views of the rights of
teachers and parents to contract, and the right of parents to control the
upbringing of their children, with the strong point that there is something
repellent about forced uniformity in education. In a rather startling
excursus, McReynolds harked back to his classical education:
For the welfare of his Ideal Commonwealth, Plato suggested a law
which should provide: "That the wives of our guardians are to be
common, and their children are to be common, and no parent is to
know his own child, nor any child his parent.... The proper officers
will take the offspring of the good parents to the pen or fold, and
there they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a
separate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the better
when they chance to be deformed, will be put away in some
mysterious, unknown place, as they should be."38
The reader of McReynolds' opinion today, already sufficiently
stunned by the Nazi quality of Plato's ideas, hardly needs to read
McReynolds' conclusion:
Although such measures have been deliberately approved by men of
great genius their ideas touching the relation between individual and
state were wholly different from those upon which our institutions
rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that any Legislature could impose
such restrictions upon the people of a state without doing violence to
both letter and spirit of the Constitution.39
Two years later, writing for the Court in Pierce v. Society of
40Sisters, McReynolds returned to this theme of forced uniformity. Pierce
is an important case in itself, but it flows directly from Meyer. In Pierce,
the Court held that parents have a constitutional right to pull their
children out of public school and to educate them in private schools
instead, or, by extension, at home. Sustaining private schooling, the
Court held compulsory public schooling unconstitutional. McReynolds
did not impugn compulsory education, nor did he deny that the state
might impose educational standards on home schooling or on private
schools. But no family could be forced to send its children to public
schools.
Legal scholars, even those who do not habitually view every step as
a step forward, overwhelmingly perceive Pierce as an essential guarantee
of freedom. 4 1 And of course it is. Because of Pierce, no American child's
38. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923) (elision in original).
39. Id.
40. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
41. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. GORDON ET AL., THE LAW OF HOMESCHOOLING 8 (1994), and
works there cited.
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mind need be stuffed with one narrow set of approved ideas. (Take that,
Plato!) Eighteen years later, in the Flag Salute Case,42 Justice Jackson
would memorably express the centrality in American constitutional
thought of this freedom from forced uniformity: "If there is any fixed star
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox . . . .'*3
Liberty! On first reading Meyer, I imagined that, as McReynolds
read Meyer from the bench (if he did), the courtroom became flooded
with a radiant American light. But by indulging this romantic fantasy I
think I was unconsciously trying to suppress an inner doubt. Meyer was
all very well, but it was hard to see Justice McReynolds in a radiant
American light.
II. THE MCREYNOLDS MYSTERY
How could McReynolds have written Meyer? McReynolds is
accounted by commentators as among the least distinguished of Supreme
Court Justices." The commentators are being kind. What they mean is
that McReynolds was the most reactionary (not to mention bigoted and
mean-spirited) curmudgeon ever to serve on the Supreme Court.45
McReynolds is remembered as the longest-sitting of the "Four
Horsemen," a quartet of Supreme Court JusticeS46 who generally could
be counted on to vote to strike down progressive legislation. Their want
of deference to CongresS 47 was probably salutary in some respects in the
early days of the New Deal, when Congress and the Roosevelt
administration would unite with industry in a hopeful corporate statism.
The early New Deal effort was to control wages, to support prices, and,
most stunningly, to discourage competition. Congress would delegate to
42. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
43. Id. at 642.
44. See Albert P. Blaustein & Roy M. Mersky, Rating Supreme Court Justices, 58 A.B.A. J.
1183, 1183-87 (1972) (grading Supreme Court Justices from the best (Chief Justice John Marshall)
to the worst (James Clark McReynolds and Charles Whittaker)); Foreword, in JOHN KNOX, THE
FORGOTTEN MEMOIR OF JOHN KNOX: A YEAR IN THE LIFE OF A SUPREME COURT CLERK IN FDR's
WASHINGTON, at xx (Dennis J. Hutchinson & David J. Garrow eds., 2002).
45. See, e.g., Joel K. Goldstein, Choosing Justices: How Presidents Decide, 26 J. L. & POL.
425, 484 (2011) (referring to McReynolds as "a bigoted reactionary"); Michael J. Klarman, Social
Reform Litigation and Its Challenges: An Essay in Honor ofJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 32 HARV.
J. L. & GENDER 251, 267 (2009) (referring to "the notorious racist and anti-Semite, Justice James
McReynolds"); David E. Bernstein & Ilya Somin, Judicial Power and Civil Rights Reconsidered,
114 YALE L. J. 591, 641 (2004) (describing McReynolds as "notoriously racist and anti-Semitic").
46. Justices Pierce Butler, James Clark McReynolds, George Sutherland, and Willis Van
Devanter. For a more complex evaluation, see Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four
Horsemen, 83 VA. L. REV. 559, 560-61 (1997) (discussing the occasional apparently "liberal"
opinions of the four).
47. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935)
(striking down the National Industrial Recovery Act). The Schechter Poultry Court focused on the
minute regulation of sick chickens. Unfortunately the Schechter Poultry Court also struck down the
Act's provisions for maximum hours and a right to organize.
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private companies, in coordination with the new administrative agencies,
the task of developing intrusive and often unenforceable regulatory
codes.4 8 But the obstructionism of the surviving Horsemen persisted even
when voting on more sensible legislation, even after 1937, when the
balance of the Court had swung Roosevelt's way.49
McReynolds' role as one of the Four Horsemen is not the worst
aspect of his biography. Far from being well-disposed toward
immigrants, as one might imagine from a reading of Meyer v. Nebraska,
McReynolds, with a nativist's passion, loathed the greenhorn immigrants
crowding the slums of the big cities.o He was not alone in this. At the
time of Meyer, with the quota law of 1921,51 Congress had begun,
fatefully, to close "the golden door." Among the wretched "huddled
masses" 52 who made it to safety in America before the quotas hit were
millions of impoverished unassimilated Jewish refugees from Eastern
Europe, fleeing persecution. 3 And McReynolds was possessed by the
demon of anti-Semitism.5 4 McReynolds' anti-Semitism was notable even
in that day, when overt contempt of Jewry, humorous or rabid, infected
American society at all levels and disfigured American literature.
When Louis Brandeis, "the people's lawyer"' 6 having become the
first Jewish Justice, ventured to express a view at a conference of the
brethren, McReynolds would get up and leave.5 7 We do not have an
48. See JEFF SESHOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT 56
(2011) (describing the codes industries purported to impose on themselves in an unprecedented
privatization of legislative power).
49. See, e.g., JAMES E. BOND, I DISSENT: THE LEGACY OF CHIEF JUSTICE JAMES CLARK
McREYNOLDS 103-10 (1992) (describing McReynolds' Supreme Court opinions from 1937 through
his retirement on February 1, 1941). McReynolds was the last of the Four Horsemen; Van Devanter
retired in 1937; Sutherland retired in 1938; Butler died in 1939.
50. When ruling against an immigrant, as he tended to do, McReynolds could seem particularly
harsh. See, e.g., United States v. Manzi, 276 U.S. 463, 467 (1928) (reversing a judgment, over strong
dissent, that had approved citizenship for an immigrant's widow); Chang Chan v. Nagle, 268 U.S.
346, 353 (1925) (declaring, in response to a certified question, that four wives of Chinese
immigrants were not entitled to entry); United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472, 475 (1917)
(declaring, in response to a certified question, that an immigrant's certificate of citizenship must be
set aside).
51. Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, § 2(a), 42 Stat. 5, 5 (limiting the number of immigrants from
any nation to three percent of the number of foreign-bom residents of the same nationality listed in
the 1910 census) (repealed 1952); Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, § 4, 43 Stat. 153, 155 (repealed
1952).
52. These references, of course, are to Emma Lazarus's 1883 poem, "The New Colossus," a
portion of which is carved in the base of the Statue of Liberty.
53. See IRVING HOWE, WORLD OF OUR FATHERS, 20-36 (1976).
54. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, From Benjamin to Brandeis to Breyer: Is There a Jewish Seat?,
41 BRANDEIS L. J. 229, 233 (2002).
55. See generally, e.g., LOUis HARAP, THE IMAGE OF THE JEW IN AMERICAN LITERATURE:
FROM EARLY REPUBLIC TO MASS IMMIGRATION (1974).
56. See, e.g., MELVIN UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 201-27 (2009).
57. PHILIP J. COOPER, BATTLES ON THE BENCH: CONFLICT INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 93-94
(1995); Ginsburg, supra note 54, at 233.
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official photograph of the Supreme Court for 1924 because that year
McReynolds refused to sit where protocol placed him, next to Brandeis.
For all McReynolds' apparent concern in Meyer v. Nebraska for
family rights, he showed no interest in acquiring a wife and family of his
own. He became the most alone of lone wolves, the most determined of
lifelong bachelors, the most sour of misogynists. If a rare woman dared
to argue a case before the Supreme Court, McReynolds would sigh, "I
see the female is here," and exit the courtroom. 59
It is not too fanciful to suppose that McReynolds, who had been
Woodrow Wilson's Attorney General, gained his nomination to the
supreme bench simply because Wilson could no longer tolerate the
curmudgeon in his cabinet and availed himself of the expedient of
60kicking McReynolds upstairs.
How could this awful man have given us a great fount of rights like
Meyer v. Nebraska? Unable to solve this mystery, in an early article I
tried to paper it over. "McReynolds was a curmudgeon," I wrote, "but he
was an American curmudgeon."6 ' A McReynolds apologist has written
that McReynolds loved children. But even this admirer acknowledges
McReynolds' misogyny. 62 Another McReynolds fan, a lifelong friend,
admits to an intention, in his memoir of the Justice, "frankly to omit
58. Ginsburg, supra note 54, at 233; see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT,
JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE
GOVERNMENT, 1910-1921, at 354 (2007) (1984). McReynolds maintained a consistent rudeness to
his later Jewish brethren, Justices Cardozo and Frankfurter.
59. BOND, supra note 49, at 10.
60. Accord PBS, Biography of the Robes: James Clarke McReynolds (Apr. 18, 2012),
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/personality/robes mcreynolds.html. This is not to say that
McReynolds' earlier service as Assistant Attorney General and then as Attorney General lacked
merit. McReynolds was a noted "trust-buster," prosecuting the great antitrust cases of his time. See
Tom C. Clark, Attorney General, Address at the Memorial Ceremonies for Justice McReynolds
before the Supreme Court of the United States (Mar. 31, 1948) (on file with author); see also
Michael A. Kahn, Note, The Politics of the Appointment Process: An Analysis of Why Learned Hand
Was Never Appointed to the Supreme Court, 25 STAN. L. REV. 251, 260-61 (1973) and literature
there cited. When Wilson nominated McReynolds to the Court McReynolds was perceived by
Wilson and others as a liberal. JOSEPHUS DANIELS, THE WILSON ERA: YEARS OF PEACE, 1910-1917,
at 540-49 (1944). Nor would I wish to diminish McReynolds' achievements as a Justice of the
Supreme Court, not only in Meyer and Pierce, but also in his contribution to the understanding of the
allocation of lawmaking power in admiralty in the major case of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244
U.S. 205 (1917) - although Justice Brandeis, in effect, would supply the intellectual foundation for
Jensen some twenty years later in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Jensen,
identifying national lawmaking power over maritime cases, is, in its own way, as mysterious as
Meyer. As one of the "Four Horsemen," McReynolds tended to disfavor national power. He
dissented, without opinion, in Carolene Products, United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 155 (1938) (holding national economic regulation presumptively constitutional). But in making
national power in Jensen not only applicable but also preemptive, and by obscuring the difference
between seamen and harbor workers, McReynolds was able to strike a blow against state workers'
compensation laws, incidentally depriving Jensen's widow and children of nine dollars a week.
61. Weinberg, supra note 10, at 1335.
62. BOND, supra note 49, at 9-10.
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entirely those ill-tempered, personal criticisms that emanated from those
against whose views he stood adamant." 63
III. "ENGLISH ONLY"
Apart from the problem of Meyer's authorship, I was also beginning
to have problems with Meyer on its merits. I could not honestly say that I
agreed with it. The statute that the Court struck down in Meyer was
obviously what today we would call an "English-only" law, and Meyer
evokes our own interminable anguished controversy over how to teach
Spanish-speaking children in American schools (and whether it is racist
to want to teach them in English). There is a range of expert opinion on
these questions." I could not say with any confidence that I was right
about this; I could say only that I had an opinion.
Reinforced and advanced by Pierce, Meyer opened space in which
even American children, American citizens born here, could receive their
educations in the foreign tongue used by their parents at home, reading
foreign books, becoming steeped in foreign ideas. Most liberals see this
aspect of Meyer as a triumph of liberty. But it was not clear to me that
this liberty was doing the children any favors. I worried that these
children would become fixed in their parents' language and culture. How
could "freedom" from the usual American education in English advance
their prospects for success in this English-speaking country? - indeed,
in an English-speaking world? To spare Spanish-speaking children the
pain of early immersion in English, educators might be putting them at a
lifelong disadvantage. Nor could it much improve the fortunes of
Spanish-speaking children to teach them their English in their own
language. That would tend to make English the kind of "foreign
language" one learns from a book. This could be the trap laid for
Spanish-speaking children even in dual-language programs, in which all
children learn in both languages. I feared that in such programs the
children for whom English was the mother tongue would pick up
Spanish while continuing to think in English, while the children for
whom Spanish was the mother tongue, even as they picked up English,
would continue to think in Spanish.
Justice Holmes dissented from Meyer in a companion case,65 joined
by Justice Sutherland. Holmes wrote:
63. Stirling Price Gilbert, "James Clark McReynolds (1862-1946): Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States of America" 3 (1946) (unpublished typescript) (on file with author).
64. See generally FRANcOIS GROSJEAN, BILINGUAL: LIFE AND REALITY (2010); LANGUAGE
LOYALTIES: A SOURCE BOOK ON THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH CONTROVERSY (James Crawford ed.,
1992) and authorities there cited.
65. Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404,412-13 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Youth is the time when familiarity with a language is established and
if there are sections in the State where a child would hear only Polish
or French or German spoken at home I am not prepared to say that it
is unreasonable to provide that in his early years he shall hear and
speak only English at school.66
It is possible to dislike and criticize Holmes but on this point I had to
agree with him. Holmes made a related argument about assimilation:
"We all agree, I take it," he wrote, "that it is desirable that all the citizens
of the United States should speak a common tongue, and therefore that
the end aimed at by the statute is a lawful and proper one."68
Reading this again, I am reminded that to this day American public
schools typically do not teach modem foreign languages until their pupils
are too old to learn them. Like Nebraska in the Meyer case, many states
still postpone the study of modem foreign languages until the high-
school years, at least in public schools. This delay means that we will
rarely be able to master the foreign language we choose. To be sure,
many can learn a foreign tongue even late in life. But it is the common
experience that many cannot. Our country is notorious for sending
American diplomats to places where they are unable to speak the local
language. It might be a reason for this apparent stupidity that we take
children from every corner of the globe and make Americans of them.
That is something we are good at, and will remain good at, and proud of,
as long as we do not allow a balkanizing multiculturalism to erode the
American ideal of the melting pot.
Of course McReynolds was right about the perils of a forced
conformity. But Holmes was right, too, about the importance, in a
society worthy of it, of assimilation.
IV. THE YODER IDYLL
A half-century after Meyer and Pierce, the Court decided a case
very like Meyer on its facts. Wisconsin v. Yoder69 concerned the way of
life of a community of strict Old Amish. Conservative Amish
communities tend to stop their children's education with grade school.
The children are not sent to high school. In Yoder, an Amish parent was
convicted of violating Wisconsin's compulsory school law, but the state
66. Id. at 4 12 .
67. See Louise Weinberg, Holmes' Failure, 96 MICH. L. REV. 691, 691-92 (1997).
68. Bartels, 262 U.S. at 412.
69. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
[Vol. 89:1144
THE MCREYNOLDS MYSTERY SOL VED
supreme court reversed the conviction. Wisconsin sought review and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.7 0
It was for religious reasons, Mr. Yoder argued, that the Amish
traditionally limit a child's education to grade school.7 ' Their religion
forbids higher education because, in their view, higher education
corrupts children, making them worldly. High school sports make
children idle, taking time from their religious duties and vocational
training. In some localities, the Amish avoid the public schools even at
the grade school level, sending their children of all ages to their own one-
room schoolhouses.72 There, the children might be taught their reading,
writing, and arithmetic for a few hours a week, thus gaining a
rudimentary "English" education. (To the Amish, who often still speak a
variant of Pennsylvania Dutch, all persons and things outside the
community are "English.") The rest of the time, and in the years in which
other American children attend a secondary school, Amish children,
Yoder argued, learn the vocational skills they need to contribute to the
community's special way of life. 3
Chief Justice Burger explained that Amish girls were trained in care
of the household and Amish boys in care of the farm. This vocational
training of the Amish could scarcely be described as unsuccessful. The
Amish, Burger pointed out, were self-supporting, prosperous, and
peaceful. Theirs was an ideal community in which there were no crimes
and no welfare cases. The Amish had even obtained a waiver of the
obligation to pay social security taxes, since they did not need or want
social security. They looked after their own elderly.
Wisconsin, for its part, was hampered in defending its compulsory
school law by the fact that the Wisconsin legislature, in its wisdom,
required that its youngsters attend school only through the age of sixteen,
in many instances a requirement satisfied with only two years of
secondary schooling.74 If the state's interest in universal high school
education was as important as Wisconsin contended, why had the
legislature not required Wisconsin's young to complete high school? To
have done so might have inconvenienced Wisconsin's disappearing small
farm families, but it might also have helped to secure a more informed
and productive life for all Wisconsin's children. In view of the state's
apparent lack of concern about high school diplomas, another couple of
years of schooling for the Amish could hardly make a great difference to
70. Id. at 207. For much of the following background, see also Brief for Respondent,
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 1970 WL 116895 (1971) (summary of facts); State v. Yoder, 182 N.W.2d 539
(Wis. 1971) and literature there cited.
71. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209.
72. Id. at 212.
73. Id. at 211.
74. Id. at 207 n.2.
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Wisconsin's educational interests. This consideration influenced the
three concurring Justices." Besides, as the Chief Justice pointed out, the
Amish were not as bizarre in their rejection of high school as might be
thought. Several states at the time did not require education beyond the
eighth grade. Mississippi had no compulsory education laws at all.76
Wisconsin insisted that Mr. Yoder had not been prosecuted for his
religious belief.77 The state acknowledged that religious belief could not
be punished. But Mr. Yoder's keeping his children out of high school
was conduct, which could be punished. Nevertheless Chief Justice
Burger did not doubt that the free exercise of religion was at stake in
Yoder.7 8 In the Amish's sincere religion, Chief Justice Burger thought,
belief could not be disentangled from conduct. The very essence of their
religion was submission to a prescribed way of life. Their religion
dictated every detail of their way of life - their language, their beards,
their concealing dresses, their covered wagons, and their farming.
Apparently charmed by the pastoral innocence of the scene the Amish
painted for him, Burger pointed out that from the very beginning, three
centuries before Yoder, the religion of the Amish had been all about a
return to biblical simplicity and unworldliness, and about staying close to
the land.79 In America the Amish had been faithful to these ideals for two
hundred years. Their religion was, in essence, a constant rejection of, and
struggle against, modernity.
The Chief Justice had to acknowledge that compulsory schooling
was originally, in part, a protection against child labor. But work on a
farm or in the home was healthful, he thought. There was no danger to
the child. 80 At all events, when a case so obviously fell under Meyer and
Pierce, and so clearly invoked both religious freedom and parental
freedom to control the upbringing of children, the prudent thing to do
was to apply the law, as far as it was possible to extrapolate it from
Meyer and Pierce.
The question was not whether Wisconsin's compulsory school law
was constitutional. Of course the state had power to encourage the
education of its workforce and its voters. As Yoder was argued, the
question, rather, was whether the First Amendment's protection of
religious freedom required Wisconsin to grant the Amish a religious
exemption from prosecution for violating the compulsory school law.
75. Id. at 237-38 (White, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 226 n.15 (majority opinion).
77. Id. at 229.
78. Id. at 215. For prudential and process reasons, this assumption characterizes Free Exercise
cases.
79. Id. at 210.
80. Id. at 228.
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The then-recent case of Sherbert v. Verner8' would seem to require as
much, in the absence of a showing of any compelling state interest to the
contrary.
But there was a snag. A Supreme Court case had gone the other
way. It was a less famous case, and an older case, but an important case
nonetheless. This was Prince v. Massachusetts.82 In Prince, a Jehovah's
Witness had been taking her child with her, out on street corners, to
preach and distribute religious pamphlets and collect money. The mother
had been warned at least twice by a school truancy officer that her child
must attend school. There was testimony that the child always begged the
mother to take her along with her; that the child thought it her religious
duty to go - paralleling the equally zealous testimony of a little girl in
Yoder.8 3 Nevertheless the Jehovah's Witness mother had been convicted
of violating the state's child labor law. The Supreme Court, splitting five
to four, sustained the conviction. Justice Rutledge, writing for the Court,
took into consideration not only the mother's but the child's right to
follow the dictates of faith. He considered also the parental right of
control shaped by Meyer and Pierce. But neither of these rights, in
Rutledge's view, was absolute:
Against these sacred private interests . . . stand the interests of society
to protect the welfare of children . . .. It is the interest of youth itself,
and of the whole community, that children be both safeguarded from
abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and independent
well-developed ... citizens.84
A more direct contradiction of the Amish's position in Yoder could
hardly be imagined. Clearly in Prince the Court had identified education
as a "compelling state interest" - to use the Court's later formulation.
Thus, Prince met the test later laid down in Sherbert v. Verner, that only
on such a showing could a state deny a religious exemption from
otherwise applicable law. The Court in Sherbert had considered Prince,
however, and had confined it narrowly to situations in which the parents'
control of the upbringing of their children presents "some substantial
threat to public safety, peace or order."85 Amish parental control did not
involve loitering on street corners and presented no such threat. The
81. 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (holding that a state may not, absent a compelling state interest,
deny a religious exemption from restrictions on unemployment compensation), overruled by Emp't
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (holding that there is no constitutionally required religious
exemption from neutral laws of general application).
82. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
83. Id. at 162-63. But see THEODORE DREISER, AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 1 (1925). At the start
of this fictionalized account of such a childhood, perhaps the author's own, a boy is made to go out
on the crowded streets with his fundamentalist family to sing hymns. Dreiser writes that the boy
"appeared to resent and even to suffer from the position in which he found himself."
84. Prince, 321 U.S. at 165.
85. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
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Yoder Court held, affirming the reversal of Mr. Yoder's conviction, that
Wisconsin must allow the Amish a religious exemption from mandatory
secondary education for their children.86
Yoder goes considerably beyond Meyer and Pierce. Nothing in
Yoder suggests that alternative home schooling or private instruction
need meet state standards. Indeed, nothing in Yoder suggests that any
schooling at all need be provided for Amish children. This troubled
Justice White, concurring. White suspected that children who wanted to
move on and leave the Amish community would need high school
educations. But he thought additional skills could be picked up later in
life.87 Chief Justice Burger noted this concern, but he asserted that Amish
children did not leave their communities. There was no significant
attrition among the Amish.
Justice Douglas, dissenting, thought it unrealistic for the Court to
imagine that the Old Amish were living some bucolic idyll.88 Evidently
there were certain pathologies. There were reports of drinking and
rowdyism among the young. The teenagers were fixated on "filthy
stories."89 There was a high suicide rate. But Chief Justice Burger
pointed out that such behaviors occur among all young people. 90 Justice
Douglas also focused on the plight of under-educated youngsters who
might have wanted to do something ambitious with their lives. They
might have wanted to be pianists or astronauts or oceanographers. 91 At
the very least, Douglas argued, the children themselves needed to be
heard from. The testimony of one young girl, who swore that she had a
religious need to avoid high school, was hardly sufficient. The children's
lives would be stunted. But he did not suggest the appointment of a
guardian ad litem in cases in which the views of the parents might not be
in the best interests of the child.
Re-reading Meyer and Pierce and Yoder today, after 9/11, we might
well feel some previously unimaginable concerns. The overwhelming
majority of American Moslems of course are good citizens, well
educated and prosperous. We do not suppose that they invariably
sympathize with Islamist religious extremists. 9 2 But Meyer and Pierce
and Yoder clear a space, partly for religious reasons, partly in deference
to the right of parental control, in which American children would be
86. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234.
87. Id. at 240 (White, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 244-45 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
89. Id. at 247 n.5.
90. Id. at 224 (majority opinion).
91. Id. at 244-45.
92. But see, e.g., George Michael, Steven Emerson: Combating Radical Islam, 17 MIDDLE E.
Q. 15 (2010), available at http://www.meforum.org/2578/steven-emerson-combating-radical-islam
(recounting a Moslem event in Oklahoma City, replete with hate speech and exhortations to
violence).
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able to receive an Islamic education, whether in a parochial school or at
home - in their parents' language, if desired, or in Koranic Arabic. All
this would be fully authorized by Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder. Islam is
most assuredly a sincere religion. However, as I understand it, it is also a
way of life,93 down to beards,94 various degrees of concealing female
dress,95  hatred of others,96  barbaric penalties,97  and a rejection of
modernity98 - and, in some families, rejection of secular schooling. 99
Some Moslem schools may offer a substantially traditional Islamic
education,100 focused on recitation and memorization of the Koran, with
only enough other material, if any, to satisfy minimal state standards.
Some may inculcate Koranic and traditional elements of eliminationist
93. On this point and those following see generally IBN WARRAQ, WHY I AM NOT A MUSLIM
(1995); see also, e.g., Syed Abul A'ala Mawdudi, Islamic Way of Life, YOUNG MUSLIMS, http://web.
youngmuslims.ca/online library/books/islamic wayof life/index.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2011)
(praising Islam as a way of living, a culture, and an encompassing political and legal system, among
other things).
94. Islam, ISLAMIC FAQ, http://www.islamicfaq.org/islam/index.html#Ql6 ("Muslims seek to
follow the noble example of the Prophet of Islam .... The Holy Prophet .. .had a beard and wore a
turban .... However, these were not done simply to follow custom or tradition.").
95. See, e.g., THE MUSLIM VEIL IN NORTH AMERICA: ISSUES AND DEBATES (Sajida Alvi,
Homa Hoodfar & Sheila McDonough eds., 2003).
96. The Koran is repetitively explicit about this, especially in the authoritative Medina shuras:
"So We planted amongst them enmity and hatred till the Day of Resurrection (when they discarded
Allih's Book, disobeyed Allah's Messengers and His Orders and transgressed beyond bounds in
Alldh's disobedience); and Alldh will inform them of what they used to do." (al-MA'idah 5:14); "It is
not for a Prophet that he should have prisoners of war (and free them with ransom) until he had
made a great slaughter (among his enemies) in the land." (al-Anfal 8:67); "Then when the Sacred
Months (the 1st, 7th, Ilth, and 12th months of the Isldmic calendar) have passed, then kill the
[idolators] wherever you find them, and capture them and besiege them, and lie in wait for them in
each and every ambush." (at-Taubah 9:5); "0 you who believe (in AllAh's Oneness and in His
Messenger Muhammad)! Verily, the Mushrikfn (polytheists, pagans, idolaters, disbelievers in the
Oneness of Allih, and in the Message of Muhammad) are Najasun (impure)." (at-Taubah 9:28).
Translations of the Meanings of the Noble Qur'an, KING FAHD COMPLEX FOR THE PRINTING OF THE
HOLY QUR'AN, http://www.qurancomplex.com/Quran/Targama/Targama.asp (last visited Jan. 7,
2011) (An updated version of the Abdullah Y. Ali translation, revised and edited by a committee at
The Presidency of Islamic Researches, IFTA, Call and Guidance (in Madinah, Saudi Arabia)). There
are many other examples. See, e.g., SPENCE KEEGAN, ISLAM: RELIGION OF INTOLERANCE (2011).
See generally, BASSAM TIBI, THE CHALLENGE OF FUNDAMENTALISM: POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE
NEW WORLD DISORDER (2nd ed. 2002).
97. The Cutting of Hands and Feet, APOSTATES OF ISLAM (2003), at
http://www.apostatesofislam.com/media/handcutting.htm ('As to the thief, Male or female, cut off
his or her hands: a punishment by way of example, from Allah, for their crime: and Allah is Exalted
in power.' - Quran 5:38"). This is from the Medina revelations, later in the life of Mohammed and
thus authoritative because superseding anything to the contrary in the earlier (Mecca) revelations.
98. See, e.g., Khaled Ahmed, Why Muslims Reject Modernity, THE EXPRESS TRIBUNE (Aug.
15, 2010), available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/39367/why-muslims-reject-modemity/.
99. See Conference on Islamic Education in North America (April 6, 2006), Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars (estimating that there were then some 6,000,000 Moslems in the
United States; that there were at that time 235 Moslem schools, perhaps a fifth of them run by
mosques, with a total of some 65,000 pupils, or three percent of American Moslem children. Still
under debate in many of these schools in 2006 was whether to add secular studies to the traditional
curriculum of Islamic studies).
100. See On Islam & Newspapers, Islamic Schools of the Past Now the Present in America,
MUSLIMVILLAGE.COM (June 6, 2011), http://muslimvillage.com/2011/06/06/islamic-schools-of-the-
past-now-the-present-in-america/.
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Jew-hatred'o' and violence.102 At most such schools, if girls are permitted
to attend, classes will be segregated by sex,1 0 3 and the girls required to
wear varying degrees of Islamic covering. Although we like to assume,
in our self-congratulatory way, that in America there is a right to wear
such covering, surely there must in any event be a right not to. But it is
hard to see how to protect little girls, should they be deemed
insufficiently shrouded, from bullying that will continue beyond the
schoolyard. Many of these girls are born in America, and are American
citizens. Yet throughout their lives they may be subject to traditional
subordinations and restrictions unimaginable to most other American
women and girls. 05 Moslem women to whom the state, with the best of
intentions, has permitted an Islamic education 0 6 may tend to raise their
own children in the same tradition.
Contrary to Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder, then, compulsory, secular,
co-educational schooling for both boys and girls might, perhaps,
contribute to greater freedom for American Moslem women. If we
indulge the presumption that such schooling could at least make some
Moslem women more broadly educated mothers, more willing and able
to help their sons and daughters realize and give of their talents, Meyer
and Pierce and Yoder would seem to stand as an impediment to progress.
Yoder was seriously undermined in 1990 by the case of Employment
Division v. Smith. 107 The Supreme Court perceived Smith, like Yoder, to
be a claim of religious exemption from otherwise applicable law.
Actually, Smith was about a worker denied unemployment
compensation. The worker, a Native American, had been fired "for
cause." Employed in a drug rehabilitation center, he had nevertheless
101.See generally MARK A. GABRIEL, ISLAM AND THE JEWS: THE UNFINISHED BATTLE (2003).
See also Translations of the Meanings of the Noble Qur an, supra note 96 ("[T]hose (Jews) who
incurred the Curse of Allah and His Wrath, and those of whom (some) He transformed into monkeys
and swines ..... (al-Mh'idah 5:60); "And kill them wherever you find them ..... (al-Baqarah
2:191)).
102.See Kenneth Adelman, U.S. Islamic Schools Teaching Homegrown Hate, CITIZENS FOR
PEACE AND TOLERANCE (Feb. 27, 2002), http://www.hatefreeamerica.com/islamic-school.html.
103. See, e.g., GEOGRAPHIES OF MUSLIM WOMEN: GENDER, RELIGION, AND SPACE 2 (Ghazi-
Walid Falah & Caroline Nagel eds., 2005).
104. THE MUSLIM VEIL IN NORTH AMERICA: ISSUES AND DEBATES, supra note 95.
105.See, e.g., PATRICIA ROBINETT, THE RAPE OF INNOCENCE: FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION
AND CIRCUMCISION IN THE USA (2010) (2006); CASSANDRA, ESCAPE! FROM AN ARAB MARRIAGE:
HORROR STORIES OF WOMEN WHO FLED FROM ABUSIVE MUSLIM HUSBANDS (2006); Syed Kamran
Mirza, "Honor Killing" Is Absolutely Islamic!, ISLAM WATCH, http://www.islam-
watch.org/SyedKamranMirza/honor-killing.htm (last updated Jan. 16, 2008); see also Murder in the
Family: Honor Killing in America (Fox News broadcast, September 5, 2008) (DVD on file with
author).
106. For an argument that the Constitution might have some application to the state's abdication
of educational responsibility in cases of fundamentalist home schooling, see Kimberly A. Yuracko,
Education Off the Grid: Constitutional Constraints on Homeschooling, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 123
(2008).
107.494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990).
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ingested peyote, a scheduled narcotic substance under state law. Native
Americans use peyote, however, not as a recreational drug, but in a
religious ritual. The worker claimed a religious exemption from the rule
denying him unemployment compensation. Justice Scalia, writing for the
Smith Court, took the plausible position that society cannot afford to
provide some people, however religious, with a special dispensation to
violate laws. 0 8 When a neutral law of general application incidentally
burdens religious conduct - inextricable as such conduct may be from
belief - the Free Exercise Clause does not require the state to grant a
religious exemption.
Nothing in Smith denies the state power to grant religious
exemptions if it wishes, short of establishing religion. To be sure, the
state would be treading a fine line.109 Yet most states traditionally have
provided religious exemptions in a variety of circumstances. In the past,
for example, "dry" states typically allowed the use of sacramental
wine."o Smith held only that the Constitution does not require the states
to grant religious exemptions from otherwise applicable law.' After
Smith, the Free Exercise Clause is reserved for cases of intentional,
targeted persecution. 112 It offers no protection against neutral laws of
general application.
This wisdom is not entirely new. An obligation to obey generally
applicable law had informed the Supreme Court's position all along."
The Court had first adopted this view over a century ago, in the first free
exercise case. Back then, Congress was the legislature for Utah because
Utah was a United States territory. In 1878, in Reynolds v. United
States,' 14 the Supreme Court held that nothing in the Constitution
compelled Congress to exempt the Mormons from anti-polygamy law.
To a modem reader it will surely appear that the anti-polygamy law for
Utah Territory was targeted at the Mormons. But the Court saw the
statute as neutral. After all, polygamy was universally regarded as
108. Id. at 888-89.
109. See, e.g., Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (striking down, under the
Establishment Clause, a tax exemption confined to religious publications).
110 See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1419 (1990).
Ill. Congress had a hard time understanding why Smith could have been right. With the near
unanimity of both houses, Congress reacted to Smith by attempting to restore the law as it stood prior
to Smith. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, struck
down by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Congress came back with a narrower statute,
this time confining its scope to two particular subject matters. Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006), sustained in Cutter v. Wilkinson,
544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005).
112. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524
(1993) (striking down a local ordinance targeted at a particular religious sect).
113. The exception, according to Justice Scalia writing in Smith, was confined to a small group
of benefits cases. Smith. 494 U.S. at 883.
114.98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878).
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criminal in the United States. One wonders whether, today, Smith and
Reynolds, rather than Yoder, would govern the availability of a religious
exemption from anti-polygamy law, in a case, let us say, challenging the
conviction thereunder of an American husband of four wives and father
of twenty children - a devout Moslem immigrant, let us say, from
Pakistan or Saudi Arabia. Yoder is implied by Meyer v. Nebraska and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, all three mandating religious exemptions
from law. But all three are in tension with Reynolds and Prince and
Smith, and their emphasis on the general duty of compliance with law.
Notwithstanding this tension, in Smith, Justice Scalia purported to
save Yoder and reconcile it with Smith. Yoder, he pointed out, was a
hybrid case, decided on two different grounds.'15 Yoder dealt not only
with the Amish's free exercise rights, but also with the right of Amish
parents to control the rearing of their young. Smith does kill the
mandatory religious exemption part of Yoder, but it leaves intact Yoder's
parental control reasoning."l 6 Justice Scalia's attempt at saving the right
of parental control in hybrid cases, then, should have left Meyer v.
Nebraska, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, and Wisconsin v. Yoder still
beacons of liberty, at least for parents. Yet Justice Scalia's reasoning on
this point is more obfuscating than convincing. What stronger claim than
the religious claim could parents possibly muster to exempt them from
the force of reasonable state law protecting their children? The mere
assertion of a right of parental control could get a parent only so far, as
against reasonable state law protective of the child."'
V. THE DARK SIDE
At the time Yoder was decided, the Court's picture of the Amish
bore some reasonable resemblance to their lives. But the pace of Amish
compromise with modernity was picking up." 8 By the 1990s most
Amish communities permitted the use of electricity, provided it was not
obtained from a public utility but supplied by their own generators. Most
began to permit telephones, if only at business. Later, the Amish seem to
have decided that cell phones are permissible everywhere, perhaps
115.Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
116. Cf Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213 ("Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the function
of a State. Yet even this paramount responsibility was, in Pierce, made to yield to the right of
parents to provide an equivalent education in a privately operated system."); Id. at 232-33 ("Under
the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably
interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control." (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)) (internal
quotation mark omitted)).
117. See, e.g., Prince, 321 U.S. at 162-63 (relying on state compulsory education law to protect
a child from the mother's use of the child in religious street activity).
118.See Lisa Biedrzycki, "Conformed to This World": A Challenge to the Continued
Justification ofthe Wisconsin v. Yoder Education Exception in a Changed Old Order Amish Society,
79 TEMP. L. REV. 249, 250 (2006).
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because wireless."' 9 A typical Amish community might frown on driving
cars, but permit riding in cars, hiring "English" drivers. 12 0 Covered
wagons are still retained, and poke bonnets and long dresses and long
beards as well - this sort of quaintness is what the tourists come for.
But there were deeper facts about the Amish, and another side to
Yoder even darker than the denial of educational opportunity to Amish
children. In 2003, the Amish in Pennsylvania lobbied their
representatives in Congress, with particular pressure on Senator Arlen
Specter,121 to grant them an exemption from the federal Fair Labor
Standards Act.122 They wanted an exemption from the provision in the
Act prohibiting child labor in certain circumstances.123 And they got their
exemption, in a 2004 amendment.124
Good grief! I thought. Is that what it was all about? I remembered
that business in Yoder about "vocational training" in the home and on the
farm. Yet the Amish surely did not need an exemption for agricultural or
domestic child labor. American children have traditionally been expected
to help out on the family farm. Today's urban schoolchildren struggle to
retain what they have learned during the year in their overlong summer
breaks, a vestige of this tradition. More importantly, the New Deal
Congress had excluded agricultural and domestic labor altogether from
federal fair labor standards. Perhaps this happened because Congress
could not imagine bestowing upon uneducated rural black workers - a
large contingent of the agricultural workforce in the 1930s - the same
pay and hours the Act would provide for more educated urban and
factory workers, who in those days were largely white. Perhaps domestic
workers were excluded in part for racial reasons, and in part because
Congress could not imagine bestowing upon women doing traditionally
unpaid women's work the same pay and hours the Act would provide for
men. Since the Fair Labor Standards Act did not cover agricultural
employment, you might suppose that the Amish would have had no
difficulty in employing child labor on their farms. The protections of
119.Howard Rheingold, Look Who's Talking, WIRED (Jan. 1999), available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/7.01/amish.html.
120.See, e.g., FAQ: Frequent Amish Questions, THE AMISH OUTLAWS, http://www.
amishoutlaws.com/faq.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).
121. Steven Greenhouse, Foes of Idle Hands, Amish Seek an Exemption from a Child Labor
Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2003, at A9; see also, e.g., Ed Thomas, NY Amish Facing Child Labor
Law Pressure, CROSSWALK.COM (Dec. 15, 2006), http://www.crosswalk.com/1457683 (reporting
that Amish sawmills in New York State had been put on notice concerning violations of the child
labor laws); John Miller, Letter from a Former Amish Child Sawmill Worker to Congress, CHILD
LABOR COALITION (Oct. 21, 2003), http://web.archive.org/web/20081030080744/http:/
www.stopchildlabor.org/amish/miller.htm (reporting personal experience of the danger and
strenuousness of children's work in the mills).
122.29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006).
123.29 U.S.C. § 212 (2006).
124.29 U.S.C. § 213(c)(7) (2006) (signed into law January 23, 2004).
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federal child labor law extend in the main only to "particularly
hazardous" occupations.12 5
It turns out that in the past quarter-century the world of the Amish
has undergone greater changes than those thus far mentioned. Recall that,
in Yoder, Chief Justice Burger mentioned a connection between
compulsory attendance laws, like the one challenged in Yoder, and the
problem of child labor. The Chief Justice reasoned that child labor was
not a problem among the Amish because work on family farms was
healthful.126 There was no danger to the children. But Burger could not
have predicted the recent growth of Amish furniture factories, and the
decline in Amish agriculture.
The Amish originally had been centered in Pennsylvania. But, over
time, with the natural increase in their numbers, and the arrival of tourist
motels and shops, the Amish found farmland in Pennsylvania too
expensive for their children to acquire enough of it, and offers from
developers too enticing to resist. The Amish were continually fanning
out to other states, ever seeking more and cheaper land, settling in
Wisconsin, Ohio, Indiana, Iowa. Ironically, wherever the Amish settled,
land prices would be driven up in part by their own demand, and in part
by developers anxious to cash in on the attractions the Amish held for
tourists. Some Amish communities were supporting themselves in the
tourist industry, working in Amish souvenir shops and Amish
restaurants, or as guides, or selling home-made jam and hand-sewn
quilts. There was considerable demand for wooden Amish knick-knacks,
hand-carved at first at home, and later made in small mills built on what
once was farm land.
In time, the Amish expanded from wooden knick-knacks into far
more profitable wood furniture, constructing it in their own factories,
using their own sawmills.12 7 They make civic furniture like gazebos and
park benches, as well as household furniture. The once rural landscape of
an Amish community is now dotted with noisy sawmills, where boys are
receiving "vocational training" - that is, they are working there.
This, then, was why the Amish needed an exemption from the law
against the exploitation of child labor in "particularly hazardous"
occupations. They were putting their children to work, all right, but not
on the farm. By 2003, most boys in an Amish community were working
in the community's furniture factories and sawmills. They had ceased to
be agricultural labor. Yet as one journalist observed, "Federal law has
long barred children under 18 from working in sawmills and
125.29 C.F.R. §§ 570.50-570.72 (2011).
126. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 229.
127.See WOODWEB, Some Perspectives on Amish Sawmill Operations (June 27, 2000),
http://www.woodweb.com/knowledge base/Amish mills.html.
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woodworking factories because they are so dangerous. The Amish have
upset opponents of child labor by pushing Congress for an exemption
based largely on religious grounds."1 28
Sawmills, indeed, are accounted among the most dangerous
workplaces. Chief Justice Burger's observation in Yoder, that Amish
children's work - agricultural work - was not dangerous or
unhealthful, is now obsolete and irrelevant. Inspectors have found Amish
youngsters working full time alongside grown men, with heavy,
dangerous machinery, breathing unhealthy air filled with sawdust. Under
federal law all workers in sawmills and woodworking factories are
required to wear masks and protective gear, but the Amish children
suffer injuries and illnesses nevertheless.1 29
When making factory furniture became a way of life for many
Amish men and boys, some began to take on outside factory jobs as well,
usually in plants producing recreational vehicles - trailers. 130 Working
on trailers is approved because building "homes" is deemed acceptable
within the Amish tradition. But the current recession has seen massive
layoffs in RV factories. Amish men and boys have been returning to their
communities' sawmills and furniture factories, as well as to small-scale
agriculture.13 1 The faith that had deemed government support
unacceptable and inspired the Amish to obtain a waiver of social security
taxes has not prevented laid-off Amish factory workers from lining up
for unemployment benefits.' 32
The experience of the girls has been a little different. Beyond the
household chores to be performed mornings and evenings, they are kept
at quilt-making, or sent to sell souvenirs in the Amish shops, or to wait
table in tourist restaurants.
The Amish may not consider themselves to be exploiting their
children's labor. In their thinking, children must learn a trade. They may
see no difference between a field or a factory as a place in which children
earn their keep. They may see only a religious difference between
children worked all day to earn their keep and children permitted to have
128.CHARLES E. HURST & DAVID L. MCCONNELL, AN AMISH PARADOX: DIVERSITY AND
CHANGE IN THE WORLD'S LARGEST AMISH COMMUNITY (2010); Steven Greenhouse, For the
Amish, Tradition and the Law Collide: Wary of Idle Hands, the Amish Are Seeking an Exemption
from Child Labor Laws for their Teenage Boys, N.Y. TIMES UPFRONT, Dec. 8, 2003.
129. See Miller, supra note 121.
130.See Marty Schladen, Amish Caught in RV Slump, J. GAZETTE (Mar. 22, 2009),
http://www.joumalgazette.net/apps/pbcs.dl/article?AID=/20090322/BlZ/303229948.
131.See Richard Mertens, Indiana's Amish, Laid Offfrom RV Factories, Return to their Plows,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (May 26, 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/
2009/0526/indianas-amish-laid-off-from-rv-factories-return-to-their-plows; Laid Off Amish RV
Workers Return to Their Plows, RV BUSINESS, (May 28, 2009), http://www.rvbusiness.
com/2009/05/laid-off-amish-rv-workers-retum-to-their-plows/.
132.See RV Layoffs Cause Ethical Issue with the Amish, RV BUSINESS, (May 11, 2009),
http://www.rvbusiness.com/2009/05/rv-layoffs-cause -ethical-issue-with-the-amish/.
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a childhood of play and school. But they knew they were working their
children illegally when they persuaded Arlen Specter and others in 2003
to back the exemption they gained from the laws prohibiting child labor
in sawmills and woodworking factories.13 3
It is increasingly understood that these children have few options.
Some Amish, whether remaining within or departing from their
communities, have begun to write books about Amish life. 134 Although
some Amish authors praise the serenity of the lives they led or are
leading, others explain that the denial to them of an education when they
were young made it difficult for them to live outside the community.
Some charge that the children are kept uneducated for the very purpose
of binding them to the community. 3 1
Other facts have been coming to light as well. The strongest
measure of the community's confidence in its ultimate control over its
children is the practice of rumspringa, a traditional "running around"
period allotted to youngsters.13 6 At about the age of eighteen, Amish
youngsters are permitted, if they wish, to go off and do anything they
like. Because the Amish are Anabaptists who believe in adult baptism,' 3 7
these youngsters are not yet baptized, and therefore, technically, their
sins somehow do not "count." Rumspringa can be imagined as a time to
sew wild oats before taking on the heavy responsibilities baptism
imposes on the Amish.
Rumspringa can last as long as a youngster likes, postponing
baptism indefinitely. Many Amish youngsters prefer to stay home under
the supervision of their parents, and at most may attend a dance or party,
or an overnight visit to a friend. These youngsters submit to baptism
eagerly. Many others go off in groups, interesting themselves in
fornication, alcohol, and narcotics. 13 8
Looked at functionally, rumspringa is the ultimate demonstration to
the children that they are substantially unable to leave the community,
that for them there is no such thing as freedom. There is little room for
these undereducated waifs in modem society. Such employment as they
can find outside their community, even in good times, does not often
improve on the labor awaiting them at home. Although statistics vary
133. See Greenhouse, supra note 121.
134. See, e.g., RUTH IRENE GARRETT & RICK FARRANT, CROSSING OVER: ONE WOMAN'S
ESCAPE FROM AMISH LIFE (2003).
135.See generally JOHN A. HOSTETLER, AMISH CHILDREN: EDUCATION IN THE FAMILY,
SCHOOL, AND COMMUNITY (2d ed. 1992).
136.See, e.g., TOM SHACHTMAN, RUMSPRINGA: TO BE OR NOT TO BE AMISH (2006);
"Rumspringa: Amish Teens Venture into Modem Vices," NPR (June 7, 2006), http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyld=5455572 (reviewing Shachtman's book).
137.1DONALD B. KRAYBILL, WHO ARE THE ANABAPTISTS: AMISH, BRETHREN, HUTTERITES,
AND MENNONITES (2003).
138. See, e.g., DVD: Devil's Playground (Stick Figure Productions 2002).
[Vol. 89:1156
THE MCREYNOLDS MYSTERY SOL VED
widely, it appears that Chief Justice Burger's observation remains more
true than he knew: There is very little attrition among the Amish.
With all this, we finally have the key to the McReynolds mystery.
These cases, Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder, need to be understood against the
background of the relation between compulsory school laws and child
labor. The use of compulsory school laws to regulate child labor is
centuries old.139 In England, employed children at first were exempt from
compulsory schooling, suggesting legislative and judicial
accommodation of common family expectations.14 0 But as compulsory
school laws have evolved, their main purpose seems thereafter to have
been to protect children from exploitation.
Of course compulsory schooling also promotes literacy and
enhances the value of an adult's labor. It also preserves employment for
adults, by keeping cheaper underage workers at school.14' This concern
for adult labor, in our country, at least, probably has some roots in the
"free labor" political movement of the antebellum period, which was also
both anti-immigrant and anti-slavery out of similar concern for the free
American worker.
VI. THE MCREYNOLDS MYSTERY SOLVED
This revelation about the Old Amish casts a long shadow back upon
Yoder, Pierce, and Meyer itself. With this broader understanding, and in
possession of the fact of child labor among the Old Amish, we can begin
to see the dark side of these cases. We can begin to understand that
Justice McReynolds' celebrated school cases were explainable by his
laissez-faire politics.
The striking down of laws compelling attendance in public schools,
the permission to parents to home-school their children, the disapproval
of English-only teaching following upon a veritable flood of
immigration, all served the interests of those who might wish to exploit
child labor. McReynolds understood the value to employers of helping
distressed families sell their children's labor. He understood the value to
employers of permitting parents to deny their children the education
which might offer them escape in later life from the sweat shops and
139.FOREST CHESTER ENSIGN, COMPULSORY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE AND CHILD LABOR: A
STUDY OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF REGULATIONS COMPELLING ATTENDANCE AND
LIMITING THE LABOR OF CHILDREN IN A SELECTED GROUP OF STATES 3 (1921).
140.See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 434-447 (1765); 2 JAMES KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 189-203 (2d ed. 1832) (1827).
141.See MARIS M. PROFFIT & DAVID SEGEL, U.S. OFFICE OF EDUC., SCHOOL CENSUS,
COMPULSORY EDUCATION, CHILD LABOR: STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS (1945); RAYMOND
GARFIELD FULLER, THE MEANING OF CHILD LABOR (1922); EDITH ABBOT & SOPHONISBA P.
BRECKINRIDGE, TRUANCY AND NON-ATTENDANCE IN THE CHICAGO SCHOOLS: A STUDY OF THE




factories of that period. McReynolds' effort, in this view, had been to
loosen the web of progressive-era legislation that sought to protect a
childfrom its parents.
McReynolds, that most reactionary of judges, might well have
thought that immigrant parents ought to have the "liberty" of diminishing
their children's opportunity to obtain a secular public education in the
English language. Those children, at once or later, could furnish a cheap,
submissive, and trapped pool of workers. Meyer identified and advanced
the parental authority, as against the state, that in Pierce, empowered the
parent to pull a child out of public school, and, in Yoder, to provide the
child with only minimal reading, writing, and arithmetic while forcing
the child into work. McReynolds might well have thought that parents
ought to have the "liberty" of pulling their children out of school and
putting them out to work. Chief Justice Burger did not see Yoder in this
stark light, but McReynolds in Meyer and Pierce would have been
writing against the background of his political and economic views,
disclosed to us in his career as one of the Four Horsemen, and by his
known convictions.
Of course McReynolds would liken the goal of assimilation, in no
way inconsistent with individualism, to the grotesque forced uniformity
advocated by Plato. From McReynolds' point of view, I suppose, the
urchin offspring of loathed immigrants had no place in mainstream
American life. They belonged in the factories, contributing to their
parents' support, and saving entrepreneurs the expense of employing
their fathers. Justice McReynolds certainly would not have wanted those
hordes in the public schools, consuming public resources at taxpayers'
expense.142
That McReynolds favored child labor is not in doubt. One has only
to consult his votes in the child labor cases. In 1918, he voted with the
five-to-four majority in Hammer v. Dagenhart,14 3 denying Congress
power to bar the products of child labor from interstate commerce.144 In
142. It is sometimes reported that McReynolds' will made considerable bequests to children's
charities, or that he contributed to children's charities all his life. E.g., BOND, supra note 49, at 5.
What are we to make of this? We do have an abbreviated statement purporting to be a description of
McReynolds' will filed in a probate court in the District of Columbia. Gilbert, supra note 63, at 23-
25. The will serves as an inadvertent revelation of McReynolds' personal isolation. It included a
cash bequest of $10,000 to a children's hospital. There was also a $10,000 bequest to a college in
Kentucky, to be used for the "instruction of girls in domestic affairs." The bulk of McReynolds'
money (he left $190,000) went to his servants, various colleges, universities, schools and hospitals
(the latter institutions possibly including children's charities). The largest single bequest, $25,000,
went to McReynolds' church. There were modest gifts to two women friends, and $10,000 to his
brother. There was also a bequest of $2500 to the mother of "lovely triplet girls." The bequest to a
children's hospital (and such bequests to similar charities as may exist among the other institutional
bequests) are consistent, at least, with McReynolds' view that the burden of supporting needy
children should not fall on the state and thus the taxpayer.
143.247 U.S. 251 (1918).
144.Id. at 277.
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1922, only a year before Meyer, he voted to strike down the Child Labor
Tax Law as beyond the power of Congress. 145 In the same year as Meyer
he voted with the Court to strike down a state minimum wage law for
women and children. 14 6 And in 1937, in alliance with the other three
"Horsemen," he dissented from the majority opinion in the watershed
case of West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.147 That case finally sustained a
state minimum wage law for women and children, and marked the year
of change after which the Supreme Court began to defer more regularly
to reasonable legislation.
Meyer's progeny, cases expansively building on Meyer's due
process liberty, may explain if not excuse the blindness of so many
writers on constitutional law, for so long, to Meyer's dark side.14 8 Our
current casebooks and treatises on constitutional law pay only cursory
attention to Meyer and Pierce, and say little or nothing about the relation
of compulsory education to the problem of child labor. It is true that, in
commenting on Yoder, writers do see a troubling permission to some
parents to reduce a child's education to the barest essentials. 49 But they
seem unwilling to open their eyes to the same sort of problem in Meyer
and Pierce. They fail to perceive, as Chief Justice Burger failed to
perceive, a hidden motive spring in Yoder - the incentives parents have
to require their children to serve them in the home, help support the
family, and to deny their children, as a practical matter, the power of
escape. Yet the parental interest in such exploitation has hardly been
unknown to the common law - historically, the common law facilitated
it.150
We can now see the connection between Justice McReynolds'
economic worldview and his opinion in Meyer.'5 1 We can now read into
Meyer McReynolds' conviction that law should not obstruct the efforts
of needy families to augment their incomes by putting their children out
to work. We can now see, in turn, that the facilitation of the exploitation
145. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20,44 (1922).
146 Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).(Sutherland, J.) (over strong dissents
by Chief Justice Taft, joined by Justice Sanford, and Justice Holmes) Justice Brandeis did not
participate.
147.300 U.S. 379 (1937).
148.1 am finding partly corroborative work, however, in the field of family law. See, e.g.,
Steven J. Macias, The Huck Finn Syndrome in History and Theory: The Origins of Family Privacy,
12 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 87, 90-91 (2010) (building on Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the
Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995 (1992)). But
see infra "Envoi" for my ultimate disagreement with this school of thought.
149. See, e.g., Emily Buss, The Adolescent's Stake in the Allocation of Educational Control
Between Parent and State, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1244-45 (2000).
150. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
151. For the view that Meyer reinforced class inequalities, see Martha Minow, Confronting the
Seduction of Choice: Law, Education, and American Pluralism, 120 YALE L. J. 814, 820 (2011)
("[Meyer's] rhetoric of choice . .. obscured inequality in economic resources that made the option of
private schools available to some and not to others . . . .").
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of labor is the link between Meyer and Lochner. It is only necessary to
recall that, in Lochner, the Court struck down a state law regulating the
hours of labor.
ENvol
While acknowledging this unhappy side of Meyer, we can still
appreciate, even in the face of continuing controversy, the importance of
what Meyer has wrought.
From the perspective of those concerned with children's rights, the
right to family privacy will seem a screen behind which the child is
abused and exploited. In this view, the right to privacy in Roe v. Wade
can be seen as stripping away the legal protections, as against their own
parents, of the unborn, just as Meyer and Pierce and Yoder analogously
strip away the legal protections, as against their own parents, of the born.
But from another perspective, the modern right to privacy has
liberated, and continues to liberate, women and men from government
intrusion upon and punishment for their most intimate acts and feelings.
If we accord due weight to the suffering and desperation of those thus
interfered with and punished, and the still pervasive social and religious
hostility to them, we ought to prefer to see children's rights and adults'
rights together, as part of the "rational continuum"'1 52 of constitutional
liberty.
Meyer's greatness lies in its progeny - cases creating a sphere of
family and domestic privacy, and within that sphere, at last securing the
liberties essential to it. All this considered, these developments, however
unsettling, when viewed in their progressive character, must be counted
as great advances in human freedom.
152.Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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It is hardly novel to note that the federal and state constitutions are
the supreme law of their respective domains.' In practice, however, that
supremacy may be largely theoretical. The goal of this Article is to ex-
plain why that is so and to briefly examine the implications of that con-
clusion. The questions explored here underlie some of the most contro-
versial issues surrounding the interplay of the three branches of govern-
ment.2 While the legal and policy implications of a particular decision
often generate much analysis-not to mention vitriol, how the structural
and institutional framework that guides the decision-making of each of
the various branches affects those outcomes is not often examined in a
systematic way. This Article seeks to do so.
Although legislators, judges, and executive branch officials, includ-
ing governors and attorneys general, take oaths to defend the state and
federal constitutions,3 rarely will any of the institutions of state govern-
ment prevent a statute whose constitutionality they question-or even
doubt-from going into or remaining in effect. Instead, they will defer to
the statute over the constitution. This Article seeks to explain why that is
so, and what, if anything, should be done about it. While these issues
arise in every jurisdiction, both state and federal, because Colorado has
had a number of recent experiences that illustrate these issues particular-
ly well, and because of the author's close familiarity with the practice in
Colorado, the Article uses Colorado as its example.
t Solicitor General, State of Colorado; Adjunct Professor, University of Denver Sturm
College of Law. The opinions expressed here are those of the author and not necessarily those of the
State of Colorado, the Department of Law, or the Office of the Attorney General.
1. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Colo. State Civil Serv. Emps. Ass'n v. Love, 448 P.2d 624,
628 (Colo. 1968) ("An amendment to the constitution is the solemn final exercise of the sovereignty
which belongs to the People of the State of Colorado. Neither executive order, nor legislative enact-
ment, nor judicial decision can be permitted to render futile this expressed will of the People.");
People v. W. Union Tel. Co., 198 P. 146, 148 (Colo. 1921).
2. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765-66 (2008); Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133,
142-44 (1st Cir. 2003); Letter from Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., to Hon. John Boehner, Speaker
of the U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/201 I/February/i I -ag-223.html [hereinafter Holder Letter].
3. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. V, § 2(2) (legislators); id. art. XII, §§ 8-9 (civil officers and
judges).
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It is worth emphasizing what this Article is not about. It is not about
which substantive theory of constitutional interpretation courts or others
should use when they go about answering what this Article will refer to
as "constitutional questions"-questions about whether a law is contrary
to the constitution. That is, the Article does not argue for or against
textualism, originalism, original meaning, original intent, living constitu-
tionalism, active liberty, or any other theory of substantive constitutional
interpretation.4 The Article is about what burden of proof or persuasion
institutions do and should apply when using whichever method of sub-
stantive interpretation they choose to resolve constitutional questions. In
other words, the Article explores how much deference state institutions
give to sister institutions, and how much doubt institutions can have
about a law's constitutionality before they will use their authority to pre-
vent its going into or remaining in effect.
First, the Article introduces the idea of a continuum of constitution-
ality-a graphical representation of the various levels of doubt or defer-
ence that a reviewing institution (or individual) could apply in drawing
the line at which its concerns about a law's constitutionality will out-
weigh its reasons for letting the law go into effect. The Article next ex-
plains the current practice of the institutions that typically address consti-
tutional questions: the courts, the Attorney General's Office, the general
assembly, and the governor. For a number of reasons, each of these insti-
tutions generally takes a deferential view of the constitutional questions
they face, applying a high burden of persuasion on anyone posing the
question. Each of these institutions thus will typically enact, sign, en-
force, defend, and uphold a law about which they may harbor even fairly
serious constitutional doubts. Only when those doubts cross a high
threshold will one of these institutions seek to impose the stated superior-
ity of the constitution.
Having described the current practice, the last part of the Article
turns to the normative question of whether each institution's practice is
appropriate given a goal of minimizing constitutional error. The Article
posits that the current situation can, and often does, create something of a
feedback loop: the judiciary and attorney general defer to the policy
branches' 6 judgments, and the policy branches take that deference into
4. This is a heavily-tread path of scholarship. See generally, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE
LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST (1980); INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT
(Jack Rakove, ed., 1990); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW (1997).
5. See discussion infra Part II. Courts and others use different terms, including "burden of
proof' or "standard of review" to describe the concept of how convinced an institutional actor must
be about a law's unconstitutionality before taking action against it, but I believe "burden of persua-
sion" is the most accurate phrase, and will generally use it in this Article.
6. See infra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons to group the governor
and legislature together as the "policy branches").
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account in making their judgments, and thus, in effect, give themselves
deference. Rarely does anyone in these institutions ask the fundamental
question, "Is this law constitutional?" Instead, in most instances, they
give laws the benefit of the doubt over the ostensibly supreme constitu-
tion.
The Article concludes, however, that for the most part this is entire-
ly proper. The judiciary and attorney general could, theoretically, be less
deferential, but for many reasons the costs would outweigh the benefits.
On the other hand, the policy branches should be encouraged to make
their decisions truly independent of the deference the rest of the system
gives them. In fact, those branches should consider adopting something
close to an inverse of the standard the others apply to them: the more
deference they get from other institutions, the less they should give
themselves. The Article suggests one small but potentially important
concrete institutional change that could help them to do so. But for the
most part, the Article recognizes that viable, concrete, enforceable
measures are few. Perhaps the best that can be hoped for is that members
of the policy branches will recognize the problem, resolve to take less
deference for themselves, and give more to the constitution, a parchment
barrier though it may be.
I. THE CONTINUUM OF CERTAINTY AND DEFERENCE: WHAT
GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS ACTUALLY ASK WHEN THEY FACE A
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
Is a particular law constitutional? While in some theoretical sense
every law is either constitutional or unconstitutional, the human beings
and human institutions that have to answer this question often have to
operate in an area of doubt, as many statutes raise at least some question
about their compatibility with various constitutional commands.7 In all
but the simplest of cases, the real world of constitutional analysis does
not fit into a simple binary paradigm. It therefore will be useful to posit a
"continuum of constitutionality". This continuum seeks to make graph-
ical some fairly common concepts about how the legal system resolves
constitutional questions.
7. See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 462, 473-75 (1987) (describing the general debate about whether law is determinate at
all and noting that while there may be some easy questions, the law is often either indeterminate or
underdeterminate; that is, that the law leaves room for debate and doubt about how to properly
resolve a case). Whether law is determinate at all is a question that need not be resolved here-
simply noting that there are at least some hard cases is enough. This is particularly true given the
complex and expansive body of federal constitutional case law that has developed over the last
century, and the complex and expansive body of codified constitutional law that is the Colorado
Constitution.
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The continuum would look something like this:
Undoubtedly -- Clearly - Probably 4 50/50 4 Probably - Clearly 4 Undoubtedly
Constitutional Unconstitutional
At either end of the continuum are the easy cases in which there can
be no doubt regarding constitutionality: the law is undoubtedly constitu-
tional or undoubtedly unconstitutional. At the next step toward the center
are laws that may raise a minimal doubt, but one that can be dismissed as
unreasonable on closer inspection. A step nearer the center are clearly
constitutional or clearly unconstitutional laws. Further toward the middle
are laws for which the answer can only be given as a preponderance: the
law is probably constitutional or probably unconstitutional. Dead in the
middle would be a true 50-50 question.
As a theoretical matter, an institution or individual could choose to
draw the line at which it will deem the law unconstitutional anywhere
along this continuum.8 And in fact, in actual practice, our system applies
different standards or burdens in different circumstances. In criminal
law, for example, juries may not convict unless the defendant has been
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.9 This high burden would be at
the far right on a similar continuum, but with "Innocent" and "Guilty"
replacing "Constitutional" and "Unconstitutional." In other situations,
the tipping point is further to the left. Terminating the parent-child legal
relationship, for example, requires "clear and convincing" evidence.' 0
Even nearer to the middle is the standard used in typical civil suits: pre-
ponderance of the evidence, or more probable than not."
The continuum could also be couched in probabilities:
0 4 10 -)20 -)30 440 -*50 -*60 -*70 -)80 -*90 - 100
Probably Constitutional Probably Unconstitutional
Here, one would understand that the number represents the likeli-
hood that a given law would be found unconstitutional, or perhaps that it
represents the percentage of neutral observers who would find the law
unconstitutional.
8. Of course, the implications of such a decision will differ based on the institution. If it is
one of the policy branches, it would mean not enacting or not signing an unconstitutional law. For
the attorney general, it might mean publicly denouncing a law or even challenging one in court. See,
e.g., People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1231 (Colo. 2003). For the courts, it would
mean issuing a declaratory judgment and perhaps an injunction.
9. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
10. People ex rel. A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 251 (Colo. 2010).
I1. See id ("The clear and convincing evidence standard requires proof by more than a 'pre-
ponderance of the evidence,' but it is more easily met than the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard
used in criminal proceedings." (citing People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127, 1136 (Colo. 1980))).
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Another way to picture the continuum is purely numerically:
0 4 1 2 -) 3 4 4 - 5 4 6 4 7 4 8 -- 9 4 10
Probably Constitutional Probably Unconstitutional
Here, the number could be viewed as representing the likelihood
that the law in question is unconstitutional. A "1 case" would be some-
thing that nobody could doubt is constitutional. A "2 case" might have
some very minimal questions, but nothing remotely serious. For exam-
ple, a law declaring that slavery is forbidden would be a 1 or 2 at most. A
"5 case" would, again, be a toss-up in which the arguments weigh equal-
ly in favor and against constitutionality. A "6 case" would be a prepon-
derance of the weight in favor of a finding of unconstitutionality. An "8
case" might correspond to having no reasonable doubt that the law is
unconstitutional, and a "10 case" would correspond to having absolutely
no doubt at all that it is unconstitutional (for example, a law that declares
the voting age to be 30).
Whichever continuum one finds most useful, they all reflect that the
higher the standard (the further to the right), the more doubt about a
law's constitutionality one will be accepting. In the familiar language of
criminal law, an institution that applies a high burden is electing to let
some number of guilty defendants (or, in our case, unconstitutional laws)
go free, and the further to the right on the continuum one chooses to
draw the line, the more guilty men, or laws, will go free. Any line to the
right of a "1" will mean that there is some doubt about a law's compati-
bility with a constitutional provision. Where our various institutions
choose to draw their lines-how they choose to deal with that doubt-
and why, is the subject of the next section.
II. THE STATUS Quo: How GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS ANSWER
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
There are four institutions in state government that generally are or
can be involved in assessing the constitutionality of a proposed or enact-
ed law: the courts, the Attorney General's Office, the general assembly,
and the governor. This section discusses the way each of these institu-
tions goes about making these assessments. Since the general assembly
and the governor generally have similar institutional concerns and con-
straints, and use the same standards, and since the same arguments dis-
cussed below apply equally to them, they will be treated together as the
"policy branches."' 2
12. The phrase "political branches" is commonly used to describe the legislative and execu-
tive branches in the federal system (and often the state system). See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renour-
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A. The Courts
1. Post-enactment
The standard that Colorado's judiciary declares that it applies to
constitutional challenges to laws that have been enacted by the policy
branches is well-established, clearly-stated, and highly deferential: "It is
an axiom of our judicial system that legislative enactments are presumed
to be constitutional. Parties attacking their validity carry a heavy burden
of proof: invalidity must be established clearly and beyond a reasonable
doubt."' 3 "The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt showing necessary to over-
come that presumption 'acknowledges that declaring a statute unconstitu-
tional is one of the gravest duties impressed upon the courts."'4
As the continuums above highlight, the implication of this, howev-
er, is that our courts do not in fact declare that laws are constitutional. It
is more accurate to view a decision upholding a law as acquitting the law
of the allegation that it is unconstitutional. And just as a not guilty ver-
dict does not necessarily mean the jury found that the defendant was in-
nocent,15 an "acquittal" of a statute does not necessarily mean the court
believes the law does not violate the constitution; it simply means that
ishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2614 (2010); Carlson v. Landon, 342
U.S. 524, 537 (1952); Keating v. Johnson, 918 P.2d 51, 59 (Okla. 1996). I have decided to instead
use "policy branches" for two reasons. First, it is important for purposes of this Article to keep in
mind that Colorado has a non-unitary executive branch. The attorney general, while part of the
executive branch, is independent and has little policy-making role. The general assembly and the
governor are the institutions that make policy. And to the extent "political branches" might carry a
pejorative connotation that the activities of those branches are motivated by cynical political motives
above all else, I hope the new phrase makes clear that no such criticism is intended. (I do not believe
there should be such a connotation even with "political" branches; that phrase should be read as a
recognition that the executive and legislative branches are politically accountable, not an accusation
that they necessarily act out of purely electoral motives.)
Even "policy branches" is an imperfect appellation, of course, since only part of the executive
"branch"-the governor (and not the attorney general, secretary of state, or treasurer)-is actually
covered by the phrase as used here. I have not been able to develop a better metaphor for a part of
the branch, however, ("political twigs" seems inappropriate) so "policy branches" it is herein.
13. People v. Beaver, 549 P.2d 1315, 1316 (Colo. 1976) (citing People v. Summit, 517 P.2d
850, 852 (Colo. 1974); People v. Prante, 493 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Colo. 1972)); see also Walton v.
Walton, 278 P. 780, 790 (Colo. 1929) (Butler, J., dissenting) ("This court declares that the provision
is unconstitutional, which means, of course, that its conflict with the Constitution is so clear as to be
beyond any reasonable doubt.").
14. Mesa Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. State, 203 P.3d 519, 527 (Colo. 2009) (quoting City
of Greenwood Vill. v. Petitioners for the Proposed City of Centennial, 3 P.3d 427, 440 (Colo.
2000)).
15. See People v. Allee, 740 P.2d 1, 6 (Colo. 1987) ("[A]n acquittal establishes a legal status
of innocence that conceptually can be distinct from a factual status of innocence. . .. 'A verdict of
acquittal does not establish a status of innocence. Innocence, while it entitles one to an acquittal, is
not always present where a verdict of not guilty is returned. If the jury has a reasonable doubt of
guilt under all the evidence, even if defendant is in fact guilty, it is its duty to acquit. Innocence is a
factual status. Nonliability to account resulting from acquittal is a legal status."') (quoting Roberts v.
People, 87 P.2d 251, 255 (Colo. 1938))). One could likewise say that constitutionality is a factual
status while validity (or non-invalidity) is a legal status. Courts resolve the legal status of validity,
but not the factual status of constitutionality. If the defense can create reasonable doubts, a law can
violate the constitution without being overturned, just as one can commit a crime without being
convicted.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FEEDBACK LOOP
the party challenging the law failed to meet the high burden of showing
the law is unconstitutional "beyond a reasonable doubt."
Precisely what "beyond a reasonable doubt" means can be difficult
to define,' 6 and to my knowledge, the Colorado Supreme Court has not
articulated what it means in the constitutional context. Researchers have
in fact attempted to quantify the concept of "reasonable doubt" as used in
criminal cases.17 Other scholars, however, believe the concept cannot be
quantified.'8 Courts have generally agreed with the latter view and resist-
ed attempts to quantify the concept.19 In the criminal context, it has been
defined as "such a doubt as would cause reasonable people to hesitate to
act in matters of importance to themselves." 2 0 The U.S. Supreme Court
has "repeatedly approved" this formulation. 2 1 One could, perhaps, imag-
ine a higher standard in theory. If the continuum were converted to a
numerical one, for example, "beyond a reasonable doubt" would rate
perhaps an 8, with 9 being "moral certainty" and 10 being absolute scien-
22tific or mathematical certainty. But it is not necessary for purposes of
this Article to settle upon a definition of reasonable doubt. Suffice to say
that "beyond a reasonable doubt" is, as the continuum above shows, "the
highest standard of proof' in the law. 23 In other words, it is the most def-
erential standard a court could realistically apply to constitutional ques-
tions.
The courts' stated standard is therefore as near to the right of the
continuum of constitutionality as any standard used in the law. There is
some dispute, even within the supreme court itself, about how high the
"reasonable doubt" standard is in state constitutional challenges, and
whether the court actually applies the standard consistently in practice. 24
There is also some dispute about whether reasonable doubt is the proper
16. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Rita James Simon & Linda Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof A View from
the Bench, the Jury, and the Classroom, 5 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 319, 319 (1971); Katie Evans, David
Osthus & Ryan G. Spurrier, Distributions of Interest for Quantifying Reasonable Doubt and Their
Applications, http://www.valpo.edu/mcs/pdf/ReasonableDoubtFinal.pdf 3-4 (last visited Sept. 22,
2011) (advocating for a new method to quantify reasonable doubt because of deficiencies in previous
studies that have concluded that juries typically will convict if the probability of guilt is above .70-
.74).
18. See CHARLES REMBAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND: THE EVOLUTION OF OUR LEGAL SYSTEM
412 (1980) ("Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a quantum without a number.").
19. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 1988). Courts likewise have
been reluctant to quantify the important concepts of "reasonable suspicion" and "probable cause."
See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). It seems safe to say that the two are fairly
near the center of this continuum and may straddle it.
20. COLO. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL § 3:04 (1993).
21. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 20 (1994).
22. Cf id. (appearing to hold that a doubt need not be "substantial" or "grave" to be reasona-
ble).
23. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 186 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
24. See Mesa Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. State, 203 P.3d 519, 539 (Colo. 2009) (Eid, J.,
dissenting) (discussing "major concerns ... about the majority's application of the presumption of
constitutionality" because the highly deferential approach may not always apply in practice).
16720 11 ]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW
standard at all. 25 But if we take the court at its word, then it is applying a
very high standard, as high as any used anywhere in the law. As it has
been imported from the criminal law, it is a standard in fact designed so
that some guilty men (or laws, in this case) will go free.26
This presumption of constitutionality flows from the deference the
court affords the legislature in its law making functions. While the extent
of that deference is perennially debated,2 7 there is little dispute that some
judicial deference is necessary in a democratic society.28 A reviewing
court must assume that the "legislative body intends the statutes it adopts
to be compatible with constitutional standards." 29
Alexander Bickel's book, The Least Dangerous Branch, provides
the classic explanation of the problems that a less deferential standard
can create. Judicial review, he states, has a "tendency over time seriously
to weaken the democratic process.,30 Bickel quotes James Bradley
Thayer's statement:
[T]he exercise of it [the power of judicial review], even when una-
voidable, is always attended with a serious evil, namely, that the cor-
rection of legislative mistakes comes from the outside, and the people
thus lose the political experience, and the moral education and stimu-
lus that comes from fighting the question out in the ordinary way,
and correcting their own errors. The tendency of a common and easy
resort to this great function, now lamentably too common, is to dwarf
25. See, e.g., Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 636 n.15 (10th Cir. 1998)
("The court below, and the plaintiffs themselves, assumed ... that the plaintiffs must prove the
unconstitutionality of [the law in question] 'beyond a reasonable doubt.' This circuit has never
applied such a standard of proof to a purely legal question of whether a statute is facially unconstitu-
tional." (citations omitted)). But see United States v. LaHue, 261 F.3d 993, 1004 (10th Cir. 2001)
("When reviewing a statute alleged to be vague, courts must indulge a presumption that it is consti-
tutional, and the statute must be upheld unless the court is satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that
the legislature went beyond the confines of the Constitution." (quoting United States v. Day, 223
F.3d 1225, 1228 (10th Cir. 2000)) (intemal quotation marks omitted)).
26. See Alexander Volokh, N Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 174-78 (1997) (containing
an amusing but fascinating attempt to catalogue and put in historical context the various numbers
that have been chosen to fill in the blank in the hoary statement: It is better that guilty men go
free than one innocent man be convicted).
27. See David M. Burke, The "Presumption of Constitutionality" Doctrine and the Rehnquist
Court: A Lethal Combination for Individual Liberty, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 73, 75-77 (1994)
(arguing against judicial deference); Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case
Against Judicial Activism: A Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1090
(2005) (arguing against Professor Randy Barnett's argument that "a law should only be invalidated
by courts as unconstitutional if it represented a clear mistake").
28. See ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND
CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEw 22-26 (1989); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 230-31 (2006).
29. Mesa Cnty., 203 P.3d at 527 (quoting Meyer v. Lamm, 846 P.2d 862, 876 (Colo. 1993)).
30. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 21 (1962).
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the political capacity of the people, and to deaden its sense of moral
responsibility. 3'
That is to say, every judicial invalidation of a democratically-
approved law has two related problems. First, it is in tension with the
fundamental concept that the three branches of government are co-equal.
As Chief Justice Marshall recognized in Marbury v. Madison,32 of
course, the point of a binding, written constitution is precisely to limit the
impulses of pure democracy.33 Thus, it is nearly universally accepted that
judicial review is legitimate despite the problems discussed above. But it
is almost as nearly universally accepted that those problems do impose
on courts a requirement that they give deference to the democratic
branches and presume that the laws they pass are constitutional unless it
is not possible to conclude otherwise. No matter how much the other
branches may believe a law they have passed to be constitutional, the
courts' decisions on such questions are, of course, final.34
Second, courts are not democratically selected, though in Colorado
there are some democratic means of controlling egregious judicial excess
(however rarely that power may be invoked).35 If democratic laws can be
stricken by undemocratic courts, this is fundamentally at odds with the
idea that we are a democratic republic. Many have recognized that dem-
ocratic laws being stricken by undemocratic courts is fundamentally at
odds with the idea of a democratic republic. In President Lincoln's
words, "[I]f the policy of the Government upon vital questions affecting
the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme
Court, ... the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to
that extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that
eminent tribunal."36 Or as Justice Frankfurter put it, "Because the powers
exercised by [the courts] are inherently oligarchic, . . . the implications of
that right [of judicial review] and the conditions for its exercise must
constantly be kept in mind and vigorously observed."37
Finally, Professor Nagel has powerfully argued that a lack of judi-
cial deference to other political institutions "weaken[s] the capacity of
the political culture to develop moral understandings and to initiate wise
31. Id. at 22 (second alteration in original) (quoting J. B. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 106-07
(1901)).
32. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
33. Id. at 176-77.
34. Id. at 177-78. But see Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 640 F. Supp. 2d 714, 724 (E.D. Va.
2009) (describing "the scheme of separation of powers" as that "in which Congress passes laws, the
President enforces them, and the judiciary interprets them").
35. COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 25.
36. President Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861).
37. Am. Fed'n of Labor v. Am. Sash & Door Co. 335 U.S. 538, 555, 557 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring). Frankfurter's opinion also quotes Thomas Jefferson's statements that "the Court [is]
'an irresponsible body' and 'independent of the nation itself", and provides citations to a number of
"similar expressions of Jefferson's alarm at what he felt to be the dangerous encroachment of the
judiciary upon the other functions of govemment." id. at 555 & n. 16.
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change."3 Thus, "to an unexpected extent judicial restraint may be nec-
essary to a stable constitutional order." 9
2. Pre-enactment: Interrogatories
Another quirk of Colorado's constitutional structure that distin-
guishes it from the federal system and highlights the rationale for defer-
ential standards in the typical case is the Colorado Constitution's approv-
al of advisory opinions. Article VI, § 3 of the state constitution in fact
mandates that, "The supreme court shall give its opinion upon important
questions upon solemn occasions when required by the governor, the
senate, or the house of representatives."40
Given the reasons for deference listed above, it should not be sur-
prising that the supreme court will not apply the presumption of constitu-
tionality when its view on proposed legislation is sought via this inter-
rogatory or advisory opinion.4 1 Thus, the court in these cases actually
engages in a de novo review of the constitutional question.
This makes perfect sense: if the political branches have not yet en-
acted a law-and indeed are themselves so unsure of the law's constitu-
tionality that they seek the supreme court's input-most, if not all, of the
reasons for the presumption and deference discussed above do not ob-
tain. Because the policy branches themselves have voluntarily sought out
the court's opinion, there is no violation of the concept of three co-equal
branches. A judicial ruling on an interrogatory does nothing to diminish
the dignity of the other branches.4 2 Similarly, because by definition when
the courts are asked to answer a constitutional question about a proposed
law through the interrogatory process, they will not be overruling a dem-
ocratically-approved law, and the countermajoritarian concern fades
away.
In sum, courts are generally deferential to laws enacted by the polit-
ical branches. Their position is that they will not strike down a law if its
constitutionality is questionable, or even if the judges believe it is proba-
38. NAGEL, supra note 28, at 7.
39. Id. at 26.
40. Id. art. VI, § 3. Colorado is apparently one of only eight states with such a provision. Mel
A. Topf, State Supreme Court Advisory Opinions as Illegitimate Judicial Review, 2001 L. REV.
MICH. ST. U. DETROIT C.L. 101 n.1 (2001).
41. See In re Interrogatories on House Bill 99-1325, 979 P.2d 549, 554 (Colo. 1999) (refusing
to give presumption "because the bill in question has not been passed and the legislature has certified
to us that they are not certain of its constitutionality").
42. If the advisory opinion process does not present the same "counter-majoritarian" or "anti-
democratic" problems that judicial review of enacted legislation does, it could nevertheless be ar-
gued that the process undermines the separation of powers that marks our form of constitutional
republicanism. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 302 (2004). But, like the splintered executive, this is
another area in which our state constitution strikes a different balance than that of the national con-
stitution. It can also be argued that deference is not proper where the political branches themselves
are in dispute about the constitutionality of a law. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 704-05
(1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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bly unconstitutional. Only if the law is clearly unconstitutional will
courts stand in its way. In other words, the courts have decided that it is
better that some number of unconstitutional laws go into effect-go
free-than that one constitutional law be invalidated.4 3
This means that, in typical litigation, courts do not declare that laws
are constitutional. When a law is upheld, the court is declaring only that
it is not undoubtedly unconstitutional. (The triple, perhaps quadruple,
negative is, unfortunately, necessary-and, I believe, accurate-here.) If
the court is in doubt about a law's constitutionality, the law generally is
to be upheld in court.
B. The Attorney General's Office
Like the judiciary, the Office of the Attorney General is faced with
many difficult constitutional questions." Just in the past few years, for
example, our office has had to consider whether a ban on indoor smoking
violated the First or Fourteenth Amendments, whether a state residency
requirement for concealed weapons permits violates the Second
Amendment, whether an effort to ban political contributions from hold-
ers of certain government contracts violated the First Amendment,
whether efforts to collect taxes on products purchased over the internet
violated the so-called Dormant Commerce Clause, whether various new
and increased "fees" violated the state Taxpayer's Bill of Rights, and
whether a proposal to appropriate $500 million from a state-chartered
insurance company's reserves violated the state's ban on retrospective
legislation. In fact, given that not all questionable proposals become law,
the Office of the Attorney General confronts constitutional questions
more often than the courts. It turns out that in the end, however, the of-
fice's approach is similarly deferential in most situations: we defend
many laws that, if we were providing an academic analysis of them ra-
ther than acting as a constitutional and statutory arm of the government,
we would conclude are likely unconstitutional. While, for the reasons
explained below, this is inevitable and preferable to any other possible
system, it is important for others in the system and for the people of Col-
orado to understand that it is the case, and why.
Unlike those of the judiciary, the standards applied by the Attorney
General's Office in answering constitutional questions generally have not
been clearly spelled out in public documents. But otherwise the two are
similar in many ways. The standard the office applies in most cases is
highly deferential-indeed, it is usually at least as deferential to the poli-
cy branches as the courts' standard. And also like the courts, the office
43. Cf Volokh, supra note 26, at 174-78.
44. As Solicitor General, my overarching role is to supervise how the office addresses consti-
tutional and legal questions. This requires extensive oversight of the state's appellate litigation and,
as the following examples show, it occasionally also requires me to get involved in responding to
difficult constitutional questions posed during the legislative process.
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also generally treats questions about proposed laws differently than those
already in effect. It will answer constitutional questions more deferential-
ly (to the right on the continuum above) when the law in question has
already been enacted and signed than when it is simply a proposal. As
with the courts, all of this turns on the institutional role of the Office of
the Attorney General within the overall structure of state government.
Colorado, like many other states but unlike the federal government,
separately elects the attorney general rather than allowing him or her to
be appointed by the governor.45 This important fact gives the attorney
general some independence which can, in some circumstances, be used
to block unconstitutional legislation, or at least make it more difficult for
the political branches to enact and enforce legislation. But while this
independence is important, the attorney general, like the courts, is con-
strained by other institutional aspects of the office. And again as with the
courts, this means that, in practice, the attorney general is typically not in
a position to impede the adoption or execution of legislation he believes
may be, or even probably is, unconstitutional.
Under the state constitution, the governor is vested with the "su-
preme executive power of the state," 46 but the attorney general is inde-
pendently elected.47 The constitution, however, is generally silent about
the role of the attorney general within the executive branch; instead, the
attorney general's basic duties are spelled out in statute. Among the most
relevant for purposes of this Article, the attorney general and his subor-
dinates48 are required to "be the legal counsel and advisor of each de-
partment [and other agency] of the state government other than the legis-
lative branch.'A9 The office "shall prosecute and defend for the state all
causes in the appellate courts in which the state is a party or interested,"50
and "to prosecute and defend all suits relating to matters connected with"
the office of the governor and other major state departments.5 ' State
agencies are forbidden from hiring "any person to perform legal ser-
vices" without the involvement of the office. 52 "When requested," the
attorney general is required to give a formal opinion "in writing upon all
45. See generally NAT'L Ass'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., STATE ATrORNEYS GENERAL: POWERS
AND RESPONSIBILITIES, at ix-x (Lynne M. Ross ed., 1990) (containing a useful background on the
role of state attorneys general); William P. Marshall (later the solicitor general of Ohio), Break up
the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115
YALE L.J. 2446, 2446 (2006) (containing an interesting comparison of the state and federal executive
structures that argues in favor of the independent state attorney general model); Scott M. Matheson,
Jr., Constitutional Status and Role of the State Attorney General, 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, I
(1993) (containing a useful background on the role of state attorneys general).
46. COLo. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
47. Id art. IV, §§ 1, 4.
48. Which number includes the author. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-31-201(4), -203(1)
(2011).
49. Id. § 24-31-101(1)(a).
50. Id
51. Id § 24-31-101(1)(b).
52. Id § 24-31-203(2).
[Vol. 89:1172
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FEEDBACK LOOP
questions of law submitted to him by the general assembly or either
house thereof or by the governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state,
executive director of the department of revenue, state treasurer, state
auditor, or commissioner of education."
The attorney general also has independent common-law duties "to
protect the rights of the public" 54 and to appear in court "as the chief
legal officer of the state . . . in the interests of the people to promote the
public welfare."55 The contours of these duties are not well-defined, but
they include things ranging from authoring or joining amicus briefs on
behalf of the State of Colorado to oversight of the sale or transfer of
ownership of nonprofit entities56 to, when necessary, suing to block a law
passed by the legislative and executive branches.57
While this complex regime is fairly well-established and explains
when the Office of the Attorney General may face a constitutional ques-
tion, it does not give much guidance about how the attorney general is to
go about answering it. The many roles the office plays within the gov-
ernmental structure means that the answer to that question often changes
depending on the circumstances. The most important dividing line, as it
is as with the judiciary, is between enacted and proposed legislation.
1. Enacted Legislation.
After legislation has passed, the attorney general's obligation to de-
fend the state's law is the office's overriding obligation and priority.
Thus, we apply a standard similar to the courts' "beyond a reasonable
doubt." Given the office's role as part of the executive branch, however,
our position is if anything slightly more deferential. If, as suggested
above, the courts' standard is an 8 on the continuum of deference, ours
might approach a 9.
We of course will not defend a law that is so clearly unconstitution-
al that we cannot present ethical arguments on its behalf 59 From time to
time we are put in this position. For example, in a recent challenge to
many new aspects of the state's petition and initiative process, while we
continue to defend much of the law, we were forced to confess judgment
53. Id. § 24-31-101(1)(b). In practice, Attorneys General have provided formal opinions to the
heads of other state departments besides those listed in statute.
54. People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1229 (Colo. 2003) (quoting People v.
Tool, 86 P. 224, 227 (1905)).
55. Id. at 1230 (quoting State R.R. Comm'n v. People ex rel. Denver & R.G.R. Co., 98 P. 7,
11 (1908)).
56. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1271 (Colo. 1993).
57. See Salazar, 79 P.3d at 1225.
58. A questionable proposition. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. In practice,
the courts' standard seems closer to a 6 or 7.
59. See COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 1.16 (stating that "a lawyer shall not represent
a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client
if: (1) the representation will result in violation of .. . law").
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on one claim was not defensible under existing precedent.60 We may also
refuse to defend, or the governor or other relevant agency may ask us not
to defend, a law if we have taken a position privately, or certainly public-
ly,61 that would significantly undermine our ability to provide a vigorous
defense.6 2 In some instances, an ethical, professionally responsible argu-
ment might be available, but we would nevertheless consider that argu-
ment so unreasonable that we would refuse to advance it. As the U.S.
Attorney General recently declared:
[T]he [United States] Department [of Justice] has a longstanding
practice of defending the constitutionality of duly-enacted statutes if
reasonable arguments can be made in their defense, a practice that
accords the respect appropriately due to a coequal branch of govern-
ment. However, the Department in the past has declined to defend
statutes despite the availability of professionally responsible argu-
ments, in part because the Department does not consider every plau-
sible argument to be a 'reasonable' one.63
But these instances are relatively rare. Few laws are so clearly un-
constitutional that an ethical or reasonable argument cannot be put for-
ward in their defense. Thus, we often defend laws about which we have
serious constitutional questions. Likewise, even if we have highlighted
possible constitutional issues with a proposed law for the policy branches
to consider, that will not always require our removal from the defense of
the law if it is enacted.
The reasons for this approach-which is generally consistent with
that of past Colorado attorneys general as well as with attorneys general
60. See Order on Preliminary Injunction, Independence Institute v. Buescher, No. 10-cv-
00609-PAB-MEH (D. Colo. Aug. 13, 2010).
61. See infra Part II.D.2 (containing an example of when an attorney general takes the posi-
tion that a law is unconstitutional).
62. See, e.g., Mesa Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. State, 203 P.3d 519, 531(Colo. 2009)
(containing an example of when an attorney general takes the position that a law is unconstitutional).
63. Holder Letter, supra note 2. This letter, along with the decision of Attorney General
Salazar that is at issue in People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221 (Colo. 2003), discussed
further below, highlights an important point touched on above, see supra note 5 and accompanying
text, but that bears further emphasis. Settling on a "tipping point" on a continuum of constitutionality
(or declaring a standard to apply) to resolve a constitutional question does not actually resolve the
question. The individual or institution answering the question still must apply some substantive
inquiry into the meaning of the relevant legal and constitutional provisions and other considerations,
such as the weight to give various types of precedents. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
Then the level of doubt or confidence with which that substantive inquiry leaves the institution can
be measured against the standard to see which side of the selected tipping point the law falls on. This
means that even if everyone agreed on the proper standard to apply (or proper level of deference),
different individuals will reach different conclusions about where a particular law falls on the con-
tinuum. In this instance, for example, given that at the time the attorney general announced the
U.S.'s refusal to defend some lawsuits (but not others) challenging a particular federal law no federal
court of appeals that had considered the question had used the heightened standard the attorney
general felt was required, it seems unlikely that our office would have reached the same conclusion
that the law was beyond the appropriate standard. Nevertheless, his efforts to grapple with the proper
standard for the government's lawyers to apply is precisely what this Article attempts to do, and his
stated standard is similar if not identical to that applied by the Colorado Attorney General's Office.
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of other states and of the United States-are essentially the same as the
reasons for courts' deference.
Like courts, an attorney general faces institutional constraints on his
ability to stand in the way of laws proposed and adopted by the political
branches that are of questionable constitutionality. Though the Colorado
attorney general is independently elected, the office's role is generally
not a policy-making one. That is left to the policy branches. The system
can only function if this office applies a strong presumption that the poli-
cy branches have carried out their duty to uphold the constitutions. If the
attorney general were to block or even simply refuse to defend any laws
she believed might be unconstitutional, the office would no longer be
able to function as it is required by the constitution and state statute. The
office would instead turn into something of preemptive court, arbitrating
constitutional questions rather than defending the state's laws. This
would be a marked agglomeration of power that traditionally has been
understood to rest in the policy branches (particularly the legislative
branch).64 Tempting as this may be for those in the office, it is not a
proper use of the office except in the rarest of circumstances.6 Policy-
making must be left to the policy branches, and as long as those branches
have carried out their duty to study the constitutionality of a proposed
law, the attorney general should defer to that judgment in all but the most
extreme cases.
64. See Holder Letter, supra note 2 (stating that the practice of the Attorney General's Office
is to defend the "constitutionality of duly-enacted statutes if reasonable arguments can be made in
their defense, a practice that accords the respect appropriately due to a coequal branch of govern-
ment").
65. Salazar is the most controversial recent example. Others in Colorado include the claim
mentioned in note 60, supra, and accompanying text and the position taken in In re Interrogatories
on House Bill 99-1325, 979 P.2d 549 (Colo. 1999), in which the attorney general, on behalf of the
governor, argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Citizen United could only be read as invali-
dating certain portions of Colorado's campaign finance laws. The office, in consultation with the
governor and other state agencies, will also often abandon defenses of laws or regulations if they
have been invalidated in court. See, e.g., Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1253
(10th Cir. 2008) (holding several Colorado statutes unconstitutional because they violate the First
Amendment); see also H.B. 1267, 67th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2009) (changing the
Colorado statutes found unconstitutional in Colorado Christian University, 534 F.3d 1245). As
noted above, the U.S. attorney general has recently declined to defend a federal law, despite a fairly
successful record on the matter previously. See Holder Letter, supra note 2. That this move appears
to be out of the ordinary, and certainly appears to be based on a different standard than traditionally
applied by Colorado attorneys general, may explain at least some of the criticism of the decision.
See, e.g., Orin Kerr, The Executive Power Grab in the Decision Not to Defend DOMA, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Feb. 23, 2011, 3:49 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/02/23/the-executive-power-grab-in-
the-decision-not-to-defend-doma/. Others, however, have pointed out that while rare it is hardly
unprecedented for the U.S. Department of Justice to refuse to defend a federal law. Seth P. Waxman,
Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 1074-75 (2001). In any case, these instances highlight
the delicate balance that an institution charged with both defending laws and the constitution must
strike, and how a slight move in one direction on the continuum can be the catalyst for widespread
controversy.
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2. Proposed Legislation
The attorney general's position when it comes to answering consti-
tutional questions about proposed or pending legislation is even more
complicated because of the myriad ways in which the office can be con-
fronted with questions during the pre-enactment period. In analyzing
pending legislation, the Office of the Attorney General is obligated to
conduct an independent inquiry into a proposed law's constitutionality.6 6
In these circumstances, we are not acting as advocates defending existing
state law, in which case like courts we give deference to the judgment of
the legislators and governor. The office is acting first as an advisor to the
policy branches, bringing constitutional questions to their attention. In
doing so, 6 7 we do not apply a presumption of constitutionality to pro-
posed legislation or demand that it be shown to be unconstitutional be-
yond a reasonable doubt.
Indeed, were the office to analyze pending bills with a presumption
in favor of the bill rather than the constitution, we would undermine the
very basis for the presumption of constitutionality given by courts; the
presumption is rooted in the "foundational premise" that the legislative
and executive branches "observe and effectuate constitutional provisions
in exercising their power."68 Therefore, the attorney general's analysis,
while guided by court precedents and other input, is not an attempt to
predict what a court would do if faced with a challenge to the law or an
effort to put forth a defense or attack of the legislation.6 9 This is a de
novo inquiry into a proposal's constitutionality, and the office's conclu-
sion is my independent understanding of how the constitution applies to
the proposed legislation.70
66. See Salazar, 79 P.3d at 1229 ("[I]t is the function of the Attorney General . . . to protect
the rights of the public . . . ." (second and third alteration in original) (quoting People v. Tool, 86 P.
224, 227 (Colo. 1905)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
67. See infra Part II.C.
68. City of Greenwood Vill. v. Petitioners for Proposed City of Centennial, 3 P.3d 427, 440
(Colo. 2000).
69. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Symposium, Constitutional "Niches": The Role of Institutional
Context in Constitutional Law: Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Execu-
tive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1604 (2007). Johnsen argues that in providing opinions, law-
yers representing the executive branch
should provide an accurate and honest appraisal of applicable law, even if that advice will
constrain the administration's pursuit of desired policies. The advocacy model of lawyer-
ing, in which lawyers craft merely plausible legal arguments to support their clients' de-
sired actions, inadequately promotes the President's constitutional obligation to ensure
the legality of executive action.
Id.
70. In some instances, people within or without the government suggest that whatever the
substantive answer to a constitutional question, the state may be able to effectively avoid liability by
asserting various technical arguments based on the rules of standing. Such arguments are of course
quite proper when defending the state in litigation, but consideration of ways to evade review are
inappropriate at the stage of trying to determine, and assist the other representatives of the people
determine, whether a proposal would violate the constitution. To the contrary, when there is a chance
that legislative action could evade the check ofjudicial review, it is incumbent on those involved in
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With no presumption, we are essentially putting the standard in the
middle of the continuums shown in Part I above. (We often will also note
other constitutional questions that a proposal may present, even if we
think they fall further to the left of the continuum.)
Even if our best judgment is that the law may violate a constitution-
al provision, in the ordinary case we will nevertheless advise the execu-
tive branch officials or legislators involved that it is their decision to
make, and that we will defend the law if they do enact it. At first glance
this may be surprising, but in our view there is no better alternative. The
alternative-refusing to defend any law about which we have strong
doubts-would, as discussed above, put the Attorney General's Office in
an institutional position that conflicts with the role as envisioned by the
constitution and state statutes. Our role is generally to provide candid
advice and then to defend the judgment of the policy branches.
There are, however, exceptions to this usual course. One is if we
conclude that the law is so clearly unconstitutional that it is simply inde-
fensible as written. If we would refuse to defend the law if it were to be
passed (under the highly-deferential standards discussed in II.B. 1 above),
then we believe we have an obligation to notify the policy branches of
that fact before they pass the law. We generally provide this information
behind the scenes; our hope is that this would cause those branches to
reconsider their efforts to pass a law of such dubious constitutionality.
And indeed more often than not the constitutional difficulties are re-
moved from bills before they go forward.
The second exception occurs in more difficult, closer cases when
we believe the proposed law is more likely than not unconstitutional, but
not so defective as to be completely indefensible. In terms of the contin-
uums above, these might fall somewhere between 6 and 8 These are pro-
posals that we likely would defend if they were already law, but that we
feel are likely to transgress some constitutional provision. Normally, we
will not make this position public, for the reasons discussed above: our
job is normally to advise the policy branches, and then to defend the
choices they make.
Sometimes, however, we feel it is necessary to make our position
public. Given that the attorney general also owes a duty to the public-
indeed a duty that the supreme court has noted can supersede its duty to
the legislative process to be more careful that their action complies with constitutional requirements,
not less. See Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 618 (2007) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("It must be remembered that, even where parties have no standing to sue, members of
the Legislative and Executive Branches are not excused from making constitutional determinations
in the regular course of their duties. Government officials must make a conscious decision to obey
the Constitution whether or not their acts can be challenged in a court of law and then must conform
their actions to these principled determinations.").
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the policy branches and the government7 -the office sometimes decides
that its conclusion that a proposed law is flawed must be exposed to the
public.
This could happen if we receive a request for a formal opinion on
the constitutional question from one of the institutional "clients"-other
state agencies-the office serves.72 It also may happen if, in effect, the
people of Colorado-which the Salazar Court recognized are the attor-
ney general's other clients 7 3-are entitled to our opinion. Where the of-
fice determines that its role as counsel to the government so conflicts
with its Salazar duty to protect the rights of the public, then it must give
no deference or apply no presumptions in favor of the policy branches.
Rather, it will carry out its duty to its ultimate client-the People-by
announcing its determination that a proposed law is unconstitutional.
This has come to pass only a handful of times in recent years. One
involved the bill seeking to lift a cap on property taxes that became law
and ultimately the subject of Mesa County Board of County Commis-
sioners v. State,74 the case studied in more depth in subsection D below.
Another example was a proposal to take $500 million from the reserves
of a state-chartered insurance company and use it to balance the state
budget.75 That bill ultimately did not become law, at least in part because
the attorney general had declared that it was beyond what the office
could defend.7 6
Probably the most famous example of a Colorado attorney general
stepping in this manner is the subject of People ex rel. Salazar v. Da-
vidson.77 There, Attorney General Salazar not only opposed a bill passed
by the general assembly and signed by the governor, he took the extraor-
dinary step of suing the institutions that normally were his office's cli-
ents to block the law. The current office may not have agreed with his
analysis of the legal issue, or with his decision to take that extraordinary
step of suing to overturn a state law-the office has never done so since,
even when we have disagreed with a law-but we do believe Attorney
71. See Salazar, 79 P.3d at 1229 ("[l]t is the function of the Attorney General ... to protect
the rights of the public . . . ." (second and third alteration in original) (quoting Tool, 86 P. at 227
(Colo. 1905)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
72. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. This can also occur if we are asked to testify
before the legislature on a constitutional question. This has happened on numerous occasions, in-
volving issues such as voting for paroled felons. See Danielson v. Dennis, 139 P.3d 688, 689 (Colo.
2006).
73. See Salazar, 79 P.3d at 1229.
74. 203 P.3d 519 (Colo. 2009).
75. See Tim Hoover, Pinnacol Blasted for Pay, Offices, Legislators Press to Seize $500
Million, Challenging Spending by the Workers' Comp Fund in a Fight Growing Uglier, DENVER
POST, Apr. 15, 2009, at Al.
76. See Tim Hoover, AG Says Pinnacol Assets Off-Limits a Lawsuit over Efforts to Balance
the Budget May Be Inevitable, DENVER POST, Apr. I1, 2009, at Al.
77. 79 P.3d 1221 (Colo. 2003).
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General Salazar had the authority to make that decision, as the supreme
court held.78
In practice, there is probably something of a sliding scale involving
both these factors at work: the more debatable the constitutional question
(the closer to the center or left side of the continuums above), the more
powerful the public's claim to our counsel must be before we make pub-
lic our position. On the other end of the scale, the more indefensible a
law (the further right it falls on the continuums), the more likely we are
to make our position public. However the calculation is made, it is only
in rare circumstances that this office has or will take steps to block pro-
posed legislation unless it is well to the extreme right of the constitution-
ality continuums.
In sum, both courts and the Attorney General's Office generally ap-
ply two standards to constitutional questions that are very much alike, if
not identical. When the political branches have passed a law, both the
attorney general and the judiciary presume that those branches have
made a serious constitutional inquiry and found no deficiencies. The
attorney general and the judiciary therefore will only disagree and refuse
to defend or refuse to uphold an existing law if in their judgment the law
falls so far to the unconstitutional end of the continuum discussed above
that there can be no doubt about its violation. On the other hand, before a
proposal or bill has become law, both courts and the attorney general
have no reason to apply a presumption of constitutionality, and should
therefore answer constitutional questions with no deference to the beliefs
of the political branches.
This makes sense. There would be little benefit to the attorney gen-
eral publicly declaring that an existing law is likely unconstitutional. The
law is already in place and is unlikely to be repealed. The courts are
well-positioned-much better positioned than the Attorney General's
Office-to review such laws and make the ultimate decision about their
constitutionality. But when the law is still being debated, it can be
amended to fix any flaws the Attorney General's Office finds, or dropped
entirely, or passed, but at least with the understanding that it may cause
costly litigation.
While ethical rules and case law make clear that the attorney gen-
eral has a bit more freedom to take positions contrary to his institutional
"clients" wishes,79 the system would cease to function if the attorney
general could block or refuse to defend any law he questions. The
countermajoritarian problem is not present-or at least lessenedso-since
78. See id. at 1229-30; see also supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
79. See Salazar, 79 P.3d at 1231; COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 1.13 cmt. 9 (2011).
80. Of course, if the attorney general is ever in disagreement with a majority of the legislature
and the governor, it could be said there is a countermajoritarian aspect to his behavior. But the more
serious countermajoritarian problem is not where government institutions may act contrary to the
1792011]
180 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:1
the attorney general is elected. But there are other problems that prevent
us from vigorously standing against those branches, even if we think
their laws may be, or even likely should be, considered to transgress the
constitution.
First, unlike courts, whose nature essentially requires them to "say
what the law is" and thus declare statutes unconstitutional,8 1 the nature of
the attorney general does not require it to play such a role. Instead, the
office's main roles are to be the chief law enforcement officer of the
state, to assist the rest of the executive branch to understand and execute
the laws, and to defend those laws when challenged. While one could
devise a system in which the attorney general was something of an advi-
sory court, empowered to issue public opinions on the constitutionality
of every proposed or existing law, and to apply a non-deferential stand-
ard in arriving at those opinions, it is not the system we have here. Such
a system would be hard to square with the attorney general's obligation
to defend the laws of the state and serve as the legal advisor to most state
812agencies. To carry further the analogy to criminal trials discussed above
in Part I, like individuals accused of violating the law, laws accused of
violating the constitution deserve a vigorous defense. The institution on
wishes of an elected branch of government in a given instance, which would describe this situation.
The more serious problem decried by Bickel and Nagel arises where a majority of the people has
little or no recourse to check the government actors or institutions in question, who therefore may
continually flout majority will. See BICKEL, supra note 30, at 31; NAGEL, supra note 28, at 22-26.
That problem exists for courts much more so than for an elected attorney general, although there is at
least some theoretical democratic check in Colorado even on our state courts, which have to stand
for retention elections. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE
L.J. 1335, 1339-40 (2001) ("The countermajoritarian difficulty surfaces in Court decisions because
the Justices have little competence at discerning popular views and no accountability for the judg-
ments they render.").
81. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
82. One irony, or at least one surprising result of this conclusion is that in many ways a sepa-
rate elected attorney general such as that in Colorado may have less ability to exert control over
potentially unconstitutional (or otherwise unwise) actions of the policy branches (in particular the
executive) than would an appointed attorney general in the federal system. Where the attorney gen-
eral is appointed by the chief executive, the attorney general is typically empowered with the final
say on legal matters, including whether and how to interpret and implement statutes, rules, and
regulations, and whether to proceed with litigation. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 519 (2006) ("[T]he Attor-
ney General shall supervise all litigation to which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a
party . . . ."). In the divided executive system, however, while the attorney general may offer advice
and occasionally refuse to defend a law or regulation, for the reasons explained here, that is unlikely
to happen except in very rare circumstances. And even when the attorney general does so, the gover-
nor may hire her own counsel to carry on without the attorney general. Of course, in the unitary
executive model, to the extent the chief executive and attorney general actually disagree on major
matters, the chief executive's opinion will carry the day. See John 0. McGinnis, Principle Versus
Politics: The Solicitor General's Office in Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 799, 803-04 (1992) (reviewing CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN
REVOLUTION (1991), and discussing the solicitor general's role which is analogous to the attorney
general's position). But many legal decisions are made at lower levels than the chief executive, and
in those situations the unitary executive may, paradoxically, allow for the attorney general's legal
advice to be more independent and carry more weight than it does in the divided system discussed
herein. See Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on Defending Marriage Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 3-4 (2011) (statement of Edward Whelan,
President, Ethics and Public Policy Center).
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whom it falls to provide that defense in Colorado is the Attorney Gen-
eral's Office, whether the attorney general thinks the law may be "guilty"
or not.83
And perhaps most importantly, there is no societal consensus that
the attorney general should take a more active role in serving as a consti-
tutional gatekeeper; for the most part, the office's ultimate client-the
people of Colorado-appears to prefer the current system, in which the
office steps in only in the very rare circumstances described above. This
institutional balance is not ideal, but it is in our view the best among
nonideal options. But it must be acknowledged that it means that, like the
courts, the Attorney General's Office is rarely in a position to block or
even to refuse to defend laws that it may believe are unconstitutional. It
is only when the law is well to the extreme right of the continuum de-
scribed above that the office will seek to do so. Thus, the office will de-
fend many laws and proposals that the office finds of questionable, or
even doubtful, constitutionality.
C. The Policy Branches
It is, of course, when the policy branches consider and act upon leg-
islative proposals that constitutional questions first arise. And because
the other institutions are so deferential, it is also within the policy
branches that careful scrutiny of those questions is perhaps most im-
portant. But as with the attorney general and unlike the judiciary, how
those branches answer those questions is, not well-known or remarked
upon. In part this is due to the fact that, just as in some sense it is impos-
sible to say there is any uniform intent behind a legislative act,84 it is
probably impossible to declare that there is any one standard used by the
members of the policy branches in answering constitutional questions.
Every legislator and every governor answers the questions in her own
way. Members of the policy branches also have no obligation to put into
writing the standards they use. And it seems likely that even individuals
may use different standards at different times.s
Nevertheless, we can make at least a few assertions about the pro-
cess as it often occurs. First, unlike either the judiciary or the attorney
general, the policy branches typically only confront constitutional ques-
83. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-51-115 (2011) ("[I1f the statute, ordinance, or franchise
is alleged to be unconstitutional, the attorney general of the state shall also be served with a copy of
the proceeding and be entitled to be heard.").
84. See Dan Domenico, Deference and Legislative Intent, DULR ONUNE (Feb. 16, 2011, 1:02
PM), http://www.denverlawreview.org/practitioners-pieces/2011/2/16/deference-and-legislative-
intent.html.
85. Cf Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1994) (holding that there are multiple accepta-
ble definitions of a "reasonable doubt").
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tions before a bill becomes law.86 Second, some members of those
branches appear to believe that it is the role of others (especially the
courts) to answer constitutional questions while the policy branches con-
cern themselves only with policy. 8 7 It is worth noting that this phenome-
non does not appear to be one limited to a particular party or to Colora-
889
do," or even to the modern era.
Finally, we know that in Colorado, when the legislature does seek
legal advice on constitutional questions, the answers it receives are based
upon applying a somewhat deferential standard. The legislature has its
own lawyers in the Office of Legislative Legal Services (OLLS). These
lawyers are among the few attorneys authorized by law to provide legal
services to state entities who do not work in the Office of the Attorney
General.
OLLS reviews various legal questions for the legislature, including
constitutional questions. At least when it makes its decisions public, the
standard OLLS applies is stated as follows: "OLLS legal memoranda
generally resolve doubts about whether the general assembly has authori-
ty to enact a particular piece of legislation in favor of the general assem-
bly's plenary power." 90 Taken to its extreme this could mean that OLLS's
standard falls at the far right of the continuums above-that it defers to
the legislature unless it has absolutely no doubt about a law's unconstitu-
tionality. This seems unlikely to be the actual case, and in practice it ap-
pears more likely that OLLS's standard mirrors that of the courts, and in
fact, the standard appears to incorporate the courts' standard by seeking
to predict how courts would treat the law if it went into effect.9'
The stated reasons for using this deferential standard include that it
is "[c]onsistent with the OLLS' position as a staff agency of the general
86. It could be said that the governor will face different questions when implementing a law
that has been passed, but to the extent that is so, the governor and the attorney general will typically
be working together.
87. See Neomi Rao, The Constitution: Not Just for Courts, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2011, at
A15; Katyal, supra note 80, at 1350-51 (arguing that Congress is the best institution for abstract
constitutional interpretation).
88. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Breaking Constitutional Faith: Presi-
dent Bush and Campaign Finance Reform, FINDLAW (Apr. 5, 2002),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20020405.html (criticizing President George W. Bush for signing
into law a bill he had repeatedly stated contained provisions violating the First Amendment).
89. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997) ("In 1789,.. . a Member of
the House of Representatives objected to a debate on the constitutionality of legislation based on the
theory that 'it would be officious' to consider the constitutionality of a measure that did not affect
the House ..... (quoting I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 500 (1789)).
90. Memorandum from Office of Legislative Legal Servs. to Keith King, Colo. House Repre-
sentative I n.l (April 7, 2004) [hereinafter 2004 OLLS Memo], available at
www.lobbycolorado.com/FileRepository/documents/AttachmentA.pdf.
91. See, e.g., Memorandum from Office of Legislative Legal Servs. to Sue Windels, Colo.
State Senator 2 (March 28, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 OLLS Memo], available at
http://www.lobbycolorado.com/FileRepository/documents/LegalServicesMemo.pdf ("If enacted, the
[law in question] would be presumed constitutional and, if challenged, the [law] would have to be
proven unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.").
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assembly." 92 Moreover, OLLS's "analysis starts with the general princi-
ple that the general assembly has plenary authority to legislate."9 It also
is inspired by the very deferential stance that the courts give to the legis-
lature's enactments.9 4 Whatever the reasons, it leads to legislators basing
decisions not on the law's constitutionality, but on its "riskiness"--that
is, they effectively, if not explicitly ask, themselves not if a law is consti-
tutional but if it will be upheld by the courts.95
This means that, like the judiciary and attorney general, OLLS takes
a deferential stance on constitutional questions. And again, by applying a
deferential standard-by putting the tipping point on the right side of the
continuum-these institutions are not actually asking if laws are consti-
tutional. This is certainly not to say that the legislators or the governor
often will intentionally vote for or sign laws they know to be unconstitu-
tional,9 but just to point out that they do not formally ask that question.
By asking instead whether doubts can be resolved in favor of the policy
branches, this deferential standard (just as it does when the institutions
discussed above apply deferential standards) ensures that some number
of bills about which significant constitutional doubt exists within the
policy branches will nevertheless be "approved" for passage.
D. Case Study: Mesa County Board of Commissioners v. State
The principles and practices all came to the fore in the recent case
of Mesa County Board of Commissioners v. State. Taking a closer look at
the development of that case and the statute it involved can highlight
how the actions of the various entities in question were guided by the
standards they have chosen to apply and how those standards can alter
the outcome of a constitutional question.
The details of the law in question are fairly complex and are de-
scribed in detail in the various memoranda and opinions cited below.97
For purposes of this Article, however, the following is relevant:
- Colorado's constitution, in the Taxpayer's Bill of Rights
(TABOR), declares that "[D]istricts must have voter approval in advance
for . . . any new tax, tax rate increase, mill levy above that for the prior
year, valuation for assessment ratio increase for a property class, or ex-
92. See 2004 OLLS Memo, supra note 90, at I n. 1.
93. 2007 OLLS Memo, supra note 91, at 4.
94. See 2004 OLLS Memo, supra note 90, at 6-8 (analyzing the question by asking how the
court would analyze this issue).
95. See, e.g., Tim Hoover, Lawmakers Scrap Plan to Tap Pinnacol Funds, DENVER POST
(Apr. 15, 2009, 9:43 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_12147139?source-pkg (quoting lawmaker
explaining his decision not to pursue a questionable bill because "we've all come to the conclusion
that it . .. would be risky").
96. See Mesa Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. State, 203 P.3d 519, 525 (Colo. 2009).
97. See, e.g., id. at 524-27.
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tension of an expiring tax, or a tax policy change directly causing a net
tax revenue gain to any district."98
'Prior to 2007, a state statute effectively capped local school dis-
trict property tax revenue.
O When property values rose quickly, as they often did, the statute
thus resulted over time in local districts having to lower their property
tax rates (called "mill levies") so as not to exceed the revenue limits.
D In 2007, the state legislature and the governor proposed repealing
the state statutory limit on property tax revenue. Under this proposal, tax
rates that would have been forced downward under the existing statute
would remain the same, and revenues would thus increase.
After a short debate, the policy branches passed the bill (SB 199)
and signed it into law. Soon thereafter, a group of citizens, businesses,
taxpayers, and local governments sued, alleging that the removal of the
state property tax limit violated TABOR. The plaintiffs prevailed at the
district court level. 99 On appeal, however, the supreme court reversed and
upheld the law. 00
In this process, each of the institutions examined in this Article car-
ried out its role and applied the standards described above. In many
ways, therefore, the case was highly typical. In three ways, however, it
was atypical: first, where in the usual case only the courts make their
analysis of a constitutional question explicit and public, in this case each
institution did so; second, and even more unusually, in this case the At-
torney General's Office was so certain that the proposed law was uncon-
stitutional that it went even beyond the very lenient standard we adopt on
the constitutional continuum; finally, the reviewing courts disagreed on
the proper standard to apply to the law, with the district court applying a
lower bar for the challengers (that is, a more stringent review of the law's
constitutionality) than the usual highly deferential beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard that the supreme court applied. All of these unusual cir-
cumstances put into relief how choosing a particular standard can alter
the outcome of an institution's analysis of a constitutional question, and
can show how the usual standards can interact with each other to create a
feedback loop.
1. The Policy Branches
When the bill was proposed, legislators sought the advice of the
OLLS. That office specifically answered the question. In doing so, it
98. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(4)(a).
99. Mesa Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Colo. Dep't of Educ., No. 07CV12064, at 14 (Colo. Dist.
Ct. May 30, 2008), http://www.coloradoattomeygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/press-releases/2008/
06/02/.pdf.
100. Mesa Cnty., 203 P.3d at 522-23.
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applied the deferential standard noted above: its "position [was] to re-
solve doubts about whether the general assembly has authority to enact a
particular piece of legislation in favor of the general assembly's plenary
power" and that "if challenged, the repeal would have to be proven un-
constitutional beyond a reasonable doubt."' 0 ' That is, it applied at least a
somewhat deferential standard-a 6 or 7 on the continuum, perhaps.
OLLS noted that at least one issue was a close call: whether SB 07-199
constituted a "tax policy change." 02
The governor's counsel also provided an analysis of the question,
which mirrored the OLLS analysis fairly closely. It too appeared to apply
a deferential standard.10 3 These analyses tracked a prior OLLS memoran-
dum on the same basic question.' 0
2. The Attorney General
Given the high-profile and controversial nature of the proposed law,
the attorney general assigned me to analyze the bill's constitutionality. It
was in setting out to do so that the questions that this paper seeks to an-
swer began to crystallize. When the attorney general asked for my analy-
sis, I had to ask him what precisely he wanted me to analyze-that is,
what question was I to answer. In reading the memoranda of the policy
branches, I was struck that they did not seem to be answering directly the
important question: is the bill constitutional? Instead, the question
seemed to be whether the law was likely to be upheld in court. This can
be an important question, but it is not the only question one can ask in
these situations, as already discussed.'05 The attorney general and I dis-
cussed the possible approaches and he instructed me to proceed without
any presumptions or weighted deference, answering simply whether I
believed the law was constitutional or not. This is what I did.10 6
Thus, though we were not quite thinking in these terms at the time,
our office applied essentially the neutral, 50/50 tipping point on the con-
tinuum, a five out of ten, while the policy branches used more deferential
standards common to litigation, perhaps in the 7-9 range.10 7 This may
have made the difference in our different conclusions.
101. 2007 OLLS Memo, supra, note 91, at 2.
102. Id. at 9.
103. Letter from Thomas M. Rogers IlI, Chief Counsel to the Colo. Governor to Sue Windels,
Colo. State Senator 6 (Mar. 20, 2007) (on file with author).
104. 2004 OLLS Memo, supra note 90, at I n.1.
105. See, e.g., Holder Letter, supra note 2.
106. See Memorandum from Dan Domenico, Colo. Solicitor Gen. to John Suthers, Colo. At-
torney Gen. 11 (April 27, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter Suthers Memo].
107. See 2007 OLLS Memo, supra note 91, at 2 ("If enacted, the [law in question] would be
presumed constitutional and, if challenged, the [law] would have to be proven unconstitutional
beyond a reasonable doubt."); see also 2004 OLLS Memo, supra note 90, at 6 ("Only when the state
constitution directly or indirectly addresses the limits of legislative power or when the judiciary
defines the extent of that power in the context of a particular decision are the boundaries precisely
known.").
2011] 185
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Like those branches, I concluded that SB 07-199 did not appear to
transgress most of the potentially relevant provisions of TABOR.'08 In
my view, while there might have been colorable claims under those pro-
visions, they would not have reached the middle of our continuum. Both
OLLS and I acknowledged that there was one constitutional question that
was truly problematic: the provision of TABOR barring a "tax policy
change directly causing a net revenue gain to any district."1 09 OLLS not-
ed that this was a close question, but concluded that because the law was
being changed mainly in order to address school finance issues, it was
not a "tax policy" and thus TABOR did not apply. The governor's coun-
sel advanced a somewhat different analysis, acknowledging that the law
in question involved "tax policy" but arguing that the bill did "not consti-
tute a 'change' in tax policy." Our conclusion was that this was indeed a
close case-particularly under the presumptions OLLS applies. That is, I
would have agreed that it would be a very difficult call to say whether
the law's questionable constitutionality surpassed the 8 or 9 or so that the
policy branches were using as their standard. But at the more stringent 5,
that the attorney general and I determined was appropriate for our analy-
sis, it was clear that SB 07-199 was beyond our standard. Thus, I con-
cluded in my memorandum to him that "[m]y best judgment is that this
proposal requires voter approval under the Constitution." 0
The attorney general concurred. The next, and more difficult, ques-
tion for us was what to do with our analysis. As discussed above, we
often provide such analyses of constitutional questions confidentially to
the governor's office or to relevant legislators. Here, however, we decid-
ed that would be inappropriate. This was the unusual situation where our
obligations to the people of the state prevailed over our obligation to
institutional clients such as the governor, the legislature, or any state
agency.
A number of factors were weighed in this decision. First, the very
short timeline in which the proposal was to be considered before the end
of the legislative session meant that it was highly unlikely that our office
could have time to conduct the sort of back-and-forth efforts to clear up
constitutional problems with bills that typically takes place with the poli-
cy branches."' The fact that the policy branches had each already con-
108. See, e.g., 2007 OLLS Memo, supra note 91 at 1-2 ("The [law in question] clearly does
not constitute a new tax, tax rate increase, mill levy above that for the prior year, valuation for as-
sessment ratio increase for a property class, or extension of an expiring tax for purposes of the voter
approval requirement of section 20(4)(a) of article X of the state constitution.").
109. See COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(4)(a). I also concluded that the law may have been a weak-
ening of "[o]ther limits on district revenue, spending, and debt" that required voter approval. See
Suthers Memo, supra, note 106, at 9. It is unnecessary for purposes of this article to analyze that
question.
110. See id. at 11.
Ill. The author would like to note, perhaps a bit defensively, that because of the sudden intro-
duction of the bill, our analysis (that of the Solicitor General's office) was undertaken beginning on
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ducted their own legal analyses and made them public also suggested
that they were not relying on our office to provide this function in this
instance. The people, on the other hand, were quite interested in the is-
sue, as calls and other correspondence to the Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral revealed, but had no independent institutional legal representation.
Given all these factors, the attorney general decided we were obligated in
this case to provide our analysis to the public.
The result was that, after providing the governor with a copy of our
analysis1 2 and a day's notice, we released our conclusion to the public.
This set off something of a controversy, with some support and some
criticism, as was to be expected. Of course, much of the controversy was
over the substantive analysis, which is understandable though not partic-
ularly relevant to this Article. Much of the controversy, however, was
based on a failure to understand two things this Article seeks to help ex-
plain: the different legal standards state institutions can and do apply to
constitutional questions, and the role of the Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral as both counsel to the state government and as legal representative of
the state's citizens. Other similar decisions by other attorneys general
have likewise triggered much criticism, also at least in part due to confu-
sion about these structural issues.'i 3
3. The Courts
Not surprisingly, the law was swiftly challenged in court. The plain-
tiffs prevailed in the district court. Importantly, the district court's view
of a particular interpretive guide included in TABOR itself altered the
usual judicial standard of review it should apply:
Further, TABOR itself includes the provision requiring that [i]ts pre-
ferred interpretation shall reasonably restrain most the growth of
government.
Inclusion of this interpretation expressly in TABOR removes this
case, in the Court's view, from the generally accepted standard of re-
view requiring that those advancing the unconstitutionality of a given
statute must prove its unconstitutionality "beyond a reasonable
doubt." However, as the Colorado Supreme Court has noted that
while ordinarily a party challenging a statute as unconstitutional
bears the burden of establishing the unconstitutionality beyond a rea-
a Tuesday and was released on Thursday. I stand by the analysis and conclusions, but simply note
that with a bit more time, they could have been fleshed out and perhaps more elegantly expressed.
112. Letter from John W. Suthers, Colo. Attorney Gen. to Bill Ritter, Colo. Governor (Apr. 27,
2007) (on file with author).
113. See, e.g., Holder Letter, supra, note 2 (notifying Speaker Boehner that the Department of
Justice believes Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act is unconstitutional, and therefore will no
longer be defended by the Department of Justice); see also People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79
P.3d 1221, 1225 (Colo. 2003) (stating that the Colorado Attorney General's interpretation of the




sonable doubt, the "type of constitutional challenge, the nature of the
challenged statute, and the standing of the parties determine how we
approach judicial review in a particular case, such as the one before
us." Accordingly, this Court concludes that the relevant standard of
review requires the Court to give preference to interpretations of
TABOR that "restrain most the growth of government."'
1 4
Applying this standard-perhaps a 5 or even lower on the constitu-
tional continuum described above-the district court concluded that SB
07-199 violated TABOR.' 15 The supreme court reversed, the majority
emphasizing that its disagreement with the district court was as much
about the proper standard to apply as about the merits of the constitution-
al question:
When it issued its declaratory judgment order, the district court did
not have the benefit of our recent decision in Barber v. Ritter, in
which we held that a statute challenged under article X, section 20
must be proven to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trial court erroneously held that the relevant test of SB 07-199's
constitutionality came from the interpretive guideline included in the
text of article X, section 20 to "reasonably restrain most the growth
of government."',
16
Applying the more deferential standard, the supreme court upheld
SB 07-199.
4. The Feedback Loop in Practice
The purpose of highlighting the Mesa County case in this Article is
not to relitigate the case, or to call into question the various standards
applied by the institutional players. The dual purposes are rather to show
the different standards institutions use in answering difficult constitu-
tional questions-the different locations on the continuum they choose to
draw their lines, and to emphasize the often-pivotal impact that where
they choose to draw those lines can have on the outcome of their analysis
and thus on the constitutional fate of a legislative proposal or law. Ulti-
mately, the case shows how those choices can cause what this Article
calls the constitutional feedback loop.
In this case, the policy branches and the supreme court applied
highly deferential standards to the question of SB 07-199's compatibility
with TABOR. As discussed above, these standards could translate into
points on the continuum in the 7-9 range. The Attorney General's Office
114. Mesa Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Colo. Dep't of Educ., No. 07CV12064, at 11 (Colo. Dist.
Ct. May 30, 2008), http://www.coloradoattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/press releases/2008/
06/02/.pdf (citations omitted).
115. Id. at 14.
116. Mesa Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. State, 203 P.3d 519, 523 (Colo. 2009); see also id at 527,
536 (emphasizing the beyond a reasonable doubt standard); id at 539 (Eid, J., dissenting) (discuss-
ing the "the highly deferential approach articulated by the majority").
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and the district court (for different reasons) applied less deferential
standards, in the 4-5 range. It should be no surprise then that in a diffi-
cult case, the standards may have made the difference. If we (surely
counterfactually) assume that every institution involved here objectively
believed the law was slightly more likely unconstitutional than constitu-
tional-a 6.5, say, on the continuum-then each of the institutions would
still have arrived at the same conclusion it did. The policy branches, re-
solving their "1.5 points worth" of doubt into their presumption would
still have concluded that the bill could proceed. The supreme court's
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard has at least that much room for
doubt, and would have upheld the law. The attorney general and the dis-
trict court, giving no benefit of the doubt, would still have concluded that
the law went beyond their standards.
On the other hand, had the supreme court elected to follow the dis-
trict court's analysis of the interpretive language of TABOR and had
chosen to resolve doubts against the bill rather than in its favor, or even
to apply a neutral "5" or minimally deferential "6" on our continuum, the
result would have been different. Under those standards (given our as-
sumed objective 6.5 level of doubt) the supreme court, without changing
its actual analysis of the merits at all, would have affirmed the district
court and held the law unconstitutional.
Thus we see the practical importance of where institutions elect to
draw their lines, and we have seen how and why they choose the various
points on the continuum at which they typically draw those lines. In the
next section of this Article, I will attempt to explain some of the second-
level effects of those choices, and move into a short normative analysis
of whether the system should be and could be improved.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FEEDBACK LOOP
A. How the Feedback Loop Works
The end result of all these standards is that every institution's stand-
ard falls to the right side of the continuum of deference. Every institu-
tion, in other words, asks not whether a law is constitutional, but whether
it is clearly or undoubtedly unconstitutional. This results in a feedback
loop: the attorney general and the courts will defer to the policy branch-
es' constitutional judgments, but the policy branches then take that def-
erence into account in making that judgment themselves. The former two
institutions assume the policy branches have asked the constitutional
question and will uphold the law even if their independent judgment is
that the law is probably (though not undoubtedly) unconstitutional.
Meanwhile, the policy branches look to how the courts will assess the
constitutional question, and thus do not directly ask the constitutional




The result of the feedback loop is that laws that all three branches
might agree have serious constitutional problems-perhaps even some
that all would agree are probably unconstitutional-will be passed by the
legislature, signed by the governor, defended by the attorney general, and
upheld by the courts.
In mathematical terms, if the "beyond a reasonable doubt" line falls
around 75%, 17 then the feedback loop works like this: Imagine that a
neutral body of legal minds, applying no deference or heightened burden,
would assess that Law X is 80% likely to be unconstitutional."' The
policy branches, in considering whether to pass and sign the law, first
would resolve doubts in their own favor. If that alone were the question
the policy branches asked, this would likely result in these branches not
passing the law. As discussed above, even a presumption of constitution-
ality does not mean resolving all doubts, even extreme doubts, and we
can assume 80% is beyond even the level of doubt the policy branches
would accept. But, as just discussed, the policy branches do not actually
ask what is the likelihood a law is unconstitutional; they ask what is the
likelihood the courts will strike it down. And since the courts ask only
whether a law has been proven unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
doubt, the deference essentially gets multiplied. The legislature will take
the .80 chance the law is unconstitutional and multiply it by the .80
chance that the courts will find it unconstitutional, and arrive at .64.
Thus, a law that would have fallen outside even the highly deferential
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard (set here at .75) is now within the
standard and would likely be passed by the policy branches.
The 2007 OLLS Memo from the Mesa County case study appears to
make this feedback loop explicit. As noted above, OLLS began with a
deferential standard ("to resolve doubts about whether the general as-
sembly has authority to enact a particular piece of legislation in favor of
the general assembly's plenary power"). This is questionable in itself.
But then OLLS went on to incorporate into its analysis the additionally
deferential standard that court apply ("if challenged, the repeal would
have to be proven unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt"). Thus, it
seems that the question the legislature is asking is not whether the law is
unconstitutional, or even whether it is clearly unconstitutional, but
whether there are doubts about whether the courts will uphold the law.
Thus, the deference the courts grant the legislature itself becomes part of
the policy branches' analysis, and they ask not whether the law is consti-
tutional, but whether the courts will uphold it. As explained above, these
are very different things in our deferential world.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
118. One might imagine arriving at such an assessment by polling the group, and having 80%
declare the law is unconstitutional while 20% declare it constitutional.
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So even if everyone agrees that the issues discussed in subpart I(B)
above justify a generally deferential approach to constitutional ques-
tions-that indeed, some unconstitutional laws be allowed to go "free"
lest one constitutional one be blocked; this feedback loop shows that the
current system may allow more to go free than anyone suggests is opti-
mal. The section below discusses what, if anything, can be done about it.
B. Can the Loop be Broken?
The ultimate goal of the system as a whole should be to minimize
two types of errors: erroneously allowing unconstitutional laws to be-
come and remain law (which may be referred to as "mistaken lenity"),
and erroneously preventing laws that would be constitutional from taking
effect ("mistaken obstruction"). Of course, there is a tradeoff among the
two-the more careful one is about the former, the harder it is to protect
against the latter and vice versa.
Part II shows that all of the actors in our system have arrived, by de-
sign or otherwise, at points on the continuum of constitutionality that
heavily protect against mistaken obstruction; the inevitable conclusion is
that they thereby will make mistakes of lenity more often. As that discus-
sion shows, there are powerful reasons in our democratic society to pre-
fer this outcome-to be more worried about erroneously blocking laws
than about erroneously allowing them to pass, and therefore, this bias
may be proper.
At the same time it is worrisome that only rarely does any state ac-
tor actually ask if a law is constitutional before they enact, sign, defend,
or uphold it. In general, however, there is little that can be done, particu-
larly by the courts or the attorney general, to alter this imperfect system
without causing more harm than it would prevent. Given the author's
position as solicitor general, it is hardly surprising that I do not believe
there is much that can be done to alter the role of the attorney general in
this process. If I did, I would have sought to do so internally. It is certain-
ly tempting to argue that our office should take a more forceful role in
challenging and questioning the other branches' constitutional judgment.
And given the institutional independence of the state attorney general,
doing so would not be entirely without constitutional justification. But
the position described in subpart 1(B) is a delicate balance of that inde-
pendence and the fundamental role of the office as counselor and advo-
cate for the state's laws and agencies. Without additional constitutional
changes further empowering the attorney general to make independent
constitutional judgments, there is little that our office can do to alter the
current system.
Similarly, there is little the judiciary can do substantively that would
not cause more institutional problems than it would solve. For all the
reasons discussed in subpart II(A), the courts simply must give the policy
branches some deference and uphold duly-enacted laws unless doubts
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about their constitutionality substantially outweigh arguments in their
favor. I do believe that the system would benefit, however, if the judici-
ary were to adopt a stated standard that more closely reflects its actual
approach. One need not necessarily agree with Justice Eid that the su-
preme court selectively applies the beyond a reasonable doubt burden to
understand that in practice the court's standard is usually far lower than
what it would allow a jury to apply in a criminal case. 9 In most cases,
the court seems to apply a standard nearer to a preponderance or, at most,
clear and convincing level (in the 5.5-7.5 or 55-75% range on the nu-
merical scales). Making this explicit would not only aid litigants in
properly understanding how the courts approach constitutional questions,
it would help to alleviate the effects of the feedback loop because the
policy branches (and the Office of the Attorney General) would better
understand the deference they get from the judiciary.12 0 More accurately
describing the courts' actual standards would also make easier the more
significant recommendations urged upon the policy branches below.
The policy branches could break the feedback loop by making two
changes to the way they ask their attorneys to answer constitutional ques-
tions. First, they should not ask what the judiciary is likely to do should
the law be challenged in court. This aspect of the analysis is simply inap-
propriate in answering the bare question: Is this proposed law constitu-
tional? Since the judiciary itself will give the policy branches a strong
degree of deference, what courts will do is by definition not a guide to
actual constitutionality. The combination of the courts' deference with
the policy branches' looking to the courts for guidance is what exacer-
bates the issues that deference itself creates and turns them into a feed-
back loop. Instead, the policy branches should make an independent
analysis of any constitutional questions.
Second, in doing so, the policy branches should not "resolve any
doubts in favor of upholding the legislature's action."' 2 1 Given the pow-
erful deference that the other institutions give to the policy branches,
those branches should resolve questions instead by resolving significant
doubts against their own exercise of power. In other words, the policy
branches should draw their line at the middle or to the left of center on
the continuums above. This is the only way to prevent the number of
119. See Mesa Cnty, 203 P.3d at 539 (Eid, J., dissenting).
120. This question has been explored elsewhere. See, e.g., Michael L. Buenger, Friction by
Design: The Necessary Contest of State Judicial Power and Legislative Policymaking, 43 U. RICH.
L. REV. 571, 603 (2009) ("Too much deference to state legislative power renders constitutional
imitations meaningless . .. . Too little deference to state legislative power erodes its presumptively
plenary nature and creates ample grounds for political and interbranch conflict over the parameters
of particular limitations."); F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1447, 1458-59 (2010) ("[C]ourts would overturn legislation only if it was
based on a clearly mistaken, irrational interpretation of the Constitution."); Robert A. Schapiro,
Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitutional Law, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 656, 715 (2000) (advocating a "contextual approach" to judicial deference).
121. Contra Schapiro, supra note 120, at 694.
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unconstitutional laws that go into effect from outpacing the justifiable
number in a polity that can legitimately be said to be governed by a con-
stitution.
Perhaps the best place to draw that line would be as an inverse of
the standard used by the courts. If the courts will uphold a law unless it is
shown to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, the policy
branches ought to refrain from enacting the law unless they find it is con-
stitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Again in terms of the continuums,
if the courts put the number at an 8 on the right side of the continuum,
the policy branches should use something close to the 2 on the left.
In practice, this would not affect the great run of constitutional
questions that are asked and resolved within these various institutions.
But it would alter the conclusion of something like the 2007 OLLS
Memo. There, the policy branches were told by OLLS that the proposed
law presented a "close question",122 but that "if challenged, the [law]
would have to be proven unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt,"
and therefore, OLLS concluded that the law would be upheld.123 Under
this proposal, OLLS would not ask whether the courts were likely or not
to uphold the law, nor would it resolve doubts in favor of constitutionali-
ty. Instead, the analysis would begin by asking whether there were sig-
nificant constitutional questions. Here, since OLLS admitted there were
"close" questions, the answers to the constitutional questions would be
yes. The next question would simply be which side of the selected tip-
ping point on continuum of constitutionality the proposed law fell on.
Assuming that "close" means near to 50/50, then under the "clear and
convincing" standard, OLLS would have to conclude that the law should
not be passed. Only if OLLS could say that the question is "clearly" an-
swered in favor of constitutionality would it recommend passage. Under
the "preponderance" standard it isn't clear what the result would have
been. The analysis would have had to be more specific and robust to re-
solve what side of the line the "close" question fell.124 If those branches
concluded that the law was probably constitutional, then they would pro-
ceed. But if the doubts weighed on the right side of the continuum, then
the conclusion would have to be not to allow the bill to become law.
Were they to do so, it would result in at least one institution asking
whether a law is constitutional-a result that seems entirely to be de-
sired.
If the policy branches refuse to adopt these alterations, it may be
reasonable to conclude that they not only understand the feedback loop
but take advantage of it to implement policies they know may well be
122. See 2007 OLLS Memo, supra note 91, at 2.
123. Id. at 2, 7.
124. This requirement of more specificity and robustness itself is a benefit of this proposed
change, even if it would not alter the ultimate conclusion in any instance.
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unconstitutional. This would undermine the very basis for the deferential
postures the other institutions take to the policy branches' enactments. 125
Therefore, the courts and attorney general might have to consider mov-
ing their tipping points to the left on the continuums above, asserting a
more rigorous method of review.'26
This should not be necessary. Unlike with the judiciary and the at-
torney general, there are no institutional limitations that prevent the poli-
cy branches from adopting and applying this more stringent standard.
Instead, those branches are constrained only by political considerations:
after all, at least in theory, the reason a bill would be passed is because a
majority of citizens or their representatives want it to be. Asking the pol-
icy branches to adopt a proposed standard that would prevent them in
some instances from enacting laws that they or their constituents desire is
of course asking for a significant and perhaps unrealistic amount of self-
restraint. After all, the reason we have constitutions at all is because rely-
ing on the self-restraint of those in power is a fool's errand. 127
So ultimately it may be that the public itself will have to be the "in-
stitution" that applies an undeferential standard to constitutional ques-
tions and will have to restrain their legislators-and themselves-from
seeking laws that transgress the constitution. As Publius recognized, "A
dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the gov-
ernment."' 28 Nevertheless, the current system is generally unremarked
125. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997) ("When Congress acts within its
sphere of power and responsibilities, it has not just the right but the duty to make its own informed
judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution. This has been clear from the early days of
the Republic. In 1789, when a Member of the House of Representatives objected to a debate on the
constitutionality of legislation based on the theory that 'it would be officious' to consider the consti-
tutionality of a measure that did not affect the House, James Madison explained that 'it is incontro-
vertibly of as much importance to this branch of the Government as to any other, that the constitu-
tion should be preserved entire. It is our duty.' Were it otherwise, we would not afford Congress the
presumption of validity its enactments now enjoy." (quoting I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 500 (1789)).
126. This question has been explored elsewhere. See, e.g., Michael L. Buenger, Friction by
Design: The Necessary Contest of State Judicial Power and Legislative Policymaking, 43 U. RIcH.
L. REV. 571, 603 (2009) ("Too much deference to state legislative power renders constitutional
imitations meaningless . . . . Too little deference to state legislative power erodes its presumptively
plenary nature and creates ample grounds for political and interbranch conflict over the parameters
of particular limitations."); F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1447, 1458-59 (2010) ("[C]ourts would overturn legislation only if it was
based on a clearly mistaken, irrational interpretation of the Constitution."); Schapiro, supra note 120,
at 715 (advocating a "contextual approach" to judicial deference). See also Clark Neily & Dick M.
Carpenter II, Government Unchecked: The False Problem of "Judicial Activism" and the Need for
Judicial Engagement, Institute for Justice, at 3, 10 (2011) (arguing that the job of "keeping the other
branches within the bounds of the Constitution and ensuring individual rights are not trampled by
over-reaching government ... cannot be left to policymakers themselves" but that "instead ofjudg-
ment, courts often show reflexive deference to other branches of government".)
127. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 252 (James Madison) (Cambridge University Press ed.,
2003) ("If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men,
neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government
which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable
the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.").
128. Id.
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upon, and these minor but potentially important alterations are at least
worth considering and discussing.12 9 If they are rejected, the discussion
would be worthwhile for the institutions of the government and for the
people they represent and serve.
129. Id. ("[E]xperience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.").
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Exactly two weeks after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Jus-
tice Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) circulated a classified
opinion on the "scope of the President's authority to take military action
in response to the terrorist attacks."' This legal opinion, authored by
Deputy Assistant Attorney General John C. Yoo, argued that President
George W. Bush had broad constitutional authority, not limited to con-
gressional or statutory authorization, to conduct military operations both
foreign and domestic against the terrorists. A critical portion of the legal
rationale underlying this conclusion was worded as follows:
[I]t is clear that the Constitution secures all federal executive power
in the President to ensure a unity in purpose and energy in action.
"Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize
the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the
proceedings of any greater number." The centralization of authority
in the President alone is particularly crucial in matters of national de-
fense, war, and foreign policy, where a unitary executive can evalu-
ate threats, consider policy choices, and mobilize national resources
with a speed and energy that is far superior to any other branch. As
Hamilton noted, "Energy in the executive is a leading character in the
definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the
community against foreign attacks." This is no less true in war.2
This was but the first in a series of now-declassified memos issued
by the Office of Legal Counsel in the wake of the September 1Ith attacks
that relied on a controversial theory of executive power-the unitary
executive theory (UET)-to construct the legal framework for the War
on Terror.
f Assistant Professor of Politics, Pomona College. Ph.D. University of California, Berkeley
(2010).
1. OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE PRESIDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST TERRORISTS AND NATIONS SUPPORTING
THEM (2001) [hereinafter MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST TERRORISTS], available at 2001 WL
34726560.
2. Id. at 4 (emphasis added) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton)).
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The UET, 3 while novel for reasons I will discuss, is but the latest in
a long line of political instruments presidents have used to loosen the
constraints on presidential power. However, as one scholar has observed,
prior to the George W. Bush Administration, the ideas and institutions
that had been developed in response to the separation-of-powers problem
were mostly political innovations, not constitutional ones. The UET is
therefore distinct (and distinctly potent) because it finds the justification
for expansive presidential power in the text, history, and structure of the
Constitution itself.4 The Constitution's Vesting Clause states that "[t]he
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America."5 To wit, proponents of the UET interpret this Clause as consti-
tuting a broad and exclusive grant of power and responsibility over the
entire Executive Branch of government. As Supreme Court Justice Anto-
nin Scalia, a strong and vocal advocate of a unitary executive, argued in
his dissent in Morrison v. Olson,6 Article II vests "all of the executive
power" in the President, not "some of the executive power."7 When this
robust interpretation of the Vesting Clause is considered alongside the
Commander in Chief Clause, the Take Care Clause, and the Oath of Of-
fice, the sphere of presidential power "can be broadened along any num-
ber of fronts-for example in interpreting and executing the law, or in
conducting foreign relations, or in war-making and the control of mili-
tary affairs."'
The ideas and language attendant to the UET began to appear in scat-
tered law review articles throughout the mid-to-late 1970s.9 However, it
3. While at least two observers have linked the phrase "unitary executive" to essays in the
Federalist Papers that discuss the importance of maintaining "unity" in the Executive branch, see
ROBERT J. SPITZER, SAVING THE CONSTITUTION FROM LAWYERS 93 (2008); Jeffrey Rosen, Power of
One: Bush's Leviathan State, NEW REPUBLIC (July 24, 2006), http://www.tnr.com/article/bushs-
leviathan-state, its more proximate origins can be traced to language from the Supreme Court's
opinion in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926) ("The ordinary duties of officers pre-
scribed by statute come under the general administrative control of the President by virtue of the
general grant to him of the executive power, and he may properly supervise and guide their construc-
tion of the statutes under which they act in order to secure that unitary and uniform execution of the
laws which article 2 of the constitution evidently contemplated in vesting general executive power in
the President alone.").
4. Stephen Skowronek, The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: A Develop-
mental Perspective on the Unitary Executive, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2070, 2092-93 (2009).
5. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
6. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
7. Id. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8. Skowronek, supra note 4, at 2076.
9. See William Van Alstyne, A Political and Constitutional Review of United States v. Nix-
on, 22 UCLA L. REV. 116, 134 (1974) ("Among the specific executive powers enumerated in article
II of the Constitution is that 'he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.' . . . The 'he'
referred to in article 11 is the President, a unitary office, deliberately selected to be unitary against
alternative proposals advanced in Convention in 1787, and enacted into express language: 'The
executive Power shall be vested in a President . . . ."'); see also Donald E. King & Arthur B. Leav-
ens, Curbing the Dog of War: The War Powers Resolution, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 55, 61-62 (1977)
("While the power over foreign affairs is nominally divided between the President and Congress, the
institutional advantages of the unitary executive over the legislature produce a recognized ascenden-
cy of the President in foreign affairs." (footnotes omitted)).
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was not until the beginning of the Reagan Administration that the UET
made its political debut. As Figure 1 illustrates, beginning in 1981 offi-
cials in the Reagan Justice Department started using the language "uni-
tary executive" to defend and bolster presidential priorities in signing
statements, OLC opinions, and legal briefs. While this effort continued
on throughout the George H. W. Bush Administration, it was not until
the George W. Bush Administration that the UET became the political
and constitutional tool of choice for Executive Branch officials. As we
see from Figure 1, in the two decades between the UET's Executive
Branch debut and the end of the Clinton Administration, the phrase "uni-
tary executive" was used to explain or support Executive Branch policies
in just twenty-seven documents. During the eight years that George W.
Bush was in office, on the other hand, that figure nearly quadrupled.
How do we explain this? In discussing the history and development of
the UET, Stephen Skowronek has recently argued that "plausibility and
timeliness" help account for how the UET became an "effective con-
struction of presidential power."" His own work provides valuable in-
sights into the role timeliness played in the ascendance of the UET, dis-
cussing at great length the historical and institutional developments with-
in the American Presidency that laid the groundwork for the UET while
10. The tallies for the total number of Signing Statements, Executive Orders, and miscellane-
ous documents were obtained through a search of the American Presidency Project's (http://www.
Presidency.ucsb.edu) archive of Presidential Public Papers for documents containing "unitary" AND
"executive" conducted on 7/1/10. Results were then scanned individually and filtered for relevance
by the author. The tallies for Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) opinions were obtained through a
combination of HeinOnline's online archive of published Office of Legal Counsel opinions (1977-
1996) and the Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel archive of Memoranda and Opinions
(1997-2008). Each archive was searched for documents containing "unitary" AND "executive" on
7/1/10 and, again, results were then scanned individually and filtered for relevance by author. Final-
ly, the tallies for Justice Department briefs containing the language "unitary" AND "executive" were
obtained following the same procedures through a search of HeinOnline's archive of legal briefs.
11. Skowronek, supra note 4, at 2100.
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also acknowledging the unique political circumstances-September 11th
and the War on Terror-that allowed it to flourish during the George W.
Bush Administration. 12 This Article provides a complementary set of
insights into the other important attribute of an effective construction of
presidential power-plausibility.
Specifically, this Article examines the actors inside and outside the
Executive Branch who consciously invested in the UET between 1981
and 2000, nurturing, developing, and transforming it into the plausible
and powerful construction of presidential power that it had become at the
start of the George W. Bush Administration. It draws on previously un-
examined evidence from the Reagan and George H.W. Bush Justice De-
partments, Federalist Society conferences and publications, law reviews,
and personal interviews to show how the UET matured over the course
of two decades from a rather limited critique of the modem administra-
tive state into a full-blown prescription for presidential power; what
Robert J. Spitzer has described as "Article II on Steroids."' It finds that
the long-term investments in the development of the UET by legal elites
between 1981 and 2000 were critical to its political ascendance during
the George W. Bush Administration. Accordingly, it argues that without
these prior investments in the theory's plausibility, the UET would not
have become entrenched in Executive Branch policies and culture to the
extent that it was during the George W. Bush Administration.
Section I begins the narrative of the political genesis and develop-
ment of the UET in the Justice Department under President Ronald
Reagan. While Skowronek and others have shown how the ideas and
premises underlying the theory of the unitary executive had gained trac-
tion and been put to political use in prior presidential administrations,1
this Article is primarily interested in the genesis and evolution of the
UET qua UET. To that end, all records and searches I performed indicat-
ed that the Reagan Justice Department is where the UET first took shape
from the primordial soup of loosely formed ideas and premises that had
hitherto defined it. Section II proceeds chronologically, showing how the
UET was then nurtured, developed, and expanded within the George H.
W. Bush Administration and also outside of government with the institu-
tional help and support of the Federalist Society for Law and Public Poli-
cy. It finds that while adherents of the UET were in political exile during
the Clinton Administration, the Federalist Society and its network of
members inside the academy played a central role in the continued theo-
retical development of the UET.
Section III examines the political returns on this two decade-long
investment in the UET. It shows how individuals within the George W.
12. Id. at 2073.
13. SPITZER, supra note 3, at 92.
14. See Skowronek, supra note 4; see also PETER M. SHANE, MADISON'S NIGHTMARE: How
EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2009).
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Bush Administration, a significant number of whom had come up
through the ranks of the Federalist Society, were able to draw on a ma-
ture UET to support and justify some of the Administration's most con-
troversial legal policies. In closing, Section IV offers some lessons
learned from this narrative of the ascendance of the UET as contingent
upon the conscious, long-term intellectual investment of legal elites. In
doing so, it underscores the importance of investing in institutions and
personnel that, under the right circumstances, can help "ideas have con-
sequences."15
I. THE REAGAN JUSTICE DEPARTMENT: THE UET IN GESTATION
As head of a unitary executive, the President controls all subordi-
nate officers within the executive branch. The Constitution vests in
the President of the United States "The executive Power," which
means the whole executive power. . . . Any attempt by Congress to
constrain the President's authority to supervise and direct his subor-
dinates in this respect, violates the Constitution. 6
I took administrative law at Yale . . . I think we did the whole
thing without discussing the President. It was a little bit like Hamlet
without the Prince . . . it was only at the [Reagan] Justice Department
that I was exposed to arguments about the President, a unitary execu-
tive, and the President having control of the entire executive. And I
would say the Justice Department experience and especially at [the
Office of Legal Counsel]-there were a lot of people there who
would later become academics-really allowed me to learn and in-
ternalize a theory of things that just wasn't out there.
-Michael Rappaport] 7
The "Reagan Revolution," wrote former Solicitor General Charles
Fried, was "fought on two fronts."' 8 The first front was the political
front. Following the Reagan Era mantra of limited government, aggres-
sive tax cuts would "starve politicians of the resources with which they
would regulate the economy" and shift the economic paradigm from
Washington-centric steering to a free market, libertarian approach.1 9
"The other front," Fried reminds us, "was the legal front." 20 Fried de-
15. Refers to the title of an oft-cited book within conservative and libertarian circles. See
RICHARD M. WEAVER, IDEAS HAVE CONSEQUENCES (1948).
16. Statute Limiting the President's Authority to Supervise the Director of the Centers for
Disease Control in the Distribution of an AIDS Pamphlet, 12 Op. O.L.C. 47,48 (1988) (first empha-
sis added).
17. Interview with Michael Rappaport, Professor of Law, Univ. of San Diego (Mar. 17, 2008)
(emphasis added) (discussing his tenure in the Reagan Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel
as a Special Assistant from 1986-1988).
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scribes the tenets of this other Reagan Revolution in his memoir, Order
and Law: Arguing the Reagan Revolution-A Firsthand Account:
The tenets of the Reagan Revolution were clear: courts should be
more disciplined, less adventurous and political in interpreting the
law, especially the law of the Constitution; the President must be al-
lowed a strong hand in governing the nation and providing leader-
ship; justice and racial equality could be-and so should be-
achieved without twisting legal principles. 21
On the front lines of this battle were the Attorney General, the So-
licitor General, and countless others in the Department of Justice who
worked behind the scenes to quietly carry out the tenets of this ambitious
Reagan Revolution in the law.22
While the legal arm of the Reagan Revolution was implemented
with mixed results during the Reagan Administration,2 3 Reagan's Justice
Department should still be described as revolutionary for the legacy it
left behind in the form of ideas and, more importantly, personnel who
were shaped by those ideas. As Steven M. Teles has explained, the
Reagan Justice Department "invested quite considerable resources to
transform the broader terrain of constitutional and jurisprudential
thought."2 4 For example, the Justice Department's Office of Legal Policy
was repurposed to serve as a vibrant constitutional think tank focused not
only on judicial selection but also on the longer-term projects of bolster-
ing the intellectual foundations of conservative and libertarian constitu-
tional thought. 25 The Justice Department also increased the frequency
with which it conducted academic seminars, hosted prominent intellectu-
al and conservative legal thinkers, and held long-range planning retreats,
"oriented toward objectives that reached beyond Reagan's term in of-
fice." 26 Most importantly, in addition to these institutional investments,
there was a conscious focus on staffing the Justice Department with
young, ideological conservatives and libertarians committed to the tenets
of the Reagan Revolution-individuals who would continue to be com-
mitted to these tenets well after the Reagan Administration came to a
close.27
21. Id. at 17-18.
22. Id at 17.
23. See id. at 170; see also LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
AND THE RULE OF LAW 69 (1987); DOUGLAS W. KMIEC, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER:
INSIDE THE MEESE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, at xi (1992);WILLIAM FRENCH SMITH, LAW AND JUSTICE
IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION: THE MEMOIRS OF AN ATTORNEY GENERAL, at xvii (1991).
24. Steven M. Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy: Reagan 's Lawyers and the Dynamics of
Political Investment. 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 61, 63 (2009).
25. Id at 69; see also Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congres-
sional Power: Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363, 389, 397 (2008).
26. Teles, supra note 24, at 67.
27. Id. at 20-33; see also CORNELL W. CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL AND THE MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY 151 (1992); FRIED, supra note 18, at 50-51; Amanda
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Former Attorney General Edwin Meese III, the driving force behind
many of these innovations, described to me the kind of intellectual cul-
ture he sought to cultivate in the Justice Department by way of these
institutional and personnel changes:
One of the things we wanted to do was provide intellectual stimula-
tion and not let the Justice Department sink into a kind of matter of
fact civil service mentality organization but rather to have it as a vi-
brant law firm with an intellectual component . . . particularly have
people understand the broader intellectual context in which a system
of law-and think of that in the larger sense in our nation-should be
carried out and how the Justice Department could contribute to en-
riching that legal system, both in terms of the day-to-day work we
were doing but also in terms of the speaking and the other kinds of
things we did, recognizing that the Justice Department should be a
leader in the legal profession as a whole.28
Special Assistant United States Attorney and co-founder of the Fed-
eralist Society Steven Calabresi confirmed that these efforts had a power-
ful impact on the culture of the department: "[T]he Justice Department at
that time had the feel of a faculty. Obviously we didn't have students but
it was a bit like a conservative legal think tank. There was a very aca-
demic atmosphere to the Department." 29 The intellectual heritage of the
Reagan Justice Department has been preserved in the memoranda and
opinions of the OLC, the legal briefs the Justice Department submitted in
key Supreme Court cases, and various other internal publications that
provide evidence of just how deeply actors in the Justice Department
were thinking about their day-to-day work in terms of "the broader intel-
lectual context" of the law. It is in these artifacts, the products of the De-
partment's long-term investment in ideas and broad program of intellec-
tual change, that we see evidence of the UET emerging in its nascent
form.
A. Unitary Executive Theory: Office ofLegal Counsel Memos
One of the most important "tenets" of the Reagan Revolution in the
law, to recall Charles Fried's language, was that "the President must be
allowed a strong hand in governing the nation and providing leader-
ship."3 0 Following this tenet, early on in his first term President Reagan
issued an executive order aimed at reigning in and controlling the rule-
making discretion of agencies within the Executive Branch. Executive
Order 12,291 required all executive agencies, "[i]n promulgating new
Hollis-Brusky, The Reagan Administration and the Rehnquist Court's New Federalism,
SELECTEDWORKS, 12 (2008), http://works.bepress.com/amandahollis/l.
28. Interview with Edwin Meese Ill, Ronald Reagan Distinguished Fellow in Pub. Policy and
Chairman of the Ctr. for Legal and Judicial Studies, Heritage Found. (Feb. 5, 2008).
29. Interview with Steven Calabresi, Co-Founder, Federalist Soc'y & former Special Assis-
tant to Att'y Gen. Meese (Apr. 3, 2008).
30. FRIED, supra note 18, at 17-18.
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regulations, reviewing existing regulations, and developing legislative
proposals concerning regulation," to submit for approval a Regulatory
Impact Analysis to the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief op-
erating within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).31 This ex-
ecutive order, as described by scholar Peter M. Shane, "revolutionized
the rulemaking process by routinizing White House oversight of pro-
posed agency rules and specifying a general philosophy that agency
heads would be required to follow." 3 2 Shane further characterizes the
executive order as "a significant move . . . if only because by mandating
a cost-benefit framework, the President effectively tilted the playing
field in the direction of. . . [his own] regulatory philosophy."3
The Justice Department's OLC, in performing its function as "the
Attorney General's lawyer," 34 was asked to review the executive order
for form and legality. In an opinion issued in February of 1981, the OLC
defended the order by relying on a crude but distinctly identifiable theory
of the unitary executive:
The President's authority to issue the proposed executive order de-
rives from his constitutional power to "take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed." U.S. CONsT., Art. II, § 3. It is well established
that this provision authorizes the President, as head of the Executive
Branch, to "supervise and guide" executive officers . . . "in order to
secure that unitary and uniform execution of the laws which Article
II of the Constitution evidently contemplated in vesting general ex-
ecutive power in the President alone." Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52, 135 (1926).
[This authority] is based on the distinctive constitutional role of
the President. . . . In fulfillment of the President's constitutional re-
sponsibility, the proposed order promotes a coordinated system of
regulation, ensuring a measure of uniformity in the interpretation and
execution of a number of diverse statutes....
Any other conclusion would create a possible collision with
constitutional principles . . . with respect to the President's authority
as head of the Executive Branch.35
This opinion would create a legal and constitutional justification for
the consolidation of regulatory authority within the OMB-an office
staffed by "true believers" such as David Stockman, Michael Horowitz,
31. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981).
32. SHANE, supra note 14, at 150.
33. Id.
34. See Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC's Opinion Writing Function: The Legal Adhesive for a
Unitary Executive, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 337, 337 (1993); see also id at 359-65 (discussing OLC's
role in reviewing Executive Orders for form and legality).
35. Proposed Exec. Order Entitled 'Fed. Regulation,' 5 Op. O.L.C. 59 (1981).
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and others who had been selectively recruited to carry out the Reagan
Revolution. 36 This early opinion would also lay the groundwork for oth-
ers in the OLC to mobilize the fledgling UET to test and expand the lim-
its of presidential power in other ways.
For example, in 1983, the OLC was asked to weigh in on the consti-
tutional question of whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
gave the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) the au-
thority to pursue litigation aims "independent of, and possibly contrary
to, those presented by the Attorney General."3 7 Restoring control over
litigating authority, as scholar Cornell Clayton has documented, was one
of the Reagan White House's primary aims.3 8 After all, if one of the ten-
ets of the Reagan Revolution in the law was to get courts and govern-
ment agencies to stop "twisting" the law to achieve racial and social jus-
tice, then one way to assure this was carried out was to curtail the litigat-
ing authority of agencies like the EEOC, whose primary mission it is to
investigate and enforce antidiscrimination laws. In this particular case,
the EEOC had petitioned to appear on behalf of a class of black appli-
cants and members of the New Orleans Police Department seeking re-
dress from injuries suffered due to alleged racially discriminatory poli-
cies in the selection, training, and promotion of city police officers. The
OLC concluded, in no uncertain terms, that "[t]o permit the EEOC, an
executive agency subject to the authority of the President, to represent on
its own behalf a position in court independent of or contrary to the posi-
tion of the United States, would be inconsistent with the constitutional
principle of the unitary executive."3 9
All told, the Reagan Era OLC relied on an identifiable version of
the UET in seven distinct opinions, each of which asserted, in one way or
another, the constitutional prerogative of the President to supervise and
control the "unitary" Executive Branch.4 0 Moreover, in these opinions,
which span the entire tenure of the Reagan Administration (1981-1988),
one can see evidence of the theory itself becoming better defined, better
supported, and more freely deployed. What in 1981 was described in
general and rather amorphous terms as the constitutional basis for the
President's role in ensuring "uniform and unitary" execution of the laws
had, by 1983, evolved into the "principle of the unitary executive" by
36. Interview with Michael Horowitz, former Gen. Counsel, O.M.B. (Jan. 22, 2008).
37. Litig. Auth. of the E.E.O.C. in Title VII Suits Against State & Local Governmental Enti-
ties, 7 Op. O.L.C. 57 (1983).
38. See CLAYTON, supra note 27, at 200-04.
39. 7 Op. O.L.C. at 62.
40. See 5 Op. O.L.C. 59, 62; Contacts Between the O.M.B. & Exec. Agencies Under Exec.
Order No. 12,291, 5 Op. O.L.C. 107 (1981); Constitutionality of Statute Requiring Exec. Agency to
Report Directly to Congress, 6 Op. O.L.C. 632 (1982); 7 Op. O.L.C. 57; Auth. of the Special Coun-
sel of the Merit Systems Protection Board to Litigate & Submit Legislation to Congress, 8 Op.
O.L.C. 30 (1984); Federal Equal Emp't Opportunity Reporting Act of 1986, 10 Op. O.L.C. 112
(1986); Statute Limiting the Auth. to Supervise the Dir. of the C.D.C. in the Distribution of an AIDS
Pamphlet, 12 Op. O.L.C. 47 (1988).
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name.4 1 Even more strikingly, as illustrated by an OLC opinion issued in
March of 1988, by the close of the Reagan Administration the UET had
become a much sharper and more powerful weapon in the battle to con-
solidate presidential control over the Executive Branch. 42 This opinion,
signed by Assistant Attorney General Charles J. Cooper, uses the lan-
guage "unitary" or "unity" in conjunction with presidential power eleven
times.4 3 Moreover, the memo contains entire sections on "The Nature of
the Unitary Executive" and "Evidence of Original Intent," which provide
detailed evidence from The Federalist, the Ratification Debates, and the
Annals of Congress supporting the UET and its attendant interpretation
of presidential power.44
These seven OLC opinions, each of which helped President Reagan
consolidate power and control over the Executive Branch, tell but one
part of the story of the development of the UET within the Reagan Jus-
tice Department. Officials within the Reagan Justice Department were
also honing the UET to be used in a much bigger and higher profile cam-
paign to consolidate Executive Branch power under the President's con-
trol. This part of the Reagan Era battle to rearrange governmental power,
as Solicitor General Fried would later describe it, would be waged at the
Supreme Court.45
B. Unitary Executive Theory: The Campaign in the Courts
A nascent but developing UET also provided the Reagan Justice
Department litigators with the impetus and justification they needed to
bring their battle for increased presidential power and Executive Branch
control to the Supreme Court. Emboldened by a then-recent Supreme
Court decision, INS v. Chadha,4 6 which struck down the one-house legis-
lative veto on separation of powers grounds,4 7 litigators in the Justice
Department decided to test just how receptive the High Court would be
to similar separation of powers challenges. Unlike in Chadha, in
Bowsher v. Synar" and Morrison v. Olson, the Justice Department
framed its separation of powers argument explicitly in terms of the
UET.4 9 In discussing the decision to ground the Justice Department's
separation of powers campaign in terms of the UET, former Solicitor
General Fried wrote that it was Attorney General Meese who ultimately
41. Compare 5 Op. O.L.C. 59, with 7 Op. O.L.C. 57.
42. See 12 Op. O.L.C. 47.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. FRIED, supra note 18, at 133.
46. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
47. Id. at 959.
48. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
49. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 6, Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 732 (1988) (No. 87-1279), 1988 WL 1031600; Brief for the United States at
10, Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (Nos. 85-1377, 85-1378 and 85-1379), 1986 WL
728082.
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convinced him on the subject.50 As Fried explains in his memoir, and
other Reagan Justice alumni I interviewed confirmed, during his tenure
as Attorney General, Meese arranged several workshops and seminars on
the separation of powers in general, and the unitary executive in particu-
lar, so that individuals like Fried, who didn't come to the Department
"committed to th[e] program" were ultimately "convinced."" The Justice
Department's briefs in Bowsher and Morrison, which showcase a much
more theoretically developed UET than many of the OLC opinions ex-
amined in the previous section, demonstrate that the Solicitor General
was not alone in his conversion to the JET.
The first of the two post-Chadha separation of powers cases,
Bowsher v. Synar, implicated the constitutionality of the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings (GRH) Act, which vested in the Comptroller General
the authority to initiate automatic, across-the-board cuts in federal spend-
ing.5 2 This transfer of power to the Comptroller General raised constitu-
tional issues implicating the separation of powers, for even though he
was appointed by the President, the Comptroller General was subject to
removal by Congress, raising the question of whether an agent of the
Executive Branch could be removed by Congress. 53 The UET provided
Justice Department litigators with a constitutional argument for why and
how this provision threatened the separation of powers and the integrity
of the unitary executive:
The Framers deliberately settled upon a unitary Executive in order to
promote a sense of personal responsibility and accountability to the
people in the execution of the laws -- and thereby to ensure vigorous
administration of the laws and protection of the liberty, property, and
welfare of the people. The Federalist No. 70. (A. Hamilton) (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961). . . . A division between the President and the
Comptroller General of authority over the administration of the laws
throughout the Executive Branch cannot be reconciled with this con-
sidered judgment by the Framers.54
All told, in developing its separation of powers argument, the Jus-
tice Department used the words "unity" or "unitary" fifteen times.5 And
though the Justices seemed to balk a bit at the "novel doctrine" (i.e., the
UIET) that Solicitor General Fried was articulating on behalf of the Unit-
50. FRIED, supra note 18, at 158.
51. See id.
52. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) Act of
1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (codified as amended in scattered section of 2, 31 & 42
U.S.C.).
53. Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT,
210 (4th ed. 1997).
54. See Brief for the United States, Bowsher v. Synar, supra note 49, at 25.
55. Id. at 25-105.
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56
ed States during oral argument, in the end a majority of the Supreme
Court agreed that the Comptroller General provision was unconstitution-
al.57 In defending its decision, however, the Supreme Court did not make
mention of the unitary executive, relying instead on a general separation
of powers argument to strike down the relevant provision of the GRH
Act.5 1
After Bowsher, the next opportunity Justice Department litigators
had to test the Supreme Court's receptiveness to the UET came in Morri-
son v. Olson. This high-profile case challenged the Independent Counsel
provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, which provided for
the appointment of independent counsels to investigate and prosecute a
sub-set of high-ranking government officials for federal criminal law
violations. 5 9 The litigation in this particular case arose after the Inde-
pendent Counsel presented evidence to a grand jury that resulted in the
issuance of subpoenas to Theodore Olson and two other Justice Depart-
ment officials for criminally defying Congress and refusing to cooperate
with requests for information60 Olson and the other officials moved in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to have the
subpoenas quashed on the grounds that the Independent Counsel provi-
sions violated the Appointments Clause, the Separation of Powers Doc-
trine, and impermissibly interfered with the President's duty to execute
the laws under Article II, Section Three of the Constitution. 6 1 The district
court dismissed the motion, but the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed and declared that the Independent Counsel provisions were un-
constitutional.62
The opinion for the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Morrison has
been described by its principal author, Judge Laurence Silberman, as the
"high water mark" and the "apogee" of the UET-and with good rea-
son.6 3 In a sweeping analysis that spanned nearly forty pages, the majori-
ty opinion systematically argued the case for the importance of a unitary
executive, specifically mentioning the concept by name ten times, in
concluding that the Independent Counsel Act "as a whole jettisons tradi-
56. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (Nos. 85-
1377, 85-1378 and 85-1379), 1986 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 55 ("QUESTION: Well, that strikes me as
kind of a novel doctrine you're espousing, and I can't quite put a finger on that approach in any of
this Court's previous decisions.").
57. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986)
58. See id. at 722-27.
59. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591-598 (2006).
60. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 665-69 (1988).
61. Id. at 668-70.
62. Id
63. See Laurence Silberman, Panel 1: Agency Autonomy and the Unitary Executive, 68 WASH.
U.L.Q. 495, 500 (1990) ("Asking me to speak on the doctrine of the unitary executive is very much
like asking General George Pickett to speak on the future of the Confederacy after the Battle of
Gettysburg. For just as historians love to point to Pickett's Charge as the high water mark of the
South's effort to secede, some legal scholars have labeled my opinion, in which my colleague Steve
Williams joined and collaborated, as the brief apogee of a constitutional lost cause.").
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tional adherence to constitutional doctrines of separation of powers and a
unitary executive, and in so doing, seriously weakens constitutional
structures that serve to protect individual liberty."64 The Supreme Court,
however, reversed and held that the Act did not violate the separation of
powers.65 Justice Antonin Scalia was the lone dissenter. In his dissent,
Justice Scalia twice mentioned the unitary executive by name,66 which
represented the most direct and clear articulation of the UET qua UET in
Supreme Court doctrine before or since. Additionally, Justice Scalia built
his argument for a unitary executive using many of the same historical
sources (e.g., Federalist essays 47, 51, 78, 81 and 70) and arguing many
of the same points that Reagan Justice Department litigators had outlined
in their legal brief.6 7 In the end, however, Scalia's manifesto on the im-
portance of the unitary executive failed to persuade a single one of his
Supreme Court colleagues.
By the end of President Reagan's second term, though largely ig-
nored by the Supreme Court majority in Bowsher and on the losing end
of the battle in Morrison, the UET had nonetheless become the accepted
litigating strategy for Justice Department officials in separation of pow-
ers cases. For example, a 1988 report produced by the Justice Depart-
ment's Office of Legal Policy, while acknowledging the setback in Mor-
rison, still advised litigators that in the coming years "the [Supreme]
Court increasingly may confront Article II separation of powers issues
arising from congressional efforts to expand the powers of independent
agencies" and that the "'unitary Executive' principle of Article II" should
be used to "question the viability of 'independent' agencies in their pre-
sent form." 68 Even more importantly, the showcasing of the UET in the
judicial opinions of both Judge Silberman and Justice Scalia would lend
at least some weight and authority to this position within the legal com-
munity and would help make it a topic of salience outside the Reagan
Justice Department-a relatively small institution that had been the locus
of most UET discussion and theoretical development up to that point. For
example, from 1973 to 1988, only thirty-eight American law review arti-
cles discussed the unitary executive by name. In the four years following
64. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 480-81 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
65. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696.
66. See id. at 727, 732 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The purpose of the separation and equilibra-
tion of powers in general, and of the unitary Executive in particular, was not merely to assure effec-
tive government but to preserve individual freedom . . . . It is, in other words, an additional ad-
vantage of the unitary Executive that it can achieve a more uniform application of the law. Perhaps
that is not always achieved, but the mechanism to achieve is there.").
67. Compare id. at 698, 711, 720, 729 with Brief for the United States, Morrison v. Olson,
supra note 49, at 10, 17-18, 43, 46, 54.
68. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,




the decision in Morrison, however, the words "unitary executive" ap-
peared in seventy-six articles.69
While, as discussed in Section II, there are other reasons why dia-
logue about the UET increased dramatically during the George H.W.
Bush Administration, the Reagan Justice Department's litigating cam-
paign was undoubtedly part of the equation. The decision in Morrison v.
Olson would serve as a call-to-arms for many Reagan alumni and other
proponents of presidential power coming up through the ranks of the
fledgling Federalist Society-a challenge to more fully develop and the-
oretically support what the Supreme Court had dismissed during oral
argument in Bowsher as a "novel doctrine., 70 This post-Reagan Era in-
vestment in the UET, and the failed Supreme Court litigation campaign
that initially animated it, was a key contributor to the UET's ascendance
during the George W. Bush Administration. Without it, the UET might
have indeed become, as Judge Laurence Silberman feared in 1989, "a
constitutional lost cause."7 1
C. Unitary Executive Theory: The Signing Statement Initiative
The Reagan Justice Department's separation of powers litigation
campaign coincided with another, quieter initiative-also grounded in
the theory of the unitary executive-which former Special Assistant
United States Attorney and Federalist Society co-founder Steven
Calabresi would later refer to as "the signing statement initiative."72 Pres-
idential signing statements, official statements issued by the President
upon signing a bill into law, have been used since the nineteenth century
for a variety of purposes: to make a rhetorical comment (i.e., to com-
mend or criticize Congress); to communicate a political directive to sub-
ordinates in the Executive Branch about how a particular requirement
should be carried out; and to flag a constitutional objection to a particular
provision of a bill.73 Under the direction of Attorney General Meese, the
Justice Department's OLC would make far more "aggressive use of pres-
idential signing statements" than had its predecessors and would use
them in a qualitatively different manner-to vigorously defend the Presi-
dent's constitutional prerogatives and to assert a strong role for the Ex-
ecutive Branch in statutory interpretation.7
69. See infra Figure 2.
70. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 56, at 47.
71. See Silberman, supra note 63, at 500.
72. Steven G. Calabresi & Daniel Lev, The Legal Significance of Presidential Signing State-
ments, 4 FORUM, no. 2, 2006 at 2, http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol4/iss2/art8/.
73. See Christopher S. Kelley, The Significance of the Presidential Signing Statement, in
EXECUTING THE CONSTITUTION: PUTTING THE PRESIDENT BACK IN THE CONSTITUTION 73, 74-75
(Christopher S. Kelley, ed., 2006). See generally T.J. HALSTEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL
33667, PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
(2007).
74. Calabresi & Lev, supra note 72, at 1.
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The "signing statement initiative" included a successful proposal to
have West Publishing Company publish the President's signing state-
ments alongside the legislative history of a statute in the United States
Code Congressional and Administrative News. In announcing this initia-
tive at an address before the National Press Club in February of 1986,
Attorney General Meese elaborated on the impetus behind it: "To make
sure that the President's own understanding of what's in a bill . .. is giv-
en consideration at the time of statutory construction later on by a court, .
the presidential statement on the signing of a bill will accompany the
legislative history from Congress . . . . Prior to that time, as Calabresi
has explained, presidential signing statements were less accessible and
therefore rarely relied upon as authoritative pieces of legislative history
for courts to use when construing a statute. As scholar Christopher S.
Kelley has commented, the Reagan Justice Department hoped that by
placing the signing statement beside other pieces of legislative history, it
could force judicial decisionmakers to give due weight and consideration
to the Executive Branch's interpretation of a bill and help tilt the balance
of power toward the President.77
While the language "unitary executive" itself appeared in just one
presidential signing statement during President Reagan's tenure in of-
fice, 78 the UET provided the driving force and the constitutional rationale
for expanding the role of the Executive Branch in statutory interpreta-
tion. As Calabresi would later explain:
[P]residential signing statements ought to be treated as having legal
significance . . . because of the theory of the unitary executive. This
theory holds that the Vesting Clause of Article II is a grant of all of
the executive power in the country to the president....
... Signing statements allow the President to provide authoritative
guidance to his subordinates in the executive branch as to how they
should carry out and execute the law. . . . So viewed, signing state-
ments serve a vital function in making the executive branch function
in practice the way Article II says it should function in theory.
79
75. Id. at 3 (quoting Edwin Meese 1H1, Attorney General, Address at the Nat'l Press Club,
Washington, D.C. (Feb. 25, 1986)).
76. Id.
77. See Kelley, supra note 73, at 80.
78. See Statement on Signing the Bill to Increase the Federal Debt Ceiling, 2 PUB. PAPERS
1096 (Sept. 29, 1987) ("First, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Bowsher v. Synar . . . makes
clear that the Comptroller General cannot be assigned executive authority by the Congress. In light
of this decision, section 206(c) of the joint resolution, which purports to reaffirm the power of the
Comptroller General to sue the executive branch under the Impoundment Control Act, is unconstitu-
tional. It is only [with this] understanding . . that I am signing the joint resolution with this constitu-
tional defect . . .. If this provision [of sections 252(a)(1) and (2) of the amended act] were interpret-
ed otherwise . . . it would plainly constitute an unconstitutional infringement of the President's
authority as head of a unitary executive branch.").
79. Calabresi & Lev, supra note 72, at 16-17.
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We see additional evidence of this Reagan Era campaign to have the
courts recognize presidential signing statements in another 1988 internal
document published by the Office of Legal Policy, called Guidelines on
Constitutional Litigation. It devotes a two-page section to the "Use of
Presidential Signing Statements" and advises Justice Department litiga-
tors as follows:
[G]overnment attorneys should review applicable signing statements
as well as congressional debates and reports and should cite those
statements in support of appropriate interpretations in briefs filed
with the courts ...
. . . [S]tatements made by the President in fulfilling [his Article II
duties] are as relevant to "legislative intent" as are congressional
statements. 80
Even though the publication of presidential signing statements has
not produced a flood of judicial deference to Executive Branch interpre-
tation, grounding the constitutionality of the presidential signing state-
ment in the UET set the stage for future President George W. Bush to
assert an even stronger role in statutory interpretation-one that has
sparked a significant amount of political and constitutional debate on the
use and misuse of presidential signing statements.8 1
D. Unitary Executive Theory in Gestation
Even though the phrase "unitary executive" appeared relatively in-
frequently in Executive Branch papers and policies during the Reagan
Administration, as discussed above, actors in the Reagan Justice De-
partment helped to gestate and develop the UET in important ways-
through seminars and workshops, through the work and opinions of the
Office of Legal Counsel, in their legal briefs, and through the signing
statement initiative. That being said, at the end of Reagan's second term,
the theory was still very much in embryonic form. As of 1988, the UET
was being used primarily as a constitutional tool to bolster the Presi-
dent's role in controlling and overseeing Executive Branch agencies and
80. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINES ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LITIGATION 103 (1988), available at http://www.ialsnet.org/documents/Patersonmaterials2.pdf.
81. See, e.g., Task Force Report on Presidential Signing Statements and the Separation of
Powers Doctrine, AM. BAR ASS'N (August 2006), http://www.abanow.org/wordpress/wp-
content/files flutter/1273179616signstatereport.pdf ("Among those unanimous recommendations,
the Task Force voted to oppose, as contrary to the rule of law and our constitutional system of sepa-
ration of powers, a President's issuance of signing statements that claim the authority or state the
intention to disregard or decline to enforce all or part of a law he has signed, or to interpret such a
law in a manner inconsistent with the clear intent of Congress."). But see, e.g., Edwin Meese Ill,
John S. Baker, Charles J. Cooper, David B. Rivkin, Jr., Gary Lawson, Lee A. Casey, Steven
Calabresi & Robert F. Turner, Presidential Signing Statements, THE FEDERALIST SOC'Y FOR LAW &
PUB. POL'Y, 3 (2006), http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20070321_PresidentialSigningStatements.pdf
(prominent conservative legal scholars arguing in favor of presidential signing statements and con-
cluding that the ABA Task Force got it wrong).
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to reclaim some power from Congress vis-a-vis the interpretation and
execution of the laws. It would take some serious additional theoretical
and intellectual work to develop the UET into the full-blown prescription
for presidential power that it would become by the start of the George W.
Bush Administration.
As stated at the beginning of this section, the Reagan Justice De-
partment should be thought of as revolutionary not simply for its attempt
to carry out the tenets of the Reagan Revolution in the law (which it did
with limited success), but also for the legacy it left behind in ideas and
personnel that were shaped by those ideas. While those ideas survived in
some of the artifacts examined in this section, they also survived in the
personnel who left the Reagan Justice Department and continued on in
various other professional capacities. Though a few of these Reagan Jus-
tice alumni continued on at the Justice Department into the George H.W.
Bush Administration, many more found a home in the Federalist Society
for Law and Public Policy, whose meetings and professional support
allowed them to refine, nurture and develop many of the same ideas that
had been at the center of the Justice Department's intellectual agenda-
including the UET-well after they had left the Justice Department.
II. THE UET NURTURED AND DEVELOPED INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF
GOVERNMENT: 1989-2000
It is abundantly clear that section 102(c)(2), by purporting to re-
quire the President to include "individuals representing the Commis-
sion [on Security and Cooperation in Europe]" as part of a delegation
charged with conducting internal negations, is unconstitutional.
The President possesses broad authority over the Nation's diplo-
matic affairs. That authority flows from his position as head of the
unitary Executive and as Commander in Chief....
-Opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel, "Issues Raised by Foreign
Relations Authorization Bill"82
The [Federalist] Society has always been consistently interested in
promoting . . . protection of Presidential power from incursions by
Congress and things of that kind and those issues are ones that we
have continued to host conferences about and events about for the
last twenty-five years. They were also issues that a lot of people
working in the [Reagan] Justice Department were interested in.
-Federalist Society Co-Founder Steven Calabresi8
82. 14 Op. O.L.C. 37, 38 (1990) (emphasis added).
83. Interview with Steven Calabresi, Co-Founder, Federalist Soc'y & former Special Assis-
tant to Att'y Gen. Meese (Apr. 2, 2008) (emphasis added).
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When the Reagan Administration came to a close, some Justice De-
partment alumni elected to stay on and serve in the George H.W. Bush
Administration.8 4 Many more, however, continued on into positions in
the legal academy, think tanks, private litigation, or judgeships. As for-
mer Attorney General Meese commented in our interview, the Reagan
Justice Department was responsible for training and credentialing a
number of now high-profile conservatives and libertarians who would go
on to become "key leaders in the legal profession":
[W]hat's happened since that time is those [Reagan Justice alumni]
have gone out and we have a lot of people in legal education. We
have somewhere between six and twelve professors at major law
schools around the country . . . . Then, in addition to that we have a
lot of leaders of the profession [and] a lot of judges. So between the
law schools, the legal profession and the Judiciary, after our second
term was over, we provided a lot of the key leaders in those various
parts of the legal profession.85
Whether inside or outside of government, these Reagan Justice
alumni were able to stay connected and to continue work on their ambi-
tious intellectual agenda with the institutional support and encourage-
ment of the fledgling Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy.
As Steven Teles has explained, actors in the Reagan Justice De-
partment consciously invested not only in ideas and the intellectual de-
velopment of conservative and libertarian legal thought but also in per-
sonnel-young idealistic lawyers who would be the future leaders of the
legal profession. A key part of that investment was in the Federalist
Society for Law and Public Policy. By bringing the Society's leaders into
the Justice Department as Special Assistant United States Attorneys and
recruiting the leadership of the Reagan Administration (including Presi-
dent Reagan himself) to participate in Federalist Society conferences and
luncheons, Attorney General Meese and other high-ranking officials pro-
vided a mantle of institutional legitimacy to the nascent organization.
Consequently, as former head of the Office of Legal Counsel Charles J.
Cooper commented in our interview, an "ideological affinity" arose be-
tween the Reagan Justice Department and the Federalist Society:
There was just a philosophical, ideological affinity between the Fed-
eralist Society and the Reagan Administration. The two entities or
organizations shared a common set of beliefs about law, the nature of
law, the nature of the judicial function. That more than anything else
is what bound the Federalist Society and the Reagan Administration
84. See Interview with Douglas Kmiec, former Assistant Att'y Gen., O.L.C. (Mar. 14, 2008)
85. Interview with Meese, supra note 28.
86. Teles, supra note 24, at 63.
214 [Vol. 89:1
HELPING IDEAS HA VE CONSEQUENCES
. . . a shared set of beliefs about, in the broader sense, the nature of
government . 87
This "affinity" is also reflected in the speaker lists from Federalist
Society meetings hosted during the Reagan Era. Of the seventy-six
speakers listed on the published agendas of Federalist Society national
meetings from 1981 to 1988, nineteen (25%) of those speakers would
serve at some point in the Reagan Administration.
As several interviewees discussed with me, Federalist Society meet-
ings created opportunities for Reagan Justice alumni to continue the
work of the "Reagan Revolution." 89 Through the sheer act of pulling
them together as former colleagues and facilitating the continued discus-
sion of important ideas, the Federalist Society reduced the transaction
costs of intellectual collaboration and encouraged the development and
implementation of ideas that had been conceived and gestated in the
Reagan Justice Department-ideas like the ones underlying the UET.
The next section confirms that most of the post-Reagan theoretical ex-
pansion of the UET did in fact happen outside of government. While it
was deployed in several Office of Legal Counsel memos and a handful of
signing statements during the George H.W. Bush Administration, with a
few small exceptions, the UJET was mobilized in the same context as it
had been during the Reagan Administration. It was instead those Reagan
Justice alumni and others working outside of government, individuals
connected with and through the Federalist Society network, who would
contribute most to the theoretical development and expansion of the UET
between the end of the Reagan Administration and the beginning of the
George W. Bush Administration.
A. The Unitary Executive Theory in the George H. W Bush Justice
Department
One of the Reagan Justice alumni who continued on to serve in the
George H.W. Bush Administration was Douglas Kmiec. He did not,
however, stay long into the next administration. The reason being, as he
explained to me in an interview, was that it was "an entirely different
experience. The movement from a time of being inspired by 'ideas hav-
ing consequences' . . . to a time of management was almost like [flip-
ping] a switch." 90 For example, the Office of Legal Policy, which under
Reagan and Meese had functioned as a vibrant legal and constitutional
think tank, dropped its long-term intellectual focus and was largely
stripped of its role in screening and selecting potential judicial candi-
87. Interview with Charles J. Cooper, former Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel
(June 2, 2008).
88. Hollis-Brusky, supra note 27, at 16 (citing to HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (1982-1989)).
89. Interview with Meese, supra note 28; see also Interview with Kmiec, supra note 84;
Interview with Rappaport, supra note 17.
90. Interview with Kmiec, supra note 84.
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dates.91 Further, because his successors were not the academics-at-heart
that Attorney General Meese had been, morning meetings, seminars, and
retreats took on a distinctly less academic focus and tone.92 As another
observer noted, unlike the higher-ups in the Reagan Administration,
those in the George H.W. Bush Administration "never understood the
importance of ideas."93
The lack of intellectual ferment at the Justice Department under
George H.W. Bush likely explains the lack of theoretical change and
development in the UET during those years. That being said, a review of
the work products from the George H.W. Bush Justice Department con-
firms that the UET did survive the administration change intact, and in
fact, evidence from two OLC memos suggests that actors in this Admin-
istration were at least thinking about the UET in a slightly broader con-
text than their predecessors had in the Reagan Justice Department. The
first evidence of this is found in an opinion issued by the OLC in 1990
concerning Issues Raised by the Foreign Relations Authorization Bill.94
The Bill contained a provision requiring the President to include individ-
uals from the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe-an
entity controlled by the Legislative Branch-as part of a delegation
charged with conducting internal negotiations. 95 In making the argument
that this provision of the Bill "unconstitutionally infringes on the Presi-
dent's exclusive authority to conduct negotiations on behalf of the United
States[,]" the OLC asserted that "[t]he President possesses broad authori-
ty over the Nation's diplomatic affairs. That authority flows from his
position as head of the unitary executive and as Commander in Chief."9 6
This is the first time since its debut in the Reagan Justice Depart-
ment that we see evidence of Justice Department actors thinking about
the UET in tandem with the President's Commander in Chief power.
However, the proposition is more or less left to stand on its own with
very little elaboration or further support. In fact, the author(s)
acknowledge that the evidence mobilized "by no means exhaust[s] the
list of what could be cited in support of our conclusion." 97 Building on
this opinion, the OLC later articulated the same rationale-in nearly the
same exact language-for defending the President's discretion in the
issuance of diplomatic passports against congressional efforts to limit
this power:
91. See CLAYTON, supra note 27, at 229.
92. Interview with Kmiec, supra note 84.
93. Interview with Horowitz, supra note 36.
94. 14 Op. O.L.C. 37 (1990).
95. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-
246, 104 Stat. 15 (1990).
96. 14 Op. O.L.C. at, 37-38.
97. Id. at 41.
216 [Vol. 89:1
HELPING IDEAS HAVE CONSEQUENCES
The necessary background for our analysis of the particular issues
presented here is the well-settled recognition of the President's broad
authority over the Nation's foreign affairs. That authority flows from
his position as head of the unitary Executive and as Commander-in-
Chief .... See Issues Raised by Foreign Relations Authorization Bill,
14 Op. O.L.C. 37 (1990).98
Again, the author(s) do not go to great lengths to elaborate on the
evidence or authorities that support the President's "well-settled" and
"broad authority" in foreign affairs or explain how this power is derived
from his position as head of the unitary executive. Nonetheless, the idea
of expanding the UET into the realm of the President's foreign affairs
and war powers was clearly floating around the George H.W. Bush Jus-
tice Department. The only thing missing was the attendant theoretical
support for this move.
The UET provided the OLC with a constitutional rationale for pro-
tecting or expanding presidential power in eight distinct opinions. 99 Fur-
ther, the language "unitary executive" appeared in another five presiden-
tial signing statements, demonstrating that the Reagan Era signing state-
ment initiative had also survived the administration change intact. 00 For
the purposes of understanding the theoretical development of the UET,
however, the situations in which the UET was not deployed during the
George H.W. Bush Administration are perhaps more interesting than
those in which it was. Specifically, there were two controversial opinions
issued by the OLC in 1989.101 These opinions, both signed by William P.
Barr, provided the legal and constitutional justifications for the Bush I
Administration to undertake aggressive covert and military actions
abroad. The first of these opinions, Authority of the Federal Bureau of
98. Issues Raised by Provisions Directing Issuance of Official or Diplomatic Passports, 16
Op. O.L.C. 20,21 (1992).
99. See Whether the Office of Special Counsel for Immigration Related Unfair Emp't Practic-
es Is Empowered to Challenge the Constitutionality of State Statutes, 13 Op. O.L.C. 72, 75 n.5
(1989); Constitutionality of Nuclear Regulatory Comm'ns Imposition of Civil Penalties on the Air
Force, 13 Op. O.L.C. 131, 136 (1989); Common Legislative Encroachments on Exec Branch Auth.,
13 Op. O.L.C. 248, 252-53, 255 (1989); Issues Raised by Foreign Relations Authorization Bill, 14
Op. O.L.C. 37, 38 (1990); Constitutional Limits on "Contracting Out" Dep't of Justice Functions
Under OMB Circular A-76, 14 Op. O.L.C. 94, 96 (1990); Sec'y of Educ. Review of Admin. Law
Judge Decisions, 15 Op. O.L.C. 8, 14-15 & n.13 (1991); Issues Raised by Provisions Directing
Issuance of Official or Diplomatic Passports, 16 Op. O.L.C. 18, 21 (1992); Enforcement Jurisdiction
of the Special Counsel for Immigration Related Unfair Emp't Practices, 6 Op. O.L.C. 121 (1992).
100. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement
Act of 1991, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1649, 1650 (Dec. 19, 1991); Statement on Signing Legislation on Trade
and Unemployment Benefits, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1543, 1544 (Dec. 4, 1991); Statement on Signing the
National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program Reauthorization Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1614, 1615
(Nov. 16, 1990); Statement on Signing the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act,
1991, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1561, 1562 (Nov. 5, 1990); Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Au-
thorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, 1 PUB. PAPERS 239, 241 (Feb. 16, 1990).
101. See, e.g., Sharon LaFraniere, For Nominee Barr, an Unusual Path to Attorney General's
Office, WASH. PosT, Nov. 12, 1991, at A6 (discussing William P. Barr's work on Office of Legal
Counsel Memos authorizing covert CIA actions against Manuel Noriega and FBI campaigns to
capture terrorists on foreign soil without the permission of the foreign nation).
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Investigation to Override International Law in Extraterritorial Law En-
forcement Activities, superseded a prior 1980 opinion in which the OLC
had advised the President that the FBI did not have the legal authority to
carry out extraterritorial law enforcement activities that would contra-
vene or violate "customary international law."l 0 2 In defending its about-
face on the issue less than a decade later, the H.W. Bush OLC stated the
following:
We believe that the 1980 Opinion also erred because it failed to
consider the President's inherent constitutional power to authorize
law enforcement activities. Pursuant to the constitutional command
to "take Care that the laws be faithfully executed," the President has
the power to authorize agents of the executive branch to engage in
law enforcement activities in addition to those provided by statute.
[T]his constitutional authority carries with it the power to over-
ride customary international law. Thus, Executive agents, when ap-
propriately directed pursuant to the President's constitutional law en-
forcement authority, may lawfully carry on investigations and make
arrests that contravene customary international law.10 3
While the opinion certainly articulates a much more robust under-
standing of the President's constitutional authority under the "Take Care
Clause," nowhere does it deploy the JET in defense of this expanded
view of presidential power.
The OLC relied on a similarly expansive view of the President's au-
thority in foreign affairs to support the conclusion that it was well within
the President's constitutional prerogative to refuse to report to Congress
on certain planned covert operations undertaken by the CIA abroad (such
as the 1989 capture and detention of Panamanian military dictator Ma-
nuel Noriega).04 While the author(s) articulate a constitutional concep-
tion of presidential power that sounds very similar in effect to what the
UET would later provide Justice Department officials with in the George
W. Bush Administration, the lack of theoretical support for this conclu-
sion within these memos highlights the intellectual vacuum at the core of
the constitutional case for presidential power.'05 This vacuum would
102. 13 Op. O.L.C. 163, 163 (1989).
103. Id. at 176, 178 (footnotes omitted).
104. See Constitutionality of Proposed Statutory Provision Requiring Prior Cong. Notification
for Certain CIA Covert Actions, 13 Op. O.L.C. 258 (1989).
105. See, e.g., id. at 261 ("These examples could be expanded upon, but all buttress the conclu-
sion that the President's authority with respect to foreign affairs is very broad . . . ."); see also Issues
Raised by Foreign Relations Authorization Bill, 14 Op. O.L.C. 37, 41 (1990) ("These examples and
authorities by no means exhaust the list of what could be cited in support of our conclusion. None-
theless, they are clearly sufficient to demonstrate that the President has the constitutional responsibil-
ity to represent the United States abroad . . . ."); Issues Raised by Provisions Directing Issuance of
Official or Diplomatic Passports, 16 Op. O.L.C. 18, 21 (1992) ("The necessary background for our
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eventually be filled, as we will see in the next subsection, by a more ex-
pansive version of the UET.
B. The Unitary Executive Theory at Federalist Society Conferences, etc.
The intellectual ferment that Reagan Justice alumnus Douglas
Kmiec lamented was not happening within the George H.W. Bush Jus-
tice Department was in fact happening within the fledgling Federalist
Society for Law and Public Policy. For evidence of this, we need look no
further than the transcript from the very first Federalist Society held after
the end of the Reagan Administration, The Presidency and Congress:
Constitutionally Separated and Shared Powers.'06 This conference, fea-
turing six Reagan alumni as invited speakers,10 was particularly UET-
centric in its subject matter and discussion. The opening panel at the con-
ference was called "Agency Autonomy and the Unitary Executive" and
the first speaker on the panel was Judge Laurence Silberman, who had
written the overturned circuit court opinion in Morrison v. Olson. "08
Among several others, Reagan alumnus Frank Easterbrook spoke about
the President's authority to interpret statutes and endorsed the presiden-
tial signing statement as a way to preserve the unitary executive.1 09 Also,
notably, future Vice President Richard Cheney was invited to speak on
the importance of preserving the unitary executive in foreign affairs and
national security.' 10 Interlocutors used the words "unitary" or "unity" in
connection with the "executive" or the "Presidency" a total of fifty-four
times throughout the conference.
The UET headlined or played a strong supporting role at three addi-
tional Federalist Society National Conferences between the end of the
Reagan Administration and the beginning of the George W. Bush Ad-
ministration. At the Federalist Society Lawyers Convention Symposium
in 1992, The Congress: Representation, Accountability, and the Rule of
Law, the Society hosted a panel discussion on the question of "Who Con-
analysis of the particular issues presented here is the well-settled recognition of the President's broad
authority over the Nation's foreign affairs.").
106. See Symposium, The Presidency and Congress: Constitutionally Separated and Shared
Powers, 68 WASH. U. L. Q. 485 (1990).
107. See id at vii-viii (listing as invited speakers Reagan Administration alumni Dick Thorn-
burgh, Terry Eastland, T. Kenneth Cribb, Jr., Frank Easterbrook, Theodore Olson, and Edwin Meese
Ill).
108. See Silberman, supra note 63, at 500.
109. See Frank Easterbrook, Panel II: Presidential Lawmaking Powers: Vetoes, Line Item
Vetoes, Signing Statements, Executive Orders, and Delegations of Rulemaking Authority, 68 WASH.
U.L.Q. 533, 539 (1990) (reasoning presidential signing statements would produce more consistency
and accountability in statutory interpretation than would judicial interpretation: "Indeed, consistency
and accountability were principal arguments for a unitary executive in 1787.").
110. Richard Cheney, Address: The Impact of Separation of Powers on National Security, 68
WASH. U.L.Q. 525, 526-27 (1990) ("The Presidency . . . was designed as a one-person office to
ensure that it would be ready for action. Its major characteristics, in the language of the Federalist
Number 70, were to be 'decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch."' (quoting THE FEDERALIST No.
70, at 356 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961))).
2011] 219
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
trols the Administrative State?""' Invited panelists, including Reagan
alumnus Theodore Olson, mentioned the unitary executive a total of
eighteen times in their respective discussions of presidential power and
the administrative state. The UET was also discussed with considerable
frequency at the 1998 National Student Federalist Society Symposium on
Law and Public Policy, Reviving the Structural Constitution.112 Eight
different speakers across various panels mentioned the unitary executive
in their talks."' Additionally, at the 1999 Federalist Society National
Lawyers Conference, The Rule of Law, Modern Culture, and the Courts
at Century's End, future George W. Bush Justice Department official
John C. Yoo moderated a panel debate over the merits of the UET as it
relates to the separation of powers, presidential power, and foreign poli-
cy."4 This panel discussion is particularly noteworthy because it repre-
sents the first full treatment of the UET in the realm of war powers and
foreign affairs at a Federalist Society National Conference and provides
evidence of participants discussing the UET in this context prior to the
start of the George W. Bush Administration.
While the universe of speakers endorsing the unitary executive view
of the presidency at Federalist Society National Conferences between
1989 and 2000 includes some familiar Reagan Justice alumni (Steven
Calabresi, John Harrison, Charles J. Cooper, and Frank Easterbrook), it
also includes other conservative and libertarian legal scholars who, even
more notably, had not been students of the Reagan-Meese Justice De-
partment: John C. Yoo, Burt Neuborne, Cynthia Farina, Roderick M.
Hills, Jr., and Jeremy Rabkin, for example. This evidence suggests that
while Reagan Justice alumni might still have been the most vocal advo-
cates of the UET, between the end of the Reagan Administration and the
beginning of the George W. Bush Administration these ideas had been
successfully diffused to other individuals active within the Federalist
Society. Apart from its meetings and conferences, the Federalist Society
has also facilitated the diffusion of the UET to its membership through
its web-published Conservative and Libertarian Legal Scholarship: An
Annotated Bibliography."'5 Co-author and Reagan Justice Department
alumni Roger Clegg explained to me in our interview the idea behind the
Bibliography: "If you are interested in an area of the law it's very useful
to have someplace, some article that you can read that gives you an over-
111. Panel IV: Who Controls the Administrative State? A Debate on the Relationship Between
Congress and Government Agencies, 23 CUMB. L. REV. 125 (1992).
112. See Symposium, Reviving the Structural Constitution, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1
(1998).
113. Id. at4, 7 n.15, 19, 52, 176 n.16, 185 n.15, 191, 224, 227-31, 262 & n.14.
114. Conference agenda on file with author, obtained through personal communication with the
Federalist Society National Office.
115. See Roger Clegg, Michael E. DeBow & John McGinnis, Conservative and Libertarian
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view of that area of the law by somebody who shares your premises on
what the law means and how to interpret it.""'6 In the areas of law that
implicate executive power, every article and book listed in the Bibliog-
raphy (totaling fourteen pieces of scholarship)' "7 with the exception of
one" 8 advocates the unitary executive view. Moreover, eleven of the
thirteen pieces of scholarship advocating the UET view of presidential
power in the Bibliography were authored or co-authored by a document-
ed participant in Federalist Society National Conferences.
One additional way in which the Federalist Society has encouraged
the development of the UET has been through the simple act of network-
ing conservative and libertarian legal academics. Evidence from tran-
scripts reveals that legal academics account for the largest percentage
(37%) of all presenters at Federalist Society National Conferences. 119 As
Federalist Society member, UET advocate, and Reagan Justice alumnus
Michael Rappaport confirmed, the Federalist Society is thus "extremely
important" in the academy:
If I have an article that I'm writing [I will consult with] Randy Bar-
nett and Gary Lawson and those are people I would've met in some
way through the Federalist Society . . . . [So] it has the effect of a fa-
cilitator, an indirect effect. It's not controlling anything, it's changing
120
a climate. You want to change the world, you have to be patient.
Perhaps in part due to the institutional efforts of the Federalist Soci-
ety to encourage discussion of the unitary executive in the post-Reagan
years and in part because of the informal role the Society played as a
"facilitator" by connecting and networking like-minded scholars, discus-
sion about the UET in the legal academy increased dramatically during
116. Interview with Roger Clegg, Co-Author of the Federalist Soc'y's Bibliography of Con-
servative and Libertarian Legal Scholarship (Jan. 29, 2008).
117. See Clegg, DeBow & McGinnis, supra note 115, at 28-29, 35-36 (recommending Am.
Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy Research, THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY: LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH (L. Gordon Crovitz & Jeremy A. Rabkin, eds., 1989); Curtis Bradley & Jack
Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399 (2000); Jay S.
Bybee, Advising the President: Separation of Powers and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 104
YALE L.J. 51 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Exe-
cute the Law, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Steven Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for a Uni-
tary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23 (1995); Steven Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural
Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992); Joel K. Gold-
stein, The Presidency and the Rule of Law: Some Preliminary Explorations, 43 ST. LOUIS. U. L.J.
791 (1999); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1231,
(1994); Lee Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A Formalistic Perspective on Why the Court Was Wrong,
38 Am. U. L. REV. 313 (1989); Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986. SUP. CT. REV 41
(1986); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs,
Ill YALE L.J. 231 (2001); Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
1543 (2002); Eugene V. Rostow, Once More Unto the Breach: The War Powers Resolution Revisit-
ed, 21 VAL. U. L. REV. I (1986)).
118. Id at 35 (listing Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (2d ed. 2004)).
119. Percentage based on coding 1,957 presenters at Federalist Society National Student Con-
ferences and Lawyers Conferences from 1982-2008 for occupation at time of presentation.
120. Interview with Rappaport, supra note 17.
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the decade between the end of the Reagan Administration and the begin-
ning of the George W. Bush Administration. Focusing specifically on
U.S. law review articles mentioning the unitary executive as a measure
of the saliency of this theory in the academy, the next sub-section also
looks at the quality of that dialogue-the contexts in which the unitary
executive is discussed and who those discussants are. It finds that alt-
hough articles discussing the UET in a broader context-expanding it
into the realm of the President's Commander in Chief, War Powers, and
Treaty Powers-still constituted a very small majority of the total inven-
tory of theoretical writing on the UET throughout the pre-George W.
Bush Era, the articles that did address the UET in a more expansive
manner provided more than enough intellectual capital for future Justice
Department officials to spend as they worked to construct and defend
some of the most controversial legal policies of the George W. Bush
Administration.
C. The Unitary Executive Theory in the Legal Academy
In the previous sub-section, I excerpted a quotation from Reagan
alumnus and UET advocate Michael Rappaport's response to the ques-
tion of how to understand the impact of the Federalist Society. Here is a
slightly lengthier excerpt from the same interview, which speaks to the
important role the Federalist Society has played in encouraging discus-
sion and debate of ideas and theories that are undervalued or underrepre-
sented in the legal academy's marketplace of ideas:
I think [the Federalist Society has] had just enormous effects, not by
pulling any strings but just in the very ordinary way of being a vehi-
cle-allowing people to debate issues, every year having several con-
ferences which get ideas out which would not otherwise be consid-
ered. So, for example on originalism, there's a good deal of stuff out-
side the Federalist Society being done on originalism. But, for a long
time, there wouldn't have been. So it allows there to be intellectual
interest in the ideas [and] it allows people to know about one anoth-
121er.
As with the conservative-libertarian theory of originalism, which
Rappaport mentions in the excerpt above, there is now a great deal of
dialogue and discussion about the unitary executive happening outside of
Federalist Society meetings and conferences. But, as Figure 2 illustrates,
this was not always the case. A Heinonline search for the term "unitary
executive" in all U.S. law reviews in April 2010 confirmed that, while
the theory appears to have been in circulation since the 1970s, mentions
of the unitary executive in law review articles prior to the 1990s were in
fact few and far between.
12 1. Id.
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Figure 2











As we can see from Figure 2, the first notable spike in discussion of
the unitary executive in U.S. law reviews occurs during the Reagan Ad-
ministration, coinciding with Attorney General Meese's tenure at the
Justice Department (1985-1988). Over the next four years, during the
George H.W. Bush administration (1989-1992), the number of articles
mentioning the unitary executive more than doubled. As I alluded to in
Section II, this increase is likely attributable in part to Justice Antonin
Scalia's passionate and sharply worded dissent in Morrison v. Olson,
which mentioned the unitary executive by name several times. However,
as the evidence from this section confirms, Reagan Justice alumni and
others within the Federalist Society also nurtured and encouraged this
dialogue during this time period. And thanks in part to that consistent
intellectual investment and promotion, we see another sizeable spike in
law review mentions of the unitary executive during the first half of the
Clinton Administration (1993-1996). Mentions of the unitary executive
in U.S. law reviews would more or less level off over the next eight years
(1997-2004). The discovery and release of the now infamous Torture
Memo, which I discuss in Section III, and the increased visibility of the
UET in presidential signing statements and executive orders are likely
responsible for the dramatic spike in academic discussion about the uni-
tary executive during the second half of the George W. Bush Administra-
tion (2005-2008).
As important as the quantity of law review articles mentioning the
unitary executive- which shows the timing and momentum of the diffu-
sion of ideas related to the UET from the relatively tight-knit circles of
the Reagan and Bush I Justice Departments and the fledgling Federalist
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Society into the broader marketplace of legal ideas-is the quality of that
discussion. To that end, a qualitative examination of the context in which
the UET was discussed in each of these articles revealed that, prior to the
second half of the George W. Bush Administration, only a very small
fraction of U.S. law review articles mentioned the unitary executive in
the context of the President's war powers or his role in foreign affairs.
Figure 3 aggregates the results of this qualitative exercise, illustrating
both the total number of articles using the UET in this broader context
and the relative percentage of the total volume of UET articles this con-
stitutes per each four year period. As we see, the overall number of arti-
cles discussing the UET in this context prior to the George W. Bush Ad-
ministration and the relative percentage of the total UET dialogue they
constitute are both very low. In fact, only twenty-five articles published
between 1981 and 2000 mentioned the unitary executive in conjunction
with the President's broader Article II responsibilities. While this total
constitutes a very small percentage (6%) of the overall UET discussion
in U.S. law reviews during this time, as I discuss below, this small group
of articles would end up being extremely important for the UET's theo-
retical expansion and development.
Figure 3
Total Number and Relative Percentage of U.S. Law Review Articles
Mentioning the "Unitary Executive" in the Context ofWar Powers
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Like the handful of OLC memos I examined from the George H.W.
Bush Justice Department, the earliest U.S. law review articles mention-
ing the UET in the context of the President's Commander in Chief power
and role in foreign affairs hint at but do not develop the relationship be-
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tween the unitary executive and the robust understanding of executive
power they advocate in these areas. For example, in promoting an ex-
panded role for the Executive in intelligence gathering (and, conversely,
a protracted role for Congress) in a 1989 article for the Houston Journal
of International Law, Reagan alumnus and Federalist Society participant
Bruce Fein cited the Founders' selection of a unitary executive as evi-
dence of an intent to limit Congress's oversight in this area. 2 2 Similarly,
in an article published the same year in the University of Miami Law
Review, several scholars, including Reagan alumnus and Federalist Soci-
ety member William Bradford Reynolds, mentioned the Unitary Execu-
tive Clause of the Constitution as support for the President's "inherent
authority" to commit troops to hostilities absent Congressional authoriza-
tion.12 3 Likewise, in a Duke Law Journal article published in 1992, Fed-
eralist Society participant and scholar Gregory J. Sidak argued that a
robust interpretation of Congress's constitutional role in declaring and
funding war incorrectly "subordinates the unitary executive to the appro-
priations power" and therefore disrupts the entire scheme of the separa-
tion of powers. 124
Of the ten law review articles that mention the unitary executive in
the context of the President's Commander in Chief and foreign affairs
powers prior to the beginning of the Clinton Administration, six mention
the phrase just once and do so in the service of critiquing or providing
nominal support for other, more fully developed theories of executive
power. 125 Of the four remaining articles, three mention the unitary execu-
tive twice 26 and one three times.12 7 Taken together, this first generation
122. See Bruce Fein, The Constitution and Covert Action, 11 Hous. J. INT'L L. 53, 60 (1988)
("John Jay likewise lamented the lack of secrecy in foreign affairs that plagued the nation before the
Constitution was ratified with its unitary executive responsible for international negotiations.").
123. See Charles Bennett, Arthur B. Culvahouse, Geoffrey P. Miller & William Bradford
Reynolds, The President's Power as Commander-in-Chief Versus Congress' War Power and Ap-
propriations Power, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 17, 32 (1988) ("[T]he President has inherent authority,
even in the absence of implementing or authorizing legislation, to commit troops in hostilities that
fall short of war. . . . Committing troops to hostilities is a classic function of the Executive that finds
textual support in the Commander in Chief and unitary Executive clauses . . . .").
124. J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27, 105-06 (1991) ("The Iran-Contra
Affair demonstrated the debilitating effect that squabbling between the President and Congress has
over an important component of American foreign policy. That controversy ultimately involved the
separation of powers and the wisdom of retaining a unitary executive. . . . The fallacy of [a constitu-
tional theory that gives Congress an expansive role in declaring and conducting war] is that it subor-
dinates the unitary executive to the appropriations power and causes the entire scheme of the separa-
tion of powers to be trumped by a single clause in Article I that most probably was intended to serve
the modest goal of ensuring fiscal accountability.").
125. See Bennett, supra note 123, at 32; Lawrence J. Block & David B. Rivkin, The Battle to
Control the Conduct of Foreign Intelligence and Covert Operations: The Ultra-Whig Counterrevo-
lution Revisited, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 303, 348 (1989); William E. Connor, Reforming
Oversight of Convert Actions After the Iran Contra Affair: A Legislative History of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for FY 1991, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 871, 914-15 (1992); Fein, supra note 122, at 60;
Kenneth C. Randall, The Treaty Power, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1089, 1114 (1990); Bretton G. Sciaroni,
The Theory and Practice ofintelligence Oversight, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 397, 425 (1989).
126. See Charles J. Cooper & Leonard A. Leo, Executive Power Over Foreign and Military
Policy: Some Remarks on the Founders' Perspective, 16 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 265, 270-71
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of law review articles provides evidence of the desire of proponents of
presidential power to expand the UET into the realm of war powers and
foreign affairs. It also brings into sharp relief the relative dearth of intel-
lectual support that existed for this theoretical move as of the close of the
George H.W. Bush Administration. This intellectual vacuum would be
filled with a second generation of law review articles, all published while
the political right was in exile from the mid- to late-1990s (see Figure 3).
Collectively, these fifteen articles address with impressive breadth and
depth the gaps in the theory of the unitary executive, developing its intel-
lectual foundations with extensive support from an array of legal and
historical sources. For example, a 1994 Yale Law Journal article co-
authored by Reagan alumnus and Federalist Society co-founder Steven
Calabresi and fellow Federalist Society member Saikrishna Prakash me-
thodically develops the historical and theoretical foundations of the UET
over the course of 100 law review pages (mentioning the unitary execu-
tive over sixty times) and mounts an open challenge against academic
and constitutional theories of presidential power that call for a more pro-
tracted presidential role in matters of both executive administration and
foreign affairs.128
Building directly on this work, a 1996 California Law Review arti-
cle published by fellow Federalist Society member John C. Yoo discuss-
es the UET with explicit reference to the President's war powers, con-
cluding in no uncertain terms that "the Framers . . . proceeded to marry
an independent, unitary President to the substantive war powers exer-
cised by King, colonial governor, and state executive." 29 And in a fol-
low-up to his earlier opus on the UET, Steven Calabresi collaborated
with another Federalist Society member, Christopher Yoo, to develop
and defend the theory of the unitary executive from a traditionalist or
common law perspective.1 30 In this 1996 Case Western Law Review arti-
cle, which again spans over 100 pages and mentions the unitary execu-
tive by name over 100 times, the scholars "consider the unitary executive
debate from a Burkean, common law constitutionalist's perspective" and
contend that the UET, far from being a novel theory of executive power,
is strongly supported by the traditions and historical practice of the
American Presidency: "we would go further and argue that over the past
(1991); Charles J. Cooper, Orrin Hatch, Eugene Rostow & Michael Tigar, What the Constitution
Means by Executive Power, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 165, 171, 177 (1988); Abram N. Shulsky, The
Iran-Contra Affair and the Intelligence Oversight Process, 11 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 245, 250 (1988).
127. See Sidak, supra note 124, at 62, 105-06.
128. See generally Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 117.
129. John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding
of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 230 (1996).
130. See generally Steven Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the
First Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451 (1997).
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208 years a powerful tradition has grown up whereby [p]residents have
consistently defended the prerogatives [of the unitary executive]."'
This second generation of law review articles, while small in num-
ber, provided the requisite normative, historical, and constitutional sup-
port needed to expand the UET from what it had been during the Reagan
and George H.W. Bush Administrations-a relatively limited tool to
critique the administration and execution of the laws in the Executive
Branch-to what it would become during the George W. Bush Admin-
istration-"Article II on Steroids." 3 2 In this way, conservative and liber-
tarian legal academics-especially those affiliated with the Federalist
Society for Law and Public Policy-played an important role in nurtur-
ing and developing the ideas associated with the UET while the right was
in political exile under President Clinton. And while the UET would not
move into the mainstream of legal academic discourse until around the
mid-point of the George W. Bush Administration, the intellectual foun-
dations of the theory had been constructed, bit by bit, by a small but in-
vested group of UET patrons well in advance of this time.
D. The Unitary Executive Theory Nurtured and Developed
From the end of the Reagan Administration until the beginning of
the George W. Bush Administration, the UET was nurtured and devel-
oped both inside and outside of government. Actors in the George H. W.
Bush Justice Department continued to draw on the UET in OLC opinions
and signing statements to assert presidential prerogatives in the face of
perceived legislative encroachments on executive power. However, the
major theoretical developments in the UET would happen outside the
government, at Federalist Society conferences and within the legal acad-
emy. Reagan Justice alumni carried their ideas and understandings about
executive power and the unitary executive into some of the earliest Fed-
eralist Society conferences. Here, these actors, who would form the core
of the Federalist Society leadership, exposed other members of this bur-
geoning conservative and libertarian legal network to the UET.
131. Id. at 1457.
132. SPITZER, supra note 3, at 92.
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Figure 4
Relative Percentage of Total U.S. Law Review Articles Mentioning









Figure 4 provides a graphic illustration of the extent to which Fed-
eralist Society network participants were working to develop and dissem-
inate the ideas associated with the UET within the legal academy and the
greater legal culture. The three pie charts show the total number of U.S.
law review articles that discussed the UET from 1981-2008 and the rela-
tive percentage of those that were written by Federalist Society partici-
pants. As we can see, both the total number of articles discussing the
UET and the diversity of interlocutors has increased over time. These
data points speak to the success with which the UET has moved from the
much smaller networks of the Reagan Justice Department and the Feder-
alist Society into the broader legal academic dialogue. That being said,
from 2001 to 2008, individuals involved with the Federalist Society net-
work still accounted for nearly one out of every four (24%) published
law review articles that mentioned the unitary executive.
The end product of all this post-Reagan Era intellectual investment
in the unitary executive was a UET transformed. This transformation of
the UET was neither necessary nor inevitable. Instead, as the evidence
presented in this section demonstrates, it was contingent upon the efforts
of a small group of invested patrons. As Section III establishes, these
individuals and their intellectual investments are critical to explaining
how and why the UET was able to take such a swift and dramatic hold
within the Executive Branch from 2001 to 2008.
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I. THE UET "ALL GROWN UP": THE GEORGE W. BUSH JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT
Today I have signed into law H.R. 3199, the "USA PATRIOT Im-
provement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 ....
The executive branch shall construe the provisions of H.R. 3199
that call for furnishing information to entities outside the executive
branch, such as sections 106A and 199, in a manner consistent with
the President's constitutional authority to supervise the unitary ex-
ecutive branch and to withhold information the disclosure of which
could impair . . . the performance of the Executive's constitutional
duties.
-President George W. Bush's Statement on Signing the USA
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Mar. 9,
2006.133
One of the things about the Federalist Society is, because it's a small
network of conservative lawyers, people help each other get jobs,
people recommend each other . . . the interesting thing is to look at
who's been in [the George W. Bush] administration. Because, now
we're all grown-ups, right, and everybody, everybody who got a job
who was a lawyer was involved in the Federalist Society . . . . [T]he
people who were in the Justice Department . . . all those people were
Federalist Society types. I mean all of them.
-Daniel Troy, Reagan Justice alumnus and Federalist Society mem-
ber.134
Just as the theory of the unitary executive matured during the twelve
years between the Reagan Administration and the election of George W.
Bush, so had the Federalist Society network. It had "grown-up" from a
student-oriented group claiming 4,000 members in 1988 to a full-blown
professional network totaling 30,000 members in 2000.135 Through its
programming and its networking events, the Federalist Society had
helped to create a deep bench of conservative legal talent-a farm team
of government appointees in-waiting who were eager to put their shared
principles into practice within a sympathetic administration. 136 The
George W. Bush Administration turned out to be very sympathetic to
these principles, indeed. During the eight years of the George W. Bush
Administration, there were at least twelve Federalist Society participants
133. Statement on Signing the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005,
1 PUB. PAPERS. 430 (Mar. 9, 2006) (emphasis added).
134. Interview with Daniel Troy, Former Special Assistant, O.L.C., Reagan Admin. & Federal-
ist Soc'y member (Jan. 30, 2008) (emphasis added).
135. See STEVEN TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT 150 (2008).
136. See generally id., and also ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT:
PROFESSIONALIZING THE CONSERVATIVE COALITION (2008), for more on the Federalist Society's
role in job placement and networking within the conservative legal movement.
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working at the OLC.137 These twelve individuals all drafted and signed at
least one published opinion between 2001 and 2008'. Based on an in-
ventory of all publicly available opinions from that timeframe, these
twelve Federalist Society network actors represented almost half (44%)
of all signatories on OLC opinions published during the George W. Bush
Administration.'39 This evidence corroborates what Reagan alumnus and
Federalist Society member Daniel Troy alluded to in the excerpt at the
beginning of this section: there was a strong Federalist Society network
presence within the George W. Bush Justice Department. As this section
will show, having these network affiliated "boots on the ground" 140 -
individuals in policymaking positions who would be sympathetic to the
ideas undergirding the UET-helps explain the extent to which the UET
took hold during the George W. Bush Administration.
However, it does not do all the explanatory work. As Sections I and
II demonstrated, there were also a large number of UET advocates work-
ing in the Reagan Justice Department, some of whom stayed on through
the next administration. And, as we have seen, the UET did not take hold
in these administrations to the extent that it did in the George W. Bush
Administration. That is because, to return to a formulation I used in the
Introduction to this Article, these decisionmakers also needed access to
the proper arsenal of ideas (a fully developed and plausible theory of
executive power) and the right occasion to deploy them (timeliness).14 1
As the previous section demonstrated, a small group of UET patrons had
been hard at work over the course of the previous decade building the
intellectual capital that would help develop, expand and support the UET
as a powerful and plausible construction of presidential power. The
unique circumstances presented by the events of September 11, 2001,
made this intellectual capital extremely valuable to Justice Department
officials who were forced to work quickly and under great constraint to
construct the legal and constitutional framework for the Executive
Branch's response to these devastating terrorist attacks. As former Bush
Administration official Jack Goldsmith observed in his memoir The Ter-
ror Presidency, the clear and present danger to American lives combined
with the peculiar nature of the terrorist threats created "countervailing
pressures" that made it difficult for Justice Department officials to pro-
137. See Office of Legal Counsel: Opinions, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (last updated Aug. 2011),
http://wwwjustice.gov/olc/opinions.htm. I cross referenced all signatories on published memos from
2001-2008 with my list of Federalist Society participants at National Meetings from 1982-2008.
138. See id.
139. See id The total number of signatories on Office of Legal Counsel "Memoranda and
Opinions" archived online from 2001-2008 was 27, of which 12 were documented Federalist Socie-
ty participants (44%).
140. Interview with Michael Greve, Resident, Am. Enter. Inst. & Federalist Soc'y member
(Feb. 12, 2008) (describing how the Federalist Society has impacted the "elite institutions of Ameri-
can Society").
141. See Skowronek, supra note 4, at 2074, 2100-01.
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vide neutral, non-political, and thorough analyses of the legal and consti-
tutional questions surrounding the War on Terror:
For all these reasons, I found myself at OLC managing what Jim-
my Carter's Attorney General Griffin Bell described as the tension
between the "duty to define the legal limits of executive action in a
neutral manner and the President's desire to receive legal advice that
helps him do what he wants." This ever-present tension was unusual-
ly taut after 9/11, when what the President wanted to do was save
thousands of American lives. There is no magic formula for how to
combine legitimate political factors with the demands of the rule of
law. 142
And while, as Goldsmith writes, there was "no magic formula" for
combining the unique political demands of the War on Terror with the
sometimes countervailing demands of the rule of law, the recently reno-
vated and expanded UET provided Bush Administration Justice Depart-
ment officials with an accessible and potent means to apparently satisfy
both sets of demands.
This section will underscore how having the right personnel in poli-
cymaking positions combined with these other factors-plausibility and
timeliness-to facilitate the diffusion of the UET into the legal opinions
defending some of the most controversial policies of the War on Terror.
OLC opinions, however, accounted for just 11 % of the total inventory of
Executive Branch documents that mentioned the unitary executive during
the George W. Bush Administration 4 3 . As Figure I illustrated, this lan-
guage was most often used during the Bush Administration in presiden-
tial signing statements. Thus, the following section will also look at how
Justice Department officials deployed this "grown up" version of the
UET in signing statements to bolster and support Executive Branch pre-
rogatives under George W. Bush.
A. The Unitary Executive Theory and the Post-9/11 Office ofLegal
Counsel Opinions
Initial evidence of how deeply the theory of the unitary executive
had penetrated the very new George W. Bush Administration can be
found in a series of legal opinions produced by the OLC in the aftermath
of the September 11th attacks. Six opinions, issued between September
of 2001 and March of 2003,'" provided the legal and constitutional ra-
142. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 34, 38 (2007).
143. See supra Figure 1.
144. MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST TERRORISTS, supra note 1; OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMENDING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
ACT TO CHANGE THE "PURPOSE" STANDARD FOR SEARCHES (2001) [hereinafter AMENDING
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT], available at 2001 WL 36191050; OFFICE OF LEGAL
COUNSEL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE PRESIDENT'S POWER AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF TO
TRANSFER CAPTURED TERRORISTS TO THE CONTROL AND CUSTODY OF FOREIGN NATIONS (2002)
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tionale for two controversial policies guiding the conduct of the War on
Terror: the justification for conducting war domestically, which included
the use of warrantless surveillance programs, and the policies on torture
and interrogation based on legal judgments concerning the applicability
of congressional statutes and international treaties.145 These six OLC
documents, five of which were authored or co-authored by Federalist
Society participants John C. Yoo and Jay Bybee,14 6 provide striking evi-
dence of a theoretically mature UET at work in the George W. Bush
Administration.
Two OLC memos, circulated exactly two weeks after the attacks of
September 11, 2001, rely explicitly on the theory of the unitary executive
to establish broad authority for the President to take military action both
at home and abroad in response to the terrorist attacks on the United
States.147 Both of these opinions were authored by then-Deputy Assistant
Attorney General John C. Yoo-a frequent Federalist Society conference
participant. 148 Drawing from Yoo's own prior scholarship on the UET
and that of fellow Federalist Society network members Steven Calabresi,
Christopher S. Yoo, and Saikrishna Prakash, these opinions cite multiple
authorities from the founding generation 49 to support and defend the
President's constitutional authority to engage in aggressive military ac-
tion. For example, in the OLC opinion entitled The President's Constitu-
tional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and
Nations Supporting Them, Yoo cites The Federalist 70 as evidence of the
Framers' expansive view of the President's war powers:
[hereinafter TRANSFER CAPTURED TERRORISTS], available at 2002 WL 34482991; OFFICE OF
LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SWIFT JUSTICE AUTHORIZATION ACT (2002) [hereinafter
SwIFT JUSTICE AUTHORIZATION ACT] available at 2002 WL 34482989; OFFICE OF LEGAL
COUNSEL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTERROGATION OF AL QAEDA OPERATION (2002) [hereinafter
INTERROGATION OF AL QAEDA OPERATION ] available at 2002 WL 34501675; OFFICE OF LEGAL
COUNSEL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MILITARY INTERROGATION OF ALIEN UNLAWFUL COMBATANTS
HELD OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES (2003) [hereinafter INTERROGATION OF ALIEN UNLAWFUL
COMBATANTS], available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-
combatantsoutsideunitedstates.pdf.
145. See MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST TERRORISTS, supra note 1, at 19; TRANSFER
CAPTURED TERRORISTS, supra note 144, at 20-28; AMENDING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT, supra note 144, at 15. See generally SWIFT JUSTICE AUTHORIZATION ACT,
supra note 144; INTERROGATION OF AL QAEDA OPERATION, supra note 144;INTERROGATION OF
ALIEN UNLAWFUL COMBATANTS, supra note 144.
146. MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST TERRORISTS, supra note 1, at 20 (authored by Yoo);
AMENDING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT, supra note 144, at 12 (authored by Yoo);
TRANSFER CAPTURED TERRORISTS, supra note 144, at 12 (authored by Bybee); INTERROGATION OF
AL QAEDA OPERATION, supra note 144.
147. MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST TERRORISTS, supra note 1, at 4-5; AMENDING FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT, supra note 144, at 3-6.
148. As of 2008, the close of President George W. Bush's term, John Yoo had been a docu-
mented participant at fourteen Federalist Society National Conferences.
149. MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST TERRORISTS, supra note 1, at 3-5 (citing THE
FEDERALIST Nos. 23, 25, 34, 70, 74 (Alexander Hamilton); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES; JONATHON ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES; and THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787); AMENDING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT,
supra note 144, at 4-5 (citing THE FEDERALIST NOS. 23, 34, 74 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 41
(James Madison) and JONATHON ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES).
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The centralization of authority in the President alone is particularly
crucial in matters of national defense, war, and foreign policy, where
a unitary executive can evaluate threats, consider policy choices, and
mobilize national resources with a speed and energy that is far supe-
rior to any other branch. As Hamilton noted, "Energy in the execu-
tive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is
essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks."
This is no less true in war. so
This OLC opinion also deploys an argument frequently mobilized in
the UIET scholarship examined in the previous section of this Article;
namely, that Article II's Vesting Clause confers all war powers not spe-
cifically assigned to Congress in the constitution to the President: "[T]o
the extent that the constitutional text does not explicitly allocate the
power to initiate military hostilities to a particular branch, the Vesting
Clause provides that it remain among the President's unenumerated
powers."'1' Following this logic, the Yoo-authored opinion concludes
that while congressional approval of military action can be politically
useful, it is not constitutionally required.152 This means that neither the
War Powers Resolution nor the Joint Resolution can, as the opinion
reads, "place any limits on the President's determinations as to any ter-
rorist threat, the amount of military force to be used in response, or the
method, timing, and nature of the response. These decisions, under our
Constitution, are for the President alone to make." 53
Citing many of the same authorities, a second opinion issued simul-
taneously, entitled The Constitutionality of Amending Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act to Change the 'Purpose' Standard for Searches,
relied on the same arguments, grounded in the theory of the unitary ex-
ecutive, to defend a strong role for the President in intelligence gathering
operations:
The Constitution, for example, vests in the President the power to
deploy military force in the defense of the United States by the Vest-
ing Clause and by the Commander in Chief Clause. Intelligence op-
erations, such as electronic surveillance, may well be necessary and
proper for the effective deployment and execution of military force
against terrorists. 154
And while the opinion, also authored by John Yoo, worked to estab-
lish the constitutional grounds for amending the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) to cover domestic surveillance and warrantless
150. MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST TERRORISTS, supra note 144, at 4 (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton)).
151. Id. at 5.
152. Id. at 19.
153. Id
154. AMENDING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT, supra note 144, at 5 (footnote
and citations omitted).
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search programs, it was careful to point out that "FISA itself is not re-
quired by the Constitution" and that intelligence gathering activities con-
ducted for purposes of national security "need not comport with the same
Fourth Amendment requirements that apply to domestic criminal investi-
gations."' 55 In other words, the memo concluded, once the President's
constitutional war powers are triggered, the "calculus" that protects citi-
zens against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment "shift[s]" and gives the President the authority to dilute the-
se individual liberties in the name of national security.1 56
Additional opinions issued by the OLC between 2002 and 2003
built on the legal reasoning established in these two John Yoo-authored
opinions and explained how the broad war powers vested in the President
under Article II of the Constitution applied to the capture, transfer and
interrogation of suspected terrorists.'57 Central to the arguments of all
four opinions-three of which were authored by Federalist Society par-
ticipants 158 _is the belief, supported by the UET, that the President's
inherent authority to conduct military operations cannot be cabined or
constrained by either statutes or treaties.'59 For example, a March 13,
2002 memo 60 signed by Federalist Society participant Jay S. Bybee,
argued that in light of the President's constitutional authority in times of
war, neither the Geneva Conventions nor the Torture Conventions for-
bade "the transfer of members of the Taliban militia, al Qaeda, or other
terrorist organizations" under the control of the United States military to
other countries:
Those treaties that purport to govern the transfer of detained individ-
uals generally do not apply in the context of the current war against
al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Even if those treaties were appli-
cable to the present conflict, however, they do not impose significant
restrictions on the operation of the President's Commander-in-Chief
authority....
155. Id. at 7.
156. Id.
157. See generally MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST TERRORISTS, supra note 1;
INTERROGATION OF AL QAEDA OPERATION, supra note 144; INTERROGATION OF ALIEN UNLAWFUL
COMBATANTS, supra note 144.
158. OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE PRESIDENT'S POWER AS
COMMANDER IN CHIEF TO TRANSFER CAPTURED TERRORISTS TO THE CONTROL AND CUSTODY OF
FOREIGN NATIONS (2002) [hereinafter POWER TO TRANSFER CAPTURED TERRORISTS], available at
http://wwwjustice.gov/opa/documents/memorandumpresidentpower03132002.pdf; OFFICE OF
LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR INTERROGATION UNDER 18
U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, (2002) [hereinafter CONDUCT FOR INTERROGATION], available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-gonzales-aug2002.pdf; OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MILITARY INTERROGATION OF ALIEN UNLAWFUL COMBATANTS HELD OUTSIDE
THE UNITED STATES, (2003) [hereinafter MILITARY INTERROGATION OF ALIEN UNLAWFUL
COMBATANTS], available at http://www.justice.gov/oic/docs/memo-combatantsoutsideunited
states.pdf.
159. See supra Figure 1.
160. POWER TO TRANSFER CAPTURED TERRORISTS, supra note 158.
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To the extent that these treaties would cabin presidential freedom
to transfer detainees, they could not constrain his constitutional au-
thority....
. . . This view of the President's war powers is supported by the
Constitution's text and a comprehensive understanding of its struc-
tural allocation of powers, but also by an unbroken chain of historical
practice dating back to the Founding era. In tandem, these factors
conclusively demonstrate that the Commander-in-Chief Clause con-
stitutes an independent grant of substantive authority to engage in the
161
detention and transfer of prisoners captured in armed conflicts.
Another OLC opinion issued on August 1, 2002, and also signed by
Jay (popularly referred to as the "Torture Memo"), found that provisions
of the congressional statute enacted pursuant to the Conventions Against
Torture that criminalized torture "may be unconstitutional if applied to
interrogations undertaken of enemy combatants pursuant to the Presi-
dent's Commander-in-Chief powers" because "enforcement of the statute
would represent an unconstitutional infringement on the President's au-
thority to conduct war."' 62
Along those same lines, an OLC opinion dated April 8, 2002, cited
the scholarship of John Yoo to support the proposition that Article 1I
incorporated "the fullest possible range of power available to a military
commander." 63 Relying on the evidence presented in Yoo's 1996 Cali-
fornia Law Review article, the opinion concludes that "Congress cannot
constitutionally restrict the President's authority to detain enemy com-
batants or to establish military commissions to enforce the laws of
war." 64 Finally, in a March 14, 2003 memo, author John Yoo relied in
part on the UET to defend the sweeping conclusion that "any effort by
Congress to regulate the interrogation of enemy combatants would vio-
late the Constitution's sole vesting of the Commander-in-Chief authority
in the President." 6 5
These six opinions, issued in the wake of the September 11 at-
tacks, had a swift and profound impact on the manner in which the Bush
Administration conducted the War on Terror. As we've seen, Federalist
Society-affiliated officials in the OLC drew on the UET to provide the
legal and constitutional rationales for warrantless domestic surveillance
programs, the capture and transfer of suspected terrorists to prisons out-
side the United States, and for the Administration's interrogation pro-
grams. While these opinions constitute the most striking examples of the
161. Id. at 2 & n.1.
162. CONDUCT FOR INTERROGATION, supra note 158, at 2.
163. SWIFT JUSTICE AUTHORIZATION ACT, supra note 144, at 3 (citing Yoo, supra note 129, at
252-54).
164. Id. at 1.
165. MILITARY INTERROGATION OF ALIEN UNLAWFUL COMBATANTS, supra note 158, at 19.
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acute political impact of the theory of the unitary executive during the
George W. Bush Administration, the UET was also deployed by OLC
officials to bolster and defend the administration's policy goals through
the creative (and controversial) use of presidential signing statements.
B. The Unitary Executive Theory and the Presidential Signing Statement
on "Steroids"
On January 31, 2007, John P. Elwood, a Deputy Assistant Attorney
General in the OLC, was called in front of the House Committee on the
Judiciary to explain and defend President George W. Bush's use of pres-
idential signing statements in light of a damning August 2006 report is-
sued by the American Bar Association (ABA). 16 6 Citing various scholar-
ly and journalistic studies of the use of presidential signing statements,
the ABA Task Force Report concluded that:
[T]he use, frequency, and nature of [President Bush's] signing state-
ments demonstrates a "radically expansive view" of executive power
which "amounts to a claim that he is impervious to the laws that
Congress enacts" and represents a serious assault on the constitution-
al system of checks and balances. 167
Elwood, speaking on behalf of the OLC-the office responsible for
drafting presidential signing statements-stated that he and his col-
leagues "respectfully disagree with the analysis in [the ABA Task Force]
report."168 Citing legal scholarship supporting a more aggressive use of
presidential signing statements (including law review articles authored
by Federalist Society affiliated academics),169 Elwood defended the Ad-
ministration's use of signing statements as being consistent with the
President's constitutional powers and responsibilities.
Notably, Elwood took time to respond to the "critics" who had spe-
cifically taken issue with those "signing statements that make reference
to the President's authority to supervise the 'unitary executive.", 170 In a
section of his House testimony, entitled "Unitary Executive," Elwood
refers to one of the second generation UET law review articles co-
166. See Task Force Report on Presidential Signing Statements and the Separation of Powers
Doctrine, supra note 81.
167. Id at 27 (quoting Neil Kinkopf, Signing Statements and the President's Authority to
Refuse to Enforce the Law, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY 7 (June 14, 2006),
http://www.acslaw.org/publications/issue-briefs/signing-statements-and-the-president's-authority-to-
refuse-to-enforce-the-).
168. Presidential Signing Statements: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 11Oth
Cong. 6 (2007) (statement of John P. Elwood, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., O.L.C.) [hereinafter Jan.
31 Hearing].
169. See id. at 4, 12 (citing Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing State-
ments and Executive Power, 23 CONsT. COMMENT. 307, 323 (2006); Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G.
Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA
L. REV. 601, 608, 730 (2005)).
170. Id. at 12.
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authored by Federalist Society co-founder Steven Calabresi to refute the
claim that the theory of the unitary executive was an alarming novelty of
the George W. Bush Administration:
Some critics have focused in particular on signing statements that
make reference to the President's authority to supervise the "unitary
executive." Although the phrase has been used by critics to mean
many things in recent months, at bottom, the core idea of a "unitary
executive" is that, because "[t]he executive power shall be vested in
[the] President" under the Constitution, U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, the
President has broad authority to direct the exercise of discretion by
officials within the Executive Branch. As several scholars concluded
after an exhaustive survey of historical practice, "each of the first
thirty-two presidents-from George Washington up through Franklin
D. Roosevelt-believed in a unitary executive" and "every president
between 1945 and 2005 defended the unitariness of the executive
branch."'71
As this testimony foreshadows, the investment of those initiators of
the Reagan Era signing statement initiative-an initiative grounded in
and supported by the theory of the unitary executive-would produce
handsome returns during the George W. Bush Administration.
Figure 5
Percentage of Presidential Signing Statements Raising at
Least One Constitutional Objection Relative to Total












George Bush HWiliam Clinton George W. Bush
N=228 N=381 N-161
Sources: Congressional Research Service and the American Presidency
Project
171. Id. (quoting Yoo, Calabresi & Colangelo, supra note 169, at 608, 730).
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The impact of the UET is not evidenced by the quantity of signing
statements issued by President Bush but rather by the quality or nature of
those statements. For instance, a Congressional Research Service Report
found that even though President Clinton issued more than twice as
many signing statements as President George W. Bush (see Figure 5),
only 18% of Clinton's statements raised a constitutional objection to the
legislation in question as compared with 78% of those issued under
Bush.172 Further, more than a third of Bush I's signing statements (41%)
explicitly grounded their constitutional challenges in the President's au-
thority to supervise "the Unitary Executive Branch."1 7 3 While scholars
have identified up to seventeen different categories of constitutional ob-
jections raised by George W. Bush in his signing statements,174 this sec-
tion will focus on one category in particular: statements objecting to pro-
visions of bills that infringe on the President's power over foreign affairs,
including his war powers. These signing statements provide evidence of
a more mature and theoretically potent UET at work in the OLC under
George W. Bush. This category of statements illustrates just how much
the UET had "grown up" since the close of the first Bush Administration,
where, as I discussed in Section II, it was deployed with far less frequen-
cy and within a much narrower scope.
I opened Section III with an excerpt from President George W.
Bush's Statement on Signing the USA PATRIOT Act, which highlighted
the Administration's reliance on the theory of the unitary executive to
assert its constitutional authority to withhold certain information about
the War on Terror from Congress. Here is a slightly lengthier excerpt
from that same statement that provides more context on how the UET
was mobilized:
172. T.J. HALSTEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33667, REPORT FOR CONGRESS:
PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS, 9
(2007).
173. A search of the American Presidency Project's database on April 3, 2010 for all Public
Papers containing the phrase "unitary executive" from 2001-2008 returned sixty-six Presidential
signing statements, which is 41% of the total number of signing statements issued under George W.
Bush. John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project, U.C. SANTA BARBARA,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu.
174. See HALSTEAD, supra note 172, at 10 ("Professor Philip J. Cooper has characterized the
constitutional objections raised by President Bush as falling across seventeen categories, ranging
from generalized assertions of presidential authority to supervise the 'unitary executive branch' to
federalism limits imposed by the Supreme Court in United States v. Printz. The Bush II Administra-
tion has been particularly prolific in issuing signing statements that object to provisions that it claims
infringe on the President's power over foreign affairs (oftentimes with regard to requirements that
the Administration take a particular position in negotiations with foreign powers); provisions that
require the submission of proposals or recommendations to Congress (asserting that they interfere
with the President's authority under the Recommendations Clause to 'recommend such Measures as
he shall judge necessary and expedient); provisions imposing disclosure or reporting requirements
(on the ground that such provisions may interfere with the President's authority to withhold sensitive
or privileged information); conditions and qualifications on executive appointments (asserting in-
fringement on the President's authority pursuant to the Appointments Clause); and legislative veto
provisions (on the ground that they violate bicameralism and presentment requirements as estab-
lished in INS v. Chadha)." (footnotes omitted)).
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The executive branch shall construe the provisions of H.R. 3199
that call for furnishing information to entities outside the executive
branch, such as sections 106A and 119, in a manner consistent with
the President's constitutional authority to supervise the unitary ex-
ecutive branch and to withhold information the disclosure of which
could impair foreign relations, national security, the deliberative pro-
cesses of the Executive, or the performance of the Executive's consti-
tutional duties.
The executive branch shall construe section 756(e)(2) of H.R.
3199, which calls for an executive branch official to submit to the
Congress recommendations for legislative action, in a manner con-
sistent with the President's constitutional authority to supervise the
unitary executive branch and to recommend for the consideration of
the Congress such measures as he judges necessary and expedient.1
75
Provisions 106A and 119, two of the three identified as constitutionally
problematic, are audit provisions, consistent with FISA that require the
Executive Branch to report to the Inspector General on its intelligence
gathering activities. Here, as in the John Yoo-authored OLC FISA
memo examined earlier in this section,'77 the UET provided a constitu-
tional justification for the Bush Administration to reinterpret legislation
in a manner consistent with the President's national security responsibili-
ties.
While this signing statement attracted significant media attention, it
is actually quite typical of dozens of other Bush Administration state-
ments issued before and after it. Citing the President's constitutional
authority to "supervise the Unitary Executive Branch," the OLC routine-
ly deployed this language in signing statements to push back against
what it perceived to be congressional micromanagement of the Executive
Branch's constitutional responsibilities. "8 Perhaps the most striking ex-
175. Statement on Signing the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005,
supra note 133, at 430.
176. See, e.g., H.R. 3199, 109th Cong. § 106A(a) (2006) (enacted) ("Audit.-The Inspector
General of the Department of Justice shall perform a comprehensive audit of the effectiveness and
use, including any improper or illegal use, of the investigative authority provided to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation under title V of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1861 et seq.).").
177. See AMENDING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT, supra note 144, at 1.
178. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2002, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1553, 1554 (Dec. 28, 2001) ("Several provisions of the Act, including sections
525(c), 546, 705, and 3152 call for executive branch officials to submit to the Congress proposals for
legislation. These provisions shall be implemented in a manner consistent with the President's con-
stitutional authority to supervise the unitary executive branch and to recommend to the Congress
such measures as the President judges necessary and expedient"); see also Statement on Signing the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1697, 1697-98 (Sept. 30,
2002) ("The executive branch shall construe as advisory the provisions of the Act, including sections
408, 616, 621, 633, and 1343(b), that purport to direct or burden the conduct of negotiations by the
executive branch with foreign governments, international organizations, or other entities abroad or
which purport to direct executive branch officials to use the U.S. voice and vote in international
organizations to achieve specified foreign policy objectives. Such provisions, if construed as manda-
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ample of statements of this kind was President Bush's Statement on Sign-
ing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004. The
phrase "unitary executive" was used four times to raise Executive Branch
objections to perceived encroachments on the President's war powers:
Many provisions of the Act deal with the conduct of United States in-
telligence activities and the defense of the Nation, which are two of
the most important functions of the Presidency. The executive branch
shall construe the Act, including amendments made by the Act, in a
manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to
conduct the Nation's foreign relations, as Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces, and to supervise the unitary executive branch, which
encompass the authority to conduct intelligence operations. 179
It should be noted that the use of the term "many" in the excerpt
above constitutes something of an understatement. The signing statement
drew on the UET to articulate constitutional challenges to more than
forty provisions of the law.s 0
Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Elwood noted in his state-
ment before the House Judiciary Committee that all analyses concerning
the quantity or quality of President Bush's signing statements "must be
viewed in light of current events," pointing out that "the significance of
tory rather than advisory, would impermissibly interfere with the President's constitutional authori-
ties to conduct the Nation's foreign affairs, participate in international negotiations, and supervise
the unitary executive branch."); Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2003, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2140, 2141 (Nov. 27, 2002) ("The executive branch shall implement
sections 325, 334, and 826 of the Act, and section 8H(g)(1)(A) of the Inspector General Act of 1978
as enacted by section 825 of the Act, relating to submission of recommendations to the Congress, in
a manner consistent with the President's constitutional authority to supervise the unitary executive
branch. Many provisions of the Act, including section 342 and title Vill, establish new requirements
for the executive branch to disclose sensitive information. As I have noted in signing last year's
Intelligence Authorization Act and other similar legislation, the executive branch shall construe such
provisions in a manner consistent with the President's constitutional authority to withhold infor-
mation the disclosure of which could impair foreign relations, the national security, the deliberative
processes of the Executive, or the performance of the Executive's constitutional duties."); Statement
on Signing the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction
of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1476, 1477 (Nov. 6, 2003) ("Title Ill of the Act
creates an Inspector General (IG) of the CPA. Title Ill shall be construed in a manner consistent with
the President's constitutional authorities to conduct the Nation's foreign affairs, to supervise the
unitary executive branch, and as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces."); Statement on Signing
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 3 PUB. PAPERS 3118, 3119 (Dec. 17,
2004) ("The executive branch shall construe provisions in the Act that mandate submission of in-
formation to the Congress, entities within or outside the executive branch, or the public, in a manner
consistent with the President's constitutional authority to supervise the unitary executive branch and
to withhold information that could impair foreign relations, national security, the deliberative pro-
cesses of the Executive, or the performance of the Executive's constitutional duties . . . . To the
extent that provisions of the Act purport to require or regulate submission by executive branch
officials of legislative recommendations to the Congress, the executive branch shall construe such
provisions in a manner consistent with the President's constitutional authority to supervise the uni-
tary executive branch and to submit for congressional consideration such measures as the President
judges necessary and expedient.").
179. Statement on Signing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,
supra note 178, at 3118-19.
180. See id.
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legislation affecting national security has increased markedly since the
September 11th attacks and Congress's authorization of the use of mili-
tary force against the terrorists who perpetrated those attacks.""' This
observation brings into sharp relief how timeliness contributed to the
dramatic spike in the use of the UET in presidential signing statements
under George W. Bush. The War on Terror, and the legislation it both
implicated and generated, gave the Bush Administration cause and occa-
sion to deploy the UET in signing statements in order to gain some con-
stitutional leverage in the ongoing tug-of-war between the President and
Congress. And thanks in part to the small group of intellectual patrons
featured in Section II of this Article, Bush Administration officials called
to account for this aggressive use of presidential signing statements were
able to justify their actions with reference to a plausible (if still contro-
versial) and intellectually mature theory of the unitary executive.
C. The Unitary Executive Theory "All Grown Up"
As this section has demonstrated, officials in the George W. Bush
Justice Department deployed a "grown up" version of the UET both to
construct the legal framework for the War on Terror and, more routinely,
to gain constitutional leverage against Congress through the use of presi-
dential signing statements. As this Article has argued, their ability to do
so was critically contingent not only upon timeliness but also upon the
efforts of legal elites who worked to transform the UET from a rather
narrow critique of the modem administrative state into a plausible consti-
tutional justification for expanding the sphere of presidential power in
war and foreign affairs as well.
The ascendance of the UET during the George W. Bush Admin-
istration could thus be described as one of the most profitable returns on
the Reagan Justice Department's long-term investment in ideas and per-
sonnel. Reagan alumni, having failed in their ambitious mission to
transmit their vision of a unitary executive into Supreme Court doctrine,
nonetheless remained committed to the beliefs and ideas undergirding
the UET well after many of them had left the DOJ. The fledgling Feder-
alist Society for Law and Public Policy allowed this small group of
committed UET patrons to continue discussing, refining, expanding, and
exchanging their ideas. This conscious investment in developing the in-
tellectual and theoretical foundations of the UET resulted, as I describe
in Section I, in a UET transformed-a powerful weapon for an admin-
istration eager to promote a strong vision of executive power.
But neither timeliness nor plausibility matter much unless one also
has the proper personnel in place to put ideas to work. That is what the
higher-ups in the Reagan Justice Department and consequently the
founders of the Federalist Society understood the best. That is because,
181. See Jan. 31 Hearing, supra note 168, at 11-12.
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as Reagan Justice alumni and Federalist Society member Douglas Kmiec
reminded me in our interview, "policy is people":
[The Federalist Society] has influence on personnel primarily and
then through personnel, performance and ideas. That's the other slo-
gan you hear in Washington, "policy is people." "Ideas have conse-
quences" and "policy is people." It's true because if you get appoint-
ed or elected, you're not going to have a serious impact unless you
can immediately ramp up and hire people who you don't have to ed-
ucate on basic principles of agreement. You can kind of start in mid-
sentence and proceed from there.182
As I noted in the beginning of Section III, while the political right
was in exile during the Clinton Administration, the Federalist Society
had helped to create a farm team of government appointees in waiting
who were eager to put their shared principles into practice within a sym-
pathetic administration. After the 2000 election, several of these individ-
uals-including, most notably, John C. Yoo and Jay Bybee-went to
work in the OLC where, as we've seen, their ideas about the UET indeed
had both swift and dramatic consequences.
The concluding section of this Article offers some lessons learned
from this narrative of the ascendance of the UET as contingent upon the
conscious, long-term intellectual investment of legal elites. In doing so, it
underscores the importance of investing in support structures for ideas-
investments in institutions and personnel that, under the right circum-
stances, can help "ideas have consequences." 83
IV. SUPPORT STRUCTURES AND INTELLECTUAL INVESTMENT: HELPING
IDEAS HAVE CONSEQUENCES
The individuals who came to work in the Justice Department under
President Ronald Reagan shared a belief in the transformative power of
ideas; a belief that (to quote the vernacular of the time) "ideas have con-
sequences." As they would come to learn, however, even the most pow-
erful ideas need help to become consequential. In other words (to quote
political science jargon), ideas are most politically effective when but-
tressed by a strong "support structure" 1 84-a group of individuals and
institutions invested in nurturing, developing, and diffusing them. In the
case of the JET, this support structure emerged from the ashes of an
ambitious but ultimately unsuccessful Reagan Era litigation campaign to
182. Interview with Kmiec, supra note 84.
1 83. See generally WEAVER, supra note 15.
184. See CHARLES EPP, THE RIGHTs REVOLUTION 3 (1998) (defining a "support structure" in
the context of legal mobilization); see also TELES, supra note 135, at 11-12; SOUTHWORTH, supra
note 136, at 8 (discussing the importance of the burgeoning "support structure" for conservative
legal advocacy). See generally Amanda Hollis-Brusky, Support Structures and Constitutional
Change: Teles, Southworth, and the Conservative Legal Movement, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 516
(2011).
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rearrange governmental power. With the institutional support of the Fed-
eralist Society for Law and Public Policy, these Reagan alumni kept the
ideas underlying the UET alive-refining, developing, expanding and
spreading them to the next generation of scholars, litigators, and gov-
ernment officials in waiting. As this Article detailed, this support struc-
ture would help transform the UET from what it was at the close of the
Reagan Administration-"a constitutional lost cause"'as-to what it
would become during the George W. Bush Administration-"Article II
on Steroids."1 8 6 In explaining the ascendance of the UET as critically
contingent upon the political and intellectual investments of a small but
well-connected group of legal elites, this Article underscores the im-
portant role a support structure can play in helping ideas have conse-
quences.
Of course, the absence or presence of a strong support structure
cannot on its own explain or predict the extent to which certain political
ideas take hold in a given administration. Recall that in his developmen-
tal history of the UET, scholar Stephen Skowronek argued that plausibil-
ity and timeliness were two of the most important attributes of a "politi-
cally effective" construction of a presidential power.'87 While the evi-
dence presented in this Article demonstrates how the support structure
for the UET positively impacted the theory's plausibility, the circum-
stances that most directly contributed to the timeliness of the UET (9/11
and the War on Terror) were entirely exogenous. One could argue, how-
ever, that another dimension of timeliness is having the right personnel in
the right place at the right time. In this case, the support structure played
a key role in getting UET proponents recognized and employed by a
Bush Administration eager to defend a strong vision of presidential pow-
er. Were it not for the resulting critical mass of pro-UET personnel work-
ing in the OLC at the time of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the UET argu-
ably would not have had such a swift and dramatic impact on the con-
struction and justification of Bush Administration legal policy.
Evidence presented in this Article thus reinforces the proposition
that in order for a construction of presidential power to be "politically
effective,"' 88 it needs to be both plausible and timely. It also suggests,
however, that the extent to which a construction of power takes hold in a
given administration (when both these other requirements are satisfied)
might well be determined by the number of personnel in policymaking
positions who subscribe to it. Of course, of the three administrations un-
der examination in this Article, only the George W. Bush Administration
satisfied all three of these requirements. The Reagan Administration had
a critical mass of UET adherents in decisionmaking positions but at that
185. See Silberman, supra note 63, at 500.
186. See SPITZER, supra note 3, at 92.
187. Skowronek, supra note 4, at 2100.
188. Id.
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time the theory was neither plausible nor timely. The first Bush Admin-
istration, as Section I described, presented a few opportunities for the
UET to be put to work, but the theory was still too immature. Moreover,
the majority of its adherents had left government service after the close
of the Reagan administration. Future scholarship might therefore look at
whether the ascendance of the UET during the George W. Bush admin-
istration should be understood as an exceptional case or whether, under
similar conditions, other theories of presidential power have been em-
powered to have similarly significant consequences. The answer to this
question should be of interest to scholars, politicians, activists, and citi-
zens alike as we attempt to comprehend, negotiate, police, and in some
cases redraw the boundaries of presidential power in the post-George W.
Bush Era.
SANDER, THE MISMATCH THEORY, AND AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION: CRITIQUING THE ABSENCE OF PRAXIS IN POLICY
DARRELL D. JACKSONt
This Article provides an efficient synthesis of the research to date
on a controversial topic, Professor Richard Sander's mismatch theory,
and the traction it continues to gain through litigation and political pos-
turing. It is also the point of embarkation on a forthcoming exploration
of the appropriate place for African American law students.' Throughout
the Article, I inject my own thoughts and analysis about Sander's, and
each critic's, research and perspectives. This Article is timely because
concepts like equity, equality, fairness, and justice continue to be heated-
ly discussed in a variety offorums, including academic journals and po-
litical debates. The Article's goal is to broaden the considerations in-
volved in current affirmative action discussions and question policies
constructed absent the voices of those most affected.
INTRODUCTION
Nearly a decade ago, in November 2004, Richard Sander, a Profes-
sor of Law at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) School
of Law, published a now oft-cited piece about affirmative action.2 His
primary question was "whether affirmative action in law schools gener-
ates benefits to blacks that substantially exceed the costs to blacks."3
While it is difficult to determine exactly which benefits Sander included
in his analysis,4 he clearly argues that the "bad outcomes" include "high-
er attrition rates, lower pass rates on the bar, [and] problems in the job
market."'
He concluded that affirmative action "produces more harms than
benefits."6 More specifically, he advocated that "a strong case can be
f Byron R. White Center for the Study of American Constitutional Law Fellow and Charles
Inglis Thomson Fellow, University of Colorado Law School; B.A., College of William & Mary;
J.D., George Mason University School of Law; Ph.D., University of Colorado (Boulder). For their
invaluable support and assistance, I would like to thank: Michele Moses, Devon Carbado, David
Mitchell, the American Educational Research Association, and the John Mercer Langston Writing
Workshop scholars.
I. Darrell D. Jackson, Racing to Compete: A Critical Race Theorist's Qualitative Analysis of
Whether African American Male Law School Alumni Were Mismatched or Maligned (2012) (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado) (on file with author).
2. Richard H. Sander, A Systematic Analysis ofAffirmative Action in American Law Schools,
57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 369 (2004).
3. Id. at 369.
4. The exception being that Sander does identify "higher prestige" as a benefit. Id at 371.
5. Id. at 370.
6. Id. at 371.
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made that in the legal education system as a whole, racial preferences
end up producing fewer black lawyers each year than would be produced
by a race-blind system."' This Article is timely due to the national agen-
da promulgated by Sander,8 Ward Connerly, and supporters at the Amer-
ican Civil Rights Institute (ACRI).9 For a robust discussion about affirm-
ative action and ACRI initiatives to occur, all parties involved must place
Sander's ideas within a political policy context. It is important to consid-
er Sander's recommendation beyond its merely academic impact. His
statements will have implications for courts as they rule on conflicts, for
legislatures as they draft laws, for lobbyists as they advocate policy, and
elsewhere. By including the real world or experiential impact of Sand-
er's work on the very students for whom he suggests he protects, the
stakeholders discussed above can make intelligent decisions about the
role that race and the mismatch theory should or should not play within
academia and society.
I. MISMATCH THEORY
Sander's conclusions are often labeled the "mismatch theory";1o
however, Sander gives credit for coining the term "mismatch hypothesis"
to Clyde Summers, Thomas Sowell, and Paul Wangerin.11 In short, Afri-
can American recipients of affirmative action are "mismatched" with the
law schools to which they are admitted, and end up with lower achieve-
ment and success rates as a result.' 2 Following Sander's logic, if African
Americans were matched with their "appropriate" schools, there would
be greater benefits and fewer costs. By "appropriate," Sander meant a
school that has a median Law School Admission Test (LSAT) and un-
dergraduate grade point average (UGPA) score closely equivalent to
7. Id. at 372.
8. See Sander v. State Bar, 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 330, 332-34 (Ct. App. 2011) (discussing Sand-
er's lawsuit against the State Bar of California seeking to obtain bar admissions records in order to
conduct research on the disparity between bar admission rates between different ethnic groups);
Karen Sloan, Professor Hopes Bar Passage Data Will Produce 'Crisper Debate' Over Affirmative
Action, NAT'L L.J. (June 15, 2011), available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202497503009&slretum=l&hbxlogin=1.
9. See generally About the American Civil Rights Institute, AM. CIV. RTS. INST.,
http://acri.org/about.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2011).
10. THOMAS SOWELL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AROUND THE WORLD: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
145-48 (2004); lan Ayres & Richard Brooks, Response, Does Affirmative Action Reduce the Num-
ber of Black Lawyers?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1807, 1825-26 (2005); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Ri-
poste: The Mismatch Theory of Law School Admissions, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 637, 641 (2007);
Cheryl I. Harris & William C. Kidder, The Black Student Mismatch Myth in Legal Education: The
Systemic Flaws in Richard Sander's Affirmative Action Study, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC., Winter
2004/2005, at 102, 105.
I1. Sander, supra note 2, at 450. See generally THOMAS SOWELL, EDUCATION: ASSUMPTIONS
VERSUS HISTORY (1986); Clyde W. Summers, Preferential Admissions: An Unreal Solution to a
Real Problem, 2 U. TOL. L. R. 377 (1970); Paul T. Wangerin, Law School Academic Support Pro-
grams, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 771 (1989).
12. Sander, supra note 2, at 478-81.
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those of the applicant.'3 This, Sander concluded, would benefit African
Americans in law schools and the legal profession.14
A. Sander's Guiding Assumptions
I interpret Sander's conceptual framework for the mismatch theory
as premised upon certain assumptions. These include, but are not limited
to the following. First, an American societal goal is racially integrating
the country. 1 Second, affirmative action is primarily, and has been his-
torically, justified by "its impact on minorities." 6 And third, a colorblind
system of admission is preferable to one that is not. Contrast Sander's
initial assumption, that racially integrating American society is a societal
goal, with authors who have suggested that American society has never
fully embraced nor acted upon a goal of full racial integration in educa-
tion or otherwise.' 7 Instead, they argue, the remedies awarded pursuant to
Brown v. Board of Education8 were a matter of certain African Ameri-
can interests converging with those of European Americans.19 Specifical-
ly, Professor Derrick Bell suggested that European Americans will only
support policies that enhance opportunities for individuals from histori-
cally marginalized communities to the extent that those same policies
converge, also enhancing the lives of the majority of European Ameri-
cans.20 He used the Brown decision as an example to demonstrate that
political interests in suppressing communism were as relevant to the
Court's decision as the law or other timely social issues. 2 1 Bell's analysis
is supported by the fact that the initial Brown decision was made without
any judicial remedies to enforce the holding.
Next, admittedly, Sander acknowledged that a goal of affirmative
action was the diversification of American campuses, but he immediately
proceeded to assume that affirmative action has primarily and historical-
ly been justified by "its impact on minorities."2 2 He said: "Few of us
would enthusiastically support preferential admission policies if we did
not believe they played a powerful, irreplaceable role in giving
13. See id. at 478-80.
14. Id. at 478-81.
15. Id. at 368.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Gloria J. Ladson-Billings, Can We At Least Have Plessy? The Struggle for
Quality Education, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1279, 1287 (2007).
18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,
93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523-25 (1980); see also Richard Delgado, Explaining the Rise and Fall of
African American Fortunes-Interest Convergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 369, 371-72 (2002) (reviewing MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE
IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000)); Lani Guinier, From Racial Liberalism to Racial Litera-
cy: Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Divergence Dilemma, 91 J. AM. HIST. 92, 94
(2004).
20. Bell, supra note 19, at 523-25.
21. Id; see also Kevin Hopkins, Forgive U.S. Our Debts? Righting the Wrongs ofSlavery, 89
GEO. L.J. 2531, 2539 (2001).
22. Sander, supra note 2, at 368.
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nonwhites in America access to higher education, entree to the national
elite, and a chance of correcting historic underrepresentations in the lead-
ing professions." 23 He emphasized the identity of the recipient when he
labeled "black applicants" as "beneficiaries."2 4 In so doing, Sander
viewed affirmative action in a monocular fashion. Throughout his analy-
sis, Sander ignored or avoided any serious analysis of potential benefits
to European Americans, educational institutions, American society, or
democracy.
Sander immediately confounded his "racial analysis" by pointing
out that "UCLA's diversity programs had produced little socioeconomic
variety."2 5 Here, he changed the nature of his outcome variable from a
racial emphasis to a socioeconomic emphasis. While the issue of
intersectionality 26 could have been raised, Sander neglected to do so.
Instead, substituting socioeconomic diversity for racial diversity has be-
come the call of many neo-liberal and neo-conservative authors in af-
firmative action dialogue. 27 It suggests a "colorblind" approach to af-
firmative action, generally, and to educational admissions policies, spe-
cifically.2 8
Moreover, Sander's statements about success and admission stand-
ards were questionable. In his analysis, he pointed to the period from
1964-1967 as the time frame "when law schools were eliminating the
last vestiges of discrimination." 2 9 He appeared to believe that discrimina-
tion in law school admissions was defeated some forty years ago and, at
that time, African Americans gained "equal access." 30 Significant re-
search suggests that discrimination in law schools was not defeated forty
31years ago. It is with this grounding that I attempt to place the debate
surrounding the mismatch theory into context and organize its critiques.
23. Id
24. Id at 369.
25. Id at 371.
26. See, e.g., K.L. Broad, Critical Borderlands & Interdisciplinary, Intersectional Coalitions,
78 DENV. U. L. REV. 1141, 1141-1143 (2000).
27. See Stanley B. Malos, The New Affirmative Action: Socioeconomic Preference Criteria in
College Admissions, 36 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 5, 17-19 (2000); Robert Bruce Slater, Why Socioec-
onomic Affirmative Action in College Admissions Works Against African Americans, J. BLACKS
HIGHER EDUC., Summer 1995, at 57, 57.
28. Sander also avoided the reality of law school tuition. Unless financial packages accompa-
ny admission practices, it is virtually impossible to change the socioeconomic privilege attached to a
law school education, and thus, the applicant pool.
29. Sander, supra note 2, at 376-77.
30. Id
31. See DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 185-87 (2004); EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM
WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE
UNITED STATES 207-09 (2d ed. 2006); GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 94
(2002); Edward J. Littlejohn & Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Black Enrollment in Law Schools: Forward
to the Past?, 12 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 415,415-16 (1987).
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B. Affirmative Action Politics & Policy
The politics surrounding affirmative action are some of the most po-
32larized of all political positions. Within a policy context, affirmative
action in higher education serves to provide greater exposure to, and of,
all historically marginalized groups. 3 3 Its impact has been well chroni-
cled.34 Another purpose is to provide greater life opportunities to groups
that have historically been victimized by a racist society. 5 However, it is
important to distinguish racism from prejudice. Anybody is capable of
showing prejudice, but for racist action to occur one must be in a position
of power and privilege over another.3 6 Racism eliminates and subju-
gates-two activities for which power and privilege are prerequisites. 3 7
Supporters of affirmative action in higher education contend that it
is needed to rectify societal evils of the past and achieve equality.38 Such
evils include, amongst other things, the exclusion of women and other
historically marginalized communities from institutions of higher learn-
ing and exclusion from careers subsequent to such training. Providing
historically marginalized populations with additional measures that sup-
port their recruitment, admission, retention, degree completion, and ca-
reer ascension achieves equality. 40
Opponents of affirmative action in higher education usually do not
disagree about historical evils. 4 1 However, equality, they argue, cannot
be attained by treating individuals differently. Instead, it can only be
achieved when all people attain similar measures on preordained predic-
tors. One example is the argument that the admission of all candidates
32. See JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS, CULTURE,
AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA 20-22, 67-69 (1996); Randall Kennedy, Commentary, Persuasion and
Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1327-28 (1986);
THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE, at xiii-xv (George E. Curry ed. 1996); Robert Siegel, John
McWhorter, Terence Pell, Joseph Phillips, Khin Mai Aung, Kimberl6 Crenshaw, & Time Wise, It's
Time To End Affirmative Action, INTELLIGENCE SQUARED (Nov. 13 2007) (transcript available at
http://intelligencesquaredus.org/wp-content/uploads/Affirmative-Action-111307.pdf) (debate dis-
cussing whether affirmative action should be eliminated).
33. But see generally Kevin Brown, Should Black Immigrants Be Favored Over Black His-
panics and Black Multiracials in the Admissions Processes of Selective Higher Education Pro-
grams?, 54 HOw. L.J. 255 (2011) (analyzing the modifications and breadth to which racial groups
are defined and affirmative action is applied).
34. DIVERSITY CHALLENGED: EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 39-40
(Gary Orfield & Michal Kurlaender eds., 2001).
35. MICHELE S. MOSES, EMBRACING RACE: WHY WE NEED RACE-CONSCIOUS EDUCATION
POLICY 131, 133, 135-37 (2002).
36. BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 31, at 8-9.
37. LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING
POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 14-15 (2002).
38. Id. at 45-47; TIM J. WISE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: RACIAL PREFERENCE IN BLACK AND
WHITE 38-39 (2005); Kimberle Crenshaw, Playing Race Cards: Constructing a Pro-Active Defense
ofAffirmative Action, 16 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 196, 203-06 (2000).
39. WISE, supra note 38, at I1.
40. LOURY, supra note 31, at 131-32.
41. See WARD CONNERLY, CREATING EQUAL: My FIGHT AGAINST RACE PREFERENCES 17-
20 (2000); SOWELL, supra note 10, at 115-22; Sander, supra note 2, at 371-72.
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into college and universities should be measured, in whole or in large
part, by grade point average and standardized test scores.4 2
In deciding whether affirmative action is warranted and, if warrant-
ed, whether to use affirmative action, a pivotal consideration is the pur-
pose of colleges and universities. Why is it desirable to send any student
to a college or university? For example, the purpose may be to heighten
students' intelligence, to prepare students for careers, to encourage stu-
dents toward higher levels of research, to teach students how to critically
analyze, and to prepare students to be better citizens.
Grutter v. Bollinger43 suggested that the purpose of affirmative ac-
tion was to
reaffirm the Law School's commitment to diversity with special ref-
erence to the inclusion of African-American, Hispanic, and Native-
American students, who otherwise might not be represented in the
student body in meaningful numbers. By enrolling a "critical mass"
of underrepresented minority students, the policy seeks to ensure
their ability to contribute to the Law School's character and to the le-
gal profession.4
However, Amy Gutmann, President of the University of Pennsylva-
nia as well as a political theorist and philosopher,4 5 suggested that institu-
tions of higher learning "provide a realm where new and unorthodox
ideas are judged on the intellectual merits; where the men and women
who defend such ideas, provided they defend them well, are not strangers
but valuable members of a community. Universities thereby serve de-
mocracy as sanctuaries of nonrepression., 4 6 In order to accomplish such
a service to democracy, it would appear that homogeneity would be
counterproductive. While similar mindsets could conceivably create
"new and unorthodox ideas," the research on the educational benefits of
diversity47 suggests that varied mindsets would more likely create intel-
lectually debatable issues. While thresholds must be maintained to assure
that all participants are able to actively engage in debate, varied minds
are unlikely to uniformly score within a pre-ordained range on any form
of testing, standardized or not. Varied is analogous to different. 48 To ob-
tain differentiation, institutions of higher learning must search for pro-
spects with experiences and talents distinct from one another. Affirma-
42. Sander, supra note 2, at 367.
43. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
44. Id at 2328.
45. Biography, Office of the President, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA,
http://www.upenn.edulpresident/meet-president/biography (last updated March 2011).
46. AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 174 (1987).
47. See generally Michele S. Moses & M.J. Chang, Toward a Deeper Understanding of the
Diversity Rationale, 33 Educ. Researcher 6 (2006); Patricia Gurin et al., Diversity and Higher Edu-
cation: Theory and Impact on Educational Outcomes, 72 HARV. EDUC. REV. 330 (2002).
48. THE CONCISE ROGET'S INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS 780 (Barbara Ann Kipfer ed., 6th ed.
2003).
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tive action is a tool for recruiting, admitting, retaining, and matriculating
said students.
If the previous assessment justifies the use of affirmative action, an-
other question remains: Why use affirmative action as opposed to some
other tool? Michele Moses, an educational philosopher, similar to
Gutmann, whose research considers the intersection of race and higher
education, suggested that "affirmative action is necessary because it fos-
ters students' self-determination by playing a crucial role in expanding
their social contexts of choice, both while they are students and after-
wards."49 Moses argued that affirmative action expands the life choices
of its recipients. Moreover, she suggested one outcome is increased pride
for the recipients because they "get the message that their race or ethnici-
ty," and I would add gender, "is considered important enough to be used
as a qualifying factor for university admission."50 Similar to the athlete,
the musician, the legacy, or a variety of other recruits, Moses suggested
that affirmative action recipients should find pride in what they bring to
their institution of higher learning."' Their contribution may be found in,
amongst other things, experiences, perspectives, and ideologies. Affirma-
tive action supports this recognition in a way that other tools may not.
Moreover, affirmative action does this in a manner that "does not signifi-
cantly diminish the self-determination of white students."5 2
These nuances were not considered in Sander's quantitative analy-
sis.53 His articles must ignore personal experiences and growth in order
to report numeric survey data. However, to suggest a "proper match" for
any individual (much less group) without considering and understanding
the individual or group's experiences appears to be ill advised, if not
irresponsible.
Interestingly, part of Sander's hypothesis appears to be coming true.
He suggested that "about 86% of blacks currently admitted to some law
school would still gain admission to the system without racial prefer-
ences." 54 At the time that he collected his data, fall 2001, African Ameri-
cans made up about 7.7% of first-year enrollment. As of fall 2008, in a
time when Ward Connerly's American Civil Rights Institute-sponsored
state initiatives have either taken effect or been substantially considered
across the United States, African Americans' first-year enrollment has
49. MOSES, supra note 35, at 107.
50. Id. at 131.
51. See Ashley M. Hibbett, The Enigma of the Stigma: A Case Study on the Validity of the
Stigma Arguments Made in Opposition to Affirmative Action Programs in Higher Education, 21
HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 75 (2005) (discussing the results of a self-developed and self-conducted
study on the perception of affirmative action among African American students at Harvard Law
School).
52. MOSES, supra note 35, at 137.
53. See generally Sander, supra note 2.
54. Sander, supra note 2, at 373.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW
decreased to approximately 7.2%.5' That is approximately a 4.5% drop in
first-year enrollment. Sander's 86% hypothesis is, obviously, a 14% drop
in current enrollment. Are the "new generation" of African American
law school graduates "more successful" and how is that success being
measured?
II. CRITIQUES OF THE MISMATCH THEORY
Many have critiqued Sander's mismatch hypothesis. 56 Moreover,
Sander's hypothesis has attracted critiques from academicians in law,
education, statistics, and beyond.57 Generally, critics have challenged
Sander's analysis, metrics, and methodology. 8 Moreover, attempted
replications of Sander's study have raised doubts about the accuracy of
his reported correlations. 5 9 And, using an economic analysis of the law,
critics have questioned Sander's definition of success, which assigned a
value of zero to an incomplete law school education. 60 Camilli, Jackson,
Chiu, and Gallagher suggested "that regression analyses of the kind con-
ducted by Sander are incapable of producing credible estimates of causal
effects." Ultimately, critics suggested that Sander may have been so
"predisposed to show that affirmative action was counterproductive
55. See Total Minority Enrollment 2011 (New Aggregate Categories), LSAC.ORG,
http://www.1sac.org/jd/pdfs/new-aggregate-categories.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2011); Legal Educa-
tion Statistics, LSAC and http://www.1sac.org/JD/pdfs/Legal-Education-Statistics-Attendance-and-
Degrees.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2011).
56. E.g., Ayers & Brooks, supra note 10, at 1808-09; Gregory Camilli, Darrell D. Jackson,
Chia-Yi Chiu & Ann Gallagher, The Mismatch Hypothesis in Law School Admissions, 2 WIDENER J.
OF L., ECON. & RACE 165, 165-66 & n.3, 203-04 (May 3, 2011),
http://blogs.law.widener.edu/wjler/files/2011/05/LSACFinal.pdf; David L. Chambers, Timothy T.
Clydesdale, William C. Kidder & Richard 0. Lempert, The Real Impact of Eliminating Affirmative
Action in American Law Schools: An Empirical Critique of Richard Sander's Study, 57 STAN. L.
REV 1855, 1857 (2005); andrd douglas pond cummings, Open Water: Affirmative Action, Mismatch
Theory and Swarming Predators-A Response to Richard Sander, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 795, 802-05
(2006); Harris & Kidder, supra note 10, at 103; Beverly 1. Moran, The Case for Black Inferiority?
What Must be True if Professor Sander is Right: A Response to a Systemic Analysis of Affirmative
Action in American Law Schools, 5 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 41, 42-43 (2005); L. Darnell Weeden,
Raising the Bar in the Affirmative Action Debate: A Pragmatic Comment on Professor Richard H.
Sander's Systematic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools Article, 15 S. CAL.
REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 195, 196-97 (2006); David B. Wilkins, A Systematic Response to Systemic
Disadvantage: A Response to Sander, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1915, 1919 (2005).
57. E.g., id; see also Peter Arcidiacono, Esteban M. Aucejo, Hanming Fang & Kenneth 1.
Spenner, Does Affirmative Action Lead to Mismatch? A New Test and Evidence I (Nat'I Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14885, Apr. 2009), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14885; Kalena E. Cortes, Do Bans on Affirmative Action Hurt Minori-
ty Students? Evidence from the Texas Top 10% Plan, 29 ECON. OF EDUC. REV. 1110 (2010).
58. See, e.g., Ayers & Brooks, supra note 10, at 1807-09; Camilli, Jackson, Chiu & Gal-
lagher, supra note 56, at 203, 207-08; Chambers, Clydsedale, Kidder & Lempert, supra note 56, at
1857; cummings, supra note 56, at 801-02; Harris & Kidder, supra note 10, at 103; Moran, supra
note 56, at 48-58.
59. Daniel E. Ho, Scholarship Comment, Why Affirmative Action Does Not Cause Black
Students to Fail the Bar, 14 Yale L.J. 1997, 1997 (2005) [hereinafter Ho, Why Affirmative Action];
Daniel E. Ho, Affirmative Action's Affirmative Action: A Reply to Sander, 114 YALE L.J. 2011,
2011-12 (2005) [hereinafter Ho, Affirmative Action's Affirmative Action].
60. Delgado, supra note 10, at 647-48.
61. Camilli, Jackson, Chiu & Gallagher, supra note 56, at 207.
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[that] he didn't think to ask what the black drop-outs were doing." 62
Sander has denied all such allegations.63 In what follows, I thoroughly
discuss the analysis surrounding Sander's research and theory, and at-
tempt to place each into quantitative critiques or theoretical critiques. I
also briefly engage qualitative considerations and expand upon that anal-
ysis in my forthcoming work, Racing to Compete: A Critical Race Theo-
rist's Qualitative Analysis of Whether African American Male Law
School Alumni were Mismatched or Maligned.6
A. Quantitative Critiques
In addition to being a professor of'law, Sander holds a Ph.D. in eco-
nomics from Northwestern University.6 Likely as a result, his analyses
focused on quantitative methods for the creation of the mismatch theory.
Most critics, therefore, have engaged quantitative analysis to dissect his
analyses. In brief, Ayers and Brooks suggested that Sander was errone-
ous in both his interpretation of his data and his conclusions.6 6 Chambers,
Clydesdale, Kidder, and Lempert found Sander's conclusions to be unre-
liable.67 Dauber advised that Sander merely "mudd[ied] the waters."6 Ho
argued that Sander misapplied basic principles.69 Rothstein and Yoon
warned that there was no plausible interpretation of the data that would
lead to Sander's results. 70 Lastly, Camilli, Jackson, Chiu, and Gallagher
concluded that the difference in bar passage rates seems very modest
relative to the substantial social networking advantages of attending an
elite school.7 '
1. Stanford Law Review
In May 2005, Sander responded to his critics with A Reply to Crit-
ics. 7 2 This edition of the Stanford Law Review introduced readers to four
attacks on Sander's theories and methods. The issue ended with his
response.74 Ayers and Brooks began by providing a response that "re-
futes the claim that affirmative action has reduced the number of black
62. Delgado, supra note 10, at 648.
63. Richard H. Sander, Mismeasuring the Mismatch: A Response to Ho, 114 YALE L.J. 2005,
2005 (2005) [hereinafter Sander, Mismeasuring the Mismatch]; Richard H. Sander, A Reply to Crit-
ics, 57 STAN. L. REV 1963, 1964-65 (2005) [hereinafter Sander, A Reply to Critics].
64. Jackson, supra note 1.
65. Richard Sander Biography, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW,
http://www2.1aw.ucla.edulsander/BioCV/Bio.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2011).
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68. Michele Landis Dauber, The Big Muddy, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1899, 1913-14 (2005).
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lawyers." 7 5 Instead, these authors suggested that "the elimination of af-
firmative action would reduce the number of [African American] law-
yers" and that their data "suggest[ed] an equally plausible 'reverse mis-
match effect,' where the probability of black law students becoming
lawyers would be maximized under a system involving an affirmative
action program with larger racial preferences than those presently in
place."7 6
Ayers and Brooks restricted their arguments to Sander's quantita-
tive analyses. First, they considered the various weaknesses in conclu-
sions made from Sander's regression analysis.77 Second, they considered
probability curves, created both by Sander and by themselves, and the
extent to which these curves undermined Sander's theories.78 Third, they
contradicted Sander's conclusions about the correlation between bar pas-
sage rate and law school attended, as well as the ultimate population of
black lawyers. 7 9 Lastly, they critiqued Sander's paternalism regarding
rejecting black affirmative action recipients and instead called for better
distribution of information to applicants about their likelihood of success
at any particular law school.80 Ultimately, Ayers and Brooks questioned
Sander's interpretation of his own data and the conclusions he ascribed
to affirmative action.
In the same Stanford Law Review issue, Chambers, Clydesdale,
Kidder, and Lempert argued that Sander "significantly overestimated the
costs of affirmative action and failed to demonstrate benefits from ending
it" and that "the conclusions in Systemic Analysis rest on a series of sta-
tistical errors, oversights, and implausible assumptions."8' Similar to
Ayers and Brooks, 8 2 Chambers et al. suggested that implementation of
Sander's recommendations would lead to a much larger decline in ma-
triculation by African American law students than Sander suggested.
Noting that Sander based his analysis on a quantitative method known as
grid modeling, Chambers et al. stated that "the grid model cannot pro-
vide even a loose estimate of how many African Americans would in fact
matriculate in law school, but Sander, though recognizing that the model
cannot tell us what African Americans would actually do, in the end
75. Ayers & Brooks, supra note 10, at 1809.
76. Id
77. Id. at 1833-34.
78. Id. at 1818.
79. Id. at 1823-25.
80. By paternalism, I adopt cummings's definition of "attempting to exercise control over
another individual that purports to be implemented in the best interests of that individual." cum-
mings, supra note 56, at 824. In Sander's articles, he argues that African American law students are
mismatched with their appropriate institution and would be better served at less elite or rigorous
schools. See, e.g., Sander, supra note 2, at 353-34. As cummings noted, "Sander seeks to substitute
his judgment for the very students that are making that decision for themselves. This is paternalism
in its starkest form." cummings, supra note 56, at 828.
81. Chambers, Clydsedale, Kidder & Lempert, supra note 56, at 1857.
82. Ayers & Brooks, supra note 10, at 1813-16.
83. Chambers, Clydsedale, Kidder & Lempert, supra note 56 at 1857-62.
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treats it as if it does."84 Their research led them to contradict Sander and
conclude that ending affirmative action would reduce the African Ameri-
can student population for two reasons. First, "it would exclude students
whose LSAT scores and UGPAs are so low that they could not get into a
school even if they applied to a broad range of schools."8 5 Second, "some
African Americans who could get into some law school somewhere
would no longer choose to apply to law school, or would apply only to
schools that would not admit them, or would be accepted someplace but
decide not to attend."86
Next, Chambers et al. critiqued Sander's statistical analyses em-
ployed in Systemic Analysis. They noted that "Sander rests all his im-
portant claims about black student performance on statistical analyses. If
his analyses are inadequate, his conclusions are unreliable."87 They ini-
tially referenced his failure to report a Nagelkerke R-Square88 to show the
strength of associations reported in his regression models.8 9 The results
of their computation, an R-Square of .325, suggested that Sander's table
fails to fully explain what leads to bar passage. 90 Moreover, according to
Chambers et al., Sander's model, while highly accurate in predicting who
will pass the bar, "does a dismal job . . . predicting who will fail, as it
correctly labels as 'fails' only 129 out of the 1074 sample students who
actually did fail, for a success rate of only 12%."91 They concluded this
phase of their critique by noting:
Numerous other statistical problems can be found in Sander's analy-
sis. These include excluding race as a cause of outcomes in models
plagued by multicollinearity, neglecting to model selection effects
when predicting student performance, and treating law school tier not
as a set of nominal variables but as an interval scale measure. In sum,
the statistical misstatements and modeling errors in Systemic Analysis
mean that the conclusions appear to have far more evidentiary sup-
port than they in fact do.92
Chambers et al. go on to point out a variety of other concerns with
Sander's data. For example, he chose to use the National Survey of Law
School Performance (NSLSP) for some analyses and the Law School
84. Id. at 1863.
85. Id. at 1867.
86. Id. at 1867-68.
87. Id. at 1868.
88. Briefly, for those completely unfamiliar with quantitative terminology, "R" is an abbre-
viation for correlation coefficient. A correlation coefficient is a measure of linear association. "The
closer R is to 1, the stronger is the linear association between variables. . ." (p. 126). R squared
indicates how well outcomes can be predicted by a statistical model. R squared values range from 0
to 1, and an R squared of I is optimal. N.J.D. Nagelkerke, A Note on a General Definition of the
Coefficient ofDetermination, 78 BIOMETRIKA 691, 691 (1991).
89. Chambers, Clydsedale, Kidder & Lempert, supra note 56, at 1870
90. Id.
91. Id at 1871.
92. Id at 1872-73 (footnotes omitted).
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Admission Council (LSAC) National Longitudinal Bar Passage Study
(BPS) for other analyses.9 3 Sander's choice of the NSLSP led him to
conclude that African American students would perform as well as
whites absent affirmative action.94 Chambers et al. argued that had he
continued to "use[] the BPS, he would have reached quite different con-
clusions, conclusions that would have been more consistent with almost
all of the research that has been done relating standardized test scores
among African Americans to later graded performance." 95 They noted
that "studies conducted by the LSAC have shown more than once, even
among white and African American students with identical entry creden-
tials, African American students typically receive somewhat lower law
school grades than whites."96
Dauber then added to the criticism of Sander's research by stating
that "Sander has muddied rather than clarified the waters with a flawed
and ultimately misleading contribution." 97 In large part, her criticism
focused on Sander's inappropriate use of a dummy variable, using white
lawyers as a stand-in for black lawyers.98 Instead, she argued that "black
law students with similar academic credentials who attend higher-status
schools do better, not worse, than comparable black law students attend-
ing lower prestige schools in terms of bar passage rates." 99 Ultimately,
she pointed to the Stanford Law Review and its failure to engage in a
peer-reviewed process as the critical flaw in disseminating Sander's re-
search. 00
Sander's response to the concert of opponents in the Stanford Law
Review issue was multifaceted. He portrayed his hypothesis as receiving
''predominantly favorable" responses and maintained that the critiques
were "toothless."'0 ' Interestingly, he considered the Wilkins rebuttal,
which I analyze below, as the strongest of all the published critiques.
Before engaging each of his critics individually, he discussed a data set
made up of individuals he defined as his "'second-choice' sample."l 02
This is the group of African American law students who were admitted
into an elite institution yet elected to go to a lower ranked school. Ac-
cording to Sander, this group produced "outcomes closer to the white
average than the black average."'0 3 The implication is that this is further
support for the mismatch theory. The arguments against such an implica-
93. See Sander, supra note 2, at 426-29, 453.
94. Chambers, Clydsedale, Kidder & Lempert, supra note 56, at 1877.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Dauber, supra note 68, at 1902.
98. Id. at 1905.
99. Id. at 1902.
100. See id. at 1908.
101. Sander, A Reply to Critics, supra note 63, at 1964.
102. Id. at 1973.
103. Id. at 1974 (emphasis added).
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tion include, but are not limited to, the decision made by many students
(not just the African American students that Sander quantitatively ana-
lyzed) to incur less debt by attending a less selective law school and at-
tending a law school closer to home so that jobs could be maintained.
There is no indication that Sander accounted for, attempted to account
for, or could account for students who elected a less selective school for
reasons unconnected to their standardized scores.
Sander dispensed with the critics by specifically addressing each of
their central complaints. With the quantitative critics, he agreed with
certain facets of their arguments, but ultimately dismissed their conclu-
sions as either a misinterpretation of his argument or the data.'4 Notably,
Wilkins's argument, discussed below, received as much, if not more,
space than any other critique.
2. Yale Law Journal
In addition to the Stanford Law Review, the Yale Law Journal pro-
duced a three part analysis of the mismatch theory that included a com-
ment by Daniel Ho, a response by Sander, and a reply to that response by
Ho. Ho's comment argued that Sander misapplied "basic principles of
causal inference" by relying on "unjustifiable assumptions."',0 5 The faulty
assumptions, Ho argued, all led Sander to articulate erroneous conclu-
sions.106 Ultimately, Ho concluded that, although African Americans "get
lower grades as a result of going to a higher-tier school,"'0 7 ultimately,
"for similarly qualified black students, attending a higher-tier law school
has no detectable effect on bar passage rates."'08 In summary, Ho stated
that "whichever way one cuts it, there is no evidence for the hypothesis
that law school tier causes black students to fail the bar."'
0 9
Sander responded by stating, "Ho seems to miss the central analyti-
cal framework of my article, is vague in his claims of bias, and offers an
alternative approach that violates the very methodological precepts he
lays out.""o Sander went on to argue, "There are two fundamental prob-
lems with Ho's analysis. First, he assumes that the 'tier' variable in the
BPS data set is a perfect hierarchical measure of school prestige.""' The
second problem was what Sander called "unobservable characteris-
tics."ll 2 These are unknowns such as a student's "undergraduate college,
their major, and other skills and achievements."'1 3 Sander concluded by
104. See generally id
105. Ho, Why Affirmative Action, supra note 59, at 1997.
106. Id.
107. Id at 2004.
108. Id. at 1997.
109. Id. at 2004.
110. Sander, Mismeasuring the Mismatch, supra note 63, at 2005.
111. Id. at 2009.
112. Id.at2010.
113. Id.
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suggesting that "[c]riticism is vital, but critics who wish to reject the
mismatch theory outright have a responsibility to offer their own expla-
nation and cures for the disparate harm our current system inflicts on
blacks."' 14
Ho's reply argued, "[t]he descriptive facts Sander presents may ac-
count for some of the reasons for affirmative action, but they do not ad-
dress the consequences of affirmative action."'15 Ho's three key criti-
cisms of Sander were: i) "Sander's control group, as he conceived it, is
invalid;"ll 6 ii) Sander ignored the "rule of interference" which propounds
"that controlling for a consequence of the cause is never justified and
will never produce the right causal effect;"ll 7 and iii) Sander introduced
"a textbook example of bias induced by controlling for a consequence of
the cause."" 8 Ultimately, Ho suggested that Sander has (re)introduced an
important dialogue about affirmative action, but has mishandled the op-
portunity." 9
Ho's conclusion that Sander's regression suffered from post-
treatment bias was later supported by Katherine Barnes. 2 0 She added to
the list of quantitative researchers who found that Sander's hypothesis is
not supported by the very data he used. However, her analysis was new
because she did not solely analyze Sander's mismatch theory; she con-
sidered "two theories that seek to explain black students' depressed
achievement in law school: the mismatch theory and the race-based bar-
riers theory."'21 Using three variables, "race, school type, and creden-
tials," she investigated "three performance measures: bar passage, gradu-
ation, and obtaining a well-paying first job after law school." 22 Statisti-
cally, Barnes argued, "[e]nding affirmative action would lead to 13.4%
fewer black lawyers, 22.6% fewer new black law graduates, and 23%
fewer black law graduates with well-paying jobs." 23 She concluded that
the difference in grades between black and white law students is not at-
tributable to mismatch. "Instead, some form of latent race-based discrim-
ination may be at play." 2 4 Furthermore, her data suggested a "reverse-
mismatch": African American law school students are more likely to
graduate from elite institutions.125 Finally, she "suggests that the legal
academy should prioritize further investigation to determine what specif-
114. Id.
115. Ho, Affirmative Action's Affirmative Action, supra note 59, at 2011-12 (emphasis added).




120. Katherine Y. Barnes, Is Affirmative Action Responsible for the Achievement Gap Between
Black and White Law Students?, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1759, 1800 (2007).
121. Id. at 1765.
122. Id. at 1775. Barnes defines a "well-paying job as earning $40,000 or more in 1995." Id
123. Id. at 1800.
124. Id. at 1807.
125. See id at 1789.
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ically about law school culture has negative (or positive) consequences.
The challenge is to determine what in law school culture helps students,
particularly minority students, thrive."l 2 6
3. Other responses
Rothstein and Yoon engaged in one of the most current and in-depth
quantitative critiques of Sander's ideas.' 27 Arguing that Sander's analysis
implicitly attributes any black underperformance to mismatch, Rothstein
and Yoon implemented a strategy of "compar[ing] black students with
white students with the same credentials irrespective of the school that
they attend[ed]."l 2 8 They argued that their approach was preferable to
Sander's because "[t]o identify the mismatch effect of affirmative action,
Sander must correctly estimate four effects from three different statistical
models. If any of these models goes wrong, the answer obtained at the
end of the process will be biased." 2 9 Rothstein and Yoon concluded,
contrary to Sander's suggestions, that "[i]n the absence of affirmative
action ... the number of black students entering law school would fall by
about 60 percent, while black representation at the most selective schools
would fall by 90 percent." 30 Furthermore, their analysis "casts doubt on
the mismatch hypothesis, particularly as it applies to elite schools"' 3 1 and
they warned that "[t]here is no plausible interpretation of the data under
which the elimination of affirmative action would increase the number of
black lawyers, or even decrease it by a small amount."l 3 2
Most recently, Camilli, Jackson, Chiu, and Gallagher engaged
Sander by analyzing whether positive effects exist from supporting the
mismatch hypothesis. Their analysis furthered the current research be-
cause they engaged the mismatch theory by looking at potential benefits
instead of potential detriments, as previous articles had focused.'33 The
authors grounded their theory in similar studies by Alon and Tiendal 34
and Dale and Krueger.135 Focusing on the "match effect" that should
occur if Sander's hypothesis held true, the authors considered the value
added effect of attending an elite law school. Using the BPS for their
data source, the authors found "[s]ome evidence supporting the negative
match hypothesis for Black and Asian law school students in the lower
126. Id. at 1806.
127. See generally Rothstein & Yoon, supra note 70.
128. Id. at 682-83.
129. Id. at 685.
130. Id. at 711.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 712.
133. Camilli, Jackson, Chiu & Gallagher, supra note 56, at 166.
134. Sigal Alon & Marta Tienda, Assessing the "Mismatch" Hypothesis: Differences in Col-
lege Graduation Rates by Institutional Selectivity, 78 SOC. OF EDUC. 294 (2005).
135. Stacy Berg Dale & Alan B. Krueger, Estimating the Payoff to Attending a More Selective
College: An Application of Selection on Observables and Unobservables, 117 Q. J. OF ECON. 1491
(2002).
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propensity range. Yet the match effects for the bar passage in the upper
range were much lower than Sander's reports, and did not approach sta-
- ,,136tistical significance at a = .05.
They concluded that "the bar passage rates difference seems very
modest relative to the substantial social networking advantages of elite
school attendance"l 37 and highlighted Sander's own acknowledgement
that "he did not consider 'perhaps the single greatest benefit of affirma-
tive action in law schools: its role in building the long-term careers of
[B]lack lawyers and giving them a place in the most elite ranks of the
profession and American society.'" 3 8
B. Theoretical Critiques
At present, there has not been a law review issue specifically dedi-
cated to theoretical responses to the mismatch theory. Of the theoretical
responses to Sander, in brief, Wilkins recounted the history of racism and
affirmative action in law schools.13 9 Harris and Kidder pointed out the
failures of those who had erroneously made previous claims similar to
Sander's.14 0 Kidder, individually, suggested that the data Sander chose to
use was an anomaly and that a wider date range would have led to differ-
ent conclusions.141 Johnson and Onwuachi-Willig argued that Sander
chose to avoid the more difficult assessment of how "soft" variables, like
a hostile law school environment, contributed to his conclusions.142
Wilkins wrote the last article in the Stanford Law Review's series of
criticisms against Sander.143 However, Wilkins undertook a theoretical
rebuttal to Sander's hypothesis and is, therefore, placed within this sec-
tion of the literature review, not beside his fellow critics found in the
quantitative section. Wilkins asserted that, under the mismatch theory,
"Sander must prove that grades are more important than law school pres-
tige for those black law students who actually become lawyers."'44 He
then argued that Sander provided only one piece of evidence to support
his burden: that according to the first wave of responses to the After the
JD Study, "black lawyers with high grades from low-status schools are
as-if not more-likely to obtain high-paying jobs than their counter-
parts from higher-status schools with lower grades." 45 Wilkins contend-
136. Camilli, Jackson, Chiu & Gallagher, supra note 56, at 203.
137. Id. at 204.
138. Id. at 207.
139. Wilkins, supra note 56, at 1920-24.
140. Harris & Kidder, supra note 10, at 102-03.
141. See William C. Kidder, Does Affirmative Action Really Hurt Blacks and Latinos in U.S.
Law Schools?, ToMAS RIVERA POL'Y INST., September 2005, at 3.
142. Kevin R. Johnson & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Cry Me a River: The Limits of "A Systemic
Analysis ofAffirmativeAction in American Law Schools", 7 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 1. 12, 17-18
(2005).
143. Wilkins, supra note 56.
144. Id. at 1918.
145. Id.
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ed that "this single piece of evidence does not come anywhere close to
proving that most black lawyers would be better off in a world in which
the vast majority of them would attend law schools twenty to fifty places
below the ones that they currently attend." 46
In a four part analysis, Wilkins recounted the history of affirmative
action in law schools and the legal profession, weighed the importance of
attending an elite law school against the importance of grade point aver-
age, questioned the validity of the bar exam and its connection to law
school or the practice of law, and, finally, suggested alternatives for ana-
lyzing and addressing the issue that Sander claimed is paramount-the
disproportionately lower grades and bar passage of African Americans in
law school. 147 Ultimately, Wilkins introduced two paradigms that must
be considered in concert with Sander's hypothesis. First, he stated that,
"It is only by placing affirmative action in the broader context of how
careers are actually forged in today's legal marketplace that we can reach
credible judgments about whether such policies hurt some of their in-
tended beneficiaries, and, more importantly, what we might do to rectify
this situation." 48 Second, he interviewed African American Harvard Law
School alumni and engaged in counter-storytelling 4 9 to stress the bene-
fits of a Harvard Law School education. 50
In his dissent to Wilkins' response, Sander admitted a crucial reality
behind the mismatch theory that often goes overlooked by its proponents.
He stated, "Systemic Analysis does not (and does not pretend to) consider
all of the costs and benefits of racial preferences.' 5' Furthermore, in re-
sponding to Wilkins, Sander raised another valuable question when he
stated, "[d]oing poorly in law school could be a significant long-term
handicap for lawyers in two other ways. First, how much one learns in
law school could actually influence how good a lawyer one becomes
after law school." 52 Second, how do law students define what they
learned in law school and what is the connection between what students
learn in law school with how good a lawyer they become? In addition,
Sander suggested that the typical black law graduate "would have gotten
a significantly better job had he been somehow able to bypass affirma-
146. Id at 1919.
147. Id. at 1919-20.
148. Id. at 1920.
149. Counter-storytelling is a method for (re)examining a normative perspective. A belief or
understanding can become grounded in recurring narratives that lead an individual to suggest that a
conclusion or action is simply "common-sense." Counter-storytelling is one method for questioning
and critiquing the common-sense narrative by inserting perspectives, experiences, and understand-
ings that are often unheard or failed to be considered within the normative framework. See RICHARD
DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 42-43 (2001); see also
IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL: THE CHICANO FIGHT FOR JUSTICE 110-13 (2003).
150. Wilkins, supra note 56, at 1915-16, 1934 & n.72.
151. Sander, A Reply to Critics, supra note 63, at 2005 (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 2006.
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tive action in law school." 5 3 I raise each of Sander's theoretical argu-
ments as points of departure for future researchers.
Harris and Kidder, a professor of law at UCLA and a researcher at
the Equal Justice Society, respectively, added to Wilkins's consideration
of costs and benefits. They assigned a host of errors to Sander's conclu-
sions. The authors pointed out that Sander's theories were previously
argued by a host of other individuals, including, but not limited to,
Stephan and Abigail Thernstrom, Ward Connerly, Walter Williams, Gail
Heriot, and Thomas Sowell.15 4 Using Thernstrom's erroneous prediction
that California's Proposition 209 would redistribute African Americans
from UCLA and UC Berkeley to campuses like UC Riverside, Harris and
Kidder pointed out that such "benefits" never materialized and that in
2004 UCLA provided the most applicants to law schools in the coun-
try.15 5
They then addressed Sander's theory that, absent affirmative action,
African Americans would relocate to more "appropriate" law schools by
questioning his assumption "that law schools are fungible in terms of
attractiveness to black applicants.' 56 Instead, they argued that "there is
no reason to believe that an African-American candidate from New Jer-
sey" (a metropolitan area with a significant minority population) "would
attend the University of Montana" (an area with a small minority popula-
tion). 157
They also disputed Sander's conclusions by referencing the BPS
(amongst others), which found that black students with the same entry
credentials as their white classmates within the same law school still
earned lower grades. This calls for a deeper analysis of causes and in-
cludes theories like "underachievement" and "stereotype threat." 58
Individually, Kidder dealt with many of the quantitative issues in
his Tomis Rivera Policy Institute executive summary.159 Calling Sand-
er's conclusions "speculative," Kidder concluded that "based on 2004
admission data, an annual decline in African American attorneys of 30%
to 40% is more likely if affirmative action were ended."160 Kidder dis-
cussed three primary reasons that led to Sander's estimates being too
optimistic. First, the quantity of applications and acceptance rates in
2001 (the year from which Sander drew his data), were an anomaly due
153. Id
154. Harris & Kidder, supra note 10, at 102.
155. Id
156. Id. at 103.
157. Id.
158. THERESA PERRY, CLAUDE STEELE & ASA G. HILLIARD III, YOUNG, GIFTED, AND BLACK:
PROMOTING HIGH ACHIEVEMENT AMONG AFRICAN AMERICAN STUDENTS 110-12 (2003).
159. Kidder, supra note 141, at 1.
160. Id.
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to the national economy and job market.' 6 1 Second, in using another re-
searcher's (Wightman's) model, Sander simply ignored that researcher's
"warning that the grid model is 'less realistic in its assumptions' because
it ignores the schools to which minority students actually applied."' 62
Additionally, Kidder pointed out that Wightman found "that LSAT
scores and college grades 'are not significant predictors of graduation
from law school.'" 63 Lastly, Kidder suggested "that Sander did not real-
ly apply 2001 data after all, much less the latest available data."'6
Kidder concluded by suggesting that "the number of black lawyers
resulting from the 2004 admissions cycle would likely decline by 30-
40% if affirmative action were not practiced."' 65 In questioning the idea
of a mismatch, Kidder pointed out that "in 2001-2003, the top 26 law
schools graduated about 1600 African Americans, with an impressive
graduation rate above 96%, including 100% at Columbia, Georgetown,
and Michigan."l 66 It is from these law schools that one finds the majority
of law professors, federal judges, and partners at major law firms.167
In connecting Sander's critique of affirmative action to the theory of
institutional diversity, Johnson and Onwuachi-Willig "re-cast the ques-
tion posed by Professor Sander from 'what's wrong with affirmative
action?' to 'how do we diversify our law schools?"'l 68 They critiqued
Sander's article by focusing on two points. First, they "contend that the
focal point of 'A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action on American
Law Schools' is unduly narrow." 69 Second, they "examine critically
Professor Sander's assumption that relatively lower UGPAs and LSAT
scores explain why African Americans fail to fare as well academically
in law school as their white peers." 7 0 They chose not to question the
statistical conclusions reached by Sander. Instead, they argued that Sand-
er chose to avoid the more difficult assessment of how "soft" variables,
like a hostile law school environment, contributed to his conclusions.17 '
The final articles that I will consider were grounded in an analysis
of privilege. Together, they question whose "truths" get priority over
others and why. Moran summarized many of the authors described here-
in and concluded that there are what she calls six truths one must accept
when Sander's "conclusions are adopted." 72 The six truthsl73 are, essen-
161. Id. at 3.
162. Id
163. Id. at 5-6.
164. Id at 3.
165. Id at 7.
166. Id at 6.
167. See id. at 7-8.
168. Johnson & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 142, at 28.
169. Id at 4.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 12.
172. Moran, supra note 56, at 48-57.
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tially, contradictions to the very data used by Sander. An example, from
"'Truth' Number One: The Best Blacks Are Simply Not as Qualified as
the Best Whites,"174 is Moran's critique of Sander's failure to consider
economic status, educational preparation, age, or the potential of stereo-
type threat in LSAT scores, UGPA, subsequent law school grades, and
bar passage rates. Moran framed her argument in a manner that forced
supporters of Sander's hypothesis to be "boxed" into six beliefs and as-
sumptions. Ultimately, she questioned why Sander's argument received
so much attention from the media while another study received none.
That study, by Lempert, "showed that black Michigan Law School Grad-
uates earn as much as white graduates, are as satisfied with their careers,
and do more public service than whites."' 75
Randall was much more direct.'7 6 She used the law school at which
she is on the faculty as an example of how the LSAT has been and con-
tinues to be improperly considered. Specifically, she objected "to the use
of [LSAT] cut-off scores, or any admission process that has a disparate
impact on Blacks and other minorities. Moreover, she found that in-
stituting a cut-off for applicants based on their LSAT scores is not only
"clear evidence of institutional racism, but it is also evidence of systemic
racism since many institutions-including law schools, the American
Bar Association ("ABA"), and U.S. News & World Report--could
change their policies, practices, or procedures, to use the LSAT ethically
and responsibly." 78 Her article discussed why the use of a cut-off score
was not legally defensible and suggested many alternative approaches a
law school could undertake to create a more diverse and successful law
school class.179 She argued that given the disproportionate importance
law schools have historically placed on an applicant's LSAT score and
the clear evidence that the result discriminates against African American
and Latino applicants, this practice must stop immediately.'80
Weeden adopted Roithmayr's argument, in part, when she directed
that "admission standards should not systematically and disproportion-
ately exclude . . . any . . . discrete group" on the basis of disadvantage
173. 1. "The Best Blacks Are Simply Not as Qualified as the Best Whites"; 2. "The Black-
White Performance Gap on What Are (for Professor Sander) the Two Most Significant Law School
Admission Criteria Are Explained by Bad Black Parenting"; 3. "Affirmative Action Helps White
Students"; 4. "Employers That Hire White Graduates Based on Their Grades Rather Than Their
LSAT-UGPA Indexes Are Making a Bad Mistake"; 5. "When Hiring at Any Given Law School,
Law Firms Should Pay Black Law Graduates With High Grades More Than White Graduates With
High Grades"; 6. "Blacks as a Group Will Be Better Off When There Are Virtually No Blacks in
Elite Legal Jobs." Id.
174. Moran, supra note 56, at 48.
175. Id. at 59.
176. See Vemellia R. Randall, The Misuse of the LSAT: Discrimination Against Blacks and
Other Minorities in Law School Admissions, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 107 (2006).
177. Id. at 142.
178. Id. at 108.
179. Id. at 107, 136-38.
180. See id at 142.
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traceable "to historical anti-competitive conduct."18' Weeden accepted
most of Sander's argument as logical and true. Examples included: "I
believe Sander is correct in concluding that, because of the larger boost
given at top-tier schools to African Americans under affirmative action,
law schools in the next tiers have no practical choice but to use segregat-
ed admissions tracks in the name of affirmative action" and "Professor
Sander advances the common sense argument that students with substan-
tial gaps in LSAT score, undergraduate GPA and racial experience will
not perform similarly on the bar, no matter what law school they at-
tend."' 8 2 Weeden also argued for race-neutral admission standards, but
unlike Sander, who asserted that the current system is corrupt, Weeden
argued that the current system needs reform. Using Bell's theory of in-
terest convergence, Weeden argued that "citizens must always engage in
due diligence when considering whether policies allegedly designed to
benefit minority groups actually benefit or harm those groups when the
policies are implemented." 183
cummings analogized Sander to a shark, "nip[ping] at the heels of
affirmative action."l84 As an author often associated with the critical race
theory and LatCrit movement, cumnmings is one of a few critics that
brought that analysis to Sander's hypothesis. cummings did this by re-
viewing the host of earlier quantitative and theoretical critiques, then,
suggested that he has a nuanced insight to offer. cummings's critique
focused on the privilege Sander enjoyed, yet never acknowledged, in
advancing his hypothesis. Referencing the experiences of indigenous
peoples, cummings addressed the paternalistic nature of Sander's sugges-
tion that he knew what was best for African American students. cum-
mings located Sander within a historical context that has led white males
to engage "in the worst kind of clandestine racism-that of deciding as a
member of the majority race what is appropriate for a minority race."'
cummings further historicized Sander's article by educating the reader
about Sander's failures while acting as an architect of UCLA's post-
Proposition 209 formula for admissions. Finally, cummings called Sand-
er to task for using his biracial son "to authenticate and present himself
as 'non racist' in divulging his data analysis,"l86 equating it to "it's o.k.,
my sister has a half black. . . child" and for failing to appropriately credit
the value that diversity brings to the law schools' classrooms, a benefit
that Sander should be well aware of given his position as a law school
professor. 8 7
181. Weeden, supra note 56, at 225.
182. Id. at 197.
183. Id. at 198.
184. cummings, supra note 56, at 796-97.
185. Id. at 830.
186. Id at 840.
187. Id. at 841.
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Delgado used critical race theory, of which he is considered to be a
founding member, to engage a counter-narrative to Sander's theory.'8 8
Using two fictional characters, Delgado argued that "[lr]acism at the law
schools and in the legal curriculum and sheer economic hardship are
equally plausible hypotheses" to Sander's mismatch theory.189 Delgado
addressed issues of paternalism and Social Darwinism found within
Sander's writings and suggested that a logical extension would lead to
the elimination of social security, veteran's benefits, and national
parks.190 Delgado uses Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. as an example be-
cause Dr. King scored so poorly on the GRE that he was unable to pur-
sue a Ph.D. in sociology and instead enrolled in divinity school.' 9'
Though Dr. King's standardized scores would suggest that he was an
inappropriate candidate for doctoral studies, he went on to lead an ac-
complished life and engaged in some significant intellectual analyses.19 2
This example led Delgado to suggest that:
[B]ecause [Sander] was predisposed to show that affirmative action
was counterproductive, he didn't think to ask what the black drop-
outs were doing. With their knowledge of the legal system, they may
well be going on to careers of great worth, even if they are not prac-
ticing law. Sander defines success too narrowly.193
C. Qualitative Analyses
It is noteworthy that although some authors call for additional quali-
tative analysis of the issues surrounding the mismatch theory, there is a
dearth of research based on qualitative methods. Many of the articles
assert what is best for African American law students. None asked those
same students what they felt was best for themselves. My forthcoming
work grapples with this issue. Instead of telling "them" what academics
find best for them, I ask "them" and assess what they describe as the
most relevant factors toward academic success in law school.
III. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICY IN HIGHER EDUCATION ADMISSIONS
Previously, I identified some of the costs that Sander attached to Af-
rican American affirmative action recipients. He also identified what he
viewed as societal costs. These "obvious disadvantages" included "the
sacrifice of the principle of colorblindness [and] the political costs." 94
Sander has appropriated one of the most prominent arguments against
affirmative action-the desire for a colorblind society.195 Under this the-
188. See Delgado, supra note 10.
189. Id. at 644.
190. Id. at 645-46.
191. Id. at 648.
192. Id.
193. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
194. Sander, supra note 2, at 371.
195. CONNERLY, supra note 41, at 15.
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ory, no decision would involve any consideration of an individual's race
or ethnicity. Race, ethnicity, and any similarly defining traits would be
"unseen" and, therefore, irrelevant. This idea is in tune with an oft-cited
quote from a United States Supreme Court decision stating that "[t]he
[best] way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discrimi-
nating on the basis of race."l96
The opposing argument to this faction of the Supreme Court, as
well as Ward Connerly, is that race is a bellwether for the health of our
nation and that we ignore it at our peril.197 In their book, Guinier and
Torres argue for something called "political race."' 98 They use the analo-
gy of the miner's canary as a symbol for race. A canary was sent into the
mines with the miners. Due to its delicate respiratory system, a canary
would stop breathing at the first sign of toxins in the air of the mines-
well before humans would be affected-giving the miners notice and
time to flee.199 In this manner, the authors argue that race and racial is-
sues should be a sign to American society about issues that may already
be significant, but on the cusp of becoming even larger. Just as the min-
ers know that the problem is not with the canary, but with the air around
it, Guinier and Torres suggest that the problem is not with race, but with
the "air" or "social atmosphere" that surround it.2 00 The miners could
assume or believe that the bird is weak and not heed the warning. If so,
they will die. In the same vein, the authors suggested that ignoring prob-
lems identified as racial will likely take a far greater toll on a wider band
of America than anticipated.2 0'
Another prominent argument against affirmative action is that it al-
lows for the admission of less "meritorious" or deserving applicants.
Sander's (2004) analysis relies, in large part, upon this premise. If non-
European American students do not score the same or better on standard-
ized testing and grading, they are considered less meritorious of admis-
sion.202 However, as Professor Michele Moses and I showed, merit can
have competing interpretations.203 In their analysis of affirmative action
as it was being debated over a proposed amendment to Colorado's con-
stitution, Moses and I evaluated the way in which differing sides framed
the concept of merit. One debater, Jessica Corry, represented the anti-
affirmative action coalition while Melissa Hart represented the other.
196. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).
197. Guinier & Torres, supra note 37, at 11.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at l -12.
201. Id. at 11.
202. Sander, supra note 2, at 424-25.
203. Darrell D. Jackson & Michele S. Moses, Understanding Public Perceptions ofAffirmative
Action 18, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Am. Educ. Research Assoc. (April 2009) (on
file with author).
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According to Corry, affirmative action programs ignore merit, caus-
ing students admitted under such programs to feel, and others to see
them as, inferior or second-class citizens. Hart discussed what stu-
dents of color and women might bring to the classroom as evidence
of their merit for higher education admissions. She [saw] merit as an
expansive concept, one that not only include[d] traditional ideas of
academic merit, but also goes beyond academic credentials as meas-
ured by GPAs and standardized test scores. Corry view[ed] the idea
of "merit" in a restricted sense (i.e., academic qualifications only)
whereas Hart [saw] it in an expanded sense (i.e., social-experiential
as well as academic qualifications).204
Lastly, another prominent argument against affirmative action is
that it "stigmatizes" the recipients and therefore reduces their own credi-
bility.205 This argument is premised on the idea that once people are la-
beled affirmative action recipients, they will never know whether their
accomplishments are due to their own efforts or due to affirmative ac-
tion. They will, therefore, forever live with an affirmative action label
attached to everything that they do. This conceptual stigma harkens back
to the days of The Scarlet Letter. However, research does not bear out
such stigma. Most recently, researchers surveyed 610 students at seven
public law schools and determined that "affirmative action policies do
not in fact 'harm' students of color in the way that opponents of affirma-
tive action have claimed. ... 206
CONCLUSION
As previously discussed, the Sander controversy is indicative of the
larger debate over affirmative action. While Sander contended that af-
firmative action has worked to the detriment of African Americans,
Rothstein and Yoon and others concluded that without affirmative action,
the population of African American lawyers would be significantly
smaller. In a deliberative democracy, this suggests the need for continued
civil discussion of these concepts and issues within a variety of fo-
rums. 207 The Denver University Law Review is providing just such a fo-
rum.
204. Id.
205. Terry Eastland, The Case Against Affirmative Action, 34 WM. & MARY L. REv. 33, 41-43
(1992).
206. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Emily Houh & Mary Campbell, Cracking the Egg: Which
Came First-Stigma or Affirmative Action?, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1299, 1346 (2008).
207. Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education 204-07 (1987); Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thomp-
son, Why Deliberative Democracy? 21 (2004).
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MICHIGAN V. BRYANT: ORIGINALISM CONFRONTS
PRAGMATISM
INTRODUCTION
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees those
accused of crimes the right to confront the witnesses against them.1 The
scope of that right, however, is still being calibrated. In fact, the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Confrontation Clause has undergone major
revisions in recent decades, evolving from the "reliability" standard of
Ohio v. RobertS2 to the more rigid "testimonial" rule of Crawford v.
Washington.3 Recently, in Michigan v. Bryant,4 the Supreme Court re-
fined the analysis used to determine what constitutes testimony and
thereby implicates the Confrontation Clause.s The application of this new
analysis will inevitably affect the operation of the Confrontation Clause,
and the balance between the rights of victims and the rights of the ac-
cused in criminal law.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of modem Confronta-
tion Clause jurisprudence, with an emphasis on the watershed holding in
Crawford. Part II summarizes the facts, holding, and reasoning of the
majority opinion in Bryant, along with the reasoning of the concurring
opinion and dissenting opinions. Part III explores the contours of the
primary purpose analysis and the ongoing emergency exception articu-
lated in Bryant, and argues that the combined effect narrows the scope of
the Confrontation Clause while expanding judicial discretion. This
Comment concludes that despite powerful pragmatic arguments for this
shift away from emphasizing the rights of the accused, the Bryant deci-
sion ultimately subverts the aims of the Confrontation Clause. Lastly,
this Comment proposes changes to narrow and define the ongoing emer-
gency exception, and alterations to the primary purpose analysis to pro-
mote simplicity and objectivity in confrontation jurisprudence as it con-
tinues to evolve.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
3. 541 U.S. 36, 51-53 (2004); see Aviva Orenstein, Her Last Words: Dying Declarations
and Modern Confrontation Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1411, 1455-56 (2010) (describing
the Crawford approach as a "wooden, categorical system").
4. 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
5. Id. at 1157-63.
6. See id. at 1176 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence Before Crawford
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides, "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him." This right applies to federal
courts and to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.8 The twin aims of the right to confrontation are (1) to pro-
vide the jury an opportunity to evaluate the trustworthiness of a witness's
testimony and (2) to provide the accused a chance to cross-examine and
test the recollection and conscience of a witness.9 Infamous treason trials
in England and the admiralty courts in the colonies spurred the Clause's
inclusion in the Constitution.' 0 The Framers' purpose was to target state
manipulation and abuses against defendants in criminal trials; "thus, the
most important instances in which the Clause restricts the introduction of
out-of-court statements are those in which state actors are involved in a
formal, out-of-court interrogation of a witness to obtain evidence for
trial." 1
The Confrontation Clause seemed inextricably interwoven with the
hearsay rule for most of its history.12 The two concepts were nearly
merged in Justice Blackmun's analysis in Ohio v. Roberts,'3 which ush-
ered in a quarter-century of confrontation jurisprudence that turned on
the question of the reliability of the proffered hearsay evidence. 14 The
language of the Confrontation Clause-"confronted with the witnesses
against him" 1-seems to demand one of two extreme interpretations, as
articulated by Justice Harlan in his concurrence in Calfornia v. Green.
On one extreme, the Clause merely provides a procedural guide, "to con-
fer nothing more than a right to meet face to face all those who appear
and give evidence at trial."' 7 On the other extreme, the Clause is "equal-
ly susceptible of being interpreted as a blanket prohibition on the use of
any hearsay testimony."' 8 Struggling to discern a middle path that he
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
8. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).
9. See Roger W. Kirst, Does Crawford Provide a Stable Foundation for Confrontation
Doctrine?, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 38-39 (2005) (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-
43 (1895)).
10. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43-49 (2004). The trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, in
particular, will be discussed more fully below. See infra Part LB.
I1. Bryant, 113 S. Ct. at I155.
12. See Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of "Testimonial," 71 BROOK. L.
REV. 241, 246 (2005) (arguing for the separation of the two concepts, because confrontation predates
the hearsay rule and not all legal systems recognize both ideas).
13. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
14. Id. at 66.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
16. 399 U.S. 164, 175 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Kirst, supra note 9, at 42.




deemed intellectually honest, Justice Harlan first decided confrontation
demanded only that available witnesses testify,19 then the next term land-
ed on the extreme version of the Confrontation Clause that minimized
the right to a procedural mandate of face-to-face examination of witness-
20es, thereby not affecting the admission of hearsay evidence.
Justice Blackmun, however, found a middle path. The Roberts
Court held that the Confrontation Clause is meant to exclude some hear-
say evidence, but not all. 2 1 The test to discern admissible evidence be-
came whether it exhibits "indicia of reliability." 2 2 in turn, reliability was
assured by employing traditional hearsay exceptions.23 Justice Blackmun
justified this middle course by underscoring its pragmatic value. The
reliability standard satisfied the "need for certainty in the workaday
world of conducting criminal trials" 24 and relied on the "Court's demon-
strated success in steering a middle course among proposed alterna-
tives." 2 5 Many lower courts interpreted this decision to mean that Con-
frontation Clause protections were similar to hearsay rule protections
requiring reliability, and subject to "considerable discretion." 26
B. Crawford v. Washington
Crawford transformed the interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause, making this question of criminal procedure one of the most dy-
namic constitutional questions in recent years.27 The decision set aside
the Roberts reliability test and the pragmatism behind it. Justice Scalia
described the Roberts reliability framework as "so unpredictable that it
fails to provide meaningful protection from even core confrontation vio-
lations."28 Justice Scalia turned to an originalist approach to constitution-
al interpretation, examining the history surrounding the Confrontation
Clause text and the Framers' probable meaning.29 He concluded that state
abuses in criminal trials-exemplified by the ex parte testimony that
helped execute Sir Walter Raleigh, and largely left unchecked in the
English colonies-inspired the Clause.30
19. Id. at 179-83.
20. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94-96 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
21. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980).
22. Id. at 66.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 66 n.9.
26. E.g., People v. Farrell, 34 P.3d 401, 406 (Colo. 2001); see also Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 64 (2004).
27. See G. Michael Fenner, Today's Confrontation Clause (After Crawford and Melendez-
Diaz), 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 35,35 (2009).
28. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63.
29. Id. at 43-50. The question of whether one trusts this is a correct reading of the historical
record is outside the scope of this comment.
30. Id. at 44, 47-50.
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Raleigh's treason trial of 1603 has thus become a lodestar in con-
temporary confrontation jurisprudence, 400 years after the nobleman was
beheaded.3 ' The heroic and enigmatic Raleigh was accused of plotting to
overthrow King James, and "[t]o be blunt, it is likely that [Raleigh] was
guilty."3 2 His guilt, though, is immaterial. The evidence against him was
largely provided by ex parte testimony from his alleged co-conspirator
Lord Cobham, who implicated Raleigh and then later recanted his testi-
mony.33 At trial, the prosecutor refused to produce Cobham for confron-
tation, despite Raleigh's repeated calls for the opportunity to confront his
accuser. 34
All this is but one accusation of my Lord Cobham's, I heat no other
thing; to which accusation he never subscribed nor avouched it. I be-
seech you, my lords, let Cobham be sent for, charge him on his soul,
on his allegiance to the king; if he affirm it, I am guilty. 35
In a colloquial sense, the question posed by a confrontation case to-
day is whether the absent witness resembles Lord Cobham, as the focus
of scrutiny shifted from the word "confrontation" to the word "witness."
The holding of Crawford can be reduced to a syllogism: the accused
has a right to confront witnesses; witnesses are those who bear testimo-
ny; therefore, the accused must be allowed to confront anyone who bears
testimony.36 Thus, the reliability standard became a testimonial standard.
The Court held that testimonial hearsay was not allowed unless (1) the
witness was unavailable and (2) there was a prior opportunity to examine
the testimony through cross-examination. The strict, categorical separa-
tion of evidence into testimonial and nontestimonial strengthened the
Confrontation Clause in one sense while reducing its scope in another
sense. If evidence is deemed testimonial, it must be subjected to cross-
examination or barred.38 If evidence is nontestimonial, the Confrontation
Clause simply does not apply.39 As a result, the question of whether evi-
dence is testimonial became paramount.
31. See Chris Hutton, Sir Walter Raleigh Revived: The Supreme Court Re- Vamps Two Dec-
ades of Confrontation Precedent in Crawford v. Washington, 50 S.D. L. REV. 41, 51 (2005).
32. Allen D. Boyer, The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh: The Law of Treason, the Trial of Trea-
son and the Origins of the Confrontation Clause, 74 Miss. L.J. 869, 872 (2005).
33. Id at 885, 893.
34. Id at 889-90.
35. Id at 890.
36. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
37. Id at 68.
38. Id Two exceptions to this rule are forfeiture and possibly dying declarations. Forfeiture of
the confrontation right by wrongdoing applies only if the defendant intended to deprive the court of
the witness's testimony. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359-61 (2008). It remains an open
question whether dying declarations are allowable testimonial hearsay as a historical exception to
recent confrontation jurisprudence, a question that some members of the Court look forward to
exploring more deeply. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1177 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting);
Orenstein, supra note 3, at 1440-41.
39. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
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The facts of Crawford made this distinction fairly straightforward.
Michael Crawford allegedly stabbed another man to avenge the attempt-
ed rape of his wife, Sylvia Crawford.40 When Sylvia Crawford submitted
to an interrogation at the police station, she made statements that could
have damaged her husband's claim of self defense; specifically, she said
the decedent did not have a weapon in his hand, contrary to her hus-
band's claim. 41 At trial, Sylvia Crawford chose not to testify against her
husband, but the prosecution wanted to use her earlier statements. 42 The
Court found that a declarant's statements during a formal police interro-
gation several hours after the event were testimonial, and thus admission
of the evidence without the opportunity to cross examine the witness
violated the Confrontation Clause.43 In his concurrence, Chief Justice
Rehnquist predicted that by swapping the reliability test for the testimony
test, the Court had simply created a new area of confusion.44
C. Davis v. Washington and the Primary Purpose Test
Later Confrontation Clause cases required a more nuanced distinc-
tion between testimonial and nontestimonial evidence.45 The Court began
to refine its definition of "testimony" in Davis. There, the Court issued
one decision consolidating two domestic violence cases, finding that one
involved testimonial evidence while the other did not. In Davis, the
declarant's statements came during a 911 call; Michelle McCottry called
while she was being attacked, identifying her attacker as her former boy-
friend, Adrian Davis.47 When she did not appear at trial, the prosecution
sought to introduce the statements made during the 911 call. 48 In
Hammon, the declarant's statements came after the police had arrived at
the scene of a domestic disturbance.4 9 Police responded to a reported
domestic disturbance after Hershel Hammon allegedly punched Amy
Hammon and pushed her into broken glass.50 One police officer ques-
tioned Amy Hammon regarding what had transpired, and the other of-
ficer remained with her husband, who repeatedly tried to interrupt the
questioning." Subsequently, Ms. Hammon was subpoenaed to testify at
her husband's trial, and when she did not appear, the interviewing of-
40. Id. at 38.
41. Id. at 38-40.
42. Id. at 40.
43. Id. at 61, 68.
44. Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
45. See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823 (2006) ("The Davis case today does not
permit us this luxury of indecision.").
46. Id. at 829-30 (finding the statements nontestimonial in Davis, but testimonial in Hammon
v. Indiana).
47. Id. at 817 18.
48. Id. at 819.





ficer, over defense counsel objections, proceeded to testify as to her prior
statements.52
Davis introduced the objective "primary purpose test" to determine
what statements are testimonial.5 3 If the primary purpose of an interroga-
tion is to generate evidence for later use at trial, then it is testimonial; if
the primary purpose is to resolve an ongoing emergency, then it is
nontestimonial. 54 Applying this new test, the Court found that the state-
ments in Davis-made during a 911 call while the victim was being at-
tacked and seeking help-had the primary purpose of resolving an ongo-
ing emergency.55 In contrast, statements in Hammon-made after the
police had taken control of the scene and resolved the immediate
threat-were no longer meant to resolve an emergency, and were indeed
testimonial. Thus, McCottry's statements made during Davis's attack
were admissible under the Confrontation Clause, while Amy Hammon's
statements about her husband's attack were barred.
II. MICHIGAN V. BRYANT
A. Facts
Anthony Covington lay dying of a gunshot wound in a gas station
parking lot when the police were summoned on April 29, 200 1.51 Offic-
ers questioned Covington while waiting for paramedics to arrive, and
Covington told them "Rick" shot him.59 Covington also told police that
he spoke to Richard Bryant through Bryant's back door, and then was
shot through the door as he turned to leave at about 3 a.m.60 Covington
did not disclose the contents of the conversation, but it was later revealed
that Covington regularly bought cocaine from Bryant at Bryant's back
door.61 After being shot, Covington drove his car to a gas station six
blocks away, where police found him roughly twenty-five minutes after
the shooting.62
Covington died a few hours later. 63 By the time police arrived at
Bryant's home in Detroit, Michigan, he had fled, and he was not arrested
until a year later in California.
52. Id at 820.
53. Id at 822.
54. Id
55. McCottry's statements became testimonial after the attacker fled and the 911 operator
began to concentrate on identifying information about the attacker, such as his middle name, but
only her early identifying statements were challenged. Id. at 828-29.
56. Id. at 829-30.
57. Id. at 829, 834.
58. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150 (2011).
59. Id
60. Id.
61. People v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d 65, 67 (Mich. 2009).
62. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150; see also People v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d at 67.




Police officers testified at trial, repeating the statements Covington
made to them that implicated Bryant in the shooting.65 The statements
were admitted into evidence under the Roberts reliability standard and
Bryant was convicted, inter alia, of second-degree murder.66 The Michi-
gan Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the conviction months after
the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford instituted the testimonial
standard. 67 Bryant then appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court, con-
tending that Covington's declarations to police should not have been
admitted at trial; the Michigan Supreme Court remanded the case to the
Michigan Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Davis.
On remand, the Michigan Court of Appeals again affirmed the convic-
tion in an unpublished opinion; the Michigan Supreme Court reversed
this decision, concluding that Covington's statements were indeed testi-
monial hearsay and should not have been admitted at trial because it vio-
lated the Confrontation Clause.69 The state of Michigan petitioned for
certiorari on the issue of whether Covington's statements were testimo-
nial, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.7 0
C. Majority Opinion
Justice Sotomayor wrote the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito. The majority
held that Covington's statements were not testimonial because the prima-
ry purpose of the declarations was to resolve an ongoing emergency.71
To reach this conclusion, the Court refined and expanded the primary
purpose test used to determine what statements are considered testimoni-
al.
As a threshold issue, the Court acknowledged that Covington was
(1) unavailable to testify at trial, and (2) the accused did not have a
chance to cross-examine the witness.72 Therefore, if the declarant's
statements were found to be testimonial, admitting them at trial would
violate the Confrontation Clause. Then, the Court turned to the principal
issue: were Covington's statements to police testimonial?
First, the Court reiterated that the primary purpose test is an objec-
tive inquiry.73 This means that the relevant inquiry is not the actual, sub-
64. Id.atll64.
65. Id. at 1150.
66. Id.
67. People v. Bryant, No. 247039, 2004 WLl882661, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2004)
(per curiam).
68. People v. Bryant, 722 N.W.2d 797 (Mich. 2006).
69. People v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d 65, 73 (Mich. 2009).
70. Michigan v. Bryant, 130 S. Ct. 1685 (2010).
71. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1166-67 (2011).
72. Id. at 1151.
73. Id.atll56.
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jective purpose of the actors, but rather "the purpose that reasonable par-
ticipants would have had." 74 Second, Justice Sotomayor expanded the
framework of the primary purpose test and concluded that it is incorrect
to interpret Davis as asking whether the primary purpose is testimonial or
to resolve an ongoing emergency. 5 Instead, the proper inquiry is whether
the primary purpose of the interrogation is testimonial or for any other
purpose. Thus, an ongoing emergency is properly understood as one
factor-albeit an important one-that reflects on the primary purpose of
an interrogation.77 If the interrogation primarily serves any purpose other
than producing testimony, then it falls outside the scope of the Confron-
tation Clause.7 1
Third, the chief factors that help elucidate the primary purpose in-
clude (1) the presence of an ongoing emergency, (2) the formality of the
interrogation, and (3) the statements and actions of the actors.7 9 Evaluat-
ing these factors is a context-dependent inquiry that must take into ac-
count the particular circumstances of the interrogation and balance the
multiple factors.80 Hence, the presence of an ongoing emergency is the
first factor to consider, but it is not dispositive.8 1 Justice Sotomayor as-
serted that a court should consider the circumstances of the emergency
and how they weigh upon the purpose of the actors, such as the weapon
used, the medical condition of the victim, and the range of victims at
risk.12
The second factor-the evaluation of the formality of the interroga-
tion-is more straightforward. A court should consider whether the inter-
rogation was at the police station or the crime scene, how organized the
questioning seemed, and whether there were signs of formality such as a
written affidavit.83 The third factor to weigh is how the statements and
actions of the actors reflect on the intent of the interrogation. The majori-
ty held that because the purpose of the entire exchange is at issue, a court
should consider the behavior of the declarant as well as the behavior of
the interrogator. 84 Finally, the majority drew an analogy between the
ongoing emergency factor and the excited-utterance exception to hear-
say. Just as the excited-utterance is considered reliable because the de-
clarant's attention is riveted on the present moment, statements made
74. Id.
75. See id. at 1160.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1153 ("We therefore limited the Confrontation Clause's reach to testimonial state-
ments .
79. Id.at 1157-61.
80. Id. at 1158.
81. Id. at ll60.
82. Id. at 1158-59.




during an ongoing emergency are less likely to be testimonial because
the declarant's attention is captured by the emergency.
Applying this analysis, the Court found that Covington's interroga-
tion in the gas station parking lot was informal and disorganized, and that
the behavior of the actors indicated their primary purpose was to resolve
an emergency.86 Further factors militated for the finding of an ongoing
emergency, including the use of a gun,87 the grave medical condition of
the victim,88 and that the offender was still at large, potentially putting
others at risk.89 Therefore, the Court concluded that the primary purpose
of Covington's statements was not testimonial hearsay, and the state-
ments were not within the scope of the Confrontation Clause.90
D. Concurring Opinion
Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued the
proper inquiry is not the primary purpose test, but the bright-line rule of
formality. 91 The only relevant question, in his view, was whether the
declarant's statements were formal and solemn enough to be considered
testimonial hearsay. 92 Justice Thomas's concept of formality includes
indicia of solemnity such as affidavits, depositions, or organized interro-
gations in police custody,93 as occurred in Crawford.94 These formal law
enforcement actions mirror the historical practices that the Confrontation
Clause was designed to defeat.9 5 In turn, Justice Thomas criticized "the
primary-purpose test as 'an exercise in fiction' that is 'disconnected from
history' and 'yields no predictable results."' 96
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment because the interrogation
was informal-as the police arrived at a gas station parking lot to find
the declarant bleeding from a fatal gunshot wound-and thus did not
implicate the Confrontation Clause. 9 7
E. Dissenting Opinion: Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion that sharply criticized the
majority's analysis. Justice Scalia, who authored the majority opinions in
Crawford and Davis, argued that the Bryant majority betrayed Crawford
85. Id. at 1157.
86. Id at 1160,1165-66.
87. Id. at 1164.
88. Id at 1165.
89. Id at 1163-64.
90. Id. at 1167.
91. Id. at 1167 (Thomas, J., concurring).
92. Id
93. Id
94. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 65 (2004).
95. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1167.
96. Id (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 838-39 (2006)) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)).
97. Id. at 1167-68.
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rather than following the decision, and got Bryant wrong on the facts as
well as the law.98 On the facts, the ruling that the interrogation of Cov-
ington by five police officers was for the purpose of resolving an emer-
gency rather than producing testimony was, in Justice Scalia's opinion,
"transparently false" and "patently incorrect." 99 Nevertheless, Justice
Scalia saved his most fiery criticism for what he saw as the mistakes of
the majority on the law of confrontation. 00 He agreed with the majority
opinion that the primary purpose test is an objective one,o but on little
else.102
First, he departed from the majority on whose perspective should be
considered. While the majority found the purpose of both the declarant
and the interrogator relevant, Justice Scalia contended "[t]he declarant's
intent is what counts."10 3 By blending the motives of the declarant and
the police, both of whom might have mixed motives, the Court compli-
cated the inquiry instead of clarifying it.10 4 However, even under the ma-
jority's rubric of taking the officers' intent into account, Justice Scalia
would have found the statements testimonial."0 s
Second, Justice Scalia argued that the majority set a dangerously
broad precedent for what constitutes an ongoing emergency.' 06 By imply-
ing the emergency may continue until an armed shooter is apprehended,
"[t]he Court's distorted view creates an expansive exception to the Con-
frontation Clause for violent crimes." 0 7
Third, Justice Scalia contended that the reintroduction of reliability
is incompatible with the framework the Court built in Crawford, and
mused that the Court might intend to overrule Crawford by degrees if not
explicitly.'08 Specifically, the majority opinion analogized the ongoing
emergency factor to the excited-utterance exception to hearsay, implying
that cross-examination is unnecessary if the information is reliable, and
reigniting the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and the
reliability test rejected in Crawford.109 The author of Crawford was not
pleased by this development. Fourth, the multi-factor balancing test con-
cocted by the majority is too complex, according to Justice Scalia, and
98. Id. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99. Id.
100. Id. ("Instead of clarifying the law, the Court makes itself the obfuscator of last resort.").
101. Id.
102. See id. at 1168-76. Justice Scalia argued the majority was wrong on whose purpose mat-
ters, wrong on its finding of a primary purpose of emergency, wrong on its expansive view of an
ongoing emergency, wrong to resurrect indicia of reliability, wrong to foster an open-ended balanc-
ing test, and, mostly, wrong to enfeeble the Confrontation Clause. Id
103. Id.at1l68.
104. Id. at 1170.
105. Id. at ll71-72.
106. Id. at 1173.
107. Id.
108. Id.at1175.
109. Id. at 1174.
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will lead to an unpredictable, open-ended inquiry. 0 In sum, the majori-
ty's opinion results in "an enfeebled view of the right to confronta-
tion."I'
F. Dissenting Opinion: Justice Ginsburg
Justice Ginsburg wrote a separate, dissenting opinion. Justice Gins-
burg agreed with Justice Scalia that (1) Covington's statements were
testimonial hearsay because they involved a past crime and (2) the de-
clarant's point-of-view, rather than that of the interrogator, is the proper
factor to weigh.1 2 Justice Ginsburg argued that the Court's majority
opinion not only creates an overly broad exception to the Confrontation
Clause, but also "confounds our recent Confrontation Clause jurispru-
dence" by reintroducing reliability into the analysis of what statements
are testimonial." 3
Justice Ginsburg added that the question of whether dying declara-
tions should be barred by the Confrontation Clause remains unanswered.
Although not preserved for appeal in Bryant, Justice Ginsburg indicated
that she would like to "take up the question whether the exception for
dying declarations survives [the Court's] recent Confrontation Clause
decisions."'14
III. ANALYSIS
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has shifted dramatically in re-
cent years, from the loose reliability test of Roberts to the categorical
testimony approach of Crawford."' Although Bryant was ostensibly a
refinement of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence following Crawford,
the Court's analysis effectively pushed the pendulum back in the direc-
tion of the unfettered discretion of pre-Crawford decisions."16 The prima-
ry purpose test articulated by the Court in Bryant is extremely elastic and
difficult to apply predictably."' The tension between the analysis in
Crawford and Bryant squarely pits the more idealistic rule of the former
110. Id. at 1175-76.
Ill. Id.at1173.
112. Id at 1176 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
113. Id at 1176-77.
114. Id.at1177.
115. Compare Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 72-73 (1980) (finding that preliminary hearing
testimony of a witness who was unavailable at the trial was permissible where the witness' testimony
bore significant "indicia of reliability"), with Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004)
(holding that out-of-court "testimonial" statements, including prior testimony at preliminary hearing,
before a grand jury, at a former trial, or statements elicited during police interrogation, are inadmis-
sible unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross examine
witness).
116. Richard D. Friedman, Preliminary Thoughts on the Bryant Decision, THE
CONFRONTATION BLOG (Mar. 2, 2011, 12:42 AM), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/
search?updated-max=2011-06-15TI4%3A49%3A00-04%3A00 ("[T]his decision strikes me as a
giant step backwards towards a morass like that of Ohio v. Roberts . . .
117. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1175-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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against the pragmatic standard of the latter. While the pragmatism of
allowing more judicial discretion in criminal prosecutions is appealing,
neutering the Confrontation Clause in the face of strong state interests
runs contrary to the meaning of the Framers.'18
A. Critique of the Bryant Test
Perhaps the two most transparent ramifications of Bryant are the
broader ongoing emergency exception to testimony and the expanding
elasticity of the primary purpose test. This Comment argues that the
Court muddied the water by transforming the narrow emergency excep-
tion into a broad and indeterminate factor within the primary purpose
analysis. Then, this Comment turns to the primary purpose analysis it-
self, arguing that the changes wrought in Bryant render the test too mal-
leable, and thereby defeat the policy of Crawford.
1. Parameters for Ongoing Emergency Are Too Broad
In Bryant, the situation was deemed an ongoing emergency six
blocks away from the crime scene and a half hour after the shooting, with
no indication of an ongoing threat. 119 The Court set up a clear demarca-
tion in Davis/Hammon between a police officer seeking to know what is
happening during an ongoing emergency and an officer seeking to know
what happened to preserve testimony. 120 In Davis, a frantic call to 911
while an attack was occurring was declared an ongoing emergency,
while in Hammon an interrogation just after an attack was not.121
In Bryant, the Court erased this line, as several officers specifically
asked "what happened?" in the wake of an attack, displaying no worry of
a continuing threat, and yet the situation was deemed an ongoing emer-
gency.122 Justice Sotomayor prescribed a mix of factors in the context-
dependent evaluation of whether an emergency is ongoing, including the
choice of weapon, medical condition of actors, and the range of victims
at risk.123 This mix of factors suggests broad discretion in the ongoing
emergency inquiry. In a case like Bryant, the presence of a gun increased
the duration and scope of the emergency,1 24 the dire medical condition of
the victim expanded the emergency,125 and the range of potential victims
was hard to determine because it was not a domestic attack. 2 6 The Court
reasoned that an emergency continues when an armed shooter with an
unknown motive is still on the loose, even with no other indication of an
118. Seeid.at 1174.
119. People v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d 65, 67 (Mich. 2009).
120. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 829-30 (2006).
121. Id. at 827, 29-30.
122. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1163-64 (majority opinion).
123. Id.at1158-59.
124. Id.




ongoing threat: "This is not to suggest that the emergency continued until
Bryant was arrested in California a year after the shooting. We need not
decide precisely when the emergency ended . ... It is difficult to
know whether the Court need not make that distinction or cannot make
that distinction, because under the reasoning of Bryant there is no explic-
it principle to limit the duration of the emergency, allowing it to stretch
over many months and miles.
The uncertainty created by the Court is precisely the problem. Low-
er courts are left with little guidance as to when an ongoing emergency
might end after the destruction of the logic in Davis/Hammon. Hewing
close to those decisions, the emergency in Bryant would have ended after
Covington fled and his attacker failed to follow.' 28 By extending the
scope of the emergency indefinitely, the Court created yet another guess-
ing game about how the choice of weapon, medical condition, and rela-
tionship to the victim might expand the emergency. 29 Richard Bryant
was an armed shooter with an unknown motive, on the loose until he was
caught in California.13 0 He had killed once, so the majority concluded
that others were at risk until he was apprehended.' 3 ' Under Bryant,
statements made in police interviews during this year-long period about
what happened during the crime, whether with Bryant's girlfriend, Cov-
ington's brother, or a host of other witnesses, could conceivably be ad-
mitted with no right to cross-examine their testimony.132
Or, take the example of a serial rapist, armed with a gun, who is ter-
rorizing a city with random attacks. The attacker has a gun, leaves his
victims seriously injured, and is still on the loose. Based on the Bryant
Court's analysis, this emergency is ongoing. The entire city is at risk for
a possible attack. As the city's police force works overtime canvassing
the city, would all of its interrogations related to the serial rapist be to
serve an ongoing emergency? If a citizen rushes to divulge the suspicious
sexual proclivities of his neighbors, or a relative of a convicted sex of-
fender reveals that she thinks he has violated probation in some way, can
those statements be introduced in separate trials without cross-
examination because they were gathered for the primary purpose of re-
solving an ongoing emergency? The Bryant Court threw the door open to
never-ending emergencies with no instructions on how to close it again.
The effect of broadening the ongoing emergency exception is to
narrow the scope of what is considered testimonial for purposes of the
127. Id. at 1164-65 (citation omitted).
128. See id. at 1170-71 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129. See id. at 1173.
130. Id at 1163-64 (majority opinion).
131. See id.
132. See id at 1173 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Confrontation Clause. 13 3 The Court also adjusted the framework of the
inquiry from testimonial versus ongoing emergency to testimonial versus
any other purpose, thereby greatly increasing the territory of
nontestimonial statements. 134 These changes invite judicial creativity in
trying to understand what the Court might intend by any other purpose.
Also, as lower courts attempt to apply Bryant, they must do so with no
guidance or analytical justification to decide when an emergency involv-
ing an armed attacker on the loose might be deemed complete.
2. The Primary Purpose Test Is Unnecessarily Elastic and
Open-ended
The majority in Bryant acknowledged that its multi-factor balancing
approach is complex, but argued that the complexity will engender accu-
racy: "Simpler is not always better, and courts making a 'primary pur-
pose' assessment should not be unjustifiably restrained from consulting
all relevant information. ... " However, it appears more likely that the
complexity of the primary purpose test will yield unpredictability and
confusion for at least four reasons, considered below.
a. The Attempt to Measure Subjective Motives with the
"Objective" Primary Purpose Test
The Court's repeated assertions that the primary purpose test is ob-
jective cannot stop the analysis from bleeding into subjectivity and
guesswork. In Davis, the Court created the primary purpose test to de-
termine which statements are testimonial by discerning the purpose of a
police interrogation.136 Justice Thomas, concurring in part and dissenting
in part, correctly opined that unpredictability was among the chief criti-
cisms leveled at the reliability inquiry, and yet Justice Scalia and the
Court adopted an equally unpredictable inquiry with the primary purpose
test. 137 "[P]ronouncement of the 'primary' motive behind the interroga-
tion calls for nothing more than a guess by courts."' 38 The irony is that
the primary purpose test was put forth by a jurist who ridicules the idea
of discerning the purpose of legislators, and yet seems to believe it easier
to discern the purpose of a battered spouse just after a traumatic inci-
dent.13 9 As Justice Scalia has convincingly argued, "[t]he number of pos-
133. See id at 1158-59 (majority opinion) (listing factors to consider during an "ongoing
emergency" analysis, thus expanding the exception and narrowing the definition of "testimonial"
statements).
134. Id. at 1160.
135. Id at 1162.
136. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
137. Id at 834 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
138. Id at 841-42.
139. Compare Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 637 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("To
look for the sole purpose of even a single legislator is probably to look for something that does not
exist."), with Davis, 547 U.S. at 830 (majority opinion) ("Objectively viewed, the primary, if not
indeed the sole, purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a possible crime .... ).
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sible motivations, to begin with, is not binary, or indeed even finite,"o
because myriad human motivations are always in play and shifting in
primacy by the moment. The quest for a primary purpose, as Justice
Scalia argued in other contexts, is a search for "something that does not
exist."l41
Attempting to follow Davis, the Court in Bryant devised an awk-
ward formulation, trying to apprehend "the purpose that reasonable par-
ticipants would have had." 42 The thin membrane separating the objective
primary purpose test from a subjective free-for-all was thus further erod-
ed by Bryant. In the majority opinion, the Court made a subtle but im-
portant shift from the purpose of the interrogation to the purpose of the
participants.143 Necessarily then, the test no longer looks solely at the
external facts of the interrogation, but now seeks to discover the reasona-
ble purpose of each actor.
This shift dramatically changes the meaning of the word "purpose"
in the primary purpose test. When the word "purpose" is applied to
something like an interrogation, it is understood to mean the function or
use of that encounter. 1The interrogation has no internal purpose; rather,
it serves a purpose. However, in this context, when the word "purpose" is
applied to a participant, the meaning changes to include internal motiva-
tions and that person's "conscious object." 4 5 Examine the question of-
fered by the Court: What purpose would a reasonable participant have
had? 46 Do we still mean: What was the participant's function and use?
Or do we instead mean: What would motivate the reasonable participant
in this situation? 4 7 The latter is the only sensible meaning. Thus, the
purpose test has evolved from an inquiry into function to a far more un-
* - *148
certain inquiry into motive.
The natural question is whether an inquiry into human purpose can
truly be objective or even ascertainable. A test to decipher human pur-
pose is fundamentally different than an objective test to discern the func-
tion of an interrogation. Turning to familiar objective tests, a contract is
140. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 636-37.
141. Id. at 637.
142. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1156 (2011).
143. Compare Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 ("Statements are nontestimonial when made in the
course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of
the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency." (emphasis added)),
with Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156 ("[Tihe relevant inquiry is . . . the purpose that reasonable partici-
pants would have had. . . ." (emphasis added)).
144. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1356 (9th ed. 2009) ("An objective, goal, or end ...
the business activity that a corporation is chartered to engage in.").
145. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (2001).
146. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156.
147. The crux of the inquiry is motive rather than intent, as we are trying to discover why the
participant is speaking rather than his resolve to speak. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note
144, at 881 ("While motive is the inducement to do some act, intent is the mental resolution or
determination to do it.").
148. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. ati 160-61; see also supra note 147.
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formed when external behavior indicates offer and acceptance, and
courts explicitly reject evidence of internal motivations.14 9 The tort of
negligence occurs when external behavior is unreasonable, a standard
that Judge Learned Hand even reduced to a mathematical calculation that
ignores internal motivation. 1o The primary purpose test no longer bears
any resemblance to these objective tests. Instead, the primary purpose
test asks, given a set of external stimuli, what internal purpose would a
reasonable person have had? As Professor Wigmore has explained, de-
termining motive is a slippery enterprise because it requires leaps in log-
ic from external circumstances, to emotion, to action."' Now transfer
that slippery enterprise from the context of criminal guilt to the primary
purpose test. Imagine not only trying to determine whether A killed B,
but why A killed B, and what percentage of A's internal motivation can
be ascribed to various desires. That is the formidable and sometimes im-
possible analytical task the Court has assigned itself and lower courts.
Thankfully, an accused may be convicted with no evidence of motive;
however, under the primary purpose test, the arduous determination of
motive is the very heart of the test, as the trial judge attempts to deter-
mine what purpose a reasonable participant would have had.152
The problem, of course, is that every actor is invested with mixed,
contradictory, and unverifiable motives that a trial judge must now sift
through and rank. A court in this case might plausibly have found that
one of several purposes were, in fact, primary. For example, the Court
treated Covington's medical condition as evidence that his motivation
was to get immediate help and his statements were thus
nontestimonial.s 3 However, a grievous wound might also excite a desire
for revenge in a reasonable victim, and it is plausible to treat his state-
ments as a solemn declaration meant to condemn his attacker at trial,
undoubtedly leading to a determination that the victim's declaration is
testimonial. A trial judge might also reasonably conclude that a drug
addict who witnesses a crime, when surrounded by inquisitive police
officers, has the primary purpose of revealing as little as possible that
could send him to prison, and his statements are thus nontestimonial.
Because the declarant in a Confrontation Clause case is necessarily una-
vailable, gathering the pieces of these primary purpose puzzles will be
difficult if not impossible.
149. See Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 521-22 (1954) (explaining that Zehmer's internal
motivation to pull a joke was irrelevant; only external behavior was considered).
150. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (explaining B<PL,
or whether the burden is less than the probability of injury multiplied by the likely gravity of a
resulting injury).
151. JoHN H. WIGMORE, A STUDENTS' TEXTBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 76 (1935) ("The
term 'motive' is unfortunately ambiguous. That feeling which internally urges or pushes a person to
do or refrain from doing an act is an emotion, and is of course evidential towards his doing or not
doing the act.").
152. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1156 (2011).
153. Id. at 1165.
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The inquiry "will inevitably be, quite simply, an exercise in fic-
tion."l 54 Summoning the term "objective" will not allow courts to sepa-
rate the indivisible or discern what simply cannot be known. The Court
in Bryant repeatedly mentioned objectivity while shuffling toward sub-
jectivity.'55 The practical impact is that lower courts must now make
inquiries based on guesswork and without the benefit of a discernible
animating principle. Thus, the resulting opinions will be unpredictable
and contradictory, undermining the legitimacy of the enterprise.
b. Many Purposes, No Guidance: Combining the Declarant's
Purpose and the Interrogator's Purpose
The Court exacerbated the purpose problem in Bryant by blending
the intent of the declarant and the intent of police officers into a single
analysis.15 6 Because the Court shifted its focus to the internal motivation
of each actor rather than the external facts of an interrogation, it was
forced to answer the question of whose purpose will be considered.157
Faced with this choice, the Court chose everybody involved.'58 This adds
confusion, not clarity.5 9
In Bryant, the Court weighed the purposes a reasonable participant
would have had while in Covington's situation dying in a gas station
parking lot' 6 0 and the purposes a reasonable participant would have had
as she stepped into the form of each of five police officers.' 6 ' A partici-
pant in Covington's shoes could have at least four plausible purposes:
medical help, revenge through prosecution, concealing information, or
no conscious motive.' 62 Then the picture gets murkier. Police officers in
particular must "act out of a host of different, instinctive, and largely
unverifiable motives-their own safety, the safety of others, and perhaps
as well the desire to obtain incriminating evidence from the suspect."
Thus, the ambiguity of the primary purpose test grows more profound
because a police officer's motives will almost always be mixed between
handling an emergency situation and creating evidence for trial.'6 Not
only is the Court attempting to probe the elusive concept of motive, but
154. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 839 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
155. The majority opinion summoned the word "objective" or "objectively" in relation to the
relevant inquiry at least twenty times. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150-67.
156. Id.atil60-61.
157. See id. at 1160-62.
158. See id. at 1160 ("[T]he statements and actions of both the declarant and interrogators
provide objective evidence of the primary purpose of the interrogation.").
159. Id. at 1170 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("But adding in the mixed motives of the police only
compounds the problem.").
160. Id. at 1161-62 (majority opinion).
161. Id. at l63-64.
162. Seeid.at 1161.
163. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984).
164. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at I161 ("Their dual responsibilities may mean that [police officers] act
with different motives simultaneously or in quick succession.").
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in this case the uncertainty was multiplied to include the mixed motives
of six separate actors. The Court offered few clues as to how to weigh
the purposes of various participants. All are to be considered, but the
importance of each is unknown.16 5
c. Reintroduction of Hearsay Reliability Rules
Justice Sotomayor and the Court explored the link between the on-
going emergency exception to testimonial evidence and the excited utter-
ance exception to hearsay evidence, noting that both rest on the idea of
added reliability because the exciting event does not allow the declarant
time to fabricate a lie.166 This is a startling reversion in Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence; the Court merged principles of hearsay rules with
Confrontation Clause protections in Roberts,16 7 and then forcefully
ripped them apart in Crawford.'68 The Court made clear in Whorton v.
Bockting 6 9 that the Crawford rule both strengthened and narrowed the
Confrontation Clause, restricting testimonial statements by removing
reliability exceptions, but also allowing unreliable nontestimonial state-
ments.17 0 Quite simply, reliability was no longer part of Confrontation
Clause analysis, and cross-examination became the only relevant indicia
of reliability.171
Then, in Bryant, reliability was reintroduced as one of the many fac-
tors relevant to the consideration of testimonial versus nontestimonial
statements.172 Justice Scalia argued adamantly that this reincarnation of
Roberts reliability made no sense: "The Court attempts to fit its resur-
rected interest in reliability into the Crawford framework, but the result
is incoherent."173 He shared his suspicion that perhaps this was an at-
165. The consideration of each actor's intent also enlivens the question of whose purpose
prevails when the interrogator's intent and the declarant's intent are starkly at odds, such as when a
co-conspirator's statement is told to a government agent. From the declarant's perspective, the
conversation is not testimonial whatsoever; from the interrogator's perspective, the sole intent is to
produce testimony. As Justice Scalia noted sarcastically in his dissent: "If the dastardly police trick a
declarant into giving an incriminating statement against a sympathetic defendant, a court can focus
on the police's intent and declare the statement testimonial." Id at 1170 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 1157 (majority opinion).
167. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
168. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004).
169. 549 U.S. 406 (2007).
170. Id. at 419-20 ("Under Roberts, an out-of-court nontestimonial statement not subject to
prior cross-examination could not be admitted without a judicial determination regarding reliability.
Under Crawford, on the other hand, the Confrontation Clause has no application to such statements
and therefore permits their admission even if they lack indicia of reliability.").
171. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. The Court put it most colorfully, while describing the need to
confront forensic analysts: "[W]e would reach the same conclusion if all analysts always possessed
the scientific acumen of Mme. Curie and the veracity of Mother Theresa." Melendez-Diaz v. Massa-
chusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 n.6 (2009).
172. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1157 (2011) (discussing the probability of
fabrication as relevant to the primary purpose inquiry).
173. Id at 1175 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 89:1286
MICHIGAN V BRYANT
tempt to kill Crawford through a thousand cuts rather than overruling it
directly. 174
The confusion caused by reintroducing reliability into the testimo-
nial standard became evident almost immediately in the subsequent Con-
frontation Clause case considered by the Court, Bullcoming v. New Mex-
ico.175 Justice Kennedy wrote in his dissent that reliability is an "essential
part of the constitutional inquiry" after the Bryant decision,17 6 while Jus-
tice Sotomayor retorted in her concurrence that Bryant deemed reliability
relevant but not essential.177
Justice Scalia is correct that marrying reliability to the testimonial
standard is simply illogical. The reliability standard is entirely separate
from the testimonial standard; in fact, the two standards often have an
inverse relationship.'78 In Bullcoming, for example, the formal certifica-
tion of lab tests added reliability, thereby facilitating admissibility under
hearsay rules, while the formal certification also made the evidence more
clearly testimonial, blocking admissibility without confrontation. 7 9
Holding that reliability is a factor that argues for evidence being
nontestimonial is a bald contradiction to the logic of Crawford and does
nothing but add another layer of analytical confusion for lower courts to
attempt to unscramble.
d. Malleable Multi-Factor Balancing Test
The Court in Bryant created a multi-factor balancing test, but the
weight and relationship of the many factors is unclear. An ongoing
emergency can be considered in light of at least three sub-factors;' 80 the
formality of the interrogation can be considered in light of several sub-
factors;'8 ' the statements and actions of all actors can be considered, as
they indicate the balance of purposes at play;' 82 and, finally, even the
traditional exceptions to hearsay might be considered as indications of
reliability.183 The majority approach "requires judges to conduct 'open-
ended balancing tests' and 'amorphous, if not entirely subjective,' inquir-
174. Id.
175. 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
176. Id. at 2725 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
177. Id at 2720 n. I (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
178. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) ("[E]x parte examinations might some-
times be admissible under modem hearsay rules, but the Framers certainly would not have condoned
them.").
179. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2725 ("Crawford ... line of cases has treated the reliability of
evidence as a reason to exclude it.").
180. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1158-59 (2011) (weapon used, medical condition,
range of possible victims).
181. Id. at 1160 (level of organization, public or private, while waiting for medical treatment).
182. Id at 1160-62 (statements of all participants, along with the physical state of victim,
existence of emergency, and "all relevant information").
183. Id. at 1157, 1162 n.12.
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ies into the totality of the circumstances bearing upon reliability." The
Court seemed to follow the advice of Yogi Berra: "When you come to a
fork in the road, take it." 85
The majority in Bryant catalogued many factors that are not disposi-
tive-not even an ongoing emergency settles the matter-but did not
give clues about what should be dispositive.186 Instead, trial courts must
weigh the choice of weapons, the details of medical conditions, and the
scope of risk to evaluate emergency,187 then look for indications of for-
mality that one might analogize to ancient British trials,188 then conduct a
deep-dive into the psychology of internal human motivations for each of
several actors,1 89 and then finally consider how the reliability conferred
by hearsay exceptions might help determine whether statements are tes-
timonial.190 After all this, trial judges must weigh possibly competing
conclusions on emergency, formality, purpose, and reliability against
each other in an abstruse and mysterious calculus.
3. Effects of Bryant's Defects: Confounding the Policy of
Crawford
The Court must clarify its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence after
the Bryant decision, and until it does, lower courts will be left trying to
decipher its meaning. Not even the Supreme Court employed the Bryant
analysis in the subsequent Bullcoming decision.' 9' Justice Ginsburg, writ-
ing for the majority, relegated the ideas in Bryant to a passing reference
that quoted Crawford.19 2 Although it is plausible that the Bryant analysis
was unnecessary to decide whether the lab tests in Bullcoming were tes-
timonial, especially given Melendez-Diaz,'9 3 this view does not square
with Justice Sotomayor's concurrence that reads as an effort to rehabili-
tate and apply the Bryant analysis to the context of documents.19 4 Her
attempt to display the functionality of the Bryant analysis was not con-
vincing: if the other members of the Supreme Court are unable or unwill-
ing to employ Bryant, how are lower courts going to make practical use
184. Id at 1175 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63, 68
(2004)).
185. YOGI BERRA, WHEN YOU COME TO A FORK IN THE ROAD, TAKE IT! INSPIRATION AND
WISDOM FROM ONE OF BASEBALL'S GREATEST HEROES (2001).
186. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160 (majority opinion) ("[O]ur discussion ... should not be taken
to imply that the existence vel non of an ongoing emergency is dispositive of the testimonial in-
quiry.").
187. Id.atl157-60.
188. Id. at 1160.
189. Id. at 1160-62.
190. Id.atll57.
191. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2713 (2011).
192. Id
193. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
194. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2719-20 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("I write separately first to
highlight why I view the report at issue to be testimonial-specifically because its 'primary purpose'
is evidentiary ..... ).
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of the decision? The Bryant analysis is too amorphous and convoluted to
be a useful tool unless pieces of it are merely employed to reach the con-
clusion that one has already decided upon.'
The Bryant decision reduces the guarantee of the Confrontation
Clause to a suggestion. 196 Bryant weakens the Confrontation Clause be-
cause it fosters unfettered judicial discretion, allowing for a variety of
results in many cases.19 7 Lower courts should consider "all relevant in-
formation" in the analysis as the Court intends,'98 but may not know
what to do with it. Conscientious efforts to apply such a confused, multi-
tiered approach will inevitably yield unpredictable results in cases poten-
tially involving the Confrontation Clause.1 99 As Justice Thomas wrote,
this merely repeats the main mischief of the reliability test and under-
mines the central policy of Crawford.2 00 The Court argued in Crawford
that the "principal evil" the Confrontation Clause was meant to prohibit
was the use of ex parte examinations against defendants because of the
danger of "prosecutorial abuse."20' The Court reasoned that if the policy
goal is to protect criminal defendants from the possibility of government
abuse, then government agents must not be given wide latitude in the
application of the protection. 20 2 "The Framers . . . knew that judges, like
other government officers, could not always be trusted to safeguard the
rights of the people . . .. They were loath to leave too much discretion in
judicial hands." 20 3 Thus, the Framers intended to limit judicial discretion
in application of the Confrontation Clause, and honoring this intent was
fundamental to the holding in Crawford. The amorphous, multi-factored
balancing test forwarded in Bryant significantly loosens the reins on ju-
dicial discretion and, thereby, does violence to the guiding policy of
Crawford.
B. Originalism Confronts Pragmatism
If Bryant indeed weakens and narrows the Confrontation Clause, as
argued here, then it begs another question: is that result desirable or not?
195. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1170 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("And when all else fails, a court can
mix-and-match perspectives to reach its desired outcome.").
196. See id.
197. Id. at 1170 ("The only virtue of the Court's approach (if it can be misnamed a virtue) is
that it leaves judges free to reach the 'fairest' result under the totality of the circumstances.").
198. Id. at 1162 (majority opinion).
199. An apt analogy might be the Lemon purpose test for statutes under the Establishment
Clause, with its three prongs: first, that the statute possesses a secular legislative purpose; second,
that its primary effect neither enhances nor inhibits religion; and third, it does not foster excessive
government entanglement with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). Courts
and scholars have criticized the Lemon test. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 582-83 (1987);
see also Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses ofthe First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41
U. Pin. L. REv. 673, 680-81 (1980).
200. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1167 (Thomas, J., concurring).
201. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50, 56 (2004).
202. See id at 67-68.
203. Id at 67.
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After all, Richard Bryant was an alleged cocaine dealer who probably
shot a man on his back porch,20 so what harm is there in allowing the
admission of evidence that puts him behind bars? Strong practical and
emotional arguments support expanding judicial discretion to find the
fairest result in criminal prosecutions.20 5 Nevertheless, these are the very
impulses that the Confrontation Clause is meant to guard against. 206
This section will set out a framework explaining why a strong Con-
frontation Clause is essential, and why it is preferable to have a strong
rule to protect the confrontation right rather than a fuzzy standard. Next,
under this framework, I will suggest ways that the primary purpose test
articulated in Bryant might be clarified as Confrontation Clause jurispru-
dence continues to evolve.20 7
1. Framework: Textual Fidelity Trumped by Practical Ends
The distinction in the reasoning that motivated Justice Scalia's dis-
sent and Justice Sotomayor's majority opinion could hardly be more
stark. In Bryant, the two Justices embodied the familiar dialectic between
rules and standards.2 08 The arguments were also familiar,209 as Justice
Scalia argued for a rule promoting certainty and predictability,2 10 while
Justice Sotomayor argued for a standard allowing flexibility and fact-
specific application. 2 1' However, the rules versus standards debate was
the result of their divergent thinking, not the cause of it.
The reasoning in Crawford began with a quest for what the words
of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause meant to the Framers.212
Whether one feels that quest was successful or not, the majority of the
Court agreed on a meaning: the Confrontation Clause demands cross-
213examination of those who bear testimony. Next, the Court decided that
the reliability test of Ohio v. Roberts violated that intended meaning by
introducing an unacceptable degree of judicial discretion: "By replacing
categorical constitutional guarantees with open-ended balancing tests, we
do violence to their design. Vague standards are manipulable . . . ."214 So,
204. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1170 (Scalia, J., dissenting); See also People v. Bryant, 768
N.W.2d 65,67 (Mich. 2009).
205. See Orenstein, supra note 3, at 1442-45.
206. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67-68.
207. The Supreme Court has already granted certiorari to hear a Confrontation Clause case in
its next term. Williams v. Illinois, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011).
208. Justice Scalia acknowledged that he prefers a strong rule governing Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence, but not for its own sake. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1176 ("In any case, we did not disavow
multifactor balancing for reliability in Crawford out of a preference for rules over standards. We did
so because 'it d[id] violence' to the Framers' design." (alteration in original) (quoting Crawford, 541
U.S. at 68)).
209. See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REv. 379, 383-85 (1985).
210. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1176.
211. See id at 1162 (majority opinion).
212. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42-50.
213. Id at 68-69.
214. Id at 67-68.
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the Court adopted a new test, the bright-line testimonial rule of Craw-
ford.2 15 Thus, the textual meaning of the Sixth Amendment was the mo-
tivating force, and the strong rule was the result.2 16 That approach is what
allowed the bold stroke of Crawford and its single-minded goal of deci-
phering the constitutional meaning despite the many questions it left un-
answered. 2 17 Justice Scalia has proved obstinate in his dedication to this
idealistic path of constitutional interpretation, even when it leads him to
the edge of a policy abyss.218
Compared to Crawford's idealism, the Court's opinion in Bryant
worked backwards. The motivating logic began with extreme factual
scenarios, such as snipers on the loose, to justify a broad ongoing emer-
gency exception.2 1 9 Then the Court set about forging paths that might
allow courts many avenues to reach the right conclusion-such as the
weapon used, the victims wounded, the range of people at risk, the pur-
poses involved, the informality of the investigation, or even reliability of
the evidence. 2 20 Thus, the practical consequences were the motivating
force, and the standard was the result. The Bryant decision did not just
remodel the analytical framework of Crawford; it compromised the
foundation.
Bryant's multi-factor balancing act expressly pushed the primary
purpose test in the direction of a flexible standard.22 1 On a deeper level,
Bryant also shifted from the idealism of Justice Scalia's originalist argu-
ments to a brand of pragmatism that holds that the practical ends dictate
the analytical means, and that truth is determined not in the abstract but
by its consequences.222 This is a plausible view, but it should be recog-
215. See id. at 68.
216. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1176 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217. For example, the Crawford Court left "leave for another day any effort to spell out a
comprehensive definition of 'testimonial. "'Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
218. See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 207-09 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(stating that "failure to pay a tax in the good-faith belief that it is not legally owing is not 'willful"'
even if the belief is based on the erroneous assumption that the tax is unconstitutional). Even if
Justice Scalia's position was logically superior, the policy ramifications of allowing every citizen
who erroneously believes a tax is unconstitutional to refuse to pay it with no legal consequence is
staggering. And yet, the practical consequences seemed to play no overt part in his reasoning.
219. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1164, 1168 (majority opinion).
220. Id. at 1150-67. This search is reminiscent of the open-ended search for indicia of reliabil-
ity that was criticized by Justice Marshall long before it was criticized by Justice Scalia. See Dutton
v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 109-10 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I am troubled by the fact that the
plurality ... begins a hunt for whatever 'indicia of reliability' may cling to Williams' remark.. . . If
'indicia of reliability' are so easy to come by, and prove so much, then it is only reasonable to ask
whether the Confrontation Clause has any independent vitality at all in protecting a criminal defend-
ant against the use of extrajudicial statements not subject to cross-examination and not exposed to a
jury assessment of the declarant's demeanor at trial.").
221. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1162.
222. I refer here not to the common definition of pragmatism as a broad term for utility and
flexibility, but to the older philosophical definition of pragmatism as a method of evaluating the truth
of competing notions by weighing their practical consequences. See WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM
AND THE MEANING OF TRUTH, 28 (1996) ("The pragmatic method .... is to try to interpret each
notion by tracing its respective practical consequences. What difference would it practically make to
anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true?").
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nized that it is at odds with the reasoning that it purported to follow. The
Crawford rule began with the meaning of the Constitution and allowed
for some flexibility; the Bryant standard began with a pragmatic eye to-
ward consequences and allowed for constitutional protections.223 The
effect is similar results, reached by different paths.224
The modest task presented by the Bryant case was to apply the rea-
soning of Crawford and Davis to the facts of a possible emergency and,
thereby, fill one of the gaps in this evolving jurisprudence. The Court's
decision failed in this task by creating a broad exception giving life to
never-ending emergencies, 22 5 and consequently, widened the gap of un-
answered questions rather than narrowing it. More importantly, the Court
departed from the guiding principles of Crawford, killing its motivating
logic without bothering to bury the corpse.
a. Viewing the Dialectic on a Spectrum
A dialectic is nearly always a helpful oversimplification, an attempt
to divide the world in half along a clean line. So it is with the division of
rules versus standards. And so it is with the idealism versus pragmatism
that motivated the competing primary purpose tests. In reality, these dis-
tinctions are never so clean. Legal thinking, in particular, can never be
wholly idealistic. 2 26 Pragmatic considerations are bound up with the task
of responding to specific cases and controversies; even the originalist
must apply his understanding of the Constitution's text to the facts at
hand. The legal mind must concern itself with the consequences on other
case law and the real world, rather than building Kantian castles in the
air. A relevant example is Justice Thomas's formality test for testimonial
evidence, 22 7 which is the clearest bright-line rule on the Confrontation
Clause yet articulated. Nevertheless, the other Justices have rejected this
option as an empty exercise that would encourage informal police proce-
dure to obviate the Confrontation Clause rather than protecting the right
to confrontation, 2 28 a purely pragmatic argument built around potential
consequences. Unlike a philosopher, a judge must peer over the bench
and watch his decisions change the lives before him. On the other hand,
223. Compare Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004), with Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at
1162-67.
224. Perhaps no one is more aware of this gulf than the Justices themselves, as evidenced by
the curious split of the majority in Bullcoming in part IV of that decision. Justice Ginsburg argued
that the claims of catastrophic practical consequences for prosecutors are dubious, and that even if
they were true these practical concerns would not change the Constitutional interpretation. In other
words, consequences be damned, because idealism animates our Confrontation Clause decisions
under Crawford. She was joined only by Justice Scalia in part IV, and lost the rest of the coalition,
including Justice Sotomayor. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2717-20 (2011).
225. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1164-65.
226. See Iredell Jenkins, The Matchmaker or Toward a Synthesis of Legal Idealism and Posi-
tivism, 12 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 1 (1960).
227. See Bryant 131 S. Ct. at 1167 (Thomas, J., concurring).
228. See id. at 1160 (majority opinion) (arguing that informality "does not necessarily indicate
the presence of an emergency or the lack of testimonial intent").
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even the most pragmatic judge must be idealistic enough to respect the
rule of law and the doctrine of stare decisis, even if she does not think it
always yields the "best results."229
Likewise, most law does not fall cleanly within the camps of rules
or standards.23 0 Instead, there is a spectrum: at one end is a rigid rule like
a speed limit, and at the other end is a flexible standard meant to intro-
duce discretion, such as Federal Rule of Evidence 403.231 Most law falls
somewhere in between. Yet, legal tests can lean toward rule or standard;
and the thinking behind the test can begin with the absolutes of idealism
or the consequences of pragmatism. 232 Crawford and its progeny exem-
plify this idea. Crawford established a categorical rule that if evidence is
testimonial it must be subjected to cross-examination, 23 3 but avoided the
messiness of defining testimony. 234 In Davis, the Court began defining
testimonial 235 and was forced to move across the spectrum from rule to-
ward standard with the primary purpose test.2 36 Then, in Bryant, the
Court slid much further across the spectrum toward a loose standard with
its additions to the primary purpose test.23 7
b. Whether a Rule or a Standard Is Superior Depends on
Context
The advantage of viewing rules and standards as intermingled is
that one need not choose which is right in the abstract. They are both
right, and which one should be emphasized depends on the legal context.
Scholars have noted that rules and standards each have their own vices
and virtues.2 3 8 Professor Schlag listed many of these familiar attrib-
utes,239 describing rules as certain and uniform yet rigid and intransigent,
while standards are flexible and open-ended while being indeterminate
and more easily manipulated.2 40 Judge Posner argued that judicial prag-
matism is neutral on the debate between rules and standards in the ab-
stract.241 A conceptual analysis of whether rules or standards are superior
is a needless debate, not only because they are inseparable, but also be-
229. Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 17 (1996).
230. See Schlag, supra note 209, at 404-06.
231. FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .").
232. See Eric J. Segall, Justice Scalia, Critical Legal Studies, and the Rule of Law, 62 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 991, 998-99 (1994).
233. See Boyer, supra note 32, at 870 ("Remarkably, Crawford v. Washington rejected the
familiar modem approach, the balancing test, choosing instead a hard-and-fast categorical rule.").
234. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
235. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
236. Id.
237. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150-67 (2011).
238. E.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557
(1992).
239. Schlag, supra note 209, at 400.
240. Id.
241. Posner, supra note 229, at 16.
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cause they only have value within a particular legal context.242 If most
agree that rules are valuable because of their rigidity, and standards are
valuable because of their flexibility, then the operative question is
whether the instant legal context would benefit from rigidity or flexibil-
ity.
c. Confrontation Clause Demands Rigidity
Powerful practical arguments buttress the view that the Confronta-
tion Clause should be weakened. There are obvious advantages, such as
speeding up prosecutions and saving money by not calling so many wit-
nesses to the stand.243 Avoiding confrontation would also protect victims
of crime who might be traumatized by facing their tormentors in open
court.244 In this regard, the Confrontation Clause affects domestic vio-
lence and child abuse cases most profoundly. 245 Many victims refuse to
testify, either out of fear or loyalty, and the Confrontation Clause be-
comes a shield for abusers.24 6 For example, when Amy Hammon decided
to stand by the man who had punched her, attacked her daughter, and
pushed her into broken glass, the Confrontation Clause ultimately
blocked the testimony she gave on the night of the violence and protected
her abuser.247
Nonetheless, constitutional protections shield not only the righteous
and sympathetic, but the despicable and unsympathetic. Returning to the
infamous case of Sir Walter Raleigh that is said to have inspired the con-
stitutional Framers, Raleigh was being tried for treason to the king, and
treason against the monarch was the most dangerous form of national
security threat.248 Thus, the state interest was compelling, and yet this
was the example that inspired the Framers to include the Confrontation
Clause in the Sixth Amendment.249 Therefore, we must conclude that the
Confrontation Clause was designed for those situations when the state is
most driven to secure a conviction, when sacrificing the rights of the
accused seems irresistible. 25 0 The Confrontation Clause was created to
protect the unsympathetic defendant-the traitor, the drug dealer, and the
abuser. In the end, it makes little sense to limit the Confrontation Clause
based on pragmatic policy concerns. The Clause is designed to slow the
242. See id.
243. Fenner, supra note 27, at 78.
244. See id. at 80-84.
245. See Ellen Liang Yee, Confronting the "Ongoing Emergency": A Pragmatic Approach to
Hearsay Evidence in the Context of the Sixth Amendment, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 729, 775-79
(2008).
246. See Orenstein, supra note 3, at 1414.
247. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 820-21, 832-34 (2006).
248. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1173 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
249. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44, 50 (2004).
250. Id. at 68 ("Framers had an eye toward politically charged cases like Raleigh's-great state




government machine, not hasten it.2 5 1 Likewise, the stirring emotional
arguments that focus on victims of crime are irrelevant reasons to block
the confrontation rights of those presumed innocent. 25 2
The reasons to lean toward a more rigid rule are stronger within the
context of constitutional interpretation than other situations. There is
more reason to look to the past and the weight of the text, as it is the su-
preme law of the land.253 Also, there is more reason to protect a constitu-
tional right with absolutism because it is foundational to our society, and
any decision repugnant to the text is void.254 The need for a strong rule is
particularly acute in the context of the Confrontation Clause. Because
confrontation is meant to protect citizens from government abuse, it is
dangerous to then establish a malleable standard and hand government
agents unlimited discretion over when to apply the protection.255 A loose
standard will not do. As the Framers saw it, the members of the legal
profession are the foxes in a henhouse full of criminal defendants, and
we must exercise the self-control to build a strong barrier for their sake.
The foxes cannot wait until we are hungry and the chickens are at hand
to decide whether we will dine. After Bryant, though, the unsympathetic
criminal defendant will find little protection in the form of the Confron-
tation Clause. "And what has been taken away from him has been taken
away from us all."256
2. Solution: Ruling the Standard
Given the framework above, this section provides two proposals to
push the determination of what constitutes testimonial evidence across
the spectrum from flexible standard toward a more rigid rule. First, the
ongoing emergency exception should be narrower and more definite.
Second, the primary purpose test should be made as simple and objective
as possible.
a. Narrowing and Strengthening the Ongoing Emergency
Exception
The ongoing emergency exception need not be so broad; rather, an
exception to confrontation should indeed require exceptional circum-
stances. 257 The appropriate scope of the emergency exception lasts while
the alleged criminal act is occurring, and courts should require positive
251. See Fenner, supra note 27, at 79-80.
252. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 ("Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obvi-
ously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.").
253. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
254. Id.
255. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
256. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1176 (2011) (majority opinion).
257. As mentioned above, other possible exceptions include the narrow categories of forfeiture
and dying declarations, but after the Bryant decision, the ongoing emergency exception will likely be
implicated most frequently. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358-60, 62 (2008); Bryant, 131 S.
Ct. at 1176-77 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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evidence of a continuing threat to extend the emergency. 258 Even within
the narrow scope of an ongoing emergency thus construed, trial judges
should require that the content of the statements be reasonably related to
the goal of resolving the emergency. However, if an ongoing emergency
does yield statements reasonably calculated to resolve the emergency, the
emergency exception should be dispositive, because the hearsay is neces-
sarly nontestimonial. 25 9 The Bryant decision effectively reduced an on-
going emergency from an exception to a factor, and then broadened the
definition of an emergency. 26 0 A move toward a clear rule demands the
opposite: (1) narrow the definition of an emergency, (2) give it a definite
end-point, and then (3) restore to an ongoing emergency the force of an
exception. This solution fosters predictability and certainty.
The simple distinction between a present-tense danger and a past-
tense crime offers some guidance. Is the interrogation focused on "what
is happening" or "what happened"? 261 Is it more like Michelle
McCottry's 911 call while being attacked,262 or more like Amy
Hammon's conversation with police after being attacked?263 The Court
made an even finer distinction in Davis, reasoning that the 911 call was
nontestimonial during the criminal act, but the conversation turned testi-
monial seconds later once the attacker fled and the interrogator began to
collect evidence. 264 The 911 operator did not need to know the attacker's
middle name, for example, to respond to the emergency.265 The transition
from nontestimonial to testimonial thus hinged on two factors: (1) the
end of the criminal act, even though the attacker was still on the loose,
and (2) the content of the statements were no longer reasonably related to
ending the emergency. The Court should return to that narrow under-
standing of an ongoing emergency.
Likewise, courts should draw a line between the alleged criminal act
and the consequences of the act. The emergency continues while the al-
leged criminal act is ongoing, not because the consequences of the action
are ongoing. Michelle McCottry's injuries did not extend the duration of
the emergency once her attacker fled;26 6 Kenneth Lee's stab wounds did
not extend the duration of the emergency to include Sylvia Crawford's
interrogation hours later.267 Anthony Covington's medical condition,
likewise, was a consequence of the attack but not part of the attack; in-
258. But see Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 164 (majority opinion).
259. But see id. at 1157, 1160.
260. See id at 1157-60, 63-67.
261. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827, 830 (2006).
262. Id at 817-18.
263. Id. at 819-21.
264. Id at 818, 828-29.
265. See id. at 818, 828.
266. See idat 818, 828-29.
267. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38, 68 (2004).
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deed, his critical medical condition persisted for hours, until his death. 268
Consequences of a crime-such as a critical medical condition-can
persist for hours, days, or years, providing no end to the emergency and
allowing for organized interrogations under the guise of emergency re-
sponse. Such circumstances lead to the type of mistake that occurred in
Bryant, where the Court concluded that statements such as "Rick shot
me" and a physical description of Rick were somehow essential to the
purpose of receiving medical care.269
The paradigm should not start with the vision of a rooftop sniper
terrorizing a city and then render a loose standard accordingly. Yes, a
gun could make an emergency more far-reaching. Yes, a killer on the
loose could threaten many lives. But there is no need for relying on con-
jecture or a lack of evidence indicating that an assailant has not been
arrested to assume an emergency is ongoing and widespread destruction
is nigh.270 Courts should require specific, positive evidence of an ongoing
threat in order to extend the scope of the emergency.271 As the Court not-
ed in Bryant, this determination should not be based on the wisdom of
hindsight.272 If an attacker was holding hostages during a stand-off with
police, the emergency would be ongoing, even if unbeknownst to police
the attacker had killed himself hours ago.273 Nevertheless, absent positive
evidence that a threat is ongoing, it should not be presumed to continue
because of imagined scenarios and needless factors. Courts should not
necessarily assume that an abuser who killed his wife is less dangerous
than a man who killed an acquaintance, or that a knife-wielding maniac
is less dangerous than a shooter.274 The facts should guide the inquiry.
The reliance on imagined scenarios is the flaw that leads to never-ending
emergencies, and that is why the Court could not conclude with certainty
that the ongoing emergency ended at any point before Bryant was arrest-
ed a year later in California.2 75 Requiring positive evidence of an ongoing
criminal act gives the emergency a definite end-point.
Significantly, this requirement also prevents the Court from subtly
shifting the burden of persuasion from the state to the defendant. The
state must prove the evidence was nontestimonial; 27 6 by allowing conjec-
ture to extend emergencies indefinitely, the Court instead forces defend-
ants to prove when the threat ended and the hearsay became testimonial.
268. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150 (2011).
269. Id. at ll60-62, 1165.
270. But see id. at 1164.
271. See DEBORAH JONES MERRITr & RIC SIMMONS, LEARNING EVIDENCE: FROM THE
FEDERAL RULES TO THE COURTROOM 56 (2009) (explaining the pitfalls of relying on negative
evidence).
272. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1157 n.8.
273. See id.
274. But see id. at 1158-59 (assuming that domestic violence and non-firearm violence poses a
smaller circle of risk).
275. Id. at 1164-65.
276. United States v. Jackson, 636 F.3d 687, 695-96 (5th Cir. 2011).
2011] 297
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Must Richard Bryant now prove that if he once posed a threat, he no
longer posed a threat during the interrogation, and that the content of the
exchange was meant to prosecute him? That is an unfair burden.
In Bryant, the Court broadened the ongoing emergency definition,
but at the same time insisted that "the existence vel non" of an emergen-
cy is only one more factor in the primary purpose inquiry rather than an
exception.277 In this way, the Court widened and weakened the analytical
effect of an ongoing emergency, leading to increased discretion and un-
predictability. The proposed solution is to reverse this development,
making the application of the exception narrower by requiring the state-
ments to be reasonably related to ending an alleged criminal act that is
occurring, and then making the effect of the exception conclusive. 27 8
Applying these changes to the facts of Bryant, the emergency was
ongoing while Anthony Covington was shot and continued while he was
fleeing from Richard Bryant's property to his car. There is no evidence
to indicate that Bryant followed Covington or posed a continuing threat
to Covington or anyone else. 2 79 Therefore, the emergency ended when
Covington successfully got away from Bryant. Of course, the conse-
quences of the attack continued until Covington's death hours later from
the gunshot wound, 2 80 but the emergency itself did not. Police officers
arrived at the gas station after the conclusion of the emergency, 281 and
therefore, the interrogation did not fall within the ongoing emergency
exception. Even though the consequences of the attack were more dire
than those found in Davis or Hammon, the interrogation of Covington by
several police officers while waiting for medical personnel more closely
resembles the questioning of Amy Hammon than it does Michelle
McCottry's frantic call for help. 2 8 2 The criminal act was completed with
no evidence of a continued threat, and the content of the interrogation
was not limited to responding to an emergency.
This approach may be criticized as too narrow, as common sense
might indicate that a man bleeding from a gunshot wound constitutes an
emergency. While it is an emergency in a general sense, it is not an on-
going emergency in the sense that one suffering from a gunshot wound
cannot possibly be trying to communicate testimony against the shooter.
277. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160.
278. In this way, the emergency exception follows the path of the forfeiture exception explored
in Giles. There, the Court made the forfeiture exception narrow by requiring the intent of the defend-
ant to eliminate the testimony of the unavailable witness, but when the narrow exception applies it is
dispositive. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359-60, 367-68 (2008).
279. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1170 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Covington] knew the threatening
situation had ended six blocks away and 25 minutes earlier when he fled from Bryant's back porch."
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
280. Id. at 1150 (majority opinion).
281. See id.




The proposed inquiry would also remain fact-specific and somewhat
arbitrary as to when the emergency ends. Did the action end when the
bullet entered Covington's body, when he reached his car, or when the
car reached the gas station? The line should perhaps be drawn when he
reached his car, because Bryant apparently did not follow him out of the
house. The criticism is correct, though; this is not an exact science. How-
ever, the proposed changes improve on Bryant because the end of an
emergency should be drawn more narrowly. 283 If the test errs, it is better
to err on the side of preserving the right to confrontation than it is to err
on the side of denying the Sixth Amendment rights of defendants.284 The
Bryant Court was correct that the analysis of an emergency must be con-
text-dependent, 285 but that reasoning is more cogent if we rely on the
facts in the context presented rather than worst-case scenarios when de-
ciding the point at which the emergency exception ended.
A final question is why the ongoing emergency exception is being
treated separately from the primary purpose test. The Court presented the
analysis as an either-or test: the purpose of the hearsay is either testimo-
nial or for another purpose like an ongoing emergency.2 86 As explained
below, perhaps the question should be reduced to whether the evidence
was testimonial or not. An ongoing emergency should be a narrow ex-
ception to the rule, not part of the main inquiry. Thus, the ongoing emer-
gency exception, when presented by the particular facts of a case, may be
considered. If the interrogation occurred within the narrow slice of an
ongoing criminal act, and the statements are reasonably related to ending
the emergency, then the evidence is not testimonial and the inquiry is
done.
b. Turning the Primary Purpose Standard into a Rule
Guided by the idea that protecting the constitutional right to con-
frontation is best served by the application of a rigid but functional rule,
the goal is to make the test as simple and objective as possible without
sacrificing accuracy. The test has gathered some unnecessary ornamenta-
tion that can be removed, and the analysis of "purpose" should be simpli-
fied. Therefore, the suggested solution is to begin by removing the un-
necessary factors of reliability and formality, and then focusing the anal-
ysis on the objective function of the interrogation.
283. Another possible, although, in my opinion, less optimal, solution would be to redact
segments of the interrogation that occurred after the purpose had clearly become testimonial. Justice
Scalia suggested that even if the emergency was ongoing when the first police officer arrived at the
scene, the primary purpose of the interrogation had evolved into gathering testimony by the time a
fifth police officer was asking redundant questions. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1172 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); see also Davis, 547 U.S. at 828-29 (recommending redaction after the function of the interro-
gation quickly evolved from resolving the emergency to producing testimony).
284. Cf Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 109 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
285. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1158 (majority opinion).
286. See id. at 1155-57, 1165.
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i. Jettison Reliability
The most straightforward improvement is to remove the reliability
factor that the Court included in its Bryant analysis. 2 87 Not only does this
analogy make little sense under the reasoning of Crawford, it threatens to
confuse the holding of Crawford by reanimating the overruled reliability
reasoning of Roberts.2 88 "Reliability" and "testimonial" are not analo-
gous terms, and they often have an inverse relationship. 2 89 Reliability
should be ignored in a testimonial analysis.
ii. Jettison Formality as an Independent Factor
The next unnecessary bauble to remove from the testimonial analy-
sis is the independent factor of formality. This factor sticks around, it
seems, to ensure Justice Thomas's support in 5-4 decisions. 2 90 Putting
aside the realities of cobbling together a majority, the testimonial analy-
sis would be improved without treating formality as an independent fac-
tor. As Justice Sotomayor wrote in Bryant, formality supports the argu-
ment that evidence is testimony, but lack of formality tells us little.
The danger of this independent factor has been borne out in state courts
that cling to the bright-line rule of formality while ignoring the meat of
the testimonial inquiry,2 92 thereby finding the evidence to be
nontestimonial because it lacks formality, a basis that the majority of the
Court has deemed meaningless. When lower courts are finding evidence
nontestimonial on the basis of a meaningless distinction, then the test has
led them astray.
iii. Examine the Function of the Encounter
The difficulty of reforming the primary purpose test is that its de-
velopment in Bryant was more akin to mission creep than an abrupt
change of course. Many of the necessary changes are semantic, but may
yield important results as Confrontation Clause jurisprudence continues
to evolve.
First, the term "purpose" should be replaced with "function," mak-
ing it the "primary function test." This change would make the goal of
the test clear and avoid the ambiguity of the word "purpose," as its mean-
ing shifts between function and motive.2 93 This semantic slip clouded the
287. Id. at 1174 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
288. Id at 1174-75.
289. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51, 61-64, 65 (2004).
290. See Fenner, supra note 27, at 39-40.
291. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 160 (majority opinion).
292. See Ware v. State, No. CR-08-1177, 2011 WL 1088724, at *13 (Ala. Crim. App. Mar. 25,
2011) ("[W]e agree with the State's argument that the Melendez-Diaz definition of testimonial was
limited to formalized testimonial materials, i.e., affidavits.").
293. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 841-42 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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Court's reasoning in Bryant and threatens to cause the same confusion
for other courts.
Second, the test should be framed as the "primary function of the
encounter," rather than the primary purpose of a reasonable participant.
The Court in Bryant shifted back and forth between stating the test as an
inquiry into the purpose of the interrogation and an inquiry into the pur-
pose of participants,2 94 and thereby shifted between meanings of the term
"purpose" throughout the opinion. An examination of the "function of
the encounter" further clarifies that the test is not probing intent or inter-
nal motivations, and puts the test on more objective ground. The Court's
analysis should be limited to external facts in an objective test, excluding
subjective wanderings such as whether a wounded man can form a pur-
pose and the intent of each actor. Focusing on the encounter instead of
participants forwards that goal.
The Court's test probing the purpose of the participants also led it to
ask: Whose purpose matters? The majority reasoned that the purpose of
each participant matters,295 while the dissent, when forced, argued that it
is the "declarant's intent that counts."29 6 The only useful part of this ex-
change is that it strips off the final veneer of objectivity in the primary
purpose test, as the Justices acknowledge they have moved into the sub-
jective territory of intent. Frankly, the Court is asking the wrong ques-
tion. Examining the function of the encounter need not separate each
individual's purpose because they are indeterminate and, in the end, ir-
relevant. Never mind the shifting purposes of the declarant or the crowd
of interrogators. Never mind the futile attempt to suss out what internal
motivations were present and perhaps primary. The test should discern
the function of an encounter based on external statements, behavior, and
context, explicitly ignoring the internal motivations sparked by the exter-
nal stimuli. Just as courts do not care if a contracting party was secretly
joking, they should not care if a declarant harbored a secret purpose. The
proper question is not whose purpose matters, but whether the external
facts indicate that the function of the encounter was to produce testimo-
ny 297
Applying this rule to the facts of Bryant, the central question is
whether the external facts indicate that the primary function of the en-
294. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156-57.
295. Id. at 1160-61.
296. Id. at I168 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
297. This solution-like the majority solution in Bryant-has implications for co-conspirator
statements elicited through undercover operations. Although the function of that encounter seems to
be testimonial (otherwise it would never have occurred), the ramifications of such a finding would
be significant. The topic is explored thoughtfully by Professor Seigel. Michael L. Seigel & Daniel
Weisman, The Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements in a Post-Crawford World, 34 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 877, 890-91, 901-04 (2007); see also Sheila K. Hyatt, Telling Lies to Sylvia Crawford,
DULR ONLNE (Mar. 17, 2011 9:16 AM), http://www.denverlawreview.org/practitioners-
pieces/2011/3/17/telling-lies-to-sylvia-crawford.html.
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counter was testimonial. None of the possible exceptions apply: forfei-
ture is eliminated because there is no evidence Bryant shot Covington to
stop his testimony; the dying declaration, if preserved, would probably
not apply as Covington eagerly anticipated medical help, presumably in
the hope he might live; 298 and, as argued above, the emergency had al-
ready concluded even though the consequences of the emergency contin-
ued.
The encounter occurred by happenstance, so it was not planned or
created to produce testimony. Police officers simply responded to a call
for assistance.29 9 However, the words and behavior of the participants
paint a different picture. The questions of who shot Covington, the at-
tacker's height and weight, and where and how it happened serve a tes-
timonial function. 3 00 The questioning was phrased in the past tense as
recounted by police officers, 301 hence investigating a past crime rather
than a present danger. Five separate officers questioned Covington as he
waited for medical help,3 02 indicating that the primary function was to
elicit information from the declarant, not perform emergency aid-surely
one officer would be enough to gather vital information in a life-
threatening situation, while others faced the danger. If the primary func-
tion of the encounter had been to respond to a present danger, the police
officers would probably have behaved differently. If the primary function
of the encounter had been to render aid to Covington, questions seeking a
physical description of his attacker need not have been asked. Police
officers were doing their job admirably, trying under difficult circum-
stances to gather pertinent information to help them get the bad guy. That
was the primary function of this encounter between Covington and police
officers. Of course, getting the bad guy means catching him and then
putting him behind bars with evidence at trial. Therefore, the objective
evidence-words, behavior, and context-indicates that the primary
function of the encounter was testimonial, and the testimonial hearsay
implicated the right to confrontation.
This is not a perfect solution. The proposed changes rely largely on
semantic rather than substantive changes to the rule. However, words
matter. In Bryant, an ambiguous word (purpose) gave way to a faulty
question (whose purpose?). That, in turn, led the test to focus on internal
motivations instead of external facts. Relying on external facts to deter-
mine the primary function of an encounter should allow courts to ap-
proach the question in a more objective fashion. Also, the framing of a
simpler, yes-or-no test eliminates the open-ended, multi-factor analysis
that Bryant invited. The test is still fact-specific, to be sure, but not so
298. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1171.
299. Id. at 1150 (majority opinion).
300. Id. at 1171 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
301. Id at 1170.
302. Id. at 1168, 1170-71.
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amorphous. That change slides the test across the spectrum toward a
strong rule. A strong rule is preferable in the context of constitutional
interpretation, particularly when the policy is to restrain government
abuse against citizens.
CONCLUSION
The bewildering primary purpose test employed by Bryant seems
likely to lead to unpredictable outcomes in the lower courts and nearly
unfettered judicial discretion to decide what qualifies as testimonial hear-
say. Conscientious efforts to follow the Bryant analysis could yield con-
tradictory results, as courts attempt to navigate the maze of sub-factors
informing emergency, formality, purpose, and reliability, and then bal-
ance the four main factors without clear guidance. The expansion of the
ongoing emergency definition necessarily narrows the scope of the Con-
frontation Clause, while the unnecessarily elastic primary purpose test
renders the application of the confrontation right a suggestion rather than
a predictable guarantee.
While there are powerful pragmatic and emotional arguments for
limiting the application of the Confrontation Clause, the history of the
Clause suggests that it was designed to guard the accused against state
interests precisely when the state's concerns seem most compelling.
William Reed
* J.D. Candidate, 2013. I would like to thank Professor Sheila K. Hyatt for her boundless
patience and insight, Professor David Thomson for sharing his toolbox, and the members of the
Denver University Law Review Board and editorial staff who were subjected to my prose.
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ARIZONA CHRISTIAN SCHOOL TUITION ORGANIZATION V.
WINN: RECONSIDERING FLAST's EXCEPTION TO THE RULE
AGAINST TAXPAYER STANDING AND ESTABLISHING THE
TAX CREDIT DISTINCTION
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Flast v. Cohen' has
been a source of controversy in American jurisprudence. Over several
decades, courts and commentators have wrestled with the meaning,
scope, and historical underpinnings of the Flast exception to the general
3rule against taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause cases.
The Court recently reconsidered Flast's exception in Arizona Chris-
4tian School Tuition Organization v. Winn. The Winn Court held that a
taxpayer lacks Article III standing under Flast to challenge a tax credit
but not a government expenditure.' The Court had never before relied on
this tax credit distinction to dismiss a claim for lack of standing.6
Part I of this Comment reviews the origins of the general bar against
taxpayer standing and the Flast exception under the Establishment
Clause, and their respective treatment in several Supreme Court cases
leading up to Winn. Part II summarizes the facts, procedural history, and
opinions of Winn. Part III analyzes Winn's holding and the potential
problems posed by Flast's exception, namely its unduly vague meaning
and misguided reliance on James Madison's Memorial and Remon-
strance Against Religious Assessments (Memorial and Remonstrance).
Part III further analyzes the merits of Winn's tax credit distinction, in-
cluding its derivation from Flast, avoidance of speculative decisions, and
preservation of judicial economy. In addition, the section compares the
tax credit distinction under the Establishment Clause to the subsidy ex-
ception under the dormant Commerce Clause. Part IV concludes that the
tax credit distinction in Winn has merit, particularly in today's litigious
climate.
1. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
2. See, e.g., Kyle Duncan, Misunderstanding Freedom from Religion: Two Cents on Madi-
son's Three Pence, 9 NEV. L.J. 32, 32 (2008).
3. See, e.g., Craig A. Stem, Another Sign from Hein: Does the Generalized Grievance Fail a
Constitutional or a Prudential Test of Federal Standing to Sue?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1169,
1207-08 (2008).
4. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn (Winn), 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
5. See id at 1447.
6. Id. at 1452 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
7. 2 JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183 (Gaillard Hunt ed. 1901).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Origins ofStanding Doctrine and the Exception to the Rule
Against Taxpayer Standing
Derived from the text of Article III, standing doctrine gives federal
courts authority to hear only "Cases" and "Controversies."8 General
claims of ideological or symbolic harm do not create standing because
they do not present a specific injury for which a court can provide re-
dress.9 To have standing before a court, a plaintiff must demonstrate a
specific, personal injury caused by another. 0 If the Judiciary were not
limited to hearing only cases and controversies, courts might encroach
upon subject matters properly reserved for the Legislative and Executive
Branches." Standing doctrine enforces the constitutional separation of
powers by distinguishing judicial authority from legislative and execu-
tive power.12 It also ensures that the case before a court is suitable for
adjudication.13 Plaintiffs seeking redress under the Establishment
Clause14 based only on their taxpayer status generally must do so through
the political process and not through the courts.'
The Court pronounced the rule against taxpayer standing in the se-
minal case of Frothingham v. Mellon,'6 decided with Massachusetts v.
Mellon.17 In Flast, the Court created an exception to the rule against tax-
payer standing under the Establishment Clause if a claimant can establish
a personal stake in the outcome. 1 Since Flast, the Court has grappled
with the precise meaning and scope of this exception.
B. Frothingham v. Mellon
In Frothingham, a federal taxpayer alleged that the effect of appro-
priations for the Maternity Act of 1921 would "increase the burden of
future taxation and thereby take her property without due process of
law." 9 In a unanimous decision, the Court dismissed the case for the
plaintiff's lack of standing because the case presented a matter of public,
not individual, concern. 20 The Court stated that in order to present a
8. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1.
9. See Duncan, supra note 2, at 34.
10. Heather Elliott, Congress's Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. REv. 159,
168 (2011).
11. Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1442.
12. Mark C. Rahdert, Forks Taken and Roads Not Taken Standing to Challenge Faith-Based
Spending, 32 CARDOZO L. REv. 1009, 1056 (2011).
13. Id at 1059.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .....
15. Duncan, supra note 2, at 34.
16. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
17. Id. at 488-89.
18. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).
19. Id. at 479, 486.
20. Id. at 480, 487.
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"judicial controversy," a claimant must show that he or she sustained a
"direct injury" and did not "merely . .. suffer[] in some indefinite way in
common with people generally." 2 1 The Court suggested that a finding of
taxpayer standing would have made subsequent legislative spending de-
cisions subject to excessive judicial review, possibly undermining the
separation of powers.2 2
C. Flast v. Cohen
Forty-five years later, in Flast, federal taxpayers sought to enjoin
government funding of parochial school instructional materials. 2 3 Carv-
ing out an exception to the general standing bar, the Court held that the
claimants had standing because the government "extracted and spent"
"tax money" in violation of the Constitution's establishment protec-
-24tions.
The Court ruled that standing rests on whether a taxpayer has the
requisite "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy." 2 5 Taxpayers
could demonstrate standing when (1) their suit challenged congressional
taxing and spending authority, as opposed to regulatory expenditures,
26
and (2) their claim alleged a specific constitutional infringement. In
interpreting the scope of the Establishment Clause, Chief Justice Warren
relied on James Madison's pivotal Memorial and Remonstrance, in
which the then-Virginia legislator and eventual First Amendment
draftsman asserted that a state tax levy to support Christian teachers
would infringe upon people's religious liberties.2 7
In his dissent, Justice Harlan criticized the "personal stake" re-
quirement as a mere restatement of the standing problem. 2 8 He also noted
that the criteria of the two-part nexus test did not meaningfully measure
the claimant's interest in the outcome of a suit.29 Furthermore, Justice
Harlan questioned the Court's reliance on "isolated dicta" from Madi-
son's Memorial and Remonstrance as authority in interpreting the Estab-
lishment Clause.30
21. Id. at 488-89.
22. See id. at 487 ("If one taxpayer may champion and litigate such a cause, then every other
taxpayer may do the same. . .
23. Id. at 85-86.
24. See id. at 105-06.
25. Id. at 101 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
26. Id. at 102.
27. Id. at 103-04. For a discussion of Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, see infra Part
Ill.A.2.
28. Id. at 121 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 126.
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D. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc.31
In Valley Forge, a nonprofit organization of taxpayers and several
of its employees challenged a government decision to transfer a tract of
federally-owned land to an evangelical Christian college. 32 Distinguish-
ing Flast, the Court held that the claimants lacked standing to challenge a
federal executive's donative transfer of property to a religious organiza-
tion.3 3 Justice Rehnquist found that the claimants failed Flast's first
prong because they challenged a decision by the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare under the Property Clause of the Constitution,
not a congressional act under the Taxing and Spending Clause as re-
quired by Flast.34
In his dissent, Justice Brennan suggested that the distinction be-
tween the Property Clause and the Taxing and Spending Clause issues
was artificial because government donations of real property and funds
are functionally equivalent methods of providing financial support.35
E. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. 36
In Hein, the Court examined a challenge to the President's creation
of the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives and
similar departments in federal agencies supporting faith-based communi-
ty groups' efforts to secure federal funding for nonreligious activities. 37
An organization opposed to the government endorsement of religion and
several of its members brought an Establishment Clause claim against
the agencies' uses of federal money to fund conferences promoting the
President's faith-based initiative.38 Declining to extend Flast beyond
congressional appropriation challenges, a three-Justice plurality held that
taxpayer status did not allow the claimants to challenge executive ex-
penditures.39
Justice Alito's plurality opinion, which Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Kennedy joined, noted that, "in the four decades since its crea-
tion, the Flast exception has largely been confined to its facts."4 0 The
plurality further emphasized that Flast provided only a narrow exception,
any extension of which would expand judicial power and "raise serious
separation-of-powers concerns" between the Judicial and Executive
31. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
32. Id. at 469.
33. Id. at 489 n.25, 490.
34. Id. at 480.
35. Id. at 511-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
36. 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (plurality opinion).
37. Id. at 593-94.
38. Id. at 595.
39. Id. at 593.
40. Id. at 609.
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Branches. 4 1 In a concurrence joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia
concluded that Flast should be overruled because its conceptualization of
injury in purely mental terms is "wholly irreconcilable" with Article III
and particularized injury requirements embodied in standing doctrine.4 2
In a dissent that Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined, Jus-
tice Souter expressed concern that government "favoritism for religion
'sends the ... message to ... nonadherents that they are outsiders, not
full members of the political community."' 4 3 According to the dissent,
such a psychic or economic injury to religious nonbelievers "is serious
and concrete enough to be 'judicially cognizable" 4 4 and, thus, "sufficient
for standing."45
The split between the Court's conservative and liberal blocs in Hein
foreshadowed how the current Justices would align in Winn.
II. ARIZONA CHRISTIAN SCHOOL TUITION ORGANIZATION V. WINN
A. Facts
In 1997, the Arizona legislature passed a law granting state income
tax credits to Arizona taxpayers who donate to school tuition organiza-
tions (STOs).46 STOs are nonprofit organizations that award private
school scholarships to children. 4 7 Under the Arizona tax code, state tax-
payers receive dollar-for-dollar tax credits of up to $500 per person and
$1,000 per married couple for contributions made to STOs.48
STOs, in turn, use these charitable contributions to provide tuition
grants or scholarships to students attending qualified private schools,
which, in many cases, are religious.49 A qualified school is a private
school in Arizona that "does not discriminate on the basis of race, color,
handicap, familial status or national origin . . . .',,o The Arizona statute
does not "preclude[] STOs from funding scholarships to schools that
provide religious instruction" or that give religious-based admissions
preferences. 51 Under the statute in effect at the time of this suit, however,
41. Id. at 611.
42. Id. at 618-20 (Scalia, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 643 (Souter, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting McCreary Cnty. v. Am.
Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. Id. (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984)).
45. Id.
46. See 1997 Ariz. Sess. Laws 548, 549-50 (codified as amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
43-1089 (Supp. 2011)).
47. Id at 550.
48. § 43-1089(A).
49. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1440 (2011).
50. § 43-1089(H)(2)(a).
51. Winn v. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. (Winn II), 562 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2009),
rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
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STOs could not limit their scholarships for use at only one designated
school.52
B. Procedural History
In an earlier lawsuit after the statute was passed but before it took
effect,53 Arizona taxpayers challenged the statute in state court under the
religion and anti-gift clauses of the Arizona Constitution and under the
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.5 4 Ultimately, the
Arizona Supreme Court held that the statute was not unconstitutional on
its face because the tax credit provided a neutral mechanism for encour-
aging investment in education.
After the statute took effect, different plaintiffs, including Kathleen
Winn, filed suit in federal court asserting that the statute violated the
Establishment Clause as applied.5 Because many STOs restrict the
availability of scholarships to religious schools, the claimants alleged
that the tax credit program deprived parents of a genuine choice between
scholarships to private secular schools and religious ones." The United
States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the suit as "ju-
risdictionally barred by the Tax Injunction Act."58 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal, and the
United States Supreme Court affirmed that decision.59
On remand, Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization and
other parties intervened as defendants.60 The district court again dis-
missed the suit, this time for the taxpayers' failure to state a claim.61 A
three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed, holding that the claimants had standing under Flast.6 2
On the merits, the appellate court ruled that the taxpayers had stated a
claim that the statute violated the Establishment Clause.63 The full court
52. Id. at 1006.
53. Id
54. See Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 610 (Ariz. 1999) (3-2 decision).
55. Id. at 625.
56. See Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1441 (2011).
57. Winn II, 562 F.3d at 1005. Although approximately twenty-five of the fifty-five STOs in
Arizona limit scholarship grants to religious schools, at least eighty-five percent of the state-financed
scholarship money is available only to students whose parents are willing to send them to religious
schools. Winn v. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. (Winn III), 586 F.3d 649, 650, 660 n.6 (9th Cir.
2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
58. Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1441; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006) ("The district courts shall not
enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a
plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.").
59. Hibbs v. Winn (Winn IV), 542 U.S. 88, 112 (2004).
60. Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1441.
61. Id
62. See Winn II, 562 F.3d at 1008, 1011.
63. See id. at 1023.
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denied en banc review, with eight judges dissenting." The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
C. Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy delivered the Court's opinion, which Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito joined.6 Because the
Arizona taxpayers challenged a tax credit and not a government expendi-
ture, the Court held the taxpayers lacked Article III standing under
Flast.6 7 In reaching its decision, the Court presented the various constitu-
tional and common law principles of taxpayer standing in Establishment
Clause cases.
First, Justice Kennedy recounted the Constitution's "tripartite allo-
cation of power" and Article III limitations placed on the Judiciary.6 ' The
Court explained that a plaintiff seeking to invoke judicial power under
Article III must allege more than a "generalized interest of all citizens." 69
Justice Kennedy indicated that the case-or-controversy requirement of
Article III restricts judicial power to disputes presenting a specific injury
in need of redress. 7 0 The Court further cautioned that, if courts were not
otherwise restricted, the Judiciary might encroach upon matters properly
71reserved for the Legislature.
Second, the Court noted that a case or controversy requires stand-
ing, which has certain minimum constitutional requirements under Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 72 including (1) an "injury in fact" that is "con-
crete" and "actual"; (2) a "causal connection" that is "fairly . . .
trace[able]"; and (3) the "'likely,' as opposed to merely speculative . . .
redress[ability]" of the injury.73 The Winn Court found that the clai-
mants' alleged injury would require the Court to speculate about the po-
tential impact of the STO tax credit on future tax bills. 7 4 Thus, Lujan's
three-part test provided no basis for standing.7"
64. Winn IHI, 586 F.3d 649, 650, 658 (9th Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
65. Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1441.
66. Id. at 1439.
67. See id. at 1447.
68. Id. at 1441-42 (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 47 (1982)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
69. Id. (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1974))
(internal quotation mark omitted).
70. See id. at 1441.
71. Id. at 1442.
72. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
73. Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1442 (first and second alterations in original) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S.
at 560-61). Under Lujan, a plaintiff does not have standing merely as a citizen to claim that govern-
ment action violates the Constitution or federal law because an Article Ill case or controversy re-
quires a showing of "some direct injury" and not merely "a generally available grievance about
government." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74.
74. Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1444.
75. See id.
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Third, the Court cited the rule against taxpayer standing, which pro-
vides that taxpayer status is generally insufficient to establish standing in
Establishment Clause cases in order to limit potential judicial encroach-
ment on the Legislative Branch.76 Because the purported injury from the
tax credit was "speculative" and not particular, the Court found that the
Arizona taxpayers did not have standing to assert their claim based on
the general rule.77
Fourth, the Court evaluated the claimants' possible standing under
Flast's nexus test.78 The Court noted that the Flast exception is applica-
ble to a religious entity's receipt of government expenditures drawn or
extracted from general tax revenues.7 9 The Court acknowledged that go-
vernmental expenditures and STO tax credits might have similar eco-
nomic consequences but found that the contribution of tax credit savings
to a taxpayer-designated, sectarian organization does not invoke Flast.so
Fifth, the majority reviewed similar tax benefit cases in which the
Court had reached a decision on the merits." The majority found that the
Court's decision to rule on the merits of other tax benefit cases did not
support standing in Winn because those cases did not reference standing
and thus do not stand for the proposition that no jurisdictional defect
existed.82 The majority cautioned that courts would risk mistake if they
assumed or relied on unstated rules of law from prior cases.83
D. Concurring Opinion
In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia
criticized the Court's holding in Flast as an anomaly in American juri-
sprudence. 84 As he did in Hein, Justice Scalia noted that he would repu-
diate Flast because its conceptualization of injury in purely mental terms
is "irreconcilable" with Article III and particularized injury requirements
embodied in standing doctrine.8 5 Justice Scalia indicated that he never-
theless joined the majority opinion because the Court held that Arizona
76. See id at 1442.
77. See id at 1444-45.
78. Id. at 1445.
79. Id. at 1448.
80. Id. at 1447.
81. Id at 1448 (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Reli-
gious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)).
82. Id
83. Id at 1448-49; see also Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 119 (1993)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that stare decisis is limited to "questions actually considered and
passed on, [which] ensures that this Court does not decide important questions by accident or inad-
vertence").
84. Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1449-50 (Scalia, J., concurring).
85. See id. at 1450; see also Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 618-
20 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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taxpayers lacked standing to sue "by applying Flast rather than distin-
guishing it away on unprincipled grounds."
E. Dissenting Opinion
In a dissenting opinion that Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Soto-
mayor joined, Justice Kagan concluded that the Arizona taxpayers had
proper standing for their Establishment Clause claim." Justice Kagan
agreed with the majority that the general prohibition on taxpayer stand-
ing did not provide the claimants with a basis for having their day in
888court.8 According to Justice Kagan, however, the Flast exception did.8
Justice Kagan suggested that a "simple" application of Flast's two-part
test demonstrated the claimants had standing.90 Under Flast's first prong,
Justice Kagan maintained that the claimants' attack against an Arizona
tax code provision served as the requisite challenge to congressional tax-
ing and spending power.9' Justice Kagan further insisted that the Arizona
taxpayers satisfied Flast's second prong by invoking the Establishment
Clause, a specific constitutional limitation on taxing and spending au-
thority.9 2 In Justice Kagan's view, the claimants had established their
personal stake in the outcome of their constitutional challenge by satisfy-
ing both prongs of Flast's nexus test.93
The dissent then criticized the majority for its novel distinction be-
tween tax credits and government expenditures in deciding if the clai-
mants had standing. 94 Justice Kagan noted that, in the nearly forty-four
years since Flast, no prior court had made this tax credit distinction for
purposes of standing.9 5 In the dissent's view, this distinction had never
been made because it is one without a meaningful difference.96 In re-
sponse to the majority's warning against presuming jurisdiction when it
passes sub silentio,97 the dissent dismissed the warning as false because
"[t]his and every federal court" considers standing even when not raised
by the litigants.98 Justice Kagan further insisted that the Court not "disre-
gard the implications of an exercise of judicial authority assumed to be
86. Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1450 (Scalia, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 1450, 1452 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
88. See id at 1451.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1451-52.
91. See id. at 1451.
92. Id.




97. Id. at 1448-49 (majority opinion).
98. See id. at 1454 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Justice Kagan also pointed out that the Court had
adjudicated five similar tax benefit cases without questioning the plaintiffs' standing, including in a
prior iteration of this same case. Id. at 1452-53; see also Winn IV, 542 U.S. 88, 111-12 (2004) ("In a
procession of cases not rationally distinguishable from this one, no Justice or member of the bar of
this Court ever raised a § 1341 objection that... should have caused us to order dismissal of the
action for want ofjurisdiction." (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983))).
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proper for over 40 years."99 Lastly, the dissent lamented the purported
implications of the Court's decision, stating that it "devastates taxpayer
standing in Establishment Clause cases."' 00 Justice Kagan suggested that,
"[h]owever blatantly the government may violate the Establishment
Clause, taxpayers [can no longer] gain access to the federal courts" be-
cause the tax credit distinction allows government to "insulate its financ-
ing of religious activity from legal challenge."'o'
III. ANALYSIS
The United States Supreme Court has long accepted the notion that
the Establishment Clause limits government favoritism for religion.102
However, the Court has also espoused the proposition that taxpayers
generally lack standing to challenge congressional appropriations.' 03 The
Court sought to reconcile these competing principles in Flast, which has
arguably become the most controversial taxpayer suit in American juri-
sprudence. '1 Winn highlights the potential shortcomings posed by
Flast's exception and establishes the tax credit distinction in taxpayer
standing suits under the Establishment Clause.
A. Potential Problems Posed by Flast
Two potential problems presented by Flast's exception to the rule
against taxpayer standing include (1) its unduly vague meaning and
(2) its exclusive reliance on James Madison's Memorial and Remon-
strance Against Religious Assessments.
1. The Flast Exception Is Unduly Vague
First, the Flast exception lacks precision. To relax the general
standing bar, the Flast Court required plaintiffs to establish a nexus be-
tween their federal taxpayer status and each of (1) the challenged legisla-
tive taxing and spending authority, and (2) the specific constitutional
infringement alleged. 0 5 The Court noted that a claimant could not chal-
lenge an incidental regulatory expenditure nor merely allege that an
enactment is generally beyond congressional powers.10 6 However, the
Court did not define or provide any further context for how proximate
99. Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1455 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 307 (1962)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
100. Id at 1462.
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) ("The 'establishment of religion'
clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can ... pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.").
103. See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,487-88 (1923).
104. See Stern, supra note 3.
105. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
106. Id at 102-03.
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the "logical link" or "nexus" must be, thus creating a slippery slope for
the Flast exception.o
Because the Flast exception is so vague, it can support sharply di-
vergent opinions.'08 Whereas the majority in Winn found that the Arizona
taxpayers' purported injury under Flast's nexus test was merely "specul-
ative,"' 09 the dissent suggested that its "simple restatement of the Flast
standard should be enough to establish that the [claimants] have stand-
ing."' 10 Evidence of such divergent opinions, in turn, raises concerns that
decisions on standing are wrongly influenced by the Court's instincts on
the merits or views related to judicial intervention rather than by the
claimants' eligibility to invoke jurisdiction."'
2. Flast's Exclusive Reliance on Madison's Memorial and Remon-
strance Is Misguided
Second, the Flast Court's exclusive reliance on Madison's Memori-
al and Remonstrance is misguided. In an effort to reconcile the Estab-
lishment Clause and general standing bar, the Flast Court deemed the
Establishment Clause a specific limitation to congressional taxing and
spending power.112 To arrive at this conclusion, the Flast Court relied
exclusively on James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments." 3 Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance is "an
important document in the history of the Establishment Clause."" 4 in-
deed, the Court has cited it in more than thirty cases over the last sixty-
five years." 5 And its author, James Madison, is "generally recognized as
the leading architect of the religion clauses of the First Amendment."" l
6
However, Flast's exclusive reliance on Madison's Memorial and
Remonstrance is misguided because the Memorial and Remonstrance
(a) was a political, not a legal, argument;1 7 (b) appears to reflect Madi-
107. See id.
108. See Rahdert, supra note 12, at 1015.
109. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1447 (2011).
110. Id. at 1451 (Kagan, J., dissenting). For examples of similarly divergent views on the scope
and meaning of the Flast exception, see the Court's plurality or majority opinions and dissents in
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593, 637 (2007), and Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 470, 490
(1982).
111. See Rahdert, supra note 12, at 1015-16; id. at 1057 ("[Jludges who think intervention [is]
necessary, because the government action in question may be unconstitutional, are more likely to be
generous about standing.").
112. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968).
113. See Duncan, supra note 2, at 36 (noting that, other than Madison's Memorial and Remon-
strance, the Flast Court cited no other piece of historical evidence for its creation of the taxpayer
standing exception).
114. Borough of Duryea v. Guamieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2499 (2011).
115. See, e.g., id.; Everson v. Bd. ofEduc., 330 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1947).
116. Flast, 392 U.S. at 103.
117. See Duncan, supra note 2, at 47.
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son's "free exercise," not "establishment," concerns;"' and (c) is not
binding authority for Flast.
a. The Memorial and Remonstrance Was a Political, Not Le-
gal, Argument
First, Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance arose during a politi-
cal debate about popular legislation,"l9 on which courts cannot opine.120
The Memorial and Remonstrance originated in a Virginia congressional
debate in 1785 over a bill proposing a tax to support Christian teach-
ers.12 ' In an impassioned plea, James Madison asserted that any such
assessment, even one amounting to "three pence only," would infringe
upon people's religious liberties by forcing conformity to a particular
religion.122 At the time, James Madison served as a Virginia legislator
and not as a constitutional advocate or First Amendment draftsman pre-
senting a legal argument about judicial review or taxpayer standing.12 3 A
political argument in the Virginia state legislature about the proposed use
of tax dollars does not serve as a valid, legal basis for taxpayer standing
of all U.S. citizens under the Establishment Clause.12 4
b. Madison Appears to Have Been Making a "Free Exercise,"
Not an "Establishment," Claim
Second, James Madison did not appear to be making an "establish-
ment" claim,12 5 which was the very basis of the Flast decision.126 Indeed,
the Establishment Clause did not even exist at the time of Madison's
Memorial and Remonstrance.127 Commentators have suggested that the
Virginia dispute focused primarily on whether the proposed assessment
violated the "free exercise" rights set forth in the 1776 Declaration and
not whether the tax constituted an "establishment" of religion.128 In his
Memorial and Remonstrance, James Madison advocated for those consti-
tuents concerned about the tax's potential interference with their reli-
gious activities.' 29 By relying on the Memorial and Remonstrance to
118. Id. at 50.
119. Id. at 47-48.
120. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) ("The nonjusticiability of a political question
is primarily a function of the separation of powers.").
121. Flast, 392 U.S. at 104 n.24.
122. Id at 103-04 (quoting MADISON, supra note 7, at 186).
123. Duncan, supra note 2, at 46; see also Flast, 392 U.S. at 103, 104 n.24.
124. See Duncan, supra note 2, at 54.
125. Id. at 50; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
126. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 105-06.
127. James Madison issued his Memorial and Remonstrance in 1785, but Congress did not
submit the Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, to the states until
1789. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 108 n.2 (1970) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 37 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
128. See Duncan, supra note 2, at 51 (citing THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS:
CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 146, 148 (1986)).
129. "The Religion ... of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every
man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate." MADISON, supra note 7, at
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support taxpayer standing under the Establishment Clause, 30 Flast may
have improperly conflated "free exercise" with "establishment" of reli-
gion.'31
c. The Memorial and Remonstrance Is Not Binding Authority
for Flast
Third, the Memorial and Remonstrance does not serve as binding
authority for Flast.13 2 Because of its origins outside the Framers' debates
regarding the Establishment Clause, the Memorial and Remonstrance is
not authoritative like typical legislative history, let alone binding on the
Court. At best, the Memorial and Remonstrance has some persuasive
authority given that (1) the facts of the underlying dispute were analog-
ous to those in Flast, and (2) its author played a leading role in the sub-
sequent creation of the Establishment Clause.
Viewed in its proper context, Madison's Memorial and Remon-
strance fails to support on its own an exception to the general bar against
taxpayer standing.'3 3 In his dissent in Flast, Justice Harlan criticized the
Court's reliance on "isolated dicta" from Madison's Memorial and Re-
monstrance,'34 eerily foreshadowing the problems that Flast would pose
for courts in general and the Winn Court in particular.
B. Winn's Tax Credit Distinction for Standing Under the Establishment
Clause
Not only does Winn highlight the potential problems posed by Flast,
but it also distinguishes between a tax credit and a government expendi-
ture for purposes of evaluating taxpayer standing under the Establish-
ment Clause.13 5 The following analysis will seek to demonstrate that
(1) the tax credit distinction, though new to standing, does not violate
precedent; (2) the utility of the tax credit distinction depends on the con-
text; and (3) the tax credit distinction has merit in the context of Winn.
184. "Above all are [men] to be considered as retaining an 'equal title to the free exercise of Reli-
gion according to the dictates of conscience."' Id. at 186 (quoting THE VA. DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS art. XVI (1776)). "Because, finally, 'the equal right of every citizen to the free exercise of
his Religion according to the dictates of conscience' is held by the same tenure with all our other
rights." Id at 190. See also Duncan, supra note 2, at 52.
130. See Flasi, 392 U.S. at 1034)4.
131. See Duncan, supra note 2, at 52. But see Everson, 330 U.S. at 40 (Rutledge, J., dissenting)
(noting that, for Madison, "'[e]stablishment' and 'free exercise' were correlative and coextensive
ideas, representing only different facets of the single great and fundamental freedom").
132. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 126, 126 n.15 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
133. See Duncan, supra note 2, at 53.
134. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 126 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
135. See Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1449 (2011).
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1. The Tax Credit Distinction Is New to Standing Doctrine, but
Does Not Violate Precedent
Although novel to standing doctrine, the Court's distinction be-
tween a tax credit and a government expenditure does not violate
precedent. In Winn, the Court relied on the tax credit distinction in decid-
ing that the claimants lacked standing.136 In her dissent, Justice Kagan
aptly pointed out that the Court had never before relied on this distinction
to dismiss a claim for lack of standing.13 7 Justice Kagan suggested that a
tax credit is merely a state subsidy in another name.13 8 Either way, ac-
cording to Justice Kagan, the Arizona government financed sectarian
STOs and scholarships, thereby allowing taxpayers to challenge the sub-
sidy. 3 9 The dissent further suggested that the majority's "extraction"
requirement was new, disingenuous, or lacked precedential support.14 0
However, the Court previously cited Flast's extraction requirement in
DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno.141 In Cuno, the Court noted that the Flast
Court "understood the 'injury' alleged in Establishment Clause chal-
lenges to federal spending to be the very 'extract[ion] and spen[ding]' of
'tax money' in aid of religion alleged by a plaintiff." 4 2
In addition, the dissent pointed out that the Court had previously
reached a decision on the merits of Establishment Clause cases involving
tax credits without questioning the claimants' standing.14 3 However, as
the majority noted, those cases did not mention standing and thus did not
stand for the proposition that no jurisdictional defect existed.'" Without
mentioning or otherwise ruling on standing, those cases do not serve as
binding precedent for purposes of taxpayer standing or judicial review.145
Courts would indeed risk grave error if they relied on or assumed un-
stated rules of law from prior cases.146 Any such judicial practice would
136. Id. at 1447.
137. Id. at 1452 (Kagan, J., dissenting). The Court made a similar albeit less fine distinction
between a grant of real property and government expenditure in Valley Forge Christian Coll. v.
Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 480 (1982), which also faced
criticism by its dissenting Justices. Id. at 511-12 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.,
dissenting).
138. See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1450 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
139. Id.
140. See id. at 1459 (suggesting that that the majority "plucks the three words 'extrac[t] and
spen[d]' from ... the Flast opinion," whose two-part nexus test contains no such extraction require-
ment, to "severely constrict" the scope of the decision).
141. 547 U.S. 332, 348 (2006).
142. Id (alterations in original) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968)).
143. Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1452-53 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487
U.S. 589, 619 (1988) (finding standing partly because, in similar cases, the Court had "not ques-
tioned the standing of taxpayer plaintiffs to raise Establishment Clause challenges").
144. Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1448 (majority opinion).
145. See id.
146. See id. at 1449; Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 119 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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greatly undermine stare decisis. 147 Furthermore, just as every other court
"has an independent obligation to consider standing,"1 4 8 so does the
Court in Winn. All courts, including the United States Supreme Court,
retain the authority to grant or deny standing sua sponte, even if the par-
ties or lower courts do not raise the issue. 149 In Winn, the Court duly ex-
ercised its authority to deny standing.5 0
2. The Utility of the Tax Credit Distinction Depends on the Context
The utility of the distinction between a tax credit and a government
expenditure depends on the context. In her dissent, Justice Kagan ac-
knowledged that the distinction is not useful in every context because
"the distinction is one in search of a difference" in "many contexts."1si In
suggesting the purportedly artificial distinction in Winn, the dissent em-
phasized that federal and state government budgeting rules routinely
insist on cost calculations relating to tax credits as well as tax expendi-
tures. 152 In a budgeting context, departments of revenue, of course, want
to understand the financial impact of both tax credits and expenditures on
their bottom lines.' 53 However, state budgeting practices are not disposi-
tive of whether a tax credit distinction has merit in Establishment Clause
cases. 154
The dissent also indicated that Arizona STOs, in their solicitation
efforts, acknowledge that donor contributions come from other taxpay-
ers.'55 In a sales and marketing context, STOs, of course, will couch the
tax credit in a way that is self-serving and most likely to maximize con-
tributions.156 However, advertising and sales practices are not dispositive
of whether a tax credit distinction has merit in Establishment Clause cas-
es. 157
The dissent further noted that the Court itself in Cuno suggested that
injuries resulting from a tax subsidy and cash grant are equivalent.'58
147. See Harper, 509 U.S. at 120 ("Any rule that creates a grave risk that [the Court] might
resolve important issues of national concern sub silentio, without thought or consideration, cannot be
a wise one.").
148. Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1454 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
149. See id.
150. See id. at 1449 (majority opinion).
151. Id. at 1455 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
152. See id at 1456.
153. See id.
154. Cf Duncan, supra note 2, at 54 (noting that an unmistakably political argument about the
proposed use of tax dollars does not serve as a legal basis for taxpayer standing).
155. Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1458 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that STOs, to elicit support,
"highlight that 'donations' are made not with an individual's own, but with other people's-i.e.,
taxpayers'-money").
156. Cf Duncan, supra note 2, at 56 ("Madison's views were protean, depending on whether
he was occupying the role of Virginia legislator, constitutional advocate, First Amendment
draftsman, President, or former President.").
157. Cf supra note 154.
158. Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1457 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("In either case . . . the alleged injury is
based on the asserted effect of the allegedly illegal activity on public revenues, to which the taxpayer
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However, the lack of utility of the tax credit distinction in a Commerce
Clause case is not indicative of its merit in an Establishment Clause
case.'"9 These examples merely demonstrate that the tax credit distinction
may not have merit in every context.
In her dissent, Justice Kagan also presented examples of overt state
funding of religion to highlight the purported invalidity of the tax credit
distinction.160 For example, Justice Kagan presented a hypothetical sce-
nario in which a state seeks to reward members of different religious
sects $500 per year for their religious devotion.ist The dissent then
asked, should taxpayer standing of nonadherents depend on whether tar-
geted recipients receive an annual stipend or claim the $500 in aid on
their annual tax returns? 62 Of course not, but this scenario does not
present the facts of Winn. Whereas Justice Kagan's hypothetical scenario
presents overt government favoritism for specific religious groups identi-
fied by the state, the charitable contributions in Winn "result from the
decisions of private taxpayers regarding their own funds." 63 In any case,
purported victims of overt discrimination could likely "advance[] argu-
ments for jurisdiction independent of Flast"'" by demonstrating a direct,
concrete injury under Frothingham165 or Lujan.'66 This hypothetical situ-
ation merely highlights that the tax credit distinction is not useful in the
context of overt religious discrimination, thereby begging the question if
the distinction has merit in cases like Winn.
3. The Tax Credit Distinction Has Merit in Winn
The Court's distinction between a tax credit and a government ex-
penditure has merit in Winn. The strength of the rule against taxpayer
standing relative to Flast's exception arguably informed the Court's tax
credit distinction. The Court has understood the rule against taxpayer
standing as a general or default prohibition.16 7 Conversely, the Court has
contributes." (quoting DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 344 (2006)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
159. Cf Cuno, 547 U.S. at 349 (ruling that Ohio state and Toledo city taxpayers do not have
standing on grounds that the Establishment Clause challenge in Flast is somehow like their Com-
merce Clause challenge to tax credits inducing an automobile manufacturer to remain in Toledo).
160. See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1457 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bul-
lock, 489 U.S. 1, 25 (1989), in which the Court found that a Texas sales tax exemption for religious
publications violated the Establishment Clause).
161. Id
162. Id.
163. Id at 1448 (majority opinion) ("Private citizens create private STOs; STOs choose bene-
ficiary schools; and taxpayers then contribute to STOs.").
164. Id at 1449.
165. See supra text accompanying note 21.
166. See supra text accompanying note 73.
167. Cf Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1445 ("Flast's holding provides a 'narrow exception' to 'the gen-
eral rule against taxpayer standing."' (quoting Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618 (1988))); Hein
v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593 (2007) (plurality opinion) ("In Flast v.
Cohen, we recognized a narrow exception to the general rule against federal taxpayer standing."
(citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 (1968))); DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 348 (2006)
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viewed Flast as a "narrow exception" to the rule. The relatively nar-
row scope of Flast's exception likely sowed the seeds of the tax credit
distinction.169
The tax credit distinction might not be useful to a state comptroller
preparing budget scenarios, to a nonprofit fundraiser seeking to maxim-
ize charitable contributions, or to a court hearing a case involving a fa-
cially discriminatory tax credit, but the distinction has real meaning in
interpreting Flast's "narrow exception" to the rule against taxpayer
standing. The distinction between a tax credit and a government expendi-
ture in Winn has merit because it (a) is rooted in the text of Flast;
(b) avoids speculative decisions; and (c) preserves judicial economy.
a. The Tax Credit Distinction Is Rooted in the Text of Flast
First, the tax credit distinction derives from the very text of Flast,
which requires a taxpayer to challenge not just taxing authority-but
congressional taxing and spending power-to be eligible for standing.170
Flast's first prong requires that a taxpayer challenge an exercise of "con-
gressional power under the taxing and spending clause."171 In an appar-
ent subrule, the Court elaborated on the meaning of spending, noting the
type of regulatory expenditures that would not invoke the rule.172 in
Flast, the Court mentioned "taxing and spending" authority on eleven
occasions, 173 including once in the Court's statement of the holding.17 4 in
the sentence following the holding, the Court provided further context to
the meaning of "taxing and spending" power by using the "extract[ion]
and spen[ding]"s75 analogy, on which the Court had indeed relied prior to
Winn. 176 The Flast Court used an "or" construction in discussing these
distinct congressional powers on just one occasion, when it referred to
the government's failed assertion that no standing be conferred to chal-
lenge a "taxing or spending" program.
("[A] broad application of Flast's exception to the general prohibition on taxpayer standing would
be quite at odds with its narrow application in ... precedent. . . ."(citing Flast, 392 U.S. at 106)).
168. See supra note 167.
169. Cf Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1445 ("It must be noted at the outset that ... Flast's holding pro-
vides a 'narrow exception' to 'the general rule against taxpayer standing."' (emphasis added) (quot-
ing Bowen, 487 U.S. at 618)).
170. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 102.
171. Id.
172. See id. ("It will not be sufficient to allege an incidental expenditure of tax funds in the
administration of an essentially regulatory statute.").
173. See id. at passim (emphasis added).
174. See id at 105-06 ("Consequently, we hold that a taxpayer will have standing consistent
with Article III to invoke federal judicial power when he alleges that congressional action under the
taxing and spending clause is in derogation of those constitutional provisions which operate to
restrict the exercise of the taxing and spending power." (emphasis added)).
175. See id at 106 ("The taxpayer's allegation in such cases would be that his [or her] tax
money is being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against such
abuses of legislative power.").
176. See DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 348 (2006).
177. Flast, 392 U.S. at 98 (emphasis added).
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If the Flast Court intended the exception to apply to exercises of
mere taxing and not spending authority, it would have said so. The Ari-
zona taxpayers' interpretation of a tax credit suggests that a contribution
yielding tax credits is "owed to the State" and "should be treated as if it
were government property."' However, that interpretation renders
Flast's spending language superfluous or defines a tax credit in a way
that has "no basis in standing jurisprudence." 79 Because a tax credit in-
vokes taxing and not spending power, it does not fall within the Flast
exception.
b. The Tax Credit Distinction Avoids Speculative Decisions
Second, the tax credit distinction avoids speculative decisions.
Whereas an affirmative tax on targeted constituents may make the al-
leged economic or psychic harm discernible, a tax credit requires courts
to speculate about the potential impact of such tax credit on future tax
bills.180 To find specific injury, courts must assume that legislators will
increase plaintiffs' tax bills to offset the supposed deficit caused by the
tax credit.' To find requisite redressability, courts must speculate that,
if injunctive relief were provided, elected officials would pass along the
purported increased revenue by way of reduced taxes for taxpayer-
plaintiffs. 182
Conjecture regarding improperly vetted claims leads to bad deci-
sions.183 Decisions of the United States Supreme Court have wide impli-
cations that are not easily undone because they establish binding, federal-
question precedent for lower courts.1 84 By establishing the tax credit dis-
tinction and denying standing in Winn, the Court properly avoids issuing
what otherwise might be considered an advisory opinion in a matter that
lacks specific injury.185 Instead, the Court seeks to develop concrete and
consistent Establishment Clause jurisprudence for the benefit of federal
and state courts, government officials, and taxpayer-citizens.,86
178. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1448 (2011). But see id. at 1458 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe
STO tax payment is . . . 'costless' to the individual; it comes out of what [the taxpayer] otherwise
would be legally obligated to pay the State-hence, out of public resources." (quoting Winn IV, 542
U.S. 88, 95 (2004))).
179. See id at l448.
180. See id at 1444, 1447.
181. Id. at 1444.
182. Id
183. See id at 1449 ("The Court would risk error if it relied on assumptions that have gone
unstated and unexamined.").
184. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 353-55 (1816).
185. Cf Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1934) ("This court may not be called on
to give advisory opinions or to pronounce declaratory judgments.... Leave will not be granted
unless the threatened injury is clearly shown to be of serious magnitude and imminent.").
186. See Mahnich v. S. S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 113 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (noting how
inconsistency in the Court's decisions can "leave the courts below on an uncharted sea of doubt and
difficulty without any confidence that what was said yesterday will hold good tomorrow").
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c. The Tax Credit Distinction Preserves Judicial Economy
Third, the distinction between a tax credit and a government ex-
penditure preserves judicial economy. Whereas the Winn Court sug-
gested that it merely declined to extend Flast,'87 the dissent insisted that
the Court's decision "devastates taxpayer standing in Establishment
Clause cases."' Obviously, both perspectives have conflicting views as
to whether a challenge to a tax credit is properly within the Flast excep-
tion. Because the Court had never ruled on this issue before Winn, the
magnitude of the decision's impact on potential claimants and lower
courts is difficult to measure. Regardless of one's view on the merits of
that tradeoff, the Court's denial of standing in Winn frees the Judiciary
from having to hear similar cases in the future. This preservation of judi-
cial economy provided an underlying policy justification for the Court's
decision.189 A universal rule to provide standing for all claims challeng-
ing a tax credit could have resulted in an expansion of Establishment
Clause plaintiffs.190 A broad application of Flast arguably would have
been "at odds with .. . Flast's own promise that it would not transform
federal courts into forums for taxpayers' 'generalized grievances.""
9 1
The Court's decision in Winn indeed averts that outcome.19 2
C. Comparison of the Tax Credit Distinction in Winn to the Subsidy Ex-
ception Under the Dormant Commerce Clause
Although a tax credit and a subsidy are similar in some ways,' the
juxtaposition of Winn's tax credit distinction under the Establishment
Clause and the subsidy exception under the dormant Commerce Clause
arguably reveals further reasoning for the Court's decision in Winn.'94
Taxpayer standing under the Establishment and dormant Commerce
Clauses are similar in several respects. Under each legal doctrine, a pri-
vate litigant is seeking to invoke the power of the federal Judiciary to
challenge legislative or executive authority.19 5 Each legal doctrine in-
187. See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1449 (noting that a contrary holding would "alter the rules of
standing").
188. Id at 1462 (Kagan, I., dissenting).
189. See id. at 1449 (majority opinion) ("In an era of frequent litigation [and] class actions, . ..
courts must be more careful to insist on the formal rules of standing, not less so.").
190. See id.
191. DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 348 (2006) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
106 (1968)).
192. Cf United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting
that "[r]elaxation of standing requirements is directly related to the expansion ofjudicial power").
193. Cf Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1456 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("[T]ax breaks are often 'economical-
ly and functionally indistinguishable from a direct monetary subsidy."' (quoting Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 859 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring))).
194. See Elliott, supra note 10, at 189 (reviewing various means Congress might employ to
expand standing under the Commerce Clause, from which the dormant Commerce Clause emanates).
195. Cf Rahdert, supra note 12, at 1063 n.255 (noting various ways in which litigants might
challenge displays of commerce and spending authority in the context of the dispute resolution aims
of Frothingham).
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volves a federal or state government actor and a purportedly discrimina-
tory tax.196 Under each legal doctrine, a claimant asserts breach of a con-
stitutional provision: the Establishment Clause or Commerce Clause.197
Under each legal doctrine, the enactment at issue displays varying levels
of religious-based'98 or commerce-based discriminatory bias.' 99 Under
each legal doctrine, a court determines if the government actor exceeded
its establishment or commerce powers.200
As provided by the Winn Court, a taxpayer lacks standing under
Flast to challenge a tax credit but not a government expenditure. 20 1 By
comparison, a claimant may establish standing under the dormant Com-
merce Clause to challenge a state tax discriminating against out-of-state
parties202 but not a similarly discriminatory state subsidy from general
tax funds.203 Unlike the newly shielded status in Winn of a tax credit un-
der the Establishment Clause, 20 the analogous discriminatory tax exemp-
tion or rebate receives no such favorable treatment under the dormant
Commerce Clause.205 Bedause the dormant Commerce Clause generally
aims to prevent the discriminatory tax policy at issue-which goes to the
heart of interstate commerce-the Court might be more generous about
taxpayer standing in that context and thus unwilling to adopt the tax cre-
dit distinction. Purported violations of the Establishment Clause,
196. See Cuno, 547 U.S. at 348 (dictum) ("[T]he [Establishment and Commerce] Clauses are
similar in that they often implicate governments' fiscal decisions . . . .").
197. See id at 345-46 (noting that a claim by city and state taxpayers alleging that Daimler-
Chrysler's tax credit imposed a disproportionate tax burden on them under the Commerce Clause "is
no different from similar claims by federal taxpayers" already rejected by the Court as insufficient to
establish standing under the Establishment Clause).
198. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 593 (1988) (holding that the Adolescent Family
Life Act did not violate the Establishment Clause "on its face," but remanding for determination of
whether the Act violated the Establishment Clause "as applied").
199. In a dormant Commerce Clause case, an enactment might be per se invalid, discriminatory
on its face, discriminatory in purpose, discriminatory in effect, merely burdensome on interstate
commerce, or within the ordinary police power of the state. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of
Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392-94 (1994).
200. See supra note 194.
201. See Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1447 (2011).
202. See, e.g., Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 336-37 (1992) (invalidating an
Alabama law imposing a waste disposal fee on hazardous waste generated outside Alabama and
disposed of in Alabama but not on hazardous waste generated and disposed of in Alabama).
203. See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 (1994) (dictum) ("A pure
subsidy funded out of general revenue ordinarily imposes no burden on interstate commerce. . . .");
New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) (dictum) ("Direct subsidization of
domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of [the dormant Commerce Clause] .....
204. See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1447.
205. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 568, 595
(1997) (invalidating a Maine state statute that provided a property tax exemption to charitable insti-
tutions in Maine but denied full exemption to institutions conducted or operated principally for the
benefit of persons who were not Maine residents); W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 188 (invalidating
a Massachusetts state law that imposed an assessment on all sales of milk to Massachusetts retailers
but rebated all proceeds from this assessment to Massachusetts dairy farmers).
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however, can take many forms beyond just discriminatory tax policy.206
Therefore, the Court might find that plaintiffs challenging a tax credit
under the Establishment Clause do not require as much latitude to bring a
claim as those challenging a tax credit under the dormant Commerce
Clause.
CONCLUSION
Approximately forty-four years ago in Flast, the Supreme Court
created, for Establishment Clause claims, a "dramatic" exception to the
general rule against taxpayer standing.207 Since then, the Court has wres-
tled with the precise meaning and scope of Flast,20 8 whose exception is
unduly vague and exclusively relied on James Madison's Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments. Flast's reliance on Madi-
son's Memorial and Remonstrance, however, is misguided because it
was a political, not a legal, argument; appears to reflect Madison's "free
exercise," not "establishment," concerns; and is not binding authority for
Flast.
In Winn, the Court reconsidered the Flast exception and relied on a
distinction between a tax credit and a government expenditure in dis-
missing an Establishment Clause claim for the plaintiffs' lack of stand-
ing.209 Although "novel" in the context of standing doctrine,21o Winn's
tax credit distinction has merit because it derives from the text of Flast,
avoids speculative decisions, and preserves judicial economy. 211 Fur-
thermore, the tax credit distinction does not unduly restrict taxpayer
standing in Establishment Clause cases because purported violations of
the Establishment Clause-unlike those of the dormant Commerce
Clause-can take many forms beyond just discriminatory tax policy.
As did Hein, Winn highlighted the division between the Court's
conservative and liberal blocs, which denied and unsuccessfully sup-
ported standing, respectively. 2 12 Critics of Article III standing doctrine
maintain that the Court's strict version of standing emerged in reaction to
public interest litigation in the late 1970s.2' In this current "era of fre-
206. Cf Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1449 (noting that standing in Establishment Clause cases can be
shown in various ways).
207. Duncan, supra note 2.
208. See Stem, supra note 3.
209. See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1447.
210. See id. at 1450 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
211. See id at 1449 (majority opinion); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
212. See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1439; Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587,
591 (2007). The conservative bloc is further split between the Justices who seek to eliminate taxpay-
er standing altogether and those who prefer an incremental approach. See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1449-
50; Hein, 551 U.S. at 615, 618; Rahdert, supra note 12, at 1046.
213. See Elliott, supra note 10, at 169.
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quent litigation,",214 the Court's strict version of taxpayer standing under
the Establishment Clause appears to be alive and well.
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